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L I B R A R Y

BETWEEN THE BLACK DIASPORA OF ENSLAVEMENT AND
THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA SINCE THE DEMISE OF
COLONIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
TWO HISTORIC MIGRATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation Presented

by

NSIKAN-ABASI PAUL E. UDOFIA

[v. 1]

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 2007

W. E. B. Du Bois Department of Afro-American Studies

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
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
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
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
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
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DEDICATION

To Mr. and Mrs. E. Udofia, who did all they could; Mr. B.U Inyang, who did not hesitate to support; and Iniobong, Itoro, Mfoniso, and Enyeneama—for all that the American sojourn meant; and the pioneers of African-American Studies Program at UMass Amherst—for understanding and faithful support.

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ABSTRACT

BETWEEN THE BLACK DIASPORA OF ENSLAVEMENT AND THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA SINCE THE DEMISE OF COLONIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF TWO HISTORIC MIGRATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

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Based on the research questions employed in this study, the Nigerian immigrant community which first began with student sojourners, is currently more effective within the African-American context. This community would perhaps have been much slower in evolving but for the crisis of institutional instability back in the Nigerian homeland as well as the policies of two American presidents. The major features of the Nigerian immigrant community with varying degrees of influences in America are: the Nigerian offspring, the Nigerian church, the Nigerian community media, the Nigeria women association, the Nigerian attorneys and physicians.

The Nigerian offspring represent a conciliatory generation to Black America, the Nigerian homeland, Euro-America, and the most favorable orbit of incorporating Nigerian indices into the American mosaic. Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta exhibit one

of the strongest evidences of the Southern typology of Nigerian immigrants in the U.S. Within this setting, the socio-cultural experiences of Nigerians and African-Americans are closely related. Both in their American agenda as well as aspirations toward the homelands, Nigerians are replaying the earlier generational schemes of Black America. Analyses of the descendants of forced migration and voluntary Nigerian migration in the media conform to a greater degree of understanding than misunderstanding on prospects of ancestral solidarity and collective development.

The benefits derived from the two historic migrations of black Africans to the U.S. were found to be lopsided. Predisposed to neither assimilation nor integration, the Nigerian diaspora—in particular—exhibited a carefully selective pattern of socioeconomic identification, which corresponded with segregated incorporation. Generally, the incorporation of the African diaspora of colonialism in America favors a north to-east to-south thrust of the races of Africa. Accordingly, Africans from West and Central Africa, where a majority of the forced migrants were taken, are more likely to occupy an unfavorable orbit of American incorporation.

Due mostly to racial slavery, the Nigerian-African variable represents the most distinctive phase of reactive-global migration into the U.S. after decolonization. The predicted problem of “color line in the twentieth century” corresponded with the reactive patterns of cross-cultural migration particularly of the races of color and mostly at the intersection of the “fifth wave” of global migration. Sustained medium of exchanges between Nigeria and the U.S. therefore began with the “fifth wave” of reactive global migration. This marks an important historic new phase in the development and integration of Nigerian-African indices into the post-modern era.

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INTRODUCTION

The status of African immigrants as well as Africa, to a certain extent, is directly related to the issue of race, and the political status of Black Americans.

--Paul Udofia¹

In the case of the African and American Negro, it is more often the later who causes the African to complain. On the other hand, with American Negro and the West Indian, it is usually the latter who becomes the source of conflict and irritation.

--Harold Cruse²

There is now a basis for examining two historic migrations of Africans to the United States. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, African-American population rose from about 30,000,000 in 1990 to over 36,000,000 in 2000.³ The vast majority of these African-Americans are descendants of the 400,000 black Africans who were forced into North America before the United States banned the slave trade in the first decade of the nineteenth century.⁴

After about four centuries of that traumatic separation from the homelands, black Africans are voluntarily migrating to the United States and settling almost along the same lanes with their ancestral kin. A majority of the about 1,000,000 African immigrants recorded in the United States in 2000 were sub-Saharan

¹Paul Udofia, "The Political Issues for African Immigrants in the United States," in Trotter Review: Immigration, Ethnicity, and the Black Community in the United States (Boston: The William Monroe Trotter Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston, Summer 1996), p. 32.

²Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Historical Analysis of the Failure of Black Leadership (New York: Quill, 1984), p. 435.

³See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 [122nd Edition] (Washington, D.C., 2001), p. 18.

⁴For example, see Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 268; Thomas C. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, eds., Stephan Thernstrom et al (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 5.

Africans.¹ By 2000, the sub-Saharan ancestry group population rose to 1,422,006 compared to about 260,000 in 1990.² Until the 1960s, the U.S. had no clear record on the country of origin of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Only a very few Africans entered the U.S. voluntarily from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century.³

Table 1 substantiates the growth of the sub-Saharan African ancestry population in the U.S. During the 1980s, its ancestry population increased by 0.1 percent.⁴ Specifically, in the three decades preceding 2000, the Nigerian ancestry group populations were the largest: for example, in 1990 the Nigerian ancestry population was 91,688 compared to Cape Verdean (50,772), and Ethiopian (30,581). By 2000, the Nigerian ancestry population rose to 137,002 compared to Cape Verdean (79,366), Ethiopian (73,661), and Ghanaian (41,563).⁵

Admittedly, these sub-Saharan Africans have now a clearer demographic base within the U.S. both in their regional distribution as well as in settlement patterns. This development is particularly stronger for their Nigerian variable. For example, in 2000, the Nigerian population alone rose to about 134,000. During the

¹This is based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000; Kofi Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States: A Missing Link in Africa's Economic and Social Development (New York and London: Praeger, 1991), pp. 41-3.

²Ibid., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ancestry Group Population 2000; and Table 1, p. 3.

³Thomas C. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, p. 5; Ira de Reid, The Negro Immigrant: His background, Characteristics and Social adjustment, 1899-1937 (New York: Arno Press, 1963), p. 24; O.C. Wortham, "Contemporary Black Immigration to the United States," in Contemporary American Immigration: Interpretive Essays, ed., Dennis Laurence Cuddy (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 201; April A. Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples: A Reference SourceBook (Denver, Colorado: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003), p. 234.

⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population: Supplementary Reports, 1990 CP-S-1.2, Detailed Ancestry Groups for States (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, 1990), Table 2, p. 4.

⁵For example, see Tables 1 and 2.

same period (Table 1), its numerical representation had the largest share of the current build-up of black Africans in urban America.¹ In 1980, these Nigerians were the most educated African-born group. By 1990, about 64 percent of them had at least four year college degree, while some 84 percent were in work force.² On the other hand, by mid-1990s, about 21,000 Nigerian medical doctors were reportedly in the U.S.³

Table 1

The sub-Saharan African Ancestry
Groups in the United States,
by Region, by Populations, by Decade, 1980-2000

Region	1980	Region	1990	Region	2000
TOTAL	203,791	TOTAL	245,845	TOTAL	1,422,006
C. Verdean	23,215	C. Verdean	60,722	C. Verdean	79,366
Ethiopian	7,641	Eritrean	4,270	Ethiopian	73,661
Ghanaian	6,775	Ethiopian	30,581	Ghanaian	41,563
Nigerian	47,857	Ghanaian	20,066	Kenyan	14,875
S. African	8,568	Kenyan	4,639	Liberian	28,983
*Others	31,442	Liberian	8,797	Nigerian	137,002
-----	-----	Nigerian	91,688	Senegalese	3,640
-----	-----	S. Leonean	4,627	S. Leonean	6,165
-----	-----	S. African	17,992	Somalian	17,314
-----	-----	Sudanese	3,623	S. African	37,357
-----	-----	Ugandan	2,681	Sudanese	12,161
-----	-----	African, nec	20,607	Ugandan	4,721
-----	-----	-----	-----	Zairian	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	Zimbabwean	1,407
-----	-----	-----	-----	*African	923,667
-----	-----	-----	-----	*Other Sub-Saharans	40,112

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Ancestry Group Report for the United States," Detailed in the Census of the Population (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980), Table 2, p. 13.; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population: Supplementary Reports, 1990 CP-S-1.2, Detailed Ancestry Groups for States (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, 1990), Table 2, p. 4; U.S. Census Bureau, Ancestry-first Reported Universe-Total Population: Census 2000 Supplementary Survey Summary [PCT024] Tables (Washington, D. C.: Department of Commerce, 2000). *Note that the data shown here include ancestry groups from other regions of Africa, who may be of European/Asian ancestry, etc.

¹For example, see Tables 1 and 2.

²Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 236.

³Ibid. Also, see: Soumana Sako, in "Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection," African Issues, XXX (1), 2000, p. 26.

This build-up of Nigerians represents the largest concentration of a specific sub-Saharan African national group in the U.S. since the demise of the foreign slave trade and colonialism. The Nigerian variable therefore provides a clearer specific context in which to examine the relationships of two historic migrations of black Africans to the U.S. Together, the black American population in 2000 and those whose ancestors came from Nigeria as well as those who were themselves either born within or outside Nigeria totaled about 37, 000,000.¹

Historical Significance of the Nigerian Variable

Several factors accounted for the significance of the Nigerian variable in this study. First, Nigeria is where more than four centuries of transatlantic slave traffic “left a psychological legacy of suspicion, servility, or hostility which has been one of the most serious obstacles in Eurafican relations.” Second, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the current location of Nigeria, along with the Gulf of Guinea, was tied to the “Slave Coast.”² Third, the total number of slaves’ exported from the Yoruba Coast and Bonny trading centers to the Americas during the closing years of the Atlantic slave trade “approached an annual peak of 30,000.”³ During the height of the slave trade, “almost one third of the slaves came from Nigeria.”⁴ Besides this, one out of every four African slaves in the U.S. came from the Nigerian region.⁵

¹Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, p. 18 and Tables 1 and 2 of this dissertation.

²James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 11-13, 39-41.

³Richard Olaniyan, “The Atlantic slave trade,” in Nigerian History and Culture, ed., Richard Olaniyan (Ikeja and Ibadan: Longman Nigeria Limited, 1985), pp. 119-120.

⁴Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 54.

⁵Kalu Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2003), p. 113.

The unique role played by the Nigerian region was crucial in the making of the black diaspora, and ultimately of their freedom. The forced migration of Olaudah Equiano—the Ibo slave—testifies to the importance of the current location of modern Nigeria in the making of the black diaspora of enslavement.¹

Nigeria stands at the crossroads of continuing introduction of Africanisms into modern American cultures. Most of the Africanisms that survived the Middle Passage derived from the Nigerian background.² Such groups as Ibo, Yoruba, Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, Hausa-Fulani, Edo, and Bini, who comprised the majority of the forced migrants, are almost evenly represented in the current build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the U.S.³ Nigeria's representation offers an opportunity for linking and explaining the relationships between the civil rights legislations of the 1960s and post-1960s African immigration to the U.S. within the context of the black experience.⁴

Modern Nigeria, with a population of 122,635,626 in 2001, is currently the most populous African nation, and is expected to play a more prominent role of

¹David Richardson, "Through a Looking Glass: Olaudah Equiano and African Experiences of the British Atlantic Slave Trade," in Black Experience and Empire, eds., Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 59-66.

²Ibid. Richardson, pp. 66-7; ; James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Hard Road to Freedom: The Story of African America (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 7-16); "The Interesting Narrative of the Life Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa, The African," in The Classic Slave Narratives, ed., Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1987, pp. 11-39, 98-182; Eric Lincoln, The Negro Pilgrimage in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 1-3; Melville J. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), Chapters I and 2, particularly pp. 61-85; Joseph E. Holloway, "The Origins of the African American Culture," in Africanisms in American Culture, ed., Joseph P. Holloway (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), chapters I-2.

³Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 11-25, 29-40; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 10-18, 54, 236-8.

⁴Ronald Segal, The Black Diaspora: Five Centuries of the Black Experience Outside Africa (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), p. 261; Udofia, "Toward an Understanding of Nigerian Immigrants: The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 60-73.

collective partnership with black America toward regeneration, which can serve as a sustainable basis of Euro-American and African relations.¹ Whereas the black diaspora of enslavement represent the most economically and politically developed English-speaking base within the capitalist world economy, the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism—also largely English speaking—represent the most economically, politically, and educationally active base of the black African settlers in America.²

The vast concentration of Nigerians in America provides a basis for understanding the extent to which the descendants of slaves and post-colonial African immigration have shared experience as “Africans and African descendants abroad.”³ Much like the black diaspora of enslavement, the socio-cultural orbit of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism is plagued by the inherent conflict of racial “otherness.”⁴

A majority of the black African settlers, interestingly enough, are in regions which have dense population of African-Americans, as well as strong visibility of

¹Ibid. For example, according to the world population control, Nigeria’s population of over 126,000,000 in 2001 is expected to rise to the fourth position around the early decades of the twenty-first century. Also, see: “Reaching Out to the African Diaspora: The Need for Vision,” in U.S. Embassy: Public Affairs Section, Information Section Crossroads, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Abuja: The Embassy of the United States of America in Nigeria, January 2003), pp. 1-2; also see <http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhxjan03g.html>: accessed 4/19/2006, along with the related emphases in chapters 3 and 6; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 20-25, 40-3.

²Ibid.; Ali A. Mazrui, “The World Economy and the African/Afro-American Connection,” in Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection: From Dependency to Self-Reliance, ed., Adelaide M. Cromwell (Washington, D.C. Howard University Press, 1982), pp. 48-53; Udofia, Trotter Review, pp. 30-3; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 1-3, 12-25, 40-3, 49-53.

³Also, see data by U.S. Census Bureau on foreign-born population, 1970-2000; Tables 1 and 2 of this dissertation; Kwaku Danso, in Trotter Review, p. 29; P. O. Esedebe, Pan Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), p. 3; Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, pp. 14-23.

⁴Ibid. See further explanation of background in Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 41; and Emmanuel A. Ayandebe, Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), pp. 9-52.

black-owned institutions. Together, both the black diaspora of enslavement and the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism represent two historic populations worth examining collectively with due regard to the emerging new lanes of race relations in the U.S.¹

The question worth asking at this juncture is: Do Nigerians, as black people and as the most populous African immigrant group, have a special role to play in furthering an understanding of race matters in the U.S.? Does their current build-up represent an opportunity for sustained reconstruction of ancestral relationships with African-Americans, as well as improved relations with Euro-Americans, or future crisis?²

Answers to the above queries are almost similar to those identified for African-Americans and Latinos by political scientist James Jennings: "The social and political relationships between Blacks and Latinos in big cities of America will be one of the most pressing issues for urban politics in the 1990s."³

A more general issue therefore concerns the effects that the Nigerian build-up can be expected to have on the broader socio-cultural context of the black experience in American society. The first quotation on this chapter suggests one possible result. The second quotation from Harold Cruse suggests a strong likelihood of conflict shaped by varying orbits of socio-cultural differences.

¹See U.S. Bureau of the Census Report for 2000; and Kwaku Danso "Explanation for African immigration," Trotter Review, p. 29, and Patrick A, "The Invisible Africans," The Catalyst: The Coalition of Concerned Africans News Letter (Atlanta, GA, May 1998), p. 11.

²Ibid. Also, see: Udofia, Trotter Review, pp. 32-3; Paul Udofia, "Toward an Understanding of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States: The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," Master's Thesis (Boston: University of Massachusetts Boston, June, 1994), pp.1-14, 264-284; Paul Udofia, "Nigerians in the United States: Potentialities and Crises," Research Report, No.30 (Boston: William Monroe Trotter Institute: University of Massachusetts Boston, Spring 1996), pp. 3, 14, 40-3, 50.

³James Jennings "Black and Latino in the American City in the 1900s: Toward Political Alliances or Social Conflict?" National Political Science Review vol. 3 (1992), pp. 158-62.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationships between the black diaspora of enslavement and the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism and the extent to which the historical context of the former either positively or negatively influences the development of the latter. Using the Nigerian variable, this dissertation also examines the relationships between the two historic migrations of Africans to the United States. Further, it explains the links between the forced and voluntary migrations from sub-Sahara Africa to the United States, showing the extent to which post-colonial Nigerian migration represents the most distinctive wave of reactive migration since both the demise of the foreign slave trade as well as decolonization.

The five research questions employed in examining the major focus of this dissertation are:

1. To what extent did the historical cycles of the black diaspora of enslavement in the U.S. influence the development of a Nigerian immigrant community?
2. Did the current build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism around the black diaspora of enslavement in the U.S. enhance greater understanding or misunderstanding, favorable or unfavorable disposition based on shared historical commonalities and differences?
3. Did the involuntary migration of black Africans as slaves and voluntary post-colonial migration of Nigerians to the U.S. represent gains or losses?
4. In what ways did the dense concentration of Nigerian and African-American cultures in Southern U.S. offer the prospect for both sustained and improved relationships? How did the American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants perceive themselves and to what extent were they agents of regeneration between Black America and the Nigerian homeland, as well as with Euro-America.... in the twenty-first century?
5. To what extent was the forced migration of black Africans slaves linked to voluntary post-colonial migration of Nigerians as well as to the larger trend of worldwide migration into the U.S?

This dissertation employed four fundamental assumptions to examine the above research questions. The first is that the crisis of American slavery and European colonialism defined the socio-cultural orbit of African-Americans and Nigerians on the basis of their racial background. This served as the basis of collective solidarity and development. Second, the experience of African-Americans under slavery and Nigerians under colonial dispossession was as related as it was dissimilar.¹ This resulted in understanding as well as misunderstanding, similarities as well as dissimilarities in their relationships after freedom. Third, the forced migration of black Africans and voluntary Nigerian migration had both advantages and disadvantages.² Finally, there is a new basis for Afro-Atlantic accord involving African-Americans and American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants, as well as Euro-Americans in the twenty-first century.

On matters of cross-cultural relations, the data employed in this dissertation were either specifically Nigerian, or taken from a broader base of the African immigrant communities in the United States. Because of the need to understand personal viewpoints of Nigerians and African-Americans, in this study, more attention was given to the editorial and feature columns of the Nigerian community media. A significant portion of this study focuses on Nigerians and African-Americans in the Southern cities of Atlanta and Dallas, with Houston as a case study.

¹Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. 421-436; Colin Legum, Pan Africanism: A Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 13-24; Joseph Harris, ed., The Global Dimension of the African Diaspora (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), pp. 5, 74.

²Ibid.

Methodology: An Interpretation

The collection of data used in this dissertation evolved in three phases from March 1991 to July 2005. Phase 1, beginning with Master's work in American Civilization, University of Massachusetts Boston, lasted from January 6 to March 3, 1992. This phase, mostly designed to examine Nigerian and African-American relations within a more specific context in the U. S.,¹ involved an exploratory fieldwork of the Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans context in three Southern cities: Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta. The cities were chosen because they represented the major enclaves of African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants in Southern United States. The fieldwork yielded valuable research materials through contacts with Nigerian/African churches and media, including some interviews.

Examples of data collected while in the South included: (I) an official pamphlet highlighting Akwa-Ibom (Nigerian) Youth Christian and Cultural Group at an African-American Baptist church, Wheeler Avenue during the "1993 Black History Month Celebration;" (II) Excerpts on the Nigerian community from the Houston Chronicle and The Houston Post; Examination of African-Nigerian archives at Texas Southern University; Examination of Nigerian community records; (III) Examination of a KHOU TV documentary produced by African-Americans entitled Let Me Tell You About Africa [profile of Nigerian/African African-American relations]; (IV) All Nations For Christ, Redemption, a religious magazine published in Benin City, Nigeria, 1992, highlighting a continuing relationship between a Nigerian church and an African-American church; (V) Data on The Brotherhood of

¹Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 16-20.

the Cross and Star; and Excerpts on African Business Directories in the South and across the U.S. (See Appendix B.3).

Phase 11 (1993-1998), marked the archival of Nigerian (African) database during the bulk of this author's professional years focusing on American cultures, black communities, and foreign-born communities in the U.S. During this phase, the Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada from 1994-1996 was examined to determine the demography of Nigerian medical scientists who emigrated from Nigerian/African universities, etc. In addition, exploratory surveys of Nigerian/African medical scientists and related professionals and personal attendances at African community functions, were undertaken to complement the information obtained from their directories. Other relevant samples were collected and recorded and later utilized to locate needed information on Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in the U.S.

Phase III—1999 to 2004—was an extension of all the previous phases in that it required reviews of newer trends and adjustments of my earlier premises and data to changes that occurred over the past fourteen years in the patterns of Nigerian/African immigration and context of ancestral relationships with African-Americans, etc. The significance of this phase lies in the fact that, in becoming a doctoral student, my general grasp of the historiography of African world immigration to the Western Hemisphere was enormously improved by newer insights. This background was further supported by my access to the current data on the directories on Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada in 2000, along those published in the Saravic Directory of African Businesses in America and

American Companies that do Business in Africa 1999 and 2000, coupled with other sources. Collectively, these profiles exposed this author to further details both within a specific as well as broader context of African immigrants in the U.S.

Data Selection

On matters of cultural contacts/exchanges between Nigerians and African-Americans within the U.S., data were mostly collected from their U.S.-based media, African Business Directories, African Community Organizations/Businesses, African/Nigerian-owned Churches, African Civic and Political Organizations, African Professional Organizations, African-American Churches, Directory of Nigerian Physicians, and the Nigerian Consulates. Other related data selected and examined included: Nigerian immigrants, African-Americans, Asiatic immigrants, and European immigrants. Also included in his category was a comparative survey of the historiography of forced migration of Africans to the Americas, especially to mainland North America; survey of the literature on the communities of color and Pan-Africanism and the U. S.-African relations.

Sample Selection of Media

On coverage of African-Americans by Nigerian community media, a method of sample selection was adopted in two phases. During the first phase—from 1990 to 1992—a total of eighty-eight (88) editions of Nigerian/African community media were randomly selected from eight different Nigerian/African community-owned media. Due to their broad demographic reach, fifteen editions were finally sample selected from three Nigerian-owned media in Southern U.S. The newspapers were:

(I) The Nigerian News Digest (renamed African News Weekly before going out of business), a weekly publication based in Ashville, and later in Charlotte, North Carolina since 1990; (II) The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (renamed The African Herald) a monthly newspaper based in Dallas, Texas since 1990; and (III) The African Business Source Magazine, a monthly magazine published in Houston since 1990.¹

During the second phase (2004-2005), some fifty newspapers were randomly selected from The African Herald (1993-2000), and The African News Weekly (1993-2000).² Fourteen editions were finally sample selected and content analyzed. African Business Source Magazine was not included in the 1993-2000 content analyses. The African Herald and African News Weekly had more favorable demographic reach across the Southern landscape.

General Criteria of Data Treatment

The overall data were examined to determine: (I) the regional distribution of Nigerian immigrants; (II) the course of ancestral relationships between native-born blacks and Nigerian/Africans immigrants; (III) how the socio-cultural settings of the two groups either facilitated cooperation or misunderstanding; (IV) the extent to which the African-American context was either positive or negative toward the development of Nigerians; and (V) the relationships between forced and voluntary migrations, and other patterns of contemporary immigration to the U.S.

On coverage of African-Americans by the Nigerian media, every news item was searched and recorded as straight news, editorial/opinion piece, feature, or

¹Ibid., especially pp. 16-17.

²The result of sample selection of The African Herald yielded in favor of editions from 1996 to 2000. The African News Weekly yielded in favor of editions from 1993 to 1996.

picture news under four categories: (I) date of coverage; (II) type of coverage; (III) frequency of coverage; and (IV) the major-issue categories of coverage.¹ These were finally content-analyzed to uncover the extent to which the writers either understood/misunderstood African-American and Nigerian (Africans) issues, or showed favorable or unfavorable disposition.

A system of subject categories was utilized to code the main issue-positions of the content analyses under: (I) Race Relations-Racism: RRR; (II) Racial Solidarity: Pan-Africanism: RSP; (III) Special Events-Black-American Personages: SEBAP; (IV) Civil Rights-Race Politics: CRRP; and (V) Opinion-Attitude-About American Blacks: OAAAB. Finally, data accessed through both an examination of the Nigerian informational sources as well as the related literature, were employed to back-up the content analyses of African Americans and the conclusion of the dissertation.

Dissertation Outline

This dissertation was conceived largely from a Nigerian/African community perspective in eight chapters, and an introduction. Chapter 1 reviews the general demographic history of the Nigerian/African immigrants in the U.S. from 1960s to 1990s, the historical relationships between the black diaspora of enslavement and the black diaspora of colonialism, their socio-cultural context and existing problem.

Chapter 2 reviews the transatlantic slave trade, showing its particular West African background, ties with the Guinea Coast, the current location of modern

¹See Herbert G. Gans, Deciding What is News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, and News Week and Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), p. 5, for some patterns of the media analyses employed in the dissertation.

Nigeria, along with the demography of slaves exported to mainland North America. Chapters 3 and 4 explain the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial backgrounds of modern Nigeria, Nigerian immigration to the U.S., and the development of a Nigerian immigrant community.

Chapter 5 explains the nature and effects of the socio-cultural tensions confronting native-born black Americans on Nigerian immigrants. This chapter also examines the problems of traditions and changes in Nigerian marriages and the crises arising between Nigerian parents and their offspring.

Chapter 6 examines the Southern concentration of Nigerians in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Other issues examined include the influences of the Nigerian media and churches, cultural exchanges with African-Americans, the role of Nigerian/African offspring, and the socio-cultural crises of Nigerians in the South, particularly their development in Houston. While Chapter 7 is an analysis of the published views of Nigerians/Africans and Africans, Chapter 8 highlights and summarizes the major emphases/analyses, and concludes the dissertation.

CHAPTER 1

NIGERIAN-AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter explains the general demographic composition of the Nigerian-African settlers in the United States. It also reviews the much earlier and the continuing relationships between African-Americans and ancestral Africa, as well as the context of their socio-cultural conflict.

Part 1: Nigerian-African Immigrants in the U.S., 1960-1990: A General Review of Demographic History

Since the 1970s the African-born population in the United States has grown steadily in numbers. Close to one million Africans were counted in this country in 2000. Some two-thirds of the Africans currently in the U.S. arrived after 1980. Collectively, more than 50 percent of this population arrived between 1980s and 1990s. About 45 to 50 percent of these Africans were already within the American mosaic between 1970s and 1980s.¹ This build-up has resulted in the visibility of new generations of African identities in urban America.² For example, in October 28, 1996, Nigerian, Mr. Seyi Ipaye, was “named a city manager of Palestine, Texas.”³ In 1997, another Nigerian, Rev. Emmanuel W. Onunwor, became the first elected

¹U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Foreign-born Population,” Detailed Tables: PO39: Place of Birth By Citizenship Status For the Foreign-born Population, Supplementary Report Survey Summary Tables (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2000); Danso, “Explanation for African Immigration,” p. 29; Udofia, Trotter Review, pp.31-3; Udofia, Research Report, pp.10-13; David Levinson and Melvin Ember, eds., American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation, Volume 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997), p. 946.

²John A. Arthur, Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States (Praeger: Westport, Connecticut and London, 2000), p. 3.

³R. O. Nwachukwu, “A Nigerian Named City Manager of Palestine,” The African Herald (Dallas Texas, December, 1996), pp. 1, 10.

mayor of an American city in East Cleveland, Ohio.¹ In May 1998, Mr. Makia Epie, Cameroonian, “became the Mayor-protem of the city of Cedar Hill in Dallas county, Texas.”²

So, with the election of Barack Obama in 2004, son of a Kenyan father and an American mother to the U.S. Senate, the tide in the political images of the newcomers from sub-Saharan Africa in America appears to have entered into a new era of structural transformation. And with the Obama success, the political spotlight in the nation began to focus on the implications of the new waves of African-American immigrants to the United States, as distinct from those of descendants of slaves.³ Clearly, Obama—as a descendant of largely voluntary post-colonial African immigration—symbolizes the emerging new status of the generation of the second historic dispersal of Africans to America. The Obama generation, therefore, represents the increasing maturity in the U.S. of a new generation of voluntary black African immigrants side by side with the descendants of forced migration.

As we saw earlier, the over 36,000,000 population of African-Americans recorded by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 represented the accumulated build-up of the generation of 399,000 who were forced against their will as slaves to mainland North America during the first historic dispersal.⁴ Throughout the gruesome struggle from slavery to freedom or from plantation to ghetto, these descendants of forced migration attempted to ameliorate the negative image imposed upon them and upon

¹Ogbaa, *The Nigerian Americans*, p. 143.

²R. O. Nwachukwu, “Mayor-Protem; To Run for JP in Dallas County,” *The African Herald* (Dallas, Texas, September 1998), pp. 1, 29.

³For background on descendants of slaves, see Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* p, 268. However, in James A. Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History* (New York and London: W. W. & Norton and Company, 1981), p. 428, the estimate is slightly higher.

⁴*Ibid.*; *U.S. Bureau of the Census* [112th Edition], p. 18.

their ancestral homelands by racial slavery.¹ Accordingly, after many centuries of the heinous experience of forced migration, sub-Saharan Africans—following a different but almost similar course—are voluntarily immigrating to the U.S. Like the first dispersal, the second one was prompted mostly by the consequences of European colonial legacies.²

Not surprisingly, President Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria told his American audience at Harvard University in 1999 that the post-colonial crisis of African states begun to establish “its stranglehold on a continent that had already been devastated and depopulated by the trans-Atlantic slave trade.” As President Obasanjo observed, the crises of this background corresponded with the current status of human underdevelopment in Africa since the end of alien rule.³

One of the high water marks of this underdevelopment, as President Obasanjo further observed, was obvious enough in the increased loss of much needed manpower of African skilled class to the Western Hemisphere.⁴ To political

¹John Hope Franklin and Alfred M. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, Volume Two: From the Civil War to the Present (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1998); August Meier and Elliott, From Plantation to Ghetto, Third Edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Milfred C. Fierce, The Pan-African Idea in the United States 1900-1919: African American Interest in Africa and the Interaction with West Africa (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), pp. vii-xxii.

²Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. xv-xvii, ix-xxiii, 1-17, 41-2; Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York: Times Book, 1992), pp. 9-14, 89-117, 190-242; Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and to Human Rights (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 22-25; Danso, Trotter Review, p. 28; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 2—25; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 5-6, -23; Roland Oliver, The African Experience: From Olduvai George to the 21st century, Second Edition (Boulder, Colorado, 2000), pp. 307- 313.

³Democracy and Development in Africa: From Transition to Transformation. Address by His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Harvard University; ARCO Forum for Public Affairs, Kennedy School of Government (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, October 30, 1999), p. 1.

⁴Ibid.

scientist Mazrui, the preceding background vividly illuminated the beginning of a new era of Afro-atlantic relations in the U.S. In a speech at the University of Texas at Austin in 1999, Mazrui observed that the new phase of Afro-atlantic relations had brought two generations of Africans much closer to each other than ever before in the U.S. This was the link between the forced migration via the slave trade and voluntary postcolonial African migration via institutional disruption. According to Mazrui, African immigrants “are casualties of the displacement caused either directly by colonialism or by the aftermath of colonial and post-colonial disruption.” These Africans, he further observed, constituted the bulk of first or second-generation immigrants. As citizens or permanent residents, they constituted the core of the “Diaspora of colonialism.”¹

Table 2 shows the general growth pattern of African immigrants in the U.S. from 1960 to 2000. During the four decades preceding the 2000 census, their population recorded increases of 127 percent (1960-1969), representing a change of an additional 44, 788 population. From 1970 to 1979, their population increased to 149 percent, representing 119,580 change; and from 1980 to 1990 it increased to 82.2 percent, representing 164,096 change; and finally to 131 percent from 1991 to 2000—representing a change of 475,728.

Further, in terms of the increase (change) in African immigrant as a whole, the decade between 1990 and 2000 witnessed the highest number of Africans entering the U.S. However, the highest growth rate was observed between the

¹Richard Nwachukwu, “Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Lecture Series, Africans and African Americans on the eve of the 21st Century: Between Ancestry and Anticipation,” The African Herald, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Dallas-Texas, March 1999), p. 8.

decades of the 1970-1980 (Table 2), when Egypt—with 43,424, and Nigeria with 25,528—recorded the largest population of African immigrants in the U.S.¹

Table 2

Populations of Immigrants in the United States
by Decade, 1960-2000

Decade	All Immigrants	Africans	Nigeria	Growth rate of African and Nigeria Immigrants by Decade, 1960-2000			
				Change in Immigrants		Growth Rate (%)	
				Nigeria	Africa	Nigeria	Africa
1960	9,738,091	35,355	-	-	-	-	-
1970	9,619,202	80,143	-	-	44,788	-	127
1980	1,4079.906	199,723	25,526	-	119,580	-	149
1990	19,767,316	363,819	55,350	29,824	164,096	117	82
2000	30,466,222	839,547	134,000	78,650	475,728	142	131

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Time Till 1970 (11)—1980 Detailed Population Characteristics, Chapter D, U.S. Summary; and The Foreign Born Population in the United States: 1990, CPH-L-98, Ethnic and Hispanic Branch Population Division (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 1990), Table 14, p. 85); U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Foreign-born Population,” Detailed Tables: PO39: Place of Birth By Citizenship Status For the Foreign-born Population, Supplementary Report Survey Summary Tables (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2000).

Too, for Africa as a whole, the 1990 to 2000 growth of its population could have been attributed to the Diversity Visa Program, which, as we shall hopefully see in Chapter 3, represented the most distinctive wave of African immigration to the U.S. For Nigerian immigrants, to be sure, the 1990 to 2000 decade witnessed a remarkable leap in the number of those who entered the U.S.: on the average, their proportion of total population of African immigrants rose to about 12 percent.

Although the Nigerian build-up in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s was largely of males, nonetheless, female immigrants also comprised a significant

¹U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Socio-economic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born Population: Detailed in Census Bureau Tabulations,” United States Department of Commerce News (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census [CB84-179], October 17, 1984), p. 4.

proportion of its settlers. Their male-female ratio increased from 1.5 males per females in 1980 to 1.3 males per female in 1990.¹ Overall, the black African immigration showed a strong female-male pairing since the 1970s from such countries as South Africa, Nigeria, Cape Verde, and Ethiopia.² This reflected their general growth pattern between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. For example, between 1977 and 1988 the regional flow of sub-Saharanans to the U.S. increased from 47 percent and 65 percent respectively.³

By 1990s, when immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa were of fewer students than previously, most of them were skilled class; others were married couples, political exiles, and refugees.⁴ About 194,942 of them were “Never married” compared to 198,706 “now Married,” 21,784 divorced, some 12,924 separated, and 8,924 widowed.⁵

Again, in 1990, of the 354,861 persons recorded in the African-born households, 119,092 of them, representing (33.6 percent)—were family householders—compared to 53,501 non-family holders and 82,312 householders owned by spouses.⁶ By late 1990s, about 25 percent African women reportedly lived in married families with or without children of their own. During a similar period, approximately 4 percent of African immigrant households were headed by single

¹David Levinson and Melvin Ember, American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation, Volume 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1997), p. 950.

²Ibid. Also, see: “Socio-economic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born Population, United States Department of Commerce News, pp. 3, 6.

³Ibid., Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 42.

⁴Ibid., Apraku, pp. 3-9. See further emphases in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

⁵Susan J. Lapham, Profiles of the Foreign-born Population: Selected Characteristics by Place of Birth, CPH-L-148 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ethnic and Hispanic Division, 1990), p. 13.

⁶Ibid.

women, with or without children.¹ In 1990s, as 2000, Africans immigrants were densely concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast, South, Middle Atlantic, West, and South Atlantic. During this period, their regional general distribution reflected a strong Southern pull along African-American lanes.²

On the other hand, more than most non-European foreign-born groups, African immigrants are mostly English-speaking. Their levels of high school and college education are comparatively higher compared to those from Europe, North America, Asia, and Latin America.³

For example, in 1989 when the per capita income of foreign-born Africans recorded \$20,117, that of Asians was \$16,661, and Central Americans \$9,446. Family poverty rates also varied for the same groups from 11.7 percent for foreign-born Africans to 13.1 percent for Asians to 20.9 percent for Central Americans.⁴ By early 1990s, an economically cohesive class of African skilled professionals had converged on American shore. Their impressive educational status corresponded with their per capita income compared to the 1970s. About 35 percent of them were in managerial and professional work; others in technical sales and administrative work. During a similar period their family income of “\$30,000” compared with

¹Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures, p. 950.

²James P. Allen and Eugene J. Turner, We the People: Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 143-8; Udofia, Research Report, p. 20. Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 238. Also see Chapter 3.

³Ibid. Also, see: Udofia, “Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 94-6; Lapham, Selected Characteristics, pp. 7-14; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 1-9; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 20-21, 46-8.

⁴Ibid., Lapham, “Census Bureau Finds Significant Demographic Differences Among Immigrant Groups,” Public Information Office , #CB93-165 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993); Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 31; Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures, p. 950.

“\$21, 000” for African-Americans.¹ Apraku’s study further found increases salaries Africans salaries ranging from \$59,999 to \$100,000 and over.² By 1997, when the average family income for African immigrant house was \$38,794 per year, its elite segment of 6 percent earned more than \$100,000 a year.³ By 2000, their median income of \$40,300 was one of the highest among the black family-households in America.⁴

Part 2: The Black Diaspora and African Connection 1780-1900: **A Review of Historical Context**

Since their freedom from slavery, the descendants of African slaves in America, “supposedly the most civilized portion of the black race,”⁵ have confronted problems arising from the fact of their color.⁶ Whether in appealing to scriptural or scientific evidence, or to Darwinism—or to the scientific classification of American races by scholars in The Bell Curve⁷—the generations of whites have used the background of racial slavery to rationalize their superiority over their counterparts who were forced as slaves in chains to America.

The above historical tension has persisted against the descendants of the slave trade even as recorded facts have shown that they have made important marks on the

¹Ibid.; especially Authur, Invisible Sojourners, p. 48.

²Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 7.

³Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures, p. 950.

⁴Authur, Invisible Sojourners, p. 48. Also see the U.S. Bureau of the Census Report for 2000 on Foreign-born Demographics.

⁵Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 5; and Franklin and Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom, especially Chapters 11 and 24.

⁶Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern 1492-1800 (Verso: New York, 1997), p. 4; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp. 334, 357-60.

⁷Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York and London: The Free Press, 1994), pp. xix-xxiii, 1-24.

character of American civilization.¹ Given the nature of their racial dilemma, they have often focused on their ancestral homeland. With the coming of freedom, the need to redress the degraded status of their ancestral homeland formed the core of the missions of African redemption and later of organized Pan-African conferences.²

Thus, between 1808 and 1860 the Northern free blacks used the occasion of their freedom orations to reconstruct the degraded images of their ancestral homelands. Henry Sipkins, who saw himself and fellow blacks as the “descendants of Africa,” used the platform of the freedom oration to argue that Africa might truly be called “paradise.” Sipkins believed that “Africa was in a state of perfection” before European contact, and “exhibits the most blissful regions... productive of life, almost independent of the arms of husbandry.” Its innocent inhabitants, he argued, “enjoyed with an uninterrupted pleasure the state which, by the beneficent hand of nature they were placed.”³

Russell Parrott, on the other hand, argued that it was the excessive European impulse for “universal gain” which removed the African from a state of civilization

¹Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1992 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), p. 4; A. Leon Higginbotham, Shades of Freedom: Racial Politics and Presumptions of the American Legal Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 7.

²See, for example, Fierce, The Pan African Idea, pp. vii-xxii; and Okon Edet Uya, ed., Black Brotherhood: Afro-Americans and Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. IX-97; John Bracey et al., Black Nationalism in America (New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1970), pp. 128-9; George Shepperson, “Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of Africa Nationalism,” Journal of African History (1960), pp. 301-312; Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. Chapters 1-3; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-10; Vincent B. Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism (London: Longman, 1969), Chapters 1-3; Elliott P. Skinner, African Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Africa, 1850-1924: In Defense of Black Nationality (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992), pp. 7-10; Yetkutiel Geshoni, Africans on African Americans: The Creation of An African-American Myth (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 61-4.

³Henry Sipkins, An Oration of the Abolition of the Slave Trade; Delivered in the African Church, in the City of New York, January 2, 1809. By Henry Sipkins, A Descendant of Africa (New York: Printed by John C. Totten, No. 155 Chatham St., 1809), p. 7.

“which his natural genius entitled him to enjoy.”¹ Yet, despite their romanticized consciousness, no amount of effort to recast the glories of ancient Africa could console the free Northern blacks from the remorse of an increasing resentment produced by the effects of American slavery. “We have mournfully observed the fall of those institutions that shed luster on our mother country, and extended to Greece and Rome those refinements that made them objects of admiration to the cultivations of science.” Almost similar to the stance later adopted by David Walker, they acknowledged that, in “no country under heaven have descendants of an ancestry once enrolled in the history of fame . . . been reduced to such degrading servitude” as that under which they confronted from American prejudice.²

Other blacks, however, shared in the opinion that slavery was divinely ordained for the purpose of African regeneration. This concept corresponded somewhat with some of the early ideology of Negro American leaders whom historian Julie Winch terms the “Black Elite.”³ To these blacks, therefore, it was the circumstances of racial slavery, as ordained by providence that endowed them with the moral, economic, and cultural authority necessary to lead the way toward the regeneration of ancestral Africa. This was exactly the manner that Absalom Jones

¹Ibid. Also, see: William B. Gravely, “The Dialectic of Double Consciousness in Black American Freedom Celebrations, 1808-1863,” Journal of Negro History (Winter 1982), pp. 306-11; An Oration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, by Russell Parrott. Delivered on the First of January 1814, at the African Church of St. Thomas (Philadelphia: Printed for the Different Societies by Thomas T. Stiles, 1814), in Porter, Ed., Early Negro Writing, p. 385.

²“Declaration of Sentiments,” National Reformer No. 1 (Philadelphia: American Moral Reform Society, September, 1838), p. 11.

³Julie Winch, Philadelphia’s Black Elite: Activism, Accommodation, and Struggle for Autonomy, 1787-1848 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp. 1-24, 28-9.

cast his views in the oration of 1808.¹ Not quite certain as to why slavery was tied directly to Africans, Jones reasoned that “perhaps” it was divinely ordained to convert Africa to Christianity. He looked toward a time when a “Joseph” would emerge from the ranks of the Negroes to be the “instrument of feeding the African nations with the bread of life,” and of leading them away from “sin and Satan.”²

Unlike Jones, however, Russell Parrott more directly acknowledged that Africa was slowly moving toward Christianity and away from “error and paganism.”³ Gloucester, on the other hand, saw the slavery-African-Christian link as a misused opportunity.⁴ Rather than extending the “blessings of improved politics, and the comfortable and cheering light of the Christian religion,” he observed that Africans were being “bestowed a monopoly of the miseries of the world.”⁵ Gloucester did not conceive of ancient Africa as being in an idyllic state before the arrival of the Europeans. His knowledge of Africa was linked to his steadfast opposition to the policies of the American Colonization Society.⁶ On the other hand, Gloucester, Jr., lamented that the “unhappy sons and daughters of Africa were being made to take upon their neck the galling yoke of slavery, for no other offense than that they were born black.”⁷

¹Absalom Jones, A Thanksgiving Sermon, Preached January 1, 1808, in St Thomas' African Episcopal Church, Philadelphia: On Account of the Abolition of the African Slave Trade by the Congress of the United States (Philadelphia: Fry and Kammerer, 1808), in Dorothy B. Porter, Ed., Early Negro Writing, 1760-1837 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 340-1.

²Ibid.

³Parrott, Oration 1814, p. 390.

⁴Jeremiah Gloucester, An Oration, Delivered on January 1, 1823, in Bethel Church, on the Abolition of the Slave Trade (Philadelphia: John Young, 1923), pp. 6-7.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷John Gloucester, Jr., A Sermon, Delivered in the First African Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia on the 1st of January, 1830, Before the Different Coloured Societies of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1830), p. 2.

There is reason then for believing that both the historical crisis of black national identity and the mission of African-redemption were rooted in the profound contradictions of the black experience in America. Thus, in striving toward the redemption of their ancestral homelands, the descendants of slaves often perceived themselves as “the children of Africa in this land,” and as medium of lifting the veil of degradation placed against their brethren.¹ This idea of African redemption can also be traced to the “Biblical Root” of the Jewish experience. With a similar emotion, it shows that the black diaspora yearned for a return to the homeland just as the former had done while in captivity in Egypt and Babylon. Shepperson and Skinner associated this notion of redemption in the Hebrew Scriptures, Psalms 68:31, by reference to the old prophesy that, “Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God;” and “Prince shall come out of Egypt.” In Acts 8:26-39, the conversion of a man of Ethiopia² symbolized personal transformation and triumph against odds.

Thus, the Biblical Moses, as recorded for the faithful, allegedly led the Hebrews out of Egyptian captivity. Such figures as Toussaint L’Ouverture, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner, who attempted to lead black people to freedom, also placed the tradition of the black struggle for freedom within the context of the Jewish experience.³ Unsurprisingly, prior to the inauguration of formal Pan-Africanism in 1900 the mission of African redemption served as the historical function of re-union between blacks in the Americas and the homelands. As historian Okon E. Uya documents: “The diasporic concept—that black in the Americas, as well as other

¹Bracey, Black Nationalism in America, pp. 128-9.

²Shepperson, “African Diaspora: Concept and Context,” in Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 46-7; Skinner, “The Dialectics between Diasporas and Homelands,” in Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, p. 24.

³Ibid., Skinner, p. 21.

blacks within the western hemisphere, are merely “Africans abroad”—appears to be winning adherents in both Africa and the New World.”¹ Over the span of their stay abroad, African-descended people in the Americas were unfailing in their positive role toward the development of the ancestral homelands.²

Despite occasional periods of changes in attitudes toward ancestral Africa, the mission of African redemption attracted a steady consensus of favorable support among the descendants of slaves.³ From slavery to freedom and beyond, the memories of ancestral Africa existed in the consciousness of blacks—in their spirituals, in their sorrow songs, in their religious cultures, and in the shifting attachments of African names to their American institutions. But by way of physical contacts with the homelands through missionary and educational projects, the black diaspora exemplified their aspirations toward the regeneration of the ancestral homelands.⁴ No wonder Milfred Fierce observes that, “African American interaction with Africa is not at all a brand new phenomenon.”⁵

As Fierce further writes: “the nexus between Black America and Africa—especially West Africa—has been an ordered theme in African American history, dating from the onset of the first direct traffic in slaves from West Africa to the

¹Okon Edet Uya, ed., Black Brotherhood: Afro-Americans and Africa (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. ix-97.

²Ibid.; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-8

³Ibid., Skinner, especially 63-91., 201-2, and “Rescuing Black South Africans,” Fierce, The Pan-African Idea, p. 3.

⁴Ibid., Skinner, “The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands,” p. 17; Uya, Black Brotherhood; R. D. Ralston and Albuquerque Mourao, “Africa and the New World,” in Unesco General History of Africa: Africa under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, Volume V11, ed., A. Adu Boahen (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1985, pp. 755-769; Ronald W. Walters, Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), pp.101-8.

⁵Ibid.; Fierce, Pan-African Idea, p. 3; Ralston and Mourao, “Africa and the New World,” pp. 747, 752-5.

Americas in the early part of the sixteenth century.”¹ In fact there was no historical period “when some blacks in the Americas did not hope to return to the land of their forebears.”² Many blacks in fact did return to Africa from Brazil and other parts of the West Indies, etc.³

Seen then within the context of the transatlantic slave trade and the resulting colonial dispossession, the idea of redemption served as historical bond in the peculiar relationships between descendants of slaves and continental Africans. To African-descended Americans, therefore, enslavement meant being forcibly uprooted and exiled under heinous degradation and exploitation in a hostile environment. This applies to the concept of deracination—of seeking recovery from being pulled away from the root of one’s culture and existence. To continental Africans, colonialism and the implicit effects of racial slavery served as the basis for redemption. As Legum observed, with slavery and colonialism came economic, social, political, and mental colonialism, persecution, inferiority, discrimination, and dependency.⁴

The Black Diasporic-African Contacts via Emigration/Colonization

One of the major features of the mission of African redemption was expressed through the ideology of emigration or colonization. This involved blacks who believed returning to ancestral Africa would help in advancing the course of civilizing their brethren via the exposure to Western education, Christianity, and modern cultures. For example, Paul Cuffe—a relatively well-to-do Negro from Massachusetts—was a pioneer in the emigration of blacks to Sierra-Leone between

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Legum, Pan Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 15.

1811 and 1815. Founder of the African Institution of Boston and the Friendly Society of Sierra-Leone, he sought to settle emigrants from the diaspora in Sierra-Leone so they could aid in the amelioration of “the negative image of Africa.”¹ Like so many who were to follow after him, Cuffe felt that African descendants in the diaspora had a role to play in the uplift the homelands.² Moreover, he believed that:

If no Negro state of respectability be erected in Africa, prejudice in general will make its obstinate stand against all the wealth, and genius, and skill that may be exhibited by Negroes in North or South America. The work is to be done in Africa.³

Prominent among other American Blacks who followed in the footsteps of Cuffe via physical contacts with Africa were Daniel Coker, Lott Cary, John Russwurm, Edward Blyden, Martin Delaney, Alexander Crummell, and Bishop Henry McNeal Turner.⁴ All of these leaders except Cuffe, Crummell, Delany, and Turner died in West Africa. Like Cuffe, these men shared in the Christian-civilizing role of ancestral Africa as well as in the moral, intellectual, and cultural uplift of the race. Cary, who left the U.S. to settle in Liberia, was more certain of his status in Africa than in America. As he stated:

I am an African; and in this country, however meritorious my conduct and respectable my character, I cannot receive the credit due to either. I wish to go to a country where I shall be estimated by my merits not by my complexion, and I feel bound to labour for my suffering race.⁵

Black leaders like Blyden, Delany, and Crummell emphasized the moral, intellectual, and cultural uplift of the Black race. They called upon the children of

¹Fierce, Pan-African Idea, pp. 4-5; Winch, Philadelphia's Black Elite, pp. 31-33.

²Ibid.

³Elliott P. Skinner, “Personal Networks and Institutional Linkages in the Global System,” in Dynamics of the African-Afro-American Connection, pp. 20-1.

⁴Ralston and Mourao, “Africa and the New World, p. 747.

⁵August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, eds., The Making of Black America: Essays in Negro Life & History, Volume I (New York: Athenaeum, 1969), pp. 48-50.

Africa in the diaspora to turn their skills toward the uplift of the homelands: “We the children of Africa in this land... are no way different from any other people in these respects.”¹ “For my part,” Crummell observed, “I am satisfied that my field of labor is with my own race in these times;” and, accordingly, that meant returning to the service of his brethren in Liberia.² Like Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois, Crummell believed that lifting the veil of ignorance and inferiority among Africans required developed talents and experiences as well as the leadership of their more enlightened brethren in the diaspora. Crummell honored this call for about twenty years both as a missionary and as an educator in Liberia. There, he supported Africans studying both in West Africa and in black colleges/universities in the U.S.³ To this call Crummell believed that:

There seems to me to be a natural call upon the children of Africa in foreign lands, to come and participate in the opening of treasures of the lane of their fathers . . . It has always been thus in the past, and now as the resources of Africa are being more and more developed, the extent of our interest therein is becoming more and more diminutive . . . It is the duty of black men to feel and labour for the salvation of the mighty millions of their kin all through this continent.⁴

Because the notion of African redemption was also a response to the inherent socio-cultural degradation of the black diaspora, the idea behind Christian-missionary civilization of Africans was sometimes conflicting. After all, to a certain extent, it was the presumed inferiority of Africans that justified enslavement and hence their degradation. This same background later justified their enlightened attitudes toward the regeneration of the homeland as well as ambivalence toward

¹See, for example, Shepperson’s “Notes;” Bracey, Black Nationalism, pp. 128-9.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; Bracey, pp.138-41.

⁴Ibid.

indigenous Africans. This problem was first inherent in the fact that the founding of both the white-led and black-led colonization societies between 1816 and 1858 were influenced by some negative images of Africa. This background might explain why efforts to resettle blacks in Liberia were most successful among the more vulnerable classes of blacks in the U.S.¹

So, accordingly, only a few black elites were willing to leave the American shore for Liberia. Historian Julie Winch has argued that the early phases of the American Colonization Society program to resettle blacks in Liberia had much to do with those occupying the poorest socioeconomic status. Those who were closer to an American niche were the elites and had a far lesser reason to consider leaving America for Africa.²

The prospect of positive development of blacks in Liberia through emigration, as shared by Russwurm and Bylden, for instance, corresponded with the attitude of a few elites who accepted the alternative of voluntary separation, rather than continued degradation.³ Others even expressed a preference for colonization in Canada “because it would be better adapted to our constitution” and because it was healthier in climate and “far more consonant with our views than with Africa.”⁴

By itself, however, the crises of resettlement in Liberia resulting from the first waves of black settlers, had much in common with the attitudes of white-led

¹James O. Horton and Lois E. Horton, In Hope of Liberty of Liberty: Culture, Community and Protest Among Northern Free Blacks, 1700-1860 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 194-201.

²Winch, Philadelphia's Black Elite, pp. 41-3; George O. Robert, Afro-Asian Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia (Beverly Hills, 1980), pp. 100-1.

³*Ibid.*; W. E. B. Du Bois, The Negro (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 41.

⁴Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, p. 199.

founders of ACS and its patron, the U.S. government.¹ Thus, the attitude of the early black colonists toward indigenous Africans was not much different from that of whites. If “Martin Delany,” with far stronger physical features of ancestral Africa as well as feelings² had problems understanding African ways, how much more the profound uncertainties surrounding the first waves of less darker settlers in Liberia.³

Delany’s support for the mission of African redemption, as depicted in his Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States in 1852, raised the prospect of success through emigration outside of Africa for the descendants of slaves.⁴ Fearing continued degradation in the land of their birth, Delany urged his brethren to build themselves into a respectable people, respectable trade, and respectable nation outside America.⁵

Delany, of course, later accepted emigration to Liberia; visited Liberia and Sierra-Leone and Nigeria on business trips, where he signed a treaty with the King of Egba in Yorubaland for producing cotton. Yet his espousal of the notion of black self-uplift through emigration did not materialize due to the American Civil War. He later chose to serve as an army officer in the Civil War.⁶ After the end of the war, with the arduous crisis of the black struggle, Delany was unable to rekindle his interest in the vision of emigration.

¹Ibid.; Lynch, in The Making of Black America, pp. 44-5, 46-57; Du Bois, The Negro, p. 40; Winch, Philadelphia’s Black Elite, pp. 41-3; Robert, Afro-Asian Fraternity, p. 100.

²Dorothy Sterling, The Making of an Afro-American: Martin Robinson Delany 1812-1885 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), pp. 196-201.

³For example, see Du Bois, The Negro, p. 40; Robert, Afro-Asian Fraternity, p. 100.

⁴Howard Brotz, ed., African-American Social & Political Thought, 1850-1920 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1992), pp. 37-111.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.; Lynch, in The Making of Black America, pp. 58-61; Sterling, The Making of an Afro-American, pp. 196-201.

Blyden's brand of colonization was closer to Crummell's belief in emigration but somewhat different in approach. Crummell advocated a form voluntary emigration skewed more toward the skilled or so-called "talented class" of African-Americans rather than their less endowed brethren. He seemed less interested in the prospect of emigration to areas of Africa other than Liberia. Yet, like Blyden, he shared in the beliefs that providence was calling on the scattered children of Africa in the diaspora to return to work toward the redemption of the ancestral homeland.¹ Blyden had far stronger roots in Liberia than Crummell. As President of Liberia College, he wrote extensively on issues of African world and its related spheres of human development. Born in St. Thomas, West Indies, he later became citizen of Liberia, where he helped to plant the idea of black regeneration throughout Africa. He was committed throughout his life to serving the cause of uplifting the race. Not only did he see the scattering of Africans in the diaspora as similar to the experience of the Jews in Egypt, he figured it as a form of divine plan toward their ultimate regeneration. "Just as the history of the Israelites was directed by the hand of God, so too, was the history of black America."²

Collectively Delany, Blyden, Turner, and Garvey shared in the ideology of "Africa for Africans," as well as the idea of black nationhood. But it was during the redemptive efforts of Bishop Turner and Garvey that the idea received its fullest attention and transformation.³ The distinction between the two black personages lies more in the fact that, despite some similarities, only one of them had direct contacts with ancestral Africa.

¹Brotz, *African American Social & Political Thought*, pp. 112, 171-180.

²Geshoni, *Africans on African Americans*, pp. 61-4.

³Shepperson, "Notes," pp. 301-4.

With Turner undoubtedly having some physical contacts with the homeland, the concept of “back to Africa” reached its heights and bore some fruition. “Through Bishop Turner’s efforts, over 300 Afro-Americans emigrated to Liberia in March 1896.”¹ Again, in 1896, he visited South Africa and Nyasaland, where he met with Joseph Booth and John Chilembwe, and popularized the adoption of “Africa for Africans.” His related work with indigenous African Christian Union on economic, political, and spiritual issues were influential in the evolution of the “South African Ethiopianism Movement.” Until his death in 1915, Turner played an important role toward the emergence of an independent African Episcopal Church in South Africa.²

Like Turner, of course, Garvey sought through “the mission of African redemption a pathway to restore respectability to “the stealing of Africans from Africa.”³ Like Turner, moreover, he shared the strong convictions that whites could never be trusted to cater to lasting development of the black race; for in his view, “there is no manhood future in the United States for Negroes.”⁴ Thus, it was the Garvey movement that ultimately transformed the ideology of “Africa for Africans” and “back to Africa” from the earlier redemptive visions of Delany, Blyden, and Turner into worldwide political and cultural force. His beliefs in the pride of the race encouraged some blacks in Western Hemisphere to renew their faith and interest in participating in the development of their ancestral homelands.⁵

¹Ralston and Mourao, “Africa and the New World,” p. 748.

²Shepperson, “Notes.”

³Skinner, Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 160-1; Brotz, African American Social & Political Thought, pp. 559-575; Edwin Redkey, Black Exodus: Black Nationalist and Black to Africa Movement, 1890-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 1-3, 24-7

⁴Ibid.; Fierce, Pan-African Idea, pp. 15-19.

⁵Ralston and Mourao, “Africa and the New World,” pp. 748-752.

The Garvey era coincided with the great urbanization resulting from the black migration from the South to Northern and Mid-Western cities. His era was also transformed by the emotional appeals that resulted from the Russian Revolution. Both the First World War and the New Negro Renaissance served to rally and unite the aspirations of American world blacks and the visiting African students in the Americas and Europe, and back in Africa against European imperialism.¹

Due largely to this background, the Garvey movement had first seemed capable of uniting the varied aspirations of blacks in the diaspora and the homelands. His manifesto of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and the African Committee League as well as appeals to the black proletariat of the world had enormous influence on the visiting African students in the U. S., and later in the rise of African liberation movements. Garvey's call for "Africa for Africans" marked the height of modern African nationalism.² However, like his predecessors, he shared in the inherent contradictions of the black experience. Although he wanted Africans to "capture their resources," he looked up to whites to help in the effort. While denouncing the light-skinned middle/upper class "Negroes" for being ashamed of their black ancestry, his mission sought some forms of white patronage to uplift blacks both in the diaspora and the homelands.³ Like Turner, he gave enormous support to the religious and political ferment of Ethiopianism movement in South Africa and the rest of Africa.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 761-6.

²Shepperson's "Notes;" Tony Martin, "Scattered Africa," Global Dimension of the African Diaspora, pp. 243-8.

³Brotz, African American Social & Political Thought, pp. 555-8.

⁴Martin, "Scattered Africa," pp. 243-8.

Formal Pan-Africanism or Intra-Active Pan-Africanism

Formal Pan-Africanism emerged in 1900 as a more centralized re-arrangements of the earlier missions of pan-Negro redemption missions to Africa. According to Du Bois, this event which formed the core of “The idea of one Africa to unite the thought and ideals of all native peoples of the dark continent belongs to the twentieth century and stems naturally from West Indies and the United States.”¹

More directly tied to the development of modern African nationalism, the birth of formal Pan-Africanism could be traced to the effort of Henry Sylvester of Trinidad and Alexander Walters of the United States. Collectively these two New World Negro personages were the pioneers of the first Pan-African Conference, held in London, in which Du Bois served as the Secretary.

Whereas the missions of African redemption were sometimes undertaken through direct contacts with the ancestral homelands, formal Pan-Africanism did not always require direct contacts. Rather, as Shepperson and Legum observed, its medium of contacts with the African homelands were mostly through exchanges of ideas involving African-descended races in the Americas, Europe, and Africa via the Atlantic triangle.

Through this formal Pan-African medium the black diaspora of the Western Hemisphere and continental Africans shared their experiences and exchanged their emotional agonies against the negative effects of “racial otherness,” which affected them under alien. This was as well the forum for uniting their desire for an equal place in the world. From 1900 to 1945—formal “Pan-Africanism”—supported

¹W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (New York: Kraus-Thompson Organization Limited, 1976, p. 7.

mostly by American world blacks, served as the medium for rallying the battle cry of collective development among the varying black worlds via the Atlantic triangle.¹

At this point, however, perhaps the term “intra-active Pan-Africanism” could serve as a more adequate basis for explaining both the commonalities and differences that occurred via the Atlantic triangle between the black diaspora of the Western Hemisphere and Continental Africans. The idea of “intra-active Pan-Africanism” means that shared commonalities among the varying black worlds in the Americas, Europe, and Africa were also shaped by their distinctive cultural differences. With the new climate of Afro-Atlantic triangle, “various groups, quite separate in origin,” observed Du Bois, “became so united in experience and so exposed to the impact of new cultures that they began to think of Africa as one idea and one land.”² Previously separated by centuries of transatlantic slave trade and slavery, and later by colonialism, African students sojourning for education in the western hemisphere had the rare opportunity of a-first-hand knowledge of the extent to which their experience was as similar as it was somewhat dissimilar from that of the descendants of slaves. Legum writes that from “its early phase, particularly from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the turn of the twentieth century—the inhabitants of Africa imbibed these new ideas from their studies mainly in the United States and later in Britain.”³

¹Shepperson’s “Notes;” Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 14; I an Duffield, “Pan Africanism since 1940,” in The Cambridge History of Africa: from c. 1940 to c. 1975, Volume 8, ed., Michael Crowder (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 95-101.

²Du Bois, The World and Africa, p. 7.

³Africans in Shepperson’s “Notes;” Fenner Brockway, The Colonial Revolution (London: HartDavis, MacGibbon Ltd, 1973), pp. 36-40; Patton, Jr., “Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools...,” The Global Dimension of the African Diaspora, pp. 142-59.

So, intra-active Pan-African contacts through the medium of Atlantic triangle represented the cross-fertilization of ideas carried to and fro by African students in the Americas, Europe and Africa vis-à-vis contacts with American world Negroes. Through the varied processes of contacts, the benefits of enlightened recovery of Africans from colonial rule found entry into the continent.¹

Returning to their respective homelands, the ability of these future leaders of Africa to successfully draw from the formal and informal networks of intra-active contacts further strengthened the basis of interactive Pan-Africanism within their regional landscapes. Given the cross-cultural contamination of Africa especially within its northern belt, the prospect of an interactive Pan-African unison corresponded with the ideological variant of Africa's historical fracture. Accordingly, interactive Pan-Africanism—with its internal variant into the Muslim North and the Mediterranean Arab and the Far East—was further subdivided into intra-active Pan-Africanism, and embraced the diverse unities of Afro-Arab-Asian liberation movements.² Thus, the role of the black diaspora of enslavement in shaping the rise of African nationalist liberation movements goes even further. For example, both the principles of neutralism/alignment that found expression later at

¹Ibid. Also, see: Ralston and Mourao, "Africa and the World," pp. 746-781; Joseph E. Harris and Slimane Zeghidour, "Africa and its diaspora since 1935," in General History of Africa: Africa since 1935, Volume V111, eds., Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993), pp. 705-8,716; S. K. B. Asante and David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration," in General History of Africa, Volume V111, pp. 724-729; Legum, Pan-African: A Short Political Guide, pp. 13-24; Edem Kodjo and David Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," in General History of Africa, Volume V111, pp. 744-748,760-766; Walters, An analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements, especially, chapters 1 and 2; Gershoni, Africans on African-Americans, pp. 112-44.

²Ibid. Colin Legum, Bandung Cairo and Accra: A Report on the First Conference of Independent African States (New York, African Bureau, 1958), pp. 3-15; K. Madhu Panikkar, Revolution in Africa (London and New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), pp. 3-12, 104-125; "Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement: Statements and Appeals of the Secretariat" (Cairo: Afro-Asian Peoples' Organization, 1961-1962), pp. 37-40.

Bandung, Cairo, and Accra conferences and later still across the diverse unities of the less developed regions of the modern world before and after decolonization were mostly the basic ideologies of blacks of the Western Hemisphere.¹

The above development meant that the evolutionary development of formal Pan-Africanism from the 1900s to 1940s as well as later of the Afro-Asian liberation movements had much to do with the systemic transformation of Negro world influences within and beyond the Western Hemisphere. This same background formed the basis for the broader global transformation of the colored proletariat.² Accordingly, within the African theater of the Pan-Africanism, this involved a carry-over via the Atlantic triangle of the principles of Negro-Americans by Western-educated Africans.³ Some portion of Shepperson's appraisal of the trend is worth highlighting here:

Negro America, in a complicated Atlantic triangle of influences, has played a considerable part ideologically in the emergence of African nationalism: in conceptualization, evocation of attitudes and through

¹A. W. Singha and Shilley Hune, Non-alignment in an Age of Alignments (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1986), especially "Introduction" and Chapters I-III; Edward W. Blyden, III, "The Idea of African Neutralism and Non-Alignment: An Exploratory Survey," in New Nations in a Divided World: International Relations of Afro-Asian States, ed., Kurt London (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), pp. 153-160; G. H. Hansen, Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1966), especially "Introduction" and chapters I-II, V, XVIII, and XIX; Harris and Zeghidour, Africa and its diaspora since 1935, p. 716; Kodjo and Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," pp. 760-6

²*Ibid.* W. E. B. Du Bois, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace (New York: Harcourt-Brace Company, 1945), especially, Chapters I-5; Harold Cruse, Rebellion or Revolution (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968), pp. 75-6; Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 82-7; Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 2-5; Howard Winant, The World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II (New York: Basic Books), especially the first five chapters including introduction.

³Shepperson's "Notes," pp. 301-311; Shepperson, "'Pan Africanism and Pan-Africanism: Some Historical Notes,'" Phylon 23 (Winter 1962), pp. 346-56; Legum, Bandung, Cairo, Accra, pp. 4, 10; Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, pp. 38-42.

the provision of the raw material of history. If today, the new African nation may be said to be of more value to Negro America than Negro America to them, this should not be allowed to conceal the historical role of the colored American in their emergence.¹

Shepperson's plea for the newly independent leaders of black Africa to reciprocate the noble role of their ancestral kin therefore seems logical. There is here the recognition that between 1900 and 1927, the New World Negro-led Pan African Congresses² heralded and dominated some of the principles that later formed the basis of modern African nationalism. Consequently, the inauguration of intra-active Pan-Africanism and later of its interactive continental wings provided another form of ancestral solidarity to move the development of the homelands forward. Until 1945, Western Hemisphere blacks not only dominated intra-active Pan African conferences, they also defended the "honor and the integrity of their ancestral brothers under colonial yoke."³ As one scholar documents:

In the five international conferences held between 1900 and 1945, Afro-Americans of the Pan-Africanist persuasion defended the honor and integrity of their ancestral brothers under colonial yoke. They thereby laid the foundation for the Post Second World War of African independence movements, and rightly earned for themselves, the designation of the vanguard of modern African nationalism.⁴

Sociologist St. Clair Drake observed that Pan-Africanism began as an event involving "the beloved and scattered million" of the sons of Africa.⁵ These

¹Ibid.; Shepperson, "Notes," p. 312.

²This is in reference to Negro-led Pan-African Congresses between 1900 and 1927. Until the Manchester Pan African Congress of 1945, Africans did not play a visible leadership role in Pan-African conferences. For example, see Panikkar, Revolution in Africa, pp. 113-114; Kodjo and Chanaiwa, "Pan-Africanism and Liberation," pp. 744-6.

³Ibid.

⁴Okon E. Uya, "Conceptualizing Afro-American/African Relations: Implications for African Diaspora," in Global Dimension of the African Diaspora, p. 73.

⁵St. Clair Drake, "Diaspora Studies and Pan Africanism," in Global Dimension of the African Diaspora, p. 352.

conferences brought African-descended races into closer contacts to identify as well as to solve the problems confronting their varying worlds in the modern world. Through these forums, continental Africans enjoined themselves with their ancestral kin to address their grievances before the conscience of the imperial European/Euro-American powers. These were also the forums in which to address the inequality imposed upon them largely because of their racial background.¹

George Washington Williams, Carter Woodson, George Padmore, Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Carter Woodson, to mention but a few, were all involved in the memorable events that formed the basis of intra-active Pan-Africanism. Du Bois, in his writing and commitment, was the “Father of modern African nationalism.”

Du Bois tirelessly chaired most of the Pan-African conferences, and wrote about African histories and cultures, urging understanding and respect. His polemics, which show the ties between European colonial imperialism and the First World War, were crucial to the re-direction of the relationships between the historical struggle of blacks in the diaspora and the African homelands. Similarly, they served as the crucial facilitators of understanding among the varying races of color in the modern.²

Historian Vincent Thompson refers to the program of African development through intra-active Pan-Africanism as “a gift of the New World of America to the

¹See, for example, Shepperson “Notes” on Pan-African Conferences between 1900 and 1945.

²*Ibid.*; Harris, Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp 22-23, 112-123, 243-248; Skinner, “Personal Networks and Institutional Linkages in the Global System,” pp. 18-29; Wilson Jeremiah Moses, The Golden Age of Black Nationalism 1850-1925 (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1978), especially chapters 10-12.

Old World of Africa.”¹ As Crummell would argue, this gift by the “Children of Africa in this land”² represented the hope that, despite the bitter experience of slavery, blacks in the diaspora had as their aim the vision of uplifting the ancestral homeland. This was not an irrational concept full of vague emotions, as the German scholar Immanuel Geiss once argued.³ Rather, according to historian O. P. Esedebe, Pan-Africanism is “a political and cultural phenomenon which regards Africa, Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit.”⁴

Pan-Africanism, therefore, seeks “to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among people of the African world.” By striving to glorify the African past through the inculcation of pride in its values, it most assuredly ensures the moral, political, economic, and cultural essence of its mission.⁵ This foundation was later to have a strong bearing on the transformation of black proletarian internationalism. For, through intra-active Pan-Africanism—first dominated by descendants of slaves and interactive Pan-Africanism dominated mostly by indigenous Africans—came the diverse unities that facilitated the process toward decolonization and political freedom from alien rule.

These Pan-Africa dialectics not only coincided with the birth of independent African states, but were also unifying complementary of the strengths and weaknesses of blacks in America and Africa throughout the varying stages of their struggle for equal status. By 1920s, when the leap in the Negro America’s world

¹Thompson, African Unity, p. 3; Panikkar, Revolution in Africa, p. 104.

²Bracey, Black Nationalism.

³Immanuel Geiss, The Pan African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1968), p. 5.

⁴Esedebe, Pan Africanism: The Idea and the Movement, p. 3.

⁵Ibid.

thought reached Africans, the ideological dialectics of the Pan-Africanism centered on “Africa for Africans,”¹ and reflected the consummation of a much earlier vision of American World Negro thought. As we saw earlier, this development was inspired by the emotional “back to Africa” of the Garvey era.²

But, in the 1930s and 1940s, when the emphasis on Pan-Africanism shifted toward securing the legitimate values of black culture wherever found, the ethos of the Negritude movement emerged as the bridge of emotional and cultural continuity of black aspirations in the world.³ This period, as we also noted earlier, was marked by a carry-over and later transformation of the related ideas that transpired via intra-active triangles of Afro-atlantic contacts between the black diaspora of the Western Hemisphere and Western-educated Africans.

The Black Diaspora and the New Nations of Africa: A Review

Of course, as we hinted earlier, there were eras of low tides in both the perception as well as in the dialectics of Pan-African relations between blacks in the diaspora and the homelands. During those eras, Africa and its peoples were sometimes viewed as heathens, and as only fit to be directed by their more civilized ancestral kin in the diaspora. This kind of attitude was probably strongest during the eras of uncertainties in the black struggle in America. Professor Skinner writes that Negro Americans “took a dim view of an ancestral land whose military and political weaknesses permitted its inhabitants to be carried off and enslaved. They were

¹ Anne Forester Holloway, “Pan-African Activism in the 20th Century,” in Black Man in America: Integration and Separation, ed., James A. Moss (New York: A Delta Book, 1971), pp. 143-5.

² Ibid. Also, John Henrik Clarke, “The Afro-American Nationalism,” Freedomways I (Fall 1961), pp. 285-94; Shepperson, “Notes,” pp. 299-312; Shepperson, “Some Historical Notes,” pp. 346-58.

³ Holloway, “Pan-African Activism,” pp. 143-5.

scorned when Africa was colonized and conquered by outsiders who, convinced of the sub-humanity of its inhabitants, felt called upon to Christianize and civilized them.”¹

The aforementioned background perhaps fully explains why, in 1958, Kwame Nkrumah stated during the Sixth Pan-Africanist Conference held Ghana in that, “Before many of us were conscious of our degradation, it was the New World Negroes who raised the banner of African liberation.”² But, as Africans and African-Americans gained new national and international image and respectability between the mid-1950s and 1960s, the status of their ancestral relationships also improved correspondingly. Skinner observes that: “The emergence into independence of the sub-Saharan nations enormously changed the world-wide significance of the American race problem and provided a considerable stimulus to the movement for racial equality in the United States.”³

By the 1960s, the bulk of the new leaders of Africa were men who had come into contact with American world Negroes via intra-active Pan-Africanism. Therefore, with the birth of an independent nation of Ghana in 1957 as well as the related inauguration of the First Conference of African Independent States at Accra in 1958, Africans witnessed the consummation of an idea that was first influenced by American World Negroes.⁴

Some African-Americans who could never have conceived that black people would ever be rulers of nations, nor previously identified with Africans openly,

¹Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, p. 10.

²Meier and Rudwick, The Making of Black America, p. 83.

³Skinner, “The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands,” pp. 37-8.

⁴For example, see earlier notes on Legum, Bandung, Cairo, and Accra.

began to identify with them as partners. Others went as far as assuring friends of their special relationships with Africans and their new leaders. Thrilled by the birth of the new nations of Africa as well as by the sights of the respectable receptions accorded their dignitaries at the White House, African-Americans were filled with joy and imagination regarding the new status of their ancestral kin on the world scene.

The preceding development was also marked by increased identification with the homelands. "An increasing number of Africans and Afro-Americans are now looking back at their history and culture, and within themselves, for the spiritual and philosophical stimulus for their survival and direction."¹ This development formed the necessary bridge that underscored the nationalist focus of African liberation movements as well as the transformation of black liberation movements across the world.² By the 1960s, however, the ideological dialectics of black internationalism revolved around securing the concept of power with which to address the varying needs of the black masses in the world.³ This phase was marked by more conscious responses to both their internal and external crises. Malcolm X perhaps captured the fullest essence of this era when he told an OAU submit that,

We in America, are your host brothers and sisters, and I am only to remind you that our problems are your problems.... Your problems will never be fully solved until and unless ours are solved. You will never be fully respected unless we are also respected. You will never be recognized as free human beings until and unless we are also recognized and treated as human beings.⁴

¹Clarke, "Afro-American Nationalism." p. 294.

²Holloway, "Pan-African-Activism," pp. 143-5; Osedebe, Pan-Africanism, The Idea, pp. 234-5.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., Osedebe, p. 233.

The two poles of black internationalism came to the fore following the alleged U.S. involvement in the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister. Some African-Americans used the occasion to publicize their solidarity with political events in their ancestral homelands. To others, of course, the murder of Patrice Lumumba was the symbolic international lynching of a black man on the altar of colonialism.¹

The opposition to the murder of Lumumba involved “more than fifty Negroes” within the United Nations alone, ultimately succeeding forcing “the Council President to call a half-hour recess.”² According to Harold Cruse, his death was “the worst disorder in U.N. history.”³ Extolled in various ceremonies by African-Americans as the “best son of Africa,” the “Lincoln of Africa,” and the “Black Messiah,”⁴ Lumumba’s spirit—like that of Nat Turner—was portrayed as roaming in majesty over the land of Africa against the forces of neocolonialism.

Definitely with the passage of the civil and voting rights legislations, along with the corresponding amendment in the U.S. immigration law by around the mid-1960s, African-Americans and Africans entered into a new era of bargains in America and across the world. Despite continuing racial indifference, as a result of those enactments, the number of African-Americans holding elective office and other important public positions also began to rise steadily. For example, in the South the number reached 5,000 in 1970 and 2,500 in 1980. This trend was followed by the

¹Clarke, “Afro-American Nationalism,” pp. 285-6, 294.

²Cruse, Rebellion or Revolution, pp. 68-9.

³Ibid.

⁴Clarke, “The Afro-American Nationalism,” pp. 285-6.

rise in their national political representation from 300 in 1965 to 3,000 in 1975 and from 5,000 in 1980 to more than 7,000 in 1992.¹

Barely two decades after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts were signed into law Jesse Jackson won wide national recognition as a presidential candidate in 1984. His extensive grassroots mobilization of eligible voters attracted blacks and whites, and as a result, black mayors in 1991 headed majority-white cities with populations of 50,000 and more majority-black cities.²

Between the 1990s and mid-2000, the glaring evidences of how the descendants of slaves were reshaping American ethos in bold, brilliant and unique creative art forms—athletic, intellectual, and in popular cultures—were noticeable and undeniable.³ Certainly from the 1970s onward, there was no doubt that the gains made by black-America also had some assuring results for black Africa and indeed for Africans entering the U.S. Since the late 1980s, to be sure, the enormous influences of the Black Political Caucus in Washington, D.C., along with TransAfrica, have supported favorable U.S. policies toward Africa.⁴ This can be seen as the maturing of the earlier missions of African redemption and formal Pan-Africanism.

Africans were equally in a position to complement the historic achievements of their ancestral kin. Since the 1980s, in fact, the general course of the African and

¹Sitoff, The Struggle for Racial Equality, p. 221. For a more contemporary summary, see Richard M. Abrams, America Transformed: Sixty Years of Revolutionary Change, 1941-2001 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 130-6.

²“Taking Jessie Jackson Seriously: His Emergence as Front Runner Changes the Race—And the Nation,” Time (April 11, 1988), pp. 13-22; Ebony Magazine (August 1991), pp. 30-5; Henry Louis Gates, Jr., America Behind the Color Line: Dialogues with African Americans (New York and Boston: Warner Books, 2004), pp. xix-xvi, 1-80.

³*Ibid.*, America Behind the Color Line, pp. 1-17, especially “Part One: Ebony Towers.”

⁴Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 3-14, 69; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.

African diaspora relationships has been evolving on the global context with the consciousness of collective survival. For example, in January 1983, some scholars and policy makers from five West African nations met in Monrovia, Liberia, with their African-American kin under the auspices of the University of Sierra Leone and the Afro-American Studies Program of Boston University to search for ways to revitalize the economic and cultural networks that tied the two black worlds together.¹ Also, in September 1987, thanks to the late Chief M.K.O. Abiola of Nigeria, a summit addressing Africa's crisis in London attracted black scientists, academicians, businessmen, politicians, and all others from all corners of the world to brain storm on the solution to its growing problem.² During the 1990s, the renewed trend of Afro-Atlantic exchanges received further impulses by way of the renaissance on African and African-American cultures across the world.

Generally, a more pro-active pattern of economic, cultural, and political collaboration between the black diaspora and the ancestral homelands might have been revealed in the attitudes of the former during a greater part of the 1990s. This development was supported by Public Service Documentary highlighting visits to the homelands by some African-Americans. Black American stars like Whoopi Goldberg, A. J. Kool, and Michael Jackson visited the homelands. Significantly, these exchanges coincided with an era when the status of blacks in the economic, cultural, and political spheres had undeniable influences on a global scale.³

¹Cromwell, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, pp. ix-147.

²"A Continent in Search of Food: Proffering a Pan-African Solution to a Pan-African Problem," African Concord (Ikeja: Lagos, September, 1987), pp. 32 - 37.

³Ibid.; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32; Charles Whitaker, "Black Leaders Meet in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to Build a Bridge of Cooperation Between two Continents," Ebony Magazine (August, 1991), pp. 116-122; Gates, Jr., America Behind the Color Line, pp. xix-xvi, 1-80.

When more than 330 influential African-Americans met with their African counterparts in the “First Historic Summit held in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, in August 1991,” some saw it as a fulfillment of Pan-Africanist ideals.¹ Unlike the earlier Pan-Africanist Summits,² the Abidjan Summit which took place almost at the end of the Cold War called for building “a bridge together that will help move Africa forward, as it has never moved before.” Reporting on the Abidjan summit, Whitaker observed that, thereafter “neither Africa nor African-America would be the same.”³

Even before Abidjan, the independence of Zimbabwe, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the support for democratic changes in Nigeria and Ghana as well as Cameroon, were all enacted with the political pressure of black America. These efforts were in keeping with earlier Pan-Africanist summons to work collectively toward the regeneration of ancestral Africa. So, along with the Abidjan, and the end of the European Cold War, black America and black Africa stood at the crossroad of a new epoch.⁴ These blacks saw the varied negative images in their racial backgrounds in the ghettos of the Americas—in the U.S., Haiti, South Africa,

¹Ibid.

²See, for example, earlier backgrounds in Shepperson’s “Notes,” Legum, Pan-Africanism; Uya, Black Brotherhood; King, Pan-Africanism and Education; Geiss, Pan-African Movement, Harris, Global Dimension of The African Diaspora; Ralston and Mourao, General History of Africa, Vol. 11; Duffield, The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 8; Skinner, Defense of Black Nationality; Asante and Chanaiwa, General History of Africa, Vol. V111; Harris and Zeghidour, General History of Africa, Vol. 111; Kodjo and Chanaiwa, General History of Africa, Vol. 111, Ronald, Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora; Gershoni, Africans on African Americans.

³Whitaker, “Black Leaders Meet in Abidjan,” p. 120.

⁴Ibid.; as well as Chris Nteta, “The Linkage Between African Americans and the South African Black immigrant Community,” in Trotter Review: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Black Community in the United States, pp. 24-6; Jack E. White, “When Blacks Persecute Blacks,” Time (August 7, 1995), p. 29; Kevin Merida, “Black Americans to Press Nigeria for Democracy,” The Washington Post (March 24, 1995); p. A1; Karen de Witt, “Black Group Begins Protest Against Nigeria,” The New York Times (March 17, 1995), p. A10; “TransAfrica Releases Report on U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa,” African Newsbreed (May 1991), p. 28.

Rwanda, Liberia, Congo, Angola, Somalia, Sudan, and Nigeria. Such scenes were revealing of the strong disparities between them and other races of the modern world. It also revealed the extent of their varied experiences under alien exploitation as well as the context of their continuing struggle.

Context of an Existing Problem

Whether for Nigeria as a specific country or entire continent, the crisis of institutional instability in post-colonial Africa has resulted in the largest voluntary emigration of highly trained sectors of its personnel to America.¹ As we saw much earlier in this chapter, this development represented the second historic dispersal of black Africans, and undoubtedly requires at this point a review of their contextual experience.

Surprisingly, this largely voluntary African build-up in America has as yet to be clearly explained in relation to their status with the descendants of slaves. Yet nearly all the socio-cultural orbits of these newest of America's immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are shaped by the generational experience of the descendants of slaves. Although earlier effort suggested that the American orbit of Nigerian immigrants, for example, was defined by African-Americans, not much was known about the status of their incorporation within the American mosaic.² It still remains to be seen how much has changed from the earlier effort and how much is indeed similar to the experiences of the descendants of slaves.

¹Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 1-17, 42-3, 45; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 1-26.

²Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African-Americans," pp. iv-v, 1-23, 264-308, did very little in explaining the socio-cultural context of Nigerians' incorporation into American society.

Ira Reid's Negro Immigrant¹ may still represent the best attempt to explain the socio-cultural milieu in which the descendants of involuntary and voluntary migrations find themselves in America. Prior to Reid's work, however, the term "African" or "black," which grouped together all persons of Negro extraction, seldom referred to continental Africans.² The Negro immigrant not only was "a phenomenon of the Western World," he was also largely "from the Caribbean area."³

Despite being highly educated and conceivably more inclined toward the values of his former colonial masters, he was the most degraded and least incorporated sector of American immigrants.⁴ Not surprisingly, the few Africans entering America for education during the later colonial era were sometimes kept apart from their ancestral kin.⁵ Yet still, others were often stigmatized with the socio-cultural stigma of racial degradation.⁶ Generally, this background applies to how African settlers in America in turn often misunderstand the deep-seated crises of black Americans. On the other hand, however, efforts by some African-Americans toward issues of African development were sometimes not linked to the concerns of a majority of Africans in the U.S.⁷ The continuing effects of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism seem to be the underlying explanation why the two related and almost similarly affected groups, rarely have a clear understanding about each

¹Reid, The Negro Immigrant, especially "Introduction" and Chapters 1-4.

²Ibid., p. 24; also, see: Wortham, "Contemporary Black Immigration to the United States," in Contemporary American Immigration: Interpretive Essay, p. 201.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.; Reid, pp. 25-31.

⁵Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 1-2.

⁶Ibid., also, see background in Ali Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 28-33; Skinner, "The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands," pp. 39-41; Skinner, Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-11

⁷Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.

other's experiences and problems. This background, perhaps best explains why they were sometimes suspicious of each other. Besides, it explains why they showed an unwilling to reciprocate their historic relationship in a more respectable manner.¹ As historian Joseph Harris documents:

In both Africa and the Diaspora, blacks were taught that they were inferior to and dependent on whites. The black heritage was not a worthy field of serious study. Until fairly recently—well into the twentieth century—neither continental Africans nor their kin abroad knew much about the other, and what they did know was often distorted.²

Despite the triumphs of black America and black Africa, the pace of their human development is far behind. Neither the increased contacts between the two black worlds nor the continuing renaissance in Afrocentric cultures have been able to resolve the inherent split resulting from chattel slavery and colonial dispossession.³

Cruse, in responding to the attitudes of some visiting African students toward African Americans in the U.S., argued that their historical experience was similar yet markedly unique. While their similarities were linked to the collective experience of racial degradation and exploitation, yet differences abound due to the more traumatic ordeal of slavery on the descendants of involuntary migration.⁴

The Cruse theory, however, might not adequately explain the implications of the current build-up of indigenous African population in America. It explains why,

¹Alvin B. Tillery, Jr., "Black Americans and the Creation of America's Africa Policies: The Deracialization of Pan-African Politics," in The African Diaspora: African Origins and New World Identities, ed., Isidore Okpewho et al. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 518-521.

²Harris, Global Dimension of the African Diaspora, p. 5.

³For example, see Public Affairs Documentary: Back To Africa by F. Dennis shown in the first week of the "Black History Month" (Feb., 1993), as well as a contrasting position in an article written by Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr., "Perverting the Afrocentric," Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, November 15, 1991), p. 18.

⁴Cruse, Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, p. 342.

as documented by Arthur M. Schlesinger, some black Americans prefer being called “Black” to “African-American.”¹ It might also explain why some African immigrants were sometimes estranged from black Americans and why the latter tended to believe that Africans showed an unwillingness to “identify with us.”² Clearly, some Africans and African-Americans have differing images in their minds about themselves. While some black Americans perceived black Africans as primitive people, the latter have stereotypical images of their ancestral kin as lazy in the midst of enormous wealth.³

The problem of race and racism, along with its collective effects, has far greater significance in defining the socio-cultural context of African-American and Nigerian relations in America. According to Portes, Rumbaut and Apraku, African-Americans and African immigrants are similarly affected on racial matters. Apraku goes even further and concluded that 89 percent of his African respondents resented the “racism and discrimination perpetuated against them because of their color.” About 40 percent of the Apraku respondents said they resented “the way white Americans treat blacks in the United States.”⁴

Landry, on the other hand, argues persuasively that fully incorporating black populations into mainstream America is a “societal problem.” Centuries of racism, which made it possible for “Asians to develop businesses that were patronized by the

¹Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 88.

²Skinner, Global Dimensions, pp. 39-41; Cruse, Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. 434; Tillery, Jr., “Black Americans and the Creation of America’s Africa Policies,” p. 518.

³Ibid., Cruse, pp. 435-8; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 4.

⁴Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 81, 90-92, 94-7; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110.

general white public,” were marked by discriminatory legal and institutional structures toward African-Americans in both the South and North “for 100 years after slavery.”¹

Landry thus offers an historical foothold for grasping the problem of blatant racism and discrimination confronting Nigerians in urban America. Such cities as Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Houston, Atlanta, New York, and Dallas have high incidences of racism directed toward African-Americans and African immigrants.² This makes large urban cities significant for examining the social crisis involving the two historically related and affected groups.

Sowell’s Race and Cultures, Migrations and Cultures, and Conquests and Cultures—similar to Denish D’Souza’s End of Racism—supported the success of some immigrant groups on the basis of their racial and cultural traits.³ If Sowell, for instance, is correct,⁴ it might then mean that the forced migration of Africans to the

¹Bart Landry, “The Enduring Dilemma of Race in America,” in America at Century’s End, ed., Alan Wolfe (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 202-203.

²“I am not guilty, pleads Linus Okafor,” in The Good Hope News: The African Perspective, Vol. 1, No. 6 (Dallas, Texas, June 1990), pp. 1 and 7; Eyo Ita, “Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia,” Nigerian New Digest (Charlotte, N.C, November 27, 1991), pp. 1, 21; O. Nwachukwu, “Preying on the Weak: KXAZ TV Zeroes in on Nigerians,” The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas: Nov.-Dec., 1991), pp. 1, 11; Susan Warren, “Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here,” Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992), pp. 1A, 19A; Ike Onyia, “The Making of a Scape-goat: Nigerians and the Image Problem,” African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, November 1992), pp. 26 and 40; “Nigerian near dead due to Dallas police brutality,” in The African Herald, Vol. 7, No. 8 (Dallas, Texas, August 1996), pp. 1 and 27. Also, see the report on the sensational acquittal of “four police officers” in New York murder trial of “Amadou Diallo” in Time (March 6, 2000, pp. 24-28).

³Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multicultural Society (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 397, 472-6, 526-8; Thomas Sowell, Race and Culture: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. ix-xiv, 1-60; Thomas Sowell, Migrations and Cultures: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1996) “Chapter I: Migration Patterns;” Thomas Sowell, Conquest and Cultures: An International History (New York: Basic Books, 1998), pp. ix-xi, 3-20, 153-173.

⁴*Ibid.*, especially Race and Culture and Migrations and Cultures.

U.S. along with their exploitation was not a relevant component of economic and cultural development. Given the existence of copious evidences to the contrary, the Sowell position is likely to be an uneasy one.

Again, Barone—seemingly supportive of Sowell and Souza—argues that there are similarities between the Irish and black experience as well as between the Jewish and Asian immigrants.¹ While this is somewhat true on the general human plain, he appears to misunderstand the deeper roots of the crisis of the black experience. Collectively, the Barone thesis—like Sowell and D’Souza—calls for a clearer explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities of America’s immigrants. This is because, to another observer, America’s experiences with the “melting pot” is rather more dependent on the mutuality “to live in recognition” of its inherent racial differences.²

So, accordingly, the Barone summons to re-invent the “melting pot” is rather suggestive of a need to examine the extent to which sustained stratification of American races and racial indifferences were embedded within the “melting pot.”³ Earlier, anthropologist Ogbu posited the relationship between negative historical cycle and the underdevelopment of some racial minorities in America.⁴ His

¹Michael Barone, The New Immigrants: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2001), pp. 9-11, 17-21.

²Robert Hughes, Culture and Complaint: The Fraying of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 12-13.

³Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

⁴Ibid. For example, for differences of historical experiences, see John U. Ogbu, “The consequences of American caste system,” in The School Achievement of Minority Children, U. Neisser, ed. (Hillside, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), pp. 19-56; and Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992), especially chapters 1-4; Robin Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; and Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 5.

conclusion continues to correlate with patterns of underdevelopment found among historically affected ethnic minorities, especially African descent groups.

Nor are works by some African writers any clearer in explaining the context of the African-diasporic relations in the U.S. Although the experience of colonialism was markedly dissimilar in its negative effects on Africans,¹ Darlington states that: “The recent African immigrants were driven by the same force, which drove other immigrant groups to come to America.” As Darlington further documents: “Most of these immigrant groups came for political, economic, and /or religious reasons.”²

Darlington shows no clear grasp as to whether the “political, economic, and religious reasons” of African immigration were rooted in its peculiar historical orbit, or in the crisis of colonial dispossession—or a combination of both. Obviously, his view on the similarity between African immigration and other immigrations to the U.S. is imprecise. The fact that the larger proportion of African immigration is the result of the negative effects of colonial legacies makes other explanation inevitable.³

The apparent oversight in Darlington’s thesis perhaps lies in misunderstanding the extent to which slavery and colonialism had affected black Africa and the organization of African-descended races in the U.S. as well as post-colonial institutions in Africa after decolonization. Such an experience, which corresponded with negative attitudes toward the African region as well as toward its pattern of postcolonial immigration to the U.S., might not be similar to that of the other

¹Davidson, Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, chapter 2, especially pp. 62-80.

²Darlington I. Ndubike, The Struggle, Challenges, and Triumphs of the African Immigrants in America (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 39-40.

³See earlier notes on President Olusegun Obasanjo and Ali Mazrui on the colonial crises.

branches of American immigrants.¹ Of course, there are similar factors such as political, socioeconomic and religious crises behind foreign-born immigration.²

That the above factors also influenced immigration from Nigeria to the U.S., just as from Asia and Europe, for example, cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the emphasis here is that, the crisis of American slavery, which affected African-Americans more directly, has strong bearing on the medium and character of post-colonial African immigration to the U.S. This peculiar feature of post-colonial immigration, when compared to that of non-African descent groups, would be seen to be markedly dissimilar.

The preceding background in turn defines the pattern of incorporating the black African immigrants into the American mosaic. Hawk and Skinner have argued that the socio-cultural context of African immigrants was more likely to be dissimilar from others of non-African descent groups due to the effects of slavery and colonialism.³ African immigration along with its relationship to American institutions as well as to the host society is more problematic and peculiar. Consequently, African immigration is more clearly explained by the malfunctions of post-colonial institutions as well as by the enduring effects of the first dispersal under racial slavery. This trend, again, is not nearly as similar with the experience of other non-African descent groups who immigrated to the U.S. particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s.

¹See, for example, Blackburn, The New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Beverly Hawk's "African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," Ph.D. Dissertation (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1988), p. 271; and Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-10.

²Ndubike, The Struggle, pp. 39-40.

³See earlier notes on Blackburn, The New World Slavery; Hawk's "African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," and Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality.

Within a specific context Ogbaa appears to have misunderstood the historical links between African-Americans and Nigerians in attempting to explain the Nigerian-U.S. connection.¹ As Ogbaa documents: “Nigerian Americans wondered why the black political and civic leaders had not been able to persuade Congress and the various American presidents (except Clinton) to develop foreign policies that would have helped Nigerians as well as other Africans to develop democratic governance that ensure social justice and economic stability for their people.”²

Perhaps the Ogbaa problem is due more to a misunderstanding of the well-known historiography of the black diaspora in influencing the course of African world development. However, given some of the evidences posted in his references, this weakness is rather surprising.³ For, as our earlier emphases in this chapter revealed, it is clear that even before President Clinton’s era, black America was fairly active in influencing the direction of U.S.-Nigerian/African relations.⁴

While Ndubike misunderstands the general historical context of African immigration to the U.S., Ogbaa shows a similar problem within a specific context. These weaknesses by otherwise well-intentioned Africans strongly call for a more definitive re-examination of the relationships between the two historic migrations of Africans to the U.S. The historiography of Afro-Atlantic experience should then be linked and explained as apart of an organic unfolding of two related dispersals of Africans to the United States due to the effects of European contacts. The problem raised by Ogbaa, along with the centrality of Nigeria, calls for retracing some aspects

¹Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, p. 115.

²Ibid.

³For example, some of the references highlighted by Ogbaa implied that there were far stronger continuities than he had explained.

⁴This is supported by our earlier references.

of the forced and voluntary migrations of the black diaspora of enslavement and the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism.

Summary

There are unquestionable evidences of the presence of Nigerian/African immigrants in the U.S. as well as of the possibility of redirection in the ancestral relationships between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration from Africa south of the Sahara. These evidences are important for understanding the current implications of two historic migrations of Africans to the U.S.

The Nigerian evidences, currently the most visible, provided the basis for re-examining both the earlier as well as continuing themes in the African-diasporic relations, along with the socio-cultural context of the black experience in America. After about four centuries, a majority of voluntary post-colonial African settlers in the U.S. are mostly from Nigeria. Nigerians constituted the largest most established representation of the black diaspora of colonialism: they were both demographically and culturally aligned along African-American lines (See Chapters 2, 3, 6).

CHAPTER 2

EARLY PATTERNS OF EURO-AFRICAN CONTACT WITH THE WEST COAST OF AFRICA

This Chapter is divided into four parts. The first part contains a brief review of early Portuguese contacts with the West African Coast. The second part examines the vast stretches of the Guinea Coast including the Delta region of modern Nigeria, where a majority of the New World slaves were taken. The third section contains the explanation of early European contacts and later still, the involvement of more European slaving exploits in Niger Delta regions. The fourth part contains the regional distribution of Nigerian/African slaves in the British mainland North American colonies.

Part 1: An Overview of Forced Migration of West Africans

Figure 1 shows the major routes/lanes of commercial and cultural contacts linking inland Africa to North Africa to Mediterranean Arab and to Europe, in what can safely be termed medieval era. Also, it shows the strategic zones of early medieval European-Mediterranean commercial contacts which by the 1500s became the major pathways in the search for the bounty of the goldfields of inland Africa.

Further, with the opening of the modern era under the leadership of Iberian Europe, the Iberian inroads into the Mediterranean and later into inland Africa marked the beginning of the shift of world commerce/exchanges to the New World. Both for inland Africa as well as Afro-Arab and the related regions of Southern Europe in the Mediterranean, the Iberian era was marked by serious competitions and rivalries. With the discovery of the New World, this interlude formed the basis

of the most distinctive form of modern slavery via forced migration of West Africans.

Figure 1

The Major Routes of Medieval trans-Saharan Caravan Exchanges with inland Africa, North Africa, Mediterranean Asia and Europe



Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 33.

In retrospect, however, the forced migration of Africans can be traced to 1441, with its origin lying squarely in the official attitude of Prince Henrique of Portugal, later popularized as “Henry the Navigator.” From 1419 to 1460, Prince Henry emerged as the foremost leader of Iberian Europe—perhaps of the whole of

Europe for encouraging a series of expeditions aimed at reaching the interior sources of West African gold trade.¹

According to historian James Rawley, Henry's voyages of exploration were first driven by "the zeal against Muslims, a greed for gold, and the quest for the legendary kingdom of Prester John, and the search for Oriental spices."² Other historians, however, have varied in their explanation of the events leading to forced migration of West Africans. For example, as John Iliffe states, "The Atlantic slave trade began in 1441 when a young Portuguese sea-captain, Antam Gongcalvez, kidnapped a man and woman on the Western Saharan Coast to please his employer, Prince Henry the Navigator."³ So, according to Iliffe, the forced migration of West Africans to the Atlantic coast, later to Europe, and finally to the New World, can be traced to the attitude of early Portuguese explorers.⁴

But historian Blackburn's interpretation of the forced migration is slightly different from Iliffe's although somewhat similar to that of W. E. B. Du Bois.⁵ Indeed, in Blackburn's view, it was rather the desire of Iberian merchants to strike

¹See for example: Ira Berlin, Many Thousand Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge, MA, London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 17-19, 24-8; Ira Berlin, Generation of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves (Cambridge, MA, and London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 23-30; Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, pp. 3-4, 99; Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas 1441-1900 (New York: Longman, Inc., 1987), pp.78-81; J. D. Fage, A History of Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 221-3.

²*Ibid.*, Thompson, pp. 41-2; James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 22; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade—The Story of the Atlantic of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 52.

³John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 127.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now: An Essay in the History and Sociology of the Negro Race (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), p. 132.

bargains over captured African victims that triggered the intricate prelude leading to the forced migration of West Africans. This development, as Blackburn further tells us, lies more in the afterthought. For after capturing two West African nobles in 1441, the Iberian merchants later exchanged them in return for gold.¹

But, in Du Bois's account of 1441, it is clear that the Portuguese had "seized certain free Moors and the next year exchanged them for ten black slaves, a target of hide, ostrich eggs, and some gold."² If Du Bois and Blackburn's accounts are not very clear, at least those offered by Iliffe and Hugh—similar to Rawley, Fage, and Thompson—are clearly supportive and thus convincing.³ One can therefore accept some variant by Iliffe, Du Bois, and Blackburn on the take off of forced migration of Africans without necessarily denying that the negative attitude of Iberian Europe, and later of a succession of Western European states, had been poised against West Africa right from the onset.⁴ Iliffe documents that back in Portugal, "Goncalvez was knighted" for his act of plundering and "kidnapping Africans."⁵

Thus, the combined historical emphases point to the fact that the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade was associated with the kidnapping of Africans, and in the later centuries by the deliberate act of economic competition among the major

¹Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 102.

²Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now, p. 132.

³Ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 102; Iliffe, Africans, p. 127; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 21-5, 68-9; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 11, 21-2, 24; Fage, A History of Africa, pp. 215-17, 221-5; Thompson, The African Diaspora, pp. 68-84.

⁴M. Malowist, "The struggle for international trade and its implications for Africa," in General History of Africa: Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, Vol. V, ed., B. A. Ogot (Heinemann, California, and Unesco: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 1-16.

⁵Ibid.; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 127, 130.

Western European states.¹ Historian Rawley therefore makes the point that, when in 1444 Prince Henry further approved of the forceful removal of 235 Africans from the West African Coast to Portugal, the Atlantic migration begun.²

Gomes Eannes Zurara, an official chronicler of the court, who saw the awful sight of the West African victims of Iberian plunders in Southern Europe, recorded the following:

What heart could be so hard, as not to be pierced with piteous feeling to see that company? For some kept their heads low, and their phases bathed in tears, looking one upon another. Others stood groaning very dolorously, looking up to the height of heaven, fixing their eyes upon it, crying out loudly, as if asking help from the father of nature, others struck their faces with the palms of their hands, throwing themselves at full length upon the ground; while others made lamentations in the manner of a dirge, after the custom of their country.³

The preceding emphases perhaps adequately explain, why, in 1526, King Alfonso of Kongo—an ally of Portugal—ranted in alarm over the news of the suffering of thousands of African slaves shipped to the Atlantic coast and Europe:

Many of our subjects eagerly covet Portuguese merchandise, which your people bring into our kingdoms. To satisfy this disordered appetite, they seized numbers of our free or freed black subjects, and even nobles, sons of nobles, even the members of our own family. They sell them to the white people . . . This corruption and depravity is so widespread that our land is entirely depopulated by it . . . It is in fact our wish that this kingdom should be a place neither of trade nor of transit of slaves.⁴

How then does one explain the historical context of the preceding background? First, as our earlier emphases along with the court chronicle by Zurara showed, the beginning of the transatlantic slavery and slave trade was closely linked

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., Iliffe, pp. 127-132; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 22; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 21-5, 54-5; Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, p. 102; Fage, A History of Africa, pp. 221-5.

³Ibid., Thomas, especially the Chapter entitled, "What Heart Could Be So Hard?" p. 21.

⁴Quoted in Iliffe, Africans, p. 130; for further elaboration, see Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 118-119.

to the attitudes of the early Iberian merchants. Second, the ultimate transformation of the commerce on racial slavery was linked to the desire of Iberian Europe to control the new order of an expanding worldwide capitalism. Third, and perhaps of far greater significance, the awful sight of African victims of the Iberian plunders illuminated by Zurara represented the beginning of a markedly different cycle of slavery from one which centered in the Mediterranean basin in the late medieval period, and which involved mixed races.¹

The plunder of West Africans not only was the direct result of the rivalries between Western Christendom and Islam, but also the beginning of a markedly different cycles of race relations in the modern world. This then was the result of an attitude first begun as an attempt to outflank the Arab middlemen in order to reach the gold sources of interior Africa.²

King Alfonso's complaints to the Portuguese, which we illuminated earlier, suggested that the prospects of establishing Mediterranean-type sugar plantations along the Atlantic islands and later in the New World, had very little or nothing to do

¹Charles Verlinden, The Beginning of Modern Colonization: Eleven Essays with an Introduction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 3-27; Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades (New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-8; J. E. Inikori, "Africa in world history: the export slave from Africa and the emergence of the Atlantic economic order," in General History of Africa, Vol. V, pp. 74-5, Sydney M. Greenfield, "Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery," in Plantation Societies in the Era of European Expansion, Vol. 18, ed., Judy Bierber (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1997), pp. 1-2, 34-5; David Brion Davis, "Sugar and Slavery from the Old World to the New World," in The Atlantic Slave Trade, Second Edition, ed., David Northrup (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1999), pp. 18-20; Robin Blackburn, "The Old World Background of European colonial Slavery," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour: From Indentured Servants to Slavery, Vol. 16, ed., Colin Palmer (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 65-70, 81; James H. Sweet, "The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour: From Indentured Servants to Slavery, Vol. 16, ed., Colin Palmer (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 1-2, 16-21.

²Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 52.

with the vision of an African world development. Having willingly accepted Christianity and exchanged ambassadors with Southern Europe, the negative attitudes of the Iberians toward both his kingdom and subjects, were not signs of respectful diplomatic relations between mutually agreeable sovereigns. As historian Anene documents: "In spite of the appeals by the African rulers for assistance for the peaceful modernization of the Kongo, the Portuguese turned their attention to the slave trade, undermined the authority of the Mani-Kongo among his subordinate chiefs, and the Kongo State collapsed and became nothing more than a haunt for slaves across the Atlantic to Brazil."¹

Historian Sweet, who probes the early Iberian contacts with the Kongo, also writes approvingly in support of Anene's thesis. "Despite some success in converting the Kongolese royal court in the 1490s, no active steps were taken to ensure that slaves were baptized until 1514."² As regard the general welfare of Africans in Lisbon, Sweet further documents that, "the bodies of dead African slaves were discarded without Christian burial. In 1515, King Manuel I commented on the growing number of dead Africans found in the streets of Lisbon."³

This background appears to be significant for evaluating the scholarly controversies regarding the connection between Mediterranean and New World slavery. For, these controversies appear to require an understanding of the nature of the new cycle of socio-cultural crises unleashed by the attitudes of Iberian Europe

¹J. C. Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Handbook for Teachers and Students, eds., J.C. Anene and Godfrey Brown (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press and Nelson, 1966), p. 107. Also, see: Iliffe, Africans, p. 130; Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 12-13; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 118-119; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 14.

²Ibid.; Sweet, "The Iberian Root of American Racist Thought," p. 16.

³Ibid., pp. 16-17.

along the Afro-Asian lanes toward none-European races, especially toward West Africans. Thus, against this background, some scholarly opinions are in sharp contrast to historian Charles Verlinden's thesis of the cycle of continuities between the Old World and New World patterns of European colonization.¹ To be sure, some scholars have agreed that certain features of medieval Europe were recreated in the pattern of New World's colonization as well as in the character of its slavery. But, as regards the general relationship between the Old World and New World form of slavery, the Verlinden thesis is plagued by inconsistencies.²

This relationship between Atlantic colonization and the exploitation of Africans as slaves—first in the Atlantic littoral and Europe and later in the New World—was shaped by the more distinctive economic and political interests of the major European states, following the opening of the modern era. Blackburn has argued that the problem of inherited degradation of successive generations of blacks during and after slavery in the New World was not characteristic of other forms of European colonization. “Unlike Roman slavery, it afflicted only those of black African origin or descent.”³

To historian Sweet, in the final analysis, it was the “legacy of Iberian racism which would endure in the Americas.”⁴ Beyond this fact, however, Blackburn

¹For example, the important conclusions by historian Verlinden on the cycles of continuities in Atlantic migration/colonization, especially “Introduction” including Parts I/ Part II, have received almost an equal response among varying scholars. For some modified differences in trend of historical continuities, see: Greenfield, “Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery,” pp. 1-2, 34-5; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-8; Blackburn, “The Old World Background of European colonial Slavery,” pp. 65-70, 81, 85-9; Sweet, “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought,” pp. 1-2, 16-21.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., The Making of New World Slavery, p. 102.

⁴Sweet, “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought,” p. 24.

contends that the character of European colonization “was a curse that even the grandchildren of the grandchildren of the original African captive found it exceedingly difficult to escape.”¹ Consequently, the crisis of Atlantic colonization signaled the beginning of an historic shift from the earlier more moderate character of domestic slavery in West Africa. Also, it represented the beginning of deep-seated racial indifference in the world scene, particularly in the Euro-African relations.²

Yet, historian Thornton has argued that “Africans were not under any direct commercial or economic pressure to deal in slaves.”³ Historian Eltis, on the other hand, argues that “the slave trade was a symptom of African strength, not weakness.”⁴ So, which one of these versions represents an appropriate appraisal of the transatlantic cycle of Euro-African relations during the slave trade?

First, as we saw in the attitudes of the early Iberian explorers and later in the accounts of the King Alfonso of the Kongo, the basis in which most West Africans were to become active participants in the Atlantic slave can be explained by responses to the attitudes and lures of the Iberian explorers.⁵ Second, the peculiar concern of the King and indeed of the general climate of European rivalries has much in common with issues involving Africa’s vulnerability within an expanding worldwide capitalism. Accordingly, the willingness to supply the human cargoes that transformed the new Atlantic system of world capitalism could not have meant

¹Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 1997, p. 4.

²Ibid.

³John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 98-99.

⁴David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 149.

⁵For example, this is supported by earlier notes.

that “African strength” had a stable context of collective development like Europe under a brutal system of socio-economic exploitation, as Eltis appears to suggest.¹

Thus, the Thornton and Eltis theses require some careful evaluation. For, if they are correct, their accuracy would at least have to be closely supported by such characteristics as: (I) pre-European-type slavery in Africa (II) the early attitudes of Iberian Europe, and (III) the character of European attitudes after the discovery of the New World.² To begin with, the magnitude of pre-European-type slavery in West Africa, as we shall see further down, did not reach the scale later unleashed by the mercantilist compulsions of European states. Nor did the character of Islamic slavery reinforce such an aberrant degree of human degradation on the basis of racial identity as one later contested and justified by European merchants on the West African coastal plains and in the New World.³

Given the nature of the rivalries among the major European states who were involved in the transatlantic slave trade, it is difficult to go along particularly with the Thornton thesis. The emphasis here lies more in what he views as “Africans were not under any direct commercial or economic pressure to deal in slaves.”⁴ For, again, given the nature of the internal and external interests of the major European states, it would have been difficult to determine which of their attitudes toward Africans were of “direct commercial or economic pressure” in influencing active participation in the trade during the early centuries of racial capitalism.

¹See earlier note on historian Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas.

²For example, their position is likely to be convincing if the emphases shown thus far are not taken into consideration. We hope to return to this theme again down the pages.

³Sweet, “Iberian Root of American Racist Thought,” pp. 3-7, 16-17, 20; Blackburn, “The Old World Background of European Colonial Slavery,” pp. 99-100, 118-119.

⁴Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, pp. 98.

Whichever way, however, Africans were in a position to be lured into the large-scale slaving activities where the openings of the sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands and later still of large-scale plantations in the New World were mostly in the interest of European states.¹ Thornton, moreover, does very little in reconciling the related economic and cultural attitudes of early Iberian explorers on the West African coast with those resulting from the larger rivalries among the major European states before and during the plantation revolution. Yet, as we saw earlier, it was the cultural grandeur of Iberian Europe—first embedded in the rivalries between Muslims and Christians in the Mediterranean, and later in the shifting phases of an expanding worldwide capitalism from the Afro-Asian lanes to the New World—which invited both the vulnerability and exploitation of West Africans.²

Those recurrent cycles of changes in both economic and cultural attitudes of Europe should not be overlooked in explaining the active participation of Africans in the transatlantic slave trade. This position has been supported by historians as well as by some recurring evidences in this chapter.³ Thornton thus appears to have overlooked the processes in which the internal and external interests of European states had first lured and later exploited Native Americans, in much the same way it

¹Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora, pp. 22-55, 72-3, 78-91.

²Ibid. Also, see Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," p. 107; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 21-5, 54-5.

³Joseph E. Inikori, "The slave trade and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870," in The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century: Reports and Papers of the Meeting of Experts Organized by Unesco at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 31 January to 4 February 1978 (Paris: Unesco, 1979), pp. 58-80;" Joseph Inikori, "Slavery in Africa and the Transatlantic Slave Trade," in The African Diaspora, ed., Alusine Jalloh and Stephen E. Maizlish (College Station, TX, 1996), p. 62; Walter Rodney, "African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave-Trade," in An Expanding World: The World of Unfree Labour, pp. 240-261.

did to the Africans via the slave trade.¹ This is not to deny that some African potentates, as in the case of the Niger Delta participated in the slave trade, and hence encouraged the exploitation of their subjects.² The expansion of racial capitalism along with the successive waves of commercial and military rivalries among the major states of Europe implied that Africans were more likely to be exploited both for cheap labor as well as in the worrisome habit of slave trade.³

When, therefore, the Portuguese captains found that they could buy African servants or slave-laborers and later resold them to either those involved in settling in Atlantic islands or to the Spanish purchasers, the socio-cultural stigma of racial slavery became associated with West Africans on the coastal regions.⁴ The most important date in the historic shift from the Old World to New World cycle of modern slavery was 1492.⁵ This then was the result of the fateful accident of landing in Hispaniola by Christopher Columbus. Not surprisingly, Columbus' earlier familiarity with slavery in Madeira presaged the beginning of a new venture.⁶

With the above development came the corresponding prospects for opening a Mediterranean-type sugar plantation in the New World. This later served as the

¹Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 6-43; Rawley, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 3-7; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 27-30; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 12-13, 36-7.

²Ibid., Horton and Horton. On the other hand, historian Thompson, in The Making of the African Diaspora, pp. 74-6, cites a representative background of this trend in the character of some Niger Delta leaders of a much later phase of the slave trade.

³Inikori, "Africa in World history...", in Unesco General History of Africa, Vol. V, pp. 74-82; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 153-195.

⁴Blackburn, The New World Slavery, pp. 97-100, 103-6; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 268-9; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 68-107; K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 2-3.

⁵Ibid.; Inikori, "Africa in World history....," pp. 74-82; Thomas, The Slave Trade, Chapter 6, especially pp. 87-91.

⁶Ibid.

prelude to the largest forced migration and degradation of human labor on a racial basis in world history. "As sugar plantations spread westwards through the Mediterranean to the Atlantic islands like Madeira and eventually to the Americas, they depended increasingly on the slave labour. The Atlantic slave trade was largely a response to their demand."¹

With regard to the economic prospects resulting from the opening the New world, historian Morison recorded that Columbus himself boasted with no exaggeration before his death that, "By the Divine will I have placed under the sovereignty of the King and Queen an Other World, whereby Spain, which was reckon poor, is to become the richest of all the countries."² Morison's observation perhaps reflects the strong contrast between the early benefits of Iberian Europe and later of the major states of Western Europe in the blunder of the New World and West Africa. Thus not surprisingly, between the end of the eighteenth century and late nineteenth century, all the major states of Europe involved in the slave trade were positively transformed. On the other hand, however, Africa south of the Sahara entered into another process from informal to formal colonialism under the varying fragments of Europe.³

¹Iliffe, Africans, pp. 127-129; Basil Davidson, "The Curse of Columbus," in A Search for Africa: History, Culture, Politics (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 334-42; Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 15-18. On the other hand, however, Samuel Eliot Morison's The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 23-31), has a glorified view of the Columbus expedition.

²Ibid., Morison, especially, p. 31.

³See for example: Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, especially chapters 1-4; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 29; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 2-7; Inikori, "The slave trade and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870," pp. 58-68; Inikori, "Africa in world history....," in Unesco General History of Africa, Vol. V, pp. 83-93. For the transition to colonialism, see for example: A. Adu Boahen, African Perspective on Colonialism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), especially Chapter 1 entitled "The Eve of the colonial Conquest and Occupation."

Portugal and Spain were the two dominant European powers both on the West Coast of Africa and the New World for more than a century before other European states entered into competition. By 1500, when the Portuguese termini in Sao Tome began to extend further into the Bight of Bonny, the Caravallies (Ijo/Kalabari people) of the Delta were one of the earliest participants in traders.¹ Prior to the end of the sixteenth century, other European nations were not even serious rivals against the Portuguese.² Again, prior to the entry of other European states in about the middle of the seventeenth century, the Iberians had already monopolized the trade in such items as pepper, spices, gold, and salt—that is, before settling on slaves. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, the Dutch, English, and French rivalries had all about succeeded in replacing the Iberians.³

Thus, between the end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Iberian merchants transported thousands of West African slaves to work in their sugar colonies of Sao Tome and Principe via the Gold Coast, the Benin River, and Niger Delta basin ports. Some of these slaves were later transshipped to Europe.⁴ This development is supportive of historian Berlin's thesis that the forced migration of African began in the netherworld between Africa and Europe: "first in Africa, then Europe, and finally in the Americas."⁵

¹David Northrup, Trade Without Rulers: Pre-colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 50-51.

²Ibid., p. 52; Verlinden, Modern Colonization, pp. 6-7; Thompson, The Making of African Diaspora, pp. 13-17, 24-33; Thomas, The Slave Trade, especially chapters 5-9.

³Du Bois, Black Folk: Then and Now, pp. 136-7; Iliffe, Africans, p. 131.

⁴Ibid., Iliffe, pp. 129-130; Olaniyan, "The Atlantic Slave trade," p. 114.

⁵Ira Berlin, "From Creole to African: Atlantic Creoles and the Origins of African-American Society in Mainland North America," in An Expanding World: The World of Unfree Labour, pp. 254-61; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, pp.17-22, 25; Berlin, Generations of Captivity, pp. 23-5; Thompson, The African Diaspora, pp. 95-7.

Therefore, the bulk of the early waves of slaves transported from West Africa to the Atlantic littoral were among the first to enter Iberian Europe before being distributed to other parts of Europe, and later still, moreover, to the New World. Blackburn writes that during the fifteenth century there were thousands of African slaves in Portugal and Spain, but they were very rare elsewhere in Europe.¹ Between 1441 and 1448 about a thousand slaves were taken from West Africa to Portugal. Some 10,000 of those who were in Lisbon composed about 10 percent of the city's population.²

Again, according to historian Harris, "between 1450 and 1500 Portugal imported an estimated 700 to 900 African slaves annually."³ By the mid-sixteenth century, Seville had about had 6,327 slaves out of a total population of 85,538, who were mostly of mixed Africans and Turkish Arabs. By the early decades of the seventeenth century, an estimated 100 000 slaves were in Portugal and its related islands of Madeira.⁴

However, as historian Manning reminds us, despite the growth of enslaved Africans in Iberian Europe as well as across Europe "in 1500, Africans and persons of African descent were a clear minority of the world's slave population."⁵ Blackburn agrees, arguing that, until the early modern period, Africans were rarely held as slaves—either in the ancient world or in medieval Europe. Not therefore

¹Blackburn, "The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery," p. 118; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 129-130; Du Bois, Black Folk: Then and Now, pp. 132-3.

²Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 11; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 25; Berlin, Generations of Captivity, pp. 29-30; Sweet, "Iberia's Root of Racist Thought," pp. 20-21.

³Harris, "The African diaspora in the Old and the New Worlds," in Unesco General History of Africa, Vol. V, p. 113.

⁴Ibid.; Palmer, "Introduction," The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xviii.

⁵Manning, Slavery and African Life, p. 30.

until the biblical interpretation had diffused the myth linking slavery to Africans, did they begin to feature prominently as slaves.¹

Not surprisingly, from the 1600 to 1700 onward, Africans and persons of African descent had become the majority of the world's slave population.² About fifteen percent of the slaves forced out of Africa to the New World arrived between 1601 and 1700. As Thomas observes, however, the scale of the slave trade to the Americas in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century was small. According to him, "until the 1640s, when sugar took over from tobacco in the Caribbean plantations," the slave trade "was still on a fairly small, and therefore a relatively human, if not humane, scale."³

By the late 1600, about three percent of African slave population was shipped to the New World. Although this volume was quite small during this century, some 370,000 slaves were taken from Africa.⁴ Portugal alone is estimated to have taken about 80,000 slaves from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe in the fifty years before 1492, or as many as 150,000 to 200,000 slaves between 1440 and the end of the eighteenth century.⁵

Williams—almost similar to Due Bois and Inikori—argues that there was a close relationship between the exploitation of Africans under slavery and the rise of

¹See, for example, Harris, "The African diaspora in the Old and the New Worlds," p. 113; Blackburn, "The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery," p. 90.

²Manning, Slavery and African Life, p. 30.

³Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 180.

⁴Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis," in Slave Trades, 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced Labour, Vol. 15, ed., Patrick Manning (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 1996), Table 1, p. 42; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 377; Palmer, The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix.

⁵Sweet, "Iberian Root of American Racist Thought," p. 25.

English capitalism.¹ This position, as Williams further argues, was more obvious during the eighteenth century, and rested more on the “economic, not racial” slavery.² Although Williams’s economic thesis of slavery is controversial, his underlying conclusion bears out the strong connection between slavery and the subsequent transformation of English capitalism.³ Historian Morison concurs. “Negro slaves,” he observes, were imported to “to do the heavy work that Indians would not or could not do, and that Europeans were too proud or lazy to do.”⁴ Thus, it was not until the economic exploitation of African slaves had nurtured the seedling of advanced capitalism that their racial background became inferior.⁵

Harris, Sweet and Blackburn might argue that what Williams viewed as the character of economic exploitation originated in the racist ideology of Iberia along the Afro-Asian lanes. Their conclusions might also provide a strong argument that the latter attitude presaged the character of the New World slavery. Besides, it provided an additional basis for understanding the related cultural character of Europeans toward non-Europeans.⁶

While the seventeenth century was largely a take off period of the plantation revolutions, eighteenth century marked the transformation of racial slavery and racial

¹Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1944), especially pp. 51-85, 19-20; Du Bois, Black Folk: Then and Now, pp. 137-9; Inikori, “The slave trade and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870,” pp. 58-68; Inikori, “Africa in world history,” pp. 74-112.

²Ibid.; Williams, pp. 8-9, 19-20.

³Ibid. Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 2-7.

⁴Morison, Oxford History of American People, p. 35.

⁵Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 19-20.

⁶Harris, “The African diaspora in the Old and the New Worlds,” pp. 113-114; Sweet, “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought,” pp. 1-14, 23-4, and Blackburn, “The Old World Background,” pp. 98-102.

capitalism within the new Atlantic system.¹ The number of slaves taken out of Africa during the seventeenth century rose to 1,870,000. By the eighteenth century, the British merchants held the lion's share of the trade, which lasted for over two centuries. This dominance corresponded with its transformation into higher orbits of industrial revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²

Table 3 shows the dominant European nations involved in the transatlantic slave trade at its peak during the eighteenth century. This was a period when the overall English slave import from Africa to the New World was at its height and also when the general slave population in the Americas rose steadily.

Table 3

The Transatlantic Slave Trade, by Major
European Nations, by Populations, 1700-1800

National Carrier	Total
English	2,532,300
Portuguese	1,796,300
French	1,180,300
Dutch	350,900
North America	194,200
Danish	73,900
Other [Swedish Bradenburger]	5,000
Total	6,132,900

Source: Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis," in Slave Trades: 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced Labour, ed., Patrick Manning (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996), Table 4, p. 47; Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern 1492-1800 (New York and London: Verso, 1997), p. 383.

¹Ilfie, The Africans, pp. 127-30, especially, p. 131.

²Ibid.; along with, Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 47; Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 51-85; Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," pp.100-1; W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa (Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited, 1976), pp. 57-9; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 29; Inikori, "The slave trade and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870," pp. 58-68; Blackburn, The New World Slavery, pp. 377, 380-5; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 4-7; F. W. Knight et al., "The African Diaspora," in Unesco General History of Africa: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s, Vol. VI, ed., J. F. Ade Ajayi (Heinemann International: Unesco, 1989), pp. 761-4.

After the seventeenth century England began to occupy a dominant place in the transatlantic slave trade. This took place after Portugal and Spain, and later the Dutch were replaced. From 1700 to 1800 Portugal and France followed the English lead, with the Dutch falling behind although ahead of North America.¹ During the eighteenth century about 6,133,000 slaves were taken out of Africa. The overall slave population of African origin during the same period “grew from about 330,000 in 1700 to over 1,870,000 in 1800.”² After 1720, the annual supplies of slaves to the Americas rose to about 50,000. The largest number of slaves exported in any decade in the eighteenth century rose to about 797,000 during the 1780s.³

From 1441 to 1870, therefore, the forced migration of Africans represented the beginning of the most direct differentiation in the modern world of the races of Africa, Asia, and the Americas from those of Europe. Some scholars have estimated that between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 slaves were taken from Africa during the entire span of the transatlantic slave trade. These figures, mostly of male population, represented only but the known-recorded numbers of human loss to Africa.⁴ Historians are more certain of the number of African slaves distributed in the Americas than the actual numbers taken from its varied regions. The actual numbers

¹Ibid.

²Blackburn, The New World Slavery, pp. 377, 380-1; Iliffe, Africans, pp. 130-1.

³Ibid.

⁴Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, pp. 33-4, 65, 77, 268; Palmer, “Introduction.” in The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 3. On the other hand, however, there are variants among other scholars regarding the general population of the slaves imported to the New World. See, for example, Walters, Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora, pp. 15-16; Segal, The Black Diaspora, p. 4; Fage, A History of Africa, pp. 255; J. E. Inikori, “The Origin of the Diaspora: The Slave Trade from Africa,” Tarikh, v iv, (1978), 8; J F. Ade Ajayi and J E. Inikori, “An account of Research on the Slave Trade in Nigeria,” in The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century (Paris: UNESCO, 1979), p. 248; Iliffe, Africans, p. 131; Du Bois, The Negro, p. 93.

of those who died under the horrific conditions of transportation from the interior of the slave coasts through the Middle Passage to New World are unknown.¹

Part 2: The West African Background of New World Slaves: **Ethno-Regional Typology of the Guinea Coast**

Although Herskovits was probably the first widely recognized American scholar to popularize the West African cultural zones African-Americans, where a majority of the slaves came from, much of his arguments had already been noted by earlier black writers even before the publication of The Negro in 1915.² Later on, however, the Herskovits The Myth of the Negro Past along with The Negro, for example,³ served as important pioneering foundations for explaining the West African origins of African-descended Americans in the U.S.⁴

Undoubtedly a majority of the early waves of slaves exported to the Americas were from West Africa. As time went on, however, West Central Africa began to provide the majority of the slaves.⁵ Anthropologist Herskovits identified the basin of the Senegal River, the Guinea Coast, the Niger Delta,* and the Congo region as the key zones that furnished the bulk of the slaves to New World.⁶

Certainly one of largest proportions of the slaves exported to the Americas came from the Niger Delta ports in the Bight of Biafra (Bonny). As we saw earlier,

¹Ibid.; Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 406.

²See, for example, The Negro, especially the chapters entitled "The Coming of Black Men" and "The Guinea and Congo."

³Ibid.; Melville Herskovits The Myth of the Negro Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1941),

⁴Ibid.

⁵Palmer, "Introduction," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix.

⁶Melville J. Herskovits, The New World Negro: Selected Papers in Afro-American Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 116. *This dissertation emphasizes the crucial historiography of the Niger Delta regions in the making of the Euro-African slave trade, modern Nigeria, and of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the United States.

by 1500 the Portuguese slave trade was underway in the Bight of Bonny, with Sao Tome as one its earliest bases. Thus, by the mid-eighteenth century, the slave trade in the Delta valleys had achieved a dominant position. In fact, until about the first four decades of the nineteenth century, this region led the way throughout the peak years in the supply of human cargoes to the slaving plantations of the Americas.


Therefore, Niger Delta regions, later to become modern Nigeria, formed the macrocosm of the Euro-African slave trade. This background in turn explains the intricate socioeconomic and politico-cultural forces that shaped the Euro-African relations in the entire Delta region. As shall be seen later on, the varying slaving circuits of the Guinea Coast were well known for the trauma surrounding the Euro-African relations in the Niger Delta basin valleys. They were also inextricably intertwined with the major commercial lanes of the Guinea Coast.

The relationship between the Guinea Coast and the Atlantic slave trade as well as the flow of the human cargoes from the Niger Delta basin was important in the making of the Atlantic capitalism. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Guinea Coast and the Niger Delta were adjoined to the Gulf of Guinea and to the Atlantic Ocean, as one of the defining commercial centers in West Africa. During the seventeen and eighteen centuries in West Africa, both the Guinea Coast and the Niger Delta complemented each other as important slave-trading marts.¹

¹Dike, Trade and Politics, p. iii; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 39-40; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 6-7; E. J. Alagoa et al., "The Niger delta and the Cameroon region," in General History of Africa: Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s, Vol. VI, ed., J. F. Ade Ajayi (Ibadan: Heinemann International, Unesco, 1989), pp. 724-748; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 50-61, especially 52-3; David Northrup, "West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800," in Black Experience and the Empire, eds., Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 42-44; Richardson, "Through a Looking Glass...", in Black Experience and the Empire, pp. 64-8.

Figure 2

Map of West Africa in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Showing the Major Commercial Lanes of the Western Sudan, the Guinea Coast, the Trading Centers, Rivers Ports/Towns/Cities, and Cultural Crossroads



Source: Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outline (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), p. 228

Geographically, the Guinea Coast stretched from Sierra-Leone to Liberia to the Ivory Coast. With its vast commercial and cultural links, stretching as far as the coastal ports of Niger Delta states via the Bight of Bonny and the Bight of Benin, this region also embraced the Gold Coast and Dahomey.¹

Historian Philip Curtin observes that the term “Guinea” was a geographical designation capable of changing from century to century. During the early sixteenth century, the “Guinea” embraced the whole western coast of Africa from the Senegal River to the Orange River. Later on, however, this same region stretched from Cape Mount to the Bight of Benin.² By the eighteenth century, the climax of the transatlantic slave trade, the region stretched from present-day Gambia, Senegal, and

¹Herskovits, The New World Negro, p. 116; Du Bois, The Negro, p. 36.

²Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 103-5, 128.

Guinea Bissau to the area known as the “Guinea Coast.”¹ But to historians Meier and Rudwick, however, the Guinea formed an important part of the commercial nerve of the region known as Beled es-Sudan in Medieval Muslim, or the “Land of Blacks.”² To W. E. B. Du Bois the Guinea was “where a marvelous drama of world history has been enacted,” and also the earliest region to be disrupted by the endemic effects of the transatlantic slave trade.³

Perhaps no one factor explains the diverse unities of the races inhabiting the Guinea region more than the four main language families of Africa identified by Joseph H. Greenberg: the Niger-Congo, the Nilo-Saharan, Afro-asiatic, and Khoisan. These languages have over the millennia been known to have a common bond among Africans within and beyond the continent. The Hausa-Fulani language family spoken in Nigeria, stretches from the Sudan to North Africa to the Middle East, and finds expression in the same language family as Berber and Arabic.⁴ On the other hand, however, features of the Ibo language family can be heard as far Ghana and Liberia.⁵

Beyond the aforementioned fact, the Guinea region was “among the important creative centers in the development of human culture.”⁶ Iron, gold, and salt were produced in Africa many centuries before the contact with Europe and

¹Ibid.

²Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 6.

³Du Bois, The Negro, pp 36, 39-40; Du Bois, Black Folk: Then and Now, p. 54.

⁴Joseph H. Greenberg, The Languages of Africa (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963, pp. 38, 68; J. F. A. Ajayi, “The Survey of the Cultural and Political Regions of Africa at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century,” in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Handbook for Teachers and Students, eds., Joseph Anene and Godfrey Brown (Ibadan University Press and Nelson, 1966), pp.76-8.

⁵Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 14.

⁶Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 8.

Arab. "Cloth and clothing," as Thomas Sowell documents, "were manufactured in Africa more than a thousand years before European colonization in the nineteenth century."¹ Besides, its well-known artistic music forms, dance, iron smelting, and religion are increasingly being noted with admiration around the world.²

Africans had also advanced standards of agricultural system and animal husbandry "for centuries before the Europeans came."³ Historians Meier and Rudwick have observed that the agricultural skills of the varied races of the Sudanic and forest areas of the Guinea have been identified as having unusually high standards, and as comparable with those of the ancient Near East, the Indus of Yellow River valleys, and Mesoamerica, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and China. These skills are even believed in some cases to have surpassed those found in the Americas and the Orient.⁴

Also, centuries before European contact, the races of the Guinea region and of the wider Sudanic belt had also evolved a high level of urban civilization. The nature of their human organizations incorporated both centralized and decentralized forms of social and political institutions. Along with their powerful monarchies, these institutions were important in the day-to-day governance of the varied regions and peoples, especially during the eras of the great medieval kingdoms and later of a succession of lesser city-states of the forest kingdoms. Other forms of social organization included sophisticated class differentiation of political structures, such as in division of labor, for example, to achieve a high degree of productivity.

¹Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, p. 113.

²Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 8.

³Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, p. 113.

⁴Ibid.

Women, like men—played an important part in the society in such areas as agricultural work, cloth weaving, and pottery work.¹

These pre-colonial African civilizations were further transformed by the introduction of Islam by around 1050 into the Kingdom of Ghana. From this position Islam later gained further inroad and transformation into Mali, Songhai, and Kanem-Bornu as a medium of cultural exchanges between the races of inland Africa and the Mediterranean Middle East as well as Oriental Far East.² Thus through the cultural bond with Islam and trans-Saharan commerce, Africans were able to forge some strong links “between the Sudan and the Forest Areas.”³

By around the thirteenth century Islam reached the Senegal Valleys. Spreading from this location, it reached the Niger-Benue region of modern Nigeria between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Such cities as Zaria, Kano, and Sokoto emerged as centers of learning and commerce as a result of Islamic influences. More importantly, the Islamic factor enabled this region to share with, as well as to borrow, new sociopolitical organizations from within and beyond in varying art forms, commerce, architecture, and political institutions.⁴

Early European Contacts with the Bights of Bonny and Benin: Ethno-regional Background of the Niger Delta Basins, etc.

Writing in The Transatlantic Slave Trade, historian Rawley states that, “Before the European came to trade Africans had developed long distance trade

¹Du Bois, The Negro, pp. 36-9, 42-3; Lincoln, The Negro Pilgrimage in America, p. 3; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 6, 12-18.

²Fage, A History of Africa, p. 216; J. J. Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (London and New York: Routeledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1965), pp. 187-8, 192-5.

³Ajayi, Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 78.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 79-81; Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines [Revised Edition] (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 154-5; Davidson, The Search for Africa, pp. 34-38, 65; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 8-10.

routes.”¹ This further confirms our earlier hint that, foremost among the ancient routes of contacts by early Iberian explorers and merchants with the races of inland Africa, were those tied to the Sudanic belt as well as to the “trans-Sahara trade [in] gold and slaves.”² The position by Rawley, and later still by Sowell and Northrup, is therefore fully supportive that long-distance trade existed in Africa before the era of European contact.³

For example, in the particular case of South-eastern Nigeria, Northrup makes it plain that, “by the arrival of the Portuguese the region was already a veteran of long-distant trade both up the Niger and westward to the Gold Coast.” He further tells us that “in the case of inter-coastal trade it was the Europeans who had to make the adaptation to the existing African patterns.”⁴ Rawley concurs: “it seems probable that people along the Gulf of Guinea, from western Ghana to the Bight of Biafra, carried on a maritime trade before the arrival of the Portuguese.”⁵ Accordingly, both Northrup and Rawley observations point toward the kind of structural changes brought about by European contacts. Rawley, in fact, makes another observation that might have accounted for a much deeper crisis in the Euro-African relations:

The Atlantic slave trade, therefore, did not initiate long-distance trade among the Africans; rather it redirected trade from a south to north movement to a north to south flow. An effect of the trade was to require the establishment or expansion of trade centers along the coast, where African and Europeans could engage in the trade.⁶

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 268.

²Ibid., p. 269

³Ibid; p. 268; Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, p. 113; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 22; Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” in Black Experience and Empire, pp. 35-7

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 269.

⁶Ibid.

At this point, however, it is important to note the structural effects of the new changes brought upon Africa by the slave trade as well as upon the subsequent exports of slaves from the West African coastal plains to the Americas. For, this reversed pattern “from a south to north movement to a north to south flow” had far reaching consequences in the overall cycle of Euro-African and non-African world relations. Therefore, what Rawley saw as the “expansion of trade centers along the coast”¹ signaled as well the beginning of more serious upset against the downward and upward pull of human development which linked inland Africa via the more familiar Sudanic belt and also via the eastern coastal plains with the outside world.

As we hope to see again in mainland North America, almost a similar pattern as above expressed itself in the manner in which the generation of African slaves during and after slavery inherited a spiral “south to North movement to a north to south flow.” The mainland North American fluctuation of this dynamic was to coincide with the variant between slave societies and societies with slaves, as well as with the regional contradictions leading to the American Civil War.

Therefore, in retrospect to the African experience, despite the modern benefits resulting from the Euro-African relations, it still cannot be denied that the deflection of human movements from the more familiar ancient lanes to the coastal plains were least favorable to West Africans. Given their technological lag in swift oceanic navigation and transportation compared to the early Portuguese, the ultimate loss of well-known medium of exchanges with the outside meant serious structural crisis. In other words, the Iberian incursion represented the strongest contraction of the ancient pathway of inland Africa along the Afro-Asian lanes (See Figure 1).

¹Ibid.

It is therefore not necessarily true, as historians Oliver and Atmore have argued that, “By the eighteenth century, the opening of the Atlantic trade by the Europeans had made a crucial change only among the states of the woodland and the forest zones to the south of the Savannah belt.”¹ This is especially disturbing, if, according to same version, it is also true that: “From their earliest days, these states had all in their external relations faced toward the north.”²

First, until the Iberian Europeans reached the West African coast in the fifteenth century, the Mediterranean was the major commercial contact of Europe.³ Second, by the eighteenth century, it would have been impossible not to see the effects of the broader disruption deflected by the new Atlantic capitalism against Afro-Asia [northern Africa], for example, which included its related unities in the Mediterranean Arab/Asia.

The above development was certain to upset the wider commercial, political, cultural and military alliances that later emerged along the Afro-Asian lanes. The changes brought by the new Atlantic capitalism on the earlier status of inland Africa can then be explained in terms of the varying degrees of structural effects along the major unities of Afro-Asia, as well as across its more vulnerable regions. That is, while the degree of the structural effect was stronger “among the states of the woodland and the forest zones to the south of the savannah belt,”⁴ the basis of the general disruption had serious global implications for the races of Afro-Asia. Certainly, it represented the formative basis especially of the crisis of modern Africa.

¹Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Africa Since 1800, Fifth Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 15.

²Ibid.

³Rawley, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 2-3.

⁴Roland and Atmore, Africa Since 1800, p. 15.

It is our understanding that the preceding development, which corresponded with the early strivings of Iberian Europe to reach inner Africa, began in North Africa. As we saw much earlier, the ultimate success of this venture corresponded with the beginning of the shift from “a south to north movement,”¹ which further compounded and weakened the status of inland Africa. Harris, Thomas and Blackburn have observed that this development was first shaped by the capture of Ceuta in 1415.² This victory was the “turning point for European journeys to West Africa.”³ Being one of the greatest trading centers on the Mediterranean’s south coast, Ceuta intersected with several linkages to the caravan routes. Historian Blackburn argues that its capture raised the hope of the whole of Christian Europe, marking the beginning of the demise of Muslim Arabs and a turning point first for Iberian Europe and later for the whole of Europe in the Afro-Asian power contest.⁴

With the capture of Ceuta, the Portuguese enclaves in North Africa began to serve “as a convenient conduit for trade, a circumstance of special interest to Genoa and Venice.”⁵ Besides, its strategic position placed the Portuguese in a position to lay siege of Algericas and Tangiers, as well as to expand colonization into Madeira in 1419. Later on, of course, it secured the access to the capture and settlement of the Azores between 1427 and 1450. While Cape Bojador fell in 1434, the Portuguese reached the Senegal in 1444. Between 1450 and 1460, they settled in the Cape Verde Islands. Reaching the Gold Coast between 1470 and 1490, they built

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 269.

²Ibid., pp. 21-2; Harris, “The African diaspora in the Old and New Worlds,” Unesco General History of Africa, Vol. V, p. 113; Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 51; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 98-100.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

Forts at El-mina and Axim.¹ Except, therefore, for the intermittent attempts by the Portuguese to Christianize the peoples of Benin and Warri, the contacts with the Bights of Bonny and Benin, which dates back to the fifteenth century, symbolized the beginning of a markedly different era.² Similar to the experiences in the Kongo, early Portuguese contacts with the Niger Delta and the Cross River regions had seemed poised right from the onset to be least favorable.³

The Iberian intrusion therefore marked the beginning of sustainable contacts between Europeans and the Niger Delta valley peoples in the modern era. This came to the fore with the visit of two Portuguese explorers: Fernando Po and Pero de Centra, in 1472 and 1473.⁴ By 1485, when Jao Alfonzo d'Aveiro reportedly reached Benin, all the strategic lanes of earlier commercial contacts with the outside world had been disrupted. Similarly, nearly all the ancient routes linking the Guinea Coast to the wider Sudanic transitional belt into North Africa had been sealed. The eastern coastal routes via the Indian Ocean to the Orient were also affected.⁵ This development probably completed the shift from a "south to North movement to a north to south flow."⁶

¹Ibid., Blackburn, pp. 102-3; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 1-3. 5; Fage, A History of Africa, pp. 219-228; Anene, "Slavery and Slave Trade," p. 98; Nehemiah Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali (New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 133-5.

²E. A. Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, 1842-1914: A Political and Social Analysis (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1966), p. 3.

³This is confirmed by the earlier emphases on the character of the Portuguese mission in the Kongo. For example, see earlier notes on Anene, Iliffe, Sweet, including Blackburn, The New World Slavery, pp. 117-119.

⁴Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 2; Fredoline A. Anunobi, The Implications of Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund and Africa (Latham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1992), p. 54.

⁵Ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, pp. 98-103. See also for related details, some emphases by historian Nehemiah Levtzion, Ancient Ghana and Mali, pp. 128-135; Ronald Segal, The Race War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), pp. 36-37.

⁶Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 269.

By itself, however, the beginning of this more intensive cycle of commerce on human cargoes signaled the demise of Africa's more favorable status along the ancient lanes. It also marked the beginning of the demise of interactive pull of downward and upward exchanges and human development along the Afro-Arab/Asian lanes. The ancient lanes of pre-European era, although less advanced in terms of techniques of human exchanges and development, were at least more favorable to activities of downward and upward development, which tied inland Africa to the outside world.¹

It is most unlikely, as sometimes alleged, that it was the absence of essential items of global commerce which lured West Africans into active involvement in the slave trade. Such a position is not likely to explain the relationship between their exploitation and the development of early phases of the Atlantic capitalism.² There are in fact some hints that, until the discovery of the New World, the onset of commercial exchanges were more favorable to West Africans than to the Portuguese. As historian Northrup writes, "To earn sufficient capital to buy the Asian and African products they desired, the Portuguese were forced to enter into carrying the trade, plying ancient routes between traditional customers."³ There are even strong evidences that West Africans possessed and produced high quality of indigenous

¹Ibid. The emphases by Horton and Horton, Thomas, Blackburn, Davidson, Levtzion, and Segal, for example, corresponded with a reversal in the earlier trends of downward and upward development of inland Africa along the Afro-Asian lanes. On the other hand, however, the enormous advancement of the races of mankind since the opening of the modern era seems not to have lessened the still evolving crisis of the ancient pathway of inland Africa.

²For example, this is supported by the advantages of African labor over Indians and indeed whites indentured servants during the early phases of the Atlantic capitalism. See earlier notes on Williams, Capitalism and Slavery; and Morison, History of the American People.

³Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 22.

items like metals, iron, gold, wood work, ivory, and cloth, for example, before European contact.¹ Hence, the Atlantic slave trade shifted the early phases of positive transformation which were more favorable to inland Africa within and far beyond toward areas of extreme oppositional rewards.

Beyond the above fact, however, it is worth noting that both for the early Iberian merchants as well as for succession of other competing Europeans, the underlying reason of the early contacts was the search for legitimate commercial partnership with inland Africans.² Historian Northrup again captures an excellent trend in the preceding development in the particular case of the arrival of English merchants in the Kingdom of Benin in 1553. He observes that the early interest of the English merchants in the Niger Delta was to purchase “large quantity of Benin’s pungent pepper, which the Portuguese had earlier introduced to Europe.” Responding to this desire, “the Oba arranged for the visitors to inspect the sacks of peppercorns in a nearby warehouse.”³

Thus, during the pre-Iberian contact, the slave trade was not as dominant an item of trade in West Africa as non-human products. “Within Guinea itself,” as Segal also documented, “stone and glass beads, cloth and trinkets were manufactured, especially in Yorubaland, for sale to communities elsewhere in the area.”⁴ Corresponding with this development, the indigenous peoples of the Delta traded among themselves in gold, malaguetta, Benin pepper, salt, ivory, palm oil, and timber. Later on, however, with the contacts of European merchants, items of

¹David Northrup, Africa’s Discovery of Europe, 1450-1850 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 80-6.

²This is supported by earlier notes.

³Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” p. 35.

⁴Segal, Race War, p. 36.

trade shifted to “sylvan products,” where such items—as gold, hides, palm oil, salt, and pepper—were often exchanged for Portuguese beads, spirit, brass pots, bracelets, knives, and cloth, etc. On the larger human plains, a majority of the Delta peoples were fishermen, farmers, canoe makers, potters, iron smelters, salt makers, cloth dyers, leather makers, blacksmith, artisans, and wood carvers.¹

Even with the disadvantage of not having large sized sea-faring ships to facilitate swift movements as the early Iberian and the later waves of European merchants, the Delta middlemen were undoubtedly in advantageous positions over their counterparts in the coastal plains.² Of course, until the mid-sixteenth century, the Euro-African slave trade was not a significant arm of commerce among the varied races that converged on the shores of the Niger Delta basins. Segal further documents that:

What seems to be significantly missing as a major item in the early Guinea trade is the slave. Certainly there were slaves in the forest regions, as agricultural laborers, porters and domestic servants; but trade in slaves on any significant scale seems only to have begun after the growth of Islam in the Sudan and to have reached the coastlands only with the development of the European demand from the sixteenth century onwards.³

¹Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 1-4; Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p. 3; Fage, A History of Africa, p. 272; David Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 16-21; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 114; Anunobi, The Implications of Conditionality, p. 54; Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, p. 113.

²Ibid., Dike, pp. 20-31; also, see Anene, “Slavery and Slave Trade,” p. 98; A. J. H. Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891: The Impact of the International Economy Upon A Traditional Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp.3-9; Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines, p. 149; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 16-17; Toyin Falola and Akanmu Adebayo, “Pre-colonial Nigeria: north of the Niger-Benue,” in Nigerian History and Culture, pp.78-80; Obaro Ikime, “The Peoples and Kingdoms of the Delta Province,” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, ed., Obaro Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, 1999), pp. 102-8; Segal, The Black Diaspora, p. 11; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 10.

³Segal, Race War, p. 36.

Admittedly, prior to 1500, the forms of slavery that existed in the Niger Delta basin regions were largely based on domestic services, and mostly employed in military services of the city-states, agricultural works, and related services within family households. Despite the inherent socio-cultural stigma of slavery everywhere, its pre-European experience was fairly mild.¹

As for the people taken into slavery, they were usually those accused of deviant social behavior, such as debtors and war captives.² The enslaved sometimes had the good fortune of being assimilated as members of society with full support to express their freedom and to own land in which to build homes. Others could play vital roles in society, with little or no social stigma on their status, while “the intelligent, loyal and hardworking slave enjoyed the confidence of his master and this ensured his economic advantage.”³

Nor does the preceding mean that, pre-European slavery among the Delta peoples was a comfortable experience. For, according to Dike, it was not. “It cannot be denied that an element of cruelty and even brutality was ever present. A cruel master could, on occasion, take the life of his slave for very trifling offenses.”⁴

¹Ibid., Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 35-7.

²Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 11-12; Segal, The Black Diaspora, p. 11; Iliffe, Africans, p. 132-3; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 114.

³Kenneth O. Dike and Felicia Ekejiuba, The Aro of South-eastern Nigeria, 1650-1980: A study of socio-economic formation and transformation in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 248-9. Also, see, for example, the corresponding background on pre-European slavery in some parts of Africa by Anene, “Slavery and the Slave Trade,” pp. 92-4; Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now, pp. 132-5; Rodney, “African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast,” pp.254-261; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 31-2; Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, pp. 44-5.

⁴Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 35.

Evidences abound within and beyond the Delta region in support of the exploitation of the enslaved. For example, the existence of ancient commercial lanes linking the Niger Delta states to the Guinea Coast to the wider Sudanic belt, meant that some form of brutality went along with the hunting down, selling, and crossing of slaves via the Sahara to North Africa to the Mediterranean world.¹ Yet, as we pointed out earlier, slavery in West Africa differed from that of the New World. Both its hereditary effects on the descendants of slaves and the general attitude of racial differentiation triggered by the Portuguese mission, was bound to negatively impact upon the varying Delta regions and peoples.²

By the late sixteenth when Euro-African relations in the Delta entered a markedly dissimilar historical cycle, the socio-cultural orbit of its ancient system of slavery also shifted.³ This era was marked by intense fluctuations in both the cultural and commercial values of the dominant states of Southern and Western Europe between the Afro-Asian peripheries and West Africa as well as the New World. As we have attempted to show all along, it was this development that formed the basis of the subsequent exploitation of West Africans under racial slavery.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 36-7; Anene, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," pp. 92-3, 9, 96-8; Emmanuel Ayandeale, "External Influences on African Society," in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 133; Bernard Lewis, "The African Diaspora and the Civilization of Islam," in The African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays, eds., Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rothberg (Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 44.

²See earlier notes, along with Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 44-5.

³Davidson, Africa in History: Theme and Outlines, p. 149; Ayandeale, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p.3.

⁴Ibid., Davidson, pp. 148-150; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 1-3; Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 12-14; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 10-14.

First, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Iberian Europe dominated West African commerce, “gold constituted the main quest,” and Africans as well as Europeans shared the benefits of commercial relations almost on mutual and basis.¹ Second, when in 1530, “the golden age of the Guinea traffic in so far as Portugal was concerned ended,” the traumatic cycle of Euro-African slave trade begun to enforce its claws more strongly Africans.² With this development, the commercial interests of the competing states of Europe began to correspond with fierce rivalries on the West coast of Africa as well as in the New World. Within the Niger Delta basins, the new cycle was marked by increased export of slaves to the Americas.³ According to historian Vincent Thompson, this new order of Euro-African slave-trade was determined largely by the interests of European merchants. Marginalized slave-trading profits thus began to transform the ancient order of internal slavery among the varying West African coastal potentates.⁴

Thus, the mercantilist interests of the competing states of Europe were later to transform the earlier character of domestic slavery in West Africa. It was this development, to a large extent, which made the West African region and its peoples the target of exploited labor pull to the European plantations in the Americas.⁵

¹Ibid., Dike, pp. 4-9; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 46-8, 54.

²Ibid., p. 2.

³Ibid. Also, see Tables 4 and 5, and 7.2 further down in this chapter.

⁴Thompson, The Making of the African Diaspora, pp. 63-73.

⁵Ibid. Also, see: Walter Rodney, “African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast....,” pp. 240-53; Sweet, “The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought,” pp. 1-14, 23-4; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-8, 98-102; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 5.

Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the slave merchants of the Dutch Netherlands, England, France, Portugal, and Spain frequented the Bights of Bonny and Benin. The result was increased slave imports to the Americas.¹ The particular reference to England is significant. For, it dominated the commerce of the Delta basins for over two hundred years.² Its successful challenge to the Portuguese dominance can be traced to 1553. This was when Captain Windham, the first British to explore the Niger Delta basin, reached the Bight of Bonny. His arrival, along with some merchants, who later visited the Oba of Benin, formed an important basis in the subsequent overthrow of Portuguese commercial monopoly in the Niger Delta.³

Historian Inikori, almost like historian Northrup, argues that the primary intention of early Iberians—as for the English merchants—was influenced by “the desire to develop trade with Africa in the products of her soil—gold, pepper, ivory, etc.”⁴ This twin mission of the early Iberian Europe, and later of some European states, and particularly of England—was to make the Niger Delta region one of the most active commercial marts in the history of the transatlantic slave trade. As we indicated earlier, it was the emergence of the plantation revolution in the New World

¹Dike and Ekejiuba, The Aro of south-eastern Nigeria, pp. 31-3; Manning, Slavery and African Life, p. 96; Patrick Manning, “Migration of Africans to the Americas: The Impact on Africans, Africa, and the New World,” in Slave Trades, 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced Labour, Vol. 15, ed., Patrick Manning (Brookfield: Variorum, 1996), p. xx; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 54.

²Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 47; Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” p. 59.

³Anene, “Slavery and Slave Trade,” pp. 100; Anunobi, Implication of Conditionality, pp. 54-5; Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 12; Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” p. 35; Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” p. 60.

⁴*Ibid.*; Inikori, “The Slave Trade and the Atlantic Economies, 1451-1870,” p. 76.

that triggered a corresponding hunt for slaves in West Africa.¹ As historian Richardson observes, in the 245 years separating the first known English slaving voyage to Africa in 1562 and its abolition in 1807, its merchants dispatched about 10,000 voyages to Africa. Overall these English ships carried about “3.4 million or more enslaved Africans to the Americas.”² This meant that “one in three or four of all enslaved Africans entering the Atlantic slave trade during its history,” did so via the English ships.³

Map 3.1 shows the major Euro-African commercial routes in the Niger Delta valleys in the bulk of the era of the English dominance of the slave trade and later of the trading on palm oil. It shows as well the major port-cities, regions, and varied geographical zones and diverse unities of the peoples. As shown, the Niger Delta valleys occupied the greater part of the lowland belt: to the west, it was bounded by the Benin River and to the east by the Cross River basin, and from these enclaves, stretches to include the coast and sea lanes of the Cameroon Mountains. With an area of 270 miles along the Atlantic Coast, it covers about 120 miles in depth.⁴

¹See, for example, Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 27-31; Anene, “Slavery and Slave Trade,” p. 98; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 10-13; Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, pp. 3-4; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 25-7; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 113; Dike and Ekejiuba, The Aro of South-eastern Nigeria, pp. 32-3; Fage, A History of Africa, p. 266; Ikime, in Groundwork of Nigerian History, pp. 102-8; Rodney, “African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast ...,” pp. 254-61; Joseph Inikori, “Slavery in Africa and the Transatlantic Slave Trade,” p. 62; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 50-76; Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” pp. 41-6; Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” pp. 66-8.

²Ibid.; Richardson, p. 59.

³Ibid.

⁴Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 19.


Map 3.2 is a more complete representation of the major commercial centers along with the physical features of the Niger Delta basins in the nineteenth century. As shown by the data, the varied regions and peoples of the Delta basins were as culturally related as they were dissimilar, yet apparently very closely intertwined in their commercial organizations (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Their language families formed the basic features of commonalities and differences. For example, while the Ibo and Ibibio are culturally closer, they are in the opposite sides of the Niger Kongo language family. Similarly, while the Ibo is the easternmost extension of the Kwa sub-family of Niger Kongo language, the Ibibio is its westernmost extension of the Benue-Congo sub-family. To the eastern Delta lies the Cross River basin, inhabited mostly by the Efik people and their related Ibibio brethren, along with related Bantu-speaking groups to the north.¹

Further subdivision shows that the Efik of Old Calabar, Ibibio, and Annang were also related in pre-historic times and belonged to the Benue-Congo sub-family. Elsewhere other sub-variations of the Ibo and Ibibio suggest that the former has close affinity with the Sudanic sub-language families, while the latter shares some semi-Bantu traits. On the other hand, however, the immediate Ibo and Ijo neighbors belonged to the “kwa” sub-family of the Niger-Congo language family.²

¹Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 14; Alagoa et al, Africa in the Nineteenth Century, p. 724. For further summaries of Nigeria's ethnic groups and language families, see Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 10-18.

²Ibid. Also, see: J. H. Greenberg, The Languages of Africa (Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 38, 68; Ajayi, Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, pp. 76-8; Iliffe, Africans, p. 11; Edet A. Udo, Who Are the Ibibio? (Onitsha: Africana-REP Publishers Limited, 1983), pp. 106-7, 315.

Figure 3.1
Map of the Niger Delta City-States Showing the Major
Slave-Trading and Palm Oil Routes, by the
Major Rivers/Ports and Cities in the Nineteenth Century



Source: K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Political and Economic History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 18.

The Ijo people occupied a greater part of the coastal regions from the west, comprising of creeks and swamplands. The small Itsekiri kingdom, with some influence over the wide area of the Delta, was located in the western extremity of the Niger Delta. To the immediate west was the once dominant political and cultural polity of Benin and its related neighbors.¹ On the other hand, the Ibo and the Ijo in the western banks of the lower Niger are extensions of their core group east of the Niger. They stretched as far as the northern reaches of Cross River basin. The Ibo

¹Ibid.; Nwana Ezewunwa, "Pre-colonial Nigeria: east of the Niger," in Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 20-21.

distribution, in particular, lies more to the easterly bend of the Niger Delta.¹ The western delta was home to the Yoruba and to the Edo peoples. While the Edo people were in the eastern part, the Yoruba—the most populous group—were in the western and northern parts. The Yoruba had more established ancestral links as well as closer coastal contacts with the Edo, Itsekiri, and the Egun. Alternately, the Edo had closer coastal contacts with the Ibo, Urhobo, Ijo and Isoko.²

Ethnic groups in the western Delta spoke languages that were not mutually intelligible, but which belonged to a cluster of closely related “kwa” sub-group of the Niger-Congo family. Their cultural and linguistic features are known to have extended to the southwestern regions of the modern republic of Benin and Togo.³

The area to the north of the Niger and Benue Rivers confluence was home to a large number of ethnic groups with greater linguistic and cultural variations than to east and west of the Niger Delta basins. The major ethnic groups in this region, which included the Kanuri, the Hausa and later the Fulani, belong to the large Afro-asiatic language family. This language family, with its diverse spread across the Sudan and North Africa and the Middle East, is classified under the same language family as Berber and Arabic.⁴ Historians Falola and Adebayo have observed that the pre-colonial peoples of the Niger-Benue confluence and later of modern Northern

¹Ibid.


²A. Akinjogbin and Biodun Adediran, “Pre-colonial Nigeria: west of the Niger,” in Nigerian History and Culture, p. 35.

³Ibid.

⁴Iliffe, Africans, pp. 10-11; Ayaji, in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 87.

Nigeria were the more fortunate ones.¹ This was because their favorable location in the savannah belt allowed for the domestication of animals and agricultural productivity. Besides, this region and its peoples were more prone to contacts with the outside world.

Figure 3.2
Map Showing the Geographic Zones of the Niger Delta and the Cameroon, by Major Slave-Trading Routes, by Modern Port-Towns and Cities and River lanes in the Nineteenth Century



Source: E.J. Alagoa et al., "the Niger Delta and the Cameroon", in General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century until 1880s, Vol. VI, ed., J.E. Ade Ajayi (Unesco, 1989), p. 725.

One of the results of these contacts was the introduction of Islamic values and related institutions into the region. With this development came human adjustment

¹Toyin Falola and A. Adebayo, "Pre-colonial Nigeria: north of the Niger-Benue," in Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 56-78.

to foreign ideas via North Africa, Southern Europe, and Asia. The inhabitants of the Niger-Benue confluence were highly advanced in such professions as artisanship, animal skin work, leatherwork, and manufacturing businesses.¹

The Niger Delta City-States in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade

Historian Dike's Trade and Politics, especially the first four chapters, serves as a central source of information in this author's discussing of the Euro-African slave trade connection in the Niger Delta valleys. This means that, while other relevant sources are employed, Dike's work forms a major source of reference. First, some of the emphases in his pioneering work are still relevant to understanding this particular section of the dissertation. Dike's pioneering work was among the first to defend the existence of viable institutions of the Niger Delta city-states during the era of the transatlantic slave trade. Given the recurring crisis of post-colonial institutions in modern Nigeria, there seems even a need for re-evaluating some aspects of the Dike thesis both on the impact of the Euro-African relations as well as on the character of modern Nigeria.²

For example, beginning in the sixteenth century, and lasting about four hundred years, the commerce on "living tools became the main export of the Niger Delta and provided the wealth upon which the city-states of Brass, Bonny, New

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 30-39. Also, see for further explanation of this background on the pre-colonial history of Niger Delta/Cross River and Euro-African relations: Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 36-44; Alagoa., Unesco General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 724-7; Latham, Old Calabar; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers; Okwudiba Nnoli, "A Short History of Nigerian Underdevelopment," in Path to Nigerian Development, ed., Okwudiba Nnoli (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1981), pp. 94-134; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, pp. 20-27. However, a greater part of Dike's pioneering thesis forms a major portion in this section of the dissertation.

Calabar and Old Calabar thrive.”¹ Dike’s work also gives accounts of the existence of some influential socio-political institutions, with strong indigenous representation and interests in the commercial transactions of the Niger Delta city-states. He argues that, collectively, they were the nerves of the varying coastal trading centers before the demise of the slave trade. Until 1807, which marked the beginning of legitimate trade, the city-states served as the central unifying impulse of human interactions among the varying coastal races.²

Dike and Alagoa as well as Northrup have observed that a majority of these “city-states or trading centers” developed before the external trade with European merchants. But with the expansion of slave trade in the seventeenth century, they began to organize in response to their varied interests.³

Ultimately, it was the British Parliamentary Act of 1807 abolishing the foreign slave trade that tilted the earlier direction of the Euro-African commercial relations in the Niger Delta basins. Prior to this, many clusters of city-states, with their political as well as social institutions, were more interested in serving the diverse interests of the coastal peoples. The available commercial options during the early contact periods required collaboration with the indigenous peoples.⁴ This was when the European flag did not follow trade, and when “The lands of Guinea remained under native governments and the Europeans concerned themselves almost

¹Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria*, p. 3.

²*Ibid.*; Dike, *Trade and Politics*, Chapters 1-3, especially pp. iii-iv.

³*Ibid.*; Alagoa, *Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 724-748; E. J. Alagoa “Long Distant Trade and States in the Niger delta,” *Journal of African History*, Vol. 11, No. 3. 1970, p. 23; E. J. Alagoa, “Peoples of the Cross River Valley and the Eastern Niger Delta,” in *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, ed., Obaro Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, 1999), pp. 68-72. See earlier notes on Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*.

⁴Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” in *Black Experience and the Empire*, p. 42-3; Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, pp. 16-22.

exclusively with trade.”¹ So, before the displacement of the Delta middlemen, the concept of the Niger Delta city-states—like that of the Greek city-states—rested upon several clusters of commercially related or unrelated ethnic groups. Despite their diverse origins, their interests were closely tied via the varying trading centers by mutual alliances and shared sense of collective survival.

The process of founding and establishing the city-states or trading centers with working social institutions, was probably completed by the end of the sixteenth century. Founded with the sole desire to participate in the lucrative commerce of the “Atlantic community,” these city-states had the underlying design of strengthening the role of indigenous merchants of the Delta.² As Dike’s account shows, the city-states were divided into two broad political groups: the first group, which included the monarchies and the republic, embraced the coastal areas of Bonny, New Calabar, and Warri, Bell Town, and Aqua Town in the Cameroon. The second group including the republics and represented by single trading units, were politically divided into Old Calabar, Brass, and the Cameroon.³

Characteristically, the city-states, as noted earlier, were based on the loose unities of varying “tribal states” and peoples who bore collective interest to shared values. Despite cultural difference, they were indissolubly bound together by strong economic ties. Within this framework, the varying peoples of the Niger Delta valleys and their interior regions bonded together due to the existence of internally derived institutions. The residents of the major trading centers united as a group

¹Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 4, 7, 10-11, 18-19, 30-1, 47.

²Ibid., pp. 28, 31.

³Ibid., pp. 30-1

rather than as distant descent groups.¹ Because no single Delta tribe had a monopoly over others on items of trade, such ethnic groups as the Yoruba, Edo, Bini, Ijo, Ibo, Ekoi, Ibibio, and Efik, were in commercial and cultural exchanges with linguistically distinctive races like the Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani. While these groups were people apart, collectively they represented the clashing of cultures of the tribal hinterland and the Atlantic community. For instance, the demographic composition of Old Calabar comprised inhabitants of almost any Delta state, or represented “about 13 different tribes.”² Historian Edet Udo observes that, as a result of the slave trade and later of the legitimate trade, “Calabar became a sort of New York City of Ibibioland, harbouring hundreds of peoples from many areas” of the Niger Delta.³

Certainly between the seventeenth and eighteenth century, “the Delta was one of the most important, if not the leading, slaving mart in West Africa.”⁴ Upon this region and its varied peoples rested the enormous crisis resulting from centuries of European commercial rivalries during the era of the transatlantic slave trade that “left a psychological legacy of suspicion, servility, or hostility which has been one of the most serious obstacles in Eurafrican relations,” as well as a major cause of human underdevelopment.⁵ The transformation of this crisis was particularly much stronger from the eighteenth century to the early decades of the nineteenth century. However,

¹Ibid., pp. 19-30. Northrup, in “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800” (pp. 35-7), appears to have complemented this development in reference to the pattern of shared inter-regional trade.

²Ibid., pp. 20-6; Udo, Who Are the Ibibio, pp. 8-9.

³Ibid.; Udo, p. 50.

⁴Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. x, 1-3; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 39-41.

⁵Ibid.; Dike, pp. 47-56; Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, pp. 3-9; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 120; Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” in Black Experience and the Empire, pp. 61-8.

the leap toward the traumatic cycle of the Atlantic slave trade in the Niger Delta basins can be traced to the sixteenth century. But from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century, especially the eighteenth, the slave trade became entrenched as the nerves of Delta basins, and such groups as Ijo, Efik, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Bini, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani also became susceptible to its lures.¹

Probably the Ijo people, Kalabari or Caravallies were among the earliest to participate in large numbers in the transatlantic slave trade from present-day location of Nigeria.² This makes sense in light of the fact that, before the arrival of the Portuguese, they possessed large canoes that facilitated access to the major trading port-centers of the Niger Delta. Their canoes were effective in facilitating commercial interactions between the creek and the interior of the hinterland of the slave-coasts. These advantages later translated into the success of the Ijo middlemen. These middlemen were already well established in trading valuable items such as salt and fish, for example, which they later exchanged for copper/bracelets with the Portuguese. This position also later yielded to their advantage.³

The sources for acquiring slaves varied from one region of the Delta to another. For example, in the particular case of the Bight of Bonny, the sources varied from raiding for slaves to warfare, crime, kidnapping, failure to adhere to the law, and debt.⁴ From the 1520 onward, when the Cross River and Bonny enclaves

¹Ibid., Olaniyan, p. 119; Alagoa, Unesco History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 724-7; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-21; Ikime, Groundwork of Nigerian History, pp. 89, 102-8; J. F. Ade Ajayi, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Nigeria," in Tradition and Change in Africa, ed., Toyin Falola (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2000), p. 263.

²Ibid., Olaniyan; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 50-51; Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 169; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 46-7.

³Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 2-3, 26-7.

⁴Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 65-76.

began to surpass Benin as leading slave-trading centers of Niger Delta, most of the slaves were taken in inter-community conflicts as war captives. Generally between the 1480 and the 1520, when the slave-trading mart extended to Ijebu and the kingdom of Benin, slaves sold to the Portuguese were mostly taken in wars. Yoruba slaves taken as captives were brought all the way from the interior to the major port-cities for sale; others were taken from the hinterland north of the Niger Delta basin.¹

From about the mid-sixteenth century to the late-eighteenth century, therefore, the Cross River and Bonny enclaves were among the busiest slave-trading markets in West Africa. This rise of the slave-trading mart of Old Calabar and Bonny was probably due more to the fading influences of the slave trade in Benin in the western Delta during the late seventeenth century. The explanation advanced by some historians is closely associated with religious considerations. This was also linked to the banning on the sale of male slaves to the Portuguese from 1516 to the close of the seventeenth century. Iliffe's observation is supportive that, from the 1516 onward, when "Benin ceased to export male slaves, fearing to loss manpower," most of the slaves sold to the Portuguese "came from the Niger Delta and Igbo country to the east."² This further explains why, the Benin ports, which were initially useful in the slave trade, later had limited role for the next two centuries.³

The above in turn explains why—until the ban on Benin was lifted between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the port-cities of Old Calabar and Bonny were among the most attractive slave-trading marts in West Africa. Besides, a

¹Alagoa, *Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 724-7

²Ibid.; Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, p. 114; Iliffe, *Africans*, pp. 129-130; Ryder, "The Benin Kingdom," *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, p. 120.

³Ibid.

majority of the slaves exported from the Bight of Bonny and the Cross river were from Iboland.¹ As a matter of fact, for 190 years—that is, from 1650 to 1841—Old Calabar and Bonny led the way as both the busiest and most important slaving ports of the Niger Delta.²

As in the sixteenth century, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and indeed some part of the nineteenth century, the bulk of the slaves from the Old Calabar and Bonny—including Benin and the related enclaves of Itsekiri—were either prisoners of war, or taken during slaving expeditions.³ Such powerful kingdoms as Dahomey, Benin, and Oyo also acquired their human cargoes through military expansion and conquest.⁴ But, in the case of Benin, historian Ryder has argued that the acquisition of slaves during the last decade of the seventeenth century and greater part of the eighteenth century was marked by palace crises. This background led directly to civil war as well as to the outward increases in the number of people captured and exported as rebels to the New World.⁵

Therefore, Bonny not only occupied a strategic position in the organization of the Niger Delta city-states but was also considered the best port of commercial exchange and contacts of the Delta. Throughout a greater part of Euro-African relations, it dominated as “the economic and political center of the Niger Delta.”⁶ Well-suited for European ships due to its proximity to the sea and connection with

¹Ibid.; Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” pp. 42-46; ; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 52-61; Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” pp. 65-8.

²Ibid.; Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past, p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 28-9; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-22.

³Ibid.; Dike, pp. 26-7; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 65-76; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 114 –116; Ryder, “The Benin Kingdom,” p. 120.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., Dike, p. 31.

the great rivers of Central Africa, it justifiably served as the principal seat of slave voyages to the Americas.¹ Also, as a leading slave-trading mart from the close of the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, Bonny was ahead of Calabar and other port-cities of the Niger-Delta. Due to its strategic location, its vast trading markets stretched as far as Iboland and the Cross River basin areas.²

The port of Old Calabar was similar to Bonny although second in importance as a slave-trading mart. Next to Bonny and Calabar was the port of Opobo, which emerged as another important slave-trading nerve of the Delta from the mid-eighteenth to some part of the nineteenth century.³

Significantly, the high volume of slaves exported from the Niger Delta basins, especially during the eighteenth century, was to transform the character of slavery among the varied institutions of the city-states. The slave merchants of Old Calabar, Bonny, and Ijo, for example, began to exploit these indigenous institutions to supply the human cargoes. Old Calabar, with the Ekpe Society, emerged as a commercial clearinghouse for debt collection. This secret society controlled the flow of human cargoes east of the Bight of Bonny during the second half of the eighteenth century. It also facilitated the flow of the human cargoes exported to the Americas.⁴

In Iboland was the popular Aro Chukwu Oracle. This institution played a key role east and west of the Niger Delta as a catchman network during the slave trade.⁵ Among the Ijo people emerged the “canoe house,” a slaving institution

¹Ibid., p. 24. Also, see earlier notes on Latham, Northrup and Richardson.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 24-25; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 115-116.

⁴Ibid., Olaniyan, p. 118; Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p. 4; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 3, 35-7; Northrup, “West Africans and the Atlantic, 1550-1800,” p. 46.

⁵Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 38-9; Iliffe, Africans, p. 134.

comprised of descent group, slave-trading merchants, and political faction groups. Their members paddled the canoes up the Niger hunting and collecting slaves.¹

Collectively, these varied commercial institutions served as important slave-trading networks linking east and west of the Niger belt to its northern hinterland. Until the destruction of the Aro Chukwu Oracle by the British expeditionary force in 1900, its Long Juju determined the course of the slave trade in Iboland land and beyond. Probably the influences of the “Ekpe secret society” and the “Aro Chukwu Oracle,” as well as Ijo “canoe house,” could explain why Old Calabar and Bonny were widely known for their role in the shipments of slaves to New World.²

To the west of the Delta Yorubaland, the heartland of the once powerful Oyo Empire, the slave middlemen had their commercial centers for running and administering the major trading routes from the interior to the coast. These commercial centers served as channels for collecting taxes and fees on the trade as well as for controlling the passage of the northern merchants into the major slaving centers.³ The varying socio-political institutions that emerged in support of the foreign slave trade in the Niger Delta suggested that the alternative provided by the Euro-African connection was seated in the future disruption of their diverse unities.

The Niger Delta City-States and the Transatlantic Slave Trade: Exports and Demography, 1480-1800

There is need then to look at the demography of the Euro-African slave trade in the region of the Niger Delta valleys. The nucleus of an elaborate system of forced migration from the Niger Delta to the Atlantic Coast to Europe can be traced

¹Ibid.

²Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, Chapter V, especially, pp. 114-131; Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, p. 118.

³Ibid.

to the period between 1479 and 1480, and probably with its controlling point at Sao Tome.¹ During the early contact period, Portuguese merchants made a round trip to the Niger Delta that yielded some 400 slaves, who were later sold in the Gold Coast.² By the early decade of the 1600s, the Portuguese and Spanish ships were known to be involved in commerce of the human cargoes over all West Africa. From 1480 to 1630, an estimated 2,000 slaves were annually taken out of the Niger Delta shores.³

As we saw earlier, the genesis of this early phase of slave exports was closely linked to the Atlantic islands and from there later still, into Europe. For, with the expansion of the sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands, the Portuguese began to pay regular visits to the rivers west of Niger Delta, taking back slaves via their ships. By 1485, they had established some slaving contacts with the kingdom of Benin, and were in a favorable position to extend their slaving mart to the Ijebu Kingdom west of the Niger Delta. This venture not only was the prelude to large scale slavery and slave trade in the region, it was later accompanied by the opening of other slave-trading posts at Ughoton on the Benin River, Itsekiri and the western Ijo basin areas.⁴ The period from 1630 to 1730, which represented the leap in the cycle of New World plantation revolutions, therefore, corresponded with increases in the exports of slaves from the Niger Delta regions. During this period, the number of slaves exported from the shores of the Niger Delta basins probably exceeded 5,000 annually.⁵ Thus, the volume of slaves taken from the port-cities of the Niger Delta to the Americas

¹Ibid., Northrup, p. 51.

²J. D. Fage, "Slaves and Society in Western Africa, c. 1445-1700," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour: An Expanding World, Vol. 16, ed., Colin A. Palmer (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 1998), p. 298.

³Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, p. 119; Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 169.

⁴Ibid.; Olaniyan, pp. 113-114.

⁵Ibid., Olaniyan, p. 119.

began to peak from the mid-seventeenth century onward. By 1672, one record stated that the demand for slaves in Old Calabar and Bonny “began to outstrip the supply,” and the English merchants were able to ship about 210 slaves from this region to Barbados.¹

After the Anglo-French wars, when England emerged as the unquestionable leader of the Atlantic commerce, its slave merchants controlled the dominant share of the trade on human cargoes along the West African coast.² Figure 4 shows a graphic overview of the frequency of the Liverpool slaving contacts at the West African ports during the eighteenth century. Of the 1,099 ships that left Liverpool for West Africa between 1795 and 1804, the Old Calabar and Bonny ports were among their main areas of embarkation. Again, of the 24 captains who harbored at the port of Calabar between 1785 and 1787, “at least 13 were Liverpool men.”³

According to historian Curtin, the total population of slaves exported per decade from the Bight of Bonny rose to 4,500 between 1721 and 1730.⁴ After 1730, when the volume rose due to increased demand for slaves, an average of 7,100 slaves per annum was shipped between 1741 and 1750; moreover, another 12,500 per annum was shipped between 1760 and 1770. The peak period of this export from the Bight of Bonny in the 1790s averaged some 17,400 slaves per year.⁵ The overall exports of slaves rose to 139,000 between 1761 and 1770, and finally to 137,600 between 1791 and 1800 (Table 4).⁶ Between 1711 and 1811, about 823,700 slaves

¹Latham, *Old Calabar*, pp. 17-18, 20-1; Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, pp. 52-3.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, Latham.

⁴Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 221.


⁵*Ibid.*, Northrup, p. 54.

⁶Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, p. 221.

were reportedly exported from the Niger Delta to New World.¹ The data on Table 4 show the projected exports of the British and French slave trade within identifiable regions of the coastal origins in West Africa during the bulk of the eighteenth century. As shown, the data confirm the general flow of the export of slaves to the Americas within the major enclaves of the West African coastal plains. This represented the apogee of the transatlantic slave trade among the major European states in the Niger Delta regions. The Delta region exported 139,000 slaves around the mid-eighteenth century and another estimated 116,000 between 1771 and 1810.

Figure 4

Graphic Overview of Liverpool Merchants' Slave-Trading/
Shipping Contacts to West Africa/Bight of Bonny, 1709-1807



Source: A.J.H. Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891, p19.

As the data on Table 4 further show, during the early and later peak periods, the Delta region exported the largest number of slaves to the Americas. Overall, its

¹Ibid., pp. 116-26; Latham, Old Calabar, p. 18.

export status was the highest in the West African coastal plains from the mid-eighteenth century to the first decade of the nineteenth century.¹

Table 4

Estimated Number of Slaves Exported from the
West African Coast to the New World, 1711-1810

Coastal Region	Early Peak Decade	Slaves Exported	Subsequent decades and average number of slaves transported in them		Decades with exports in excess of early peak
Senegambia	1711-1720	31,000	1721-1790	22,000	0
Sierra Leone	1741-1750	18,000	1751-1810	7,000	0
Grain/I. Coast	1741-1750	65,000	1751-1790	43,000	1
Gold Coast	1741-1750	67,000	1751-1790	50,000	0
Slave Coast	1711-1720	72,000	1721-1790	45,000	1
Niger Delta	1761-1770	139,000	1771-1810	116,000	0

Source: J. D. Fage, A History of Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 266. These data were first adopted and modified by Fage from Philip Curtin's The Atlantic Slave Trade, Table 66, p. 221.

Table 5 shows the amount of slaves carried by European ships from the ports of Old/New Calabar and Bonny between 1752 and 1799. More than any other region of the Niger Delta basins, Bonny and Calabar provided more slaves to the New World via the Liverpool ships than any other region of West Africa.²

Between 1752 and 1799 the number of slaves exported from the Delta region of Bonny was much higher. Calabar alone "provided about 16.25 percent of the slaves carried from the Bight of Biafra in Liverpool ships."³ Again, as shown in Table 5, the frequency of commercial contacts between European slave-trading ships and the Bight of Bonny was particularly high during the eighteenth century. Some of the export figures of slaves examined by Latham derived from entries in the Antera

¹Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria, p. 3.

²Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 18-20.

³Ibid., pp. 20-22.

Duke's Diary at Old Calabar. As he himself tells us, the actual numbers carried away were not clearly represented.¹

Table 5

Africans Exported to the New World by Liverpool Merchants from New Calabar/Old Calabar, and Bonny, by Period and Number, 1752-1799

Dates	New Calabar Ships – Slaves	Bonny Ships – Slaves	Old Calabar Ships – Slaves
1752	62,260	124,670	83,130
1771	31,050	166,850	113,250
1784	114,210	136,900	114,200
1785	155,450	148,600	83,150 (2,504)
1786	62,200	115,750	135,150 (2,828)
1787	51,860	96,650	72,360 (2,545)
1788	113,234	3,414,078	62,473
1799	82,583	3,714,945	62,275

Source: A. J. H. Latham, *Old Calabar 1600-1891: The Impact of the International Economy Upon a Traditional Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 21.

Nonetheless, during this period, contacts by the merchant slave-trading ships of Liverpool were particularly regular at the port-cities of Old Calabar and Bonny.² This is supported by the fact that, by 1798, Britain exported around 38,000 slaves annually from West Africa, the French 20,000, the Dutch 4,000, and the Portuguese 10,000. During this same period, the official British Foreign Office annual total moved to about 100,000.³

The Niger Delta City-States and Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Era of Legitimate Trade, 1807-1870

By 1807, however, the Euro-African trade relations in the Niger Delta valleys entered an era of drastic shift. This signaled the collapse of the “400 years old”

¹Ibid. For example, such figures in Table 5 as 2,504 as recorded for Old Calabar for 1785 and 2828 for 1786, and 2,545—1787, when compared to other sources, suggest that not all the numbers of slaves carried away were recorded in the Antera Duke Diary (Latham, p. 20).

²Ibid., pp. 17-21.

³Dike, *Trade and Politics*, p. 47.

system of inter-regional political system and commercial organization. Throughout the early decades of 1800s, these changes ushered in a new order of internal turmoil among the varying socio-political institutions of the Niger Delta city-states. By the 1830s, the long-standing trading and political institutions that once held them together were either undermined or forcefully overthrown.¹

The sharp demise of the Niger Delta city-states was due also to the fact that for more than “two hundred years Britain had controlled the lion’s share of this [slave] traffic;” hence, “her dramatic withdrawal in 1807 precipitated economic crisis among African traders.”² The fact that “the British merchant and the slave traders had sunk much capital in the African trade,” meant that none of the parties could retire without financial ruin. The new epoch of so-called “legitimate trade,” supported by the British Naval Squadron along with its “gun boat politics,” was more favorable to the merchants of Liverpool and of Bristol.³ British merchants were now “the legitimate traders;” their indigenous Delta counterparts “man stealers.”⁴

Rather than hastening the end of the foreign slave trade, the British Parliamentary Act of 1807 turned the Delta region into an enclave of violence and rivalries among the major European nations and their indigenous collaborators. With the growing demand for cheap workforce, thousands of people were violently seized and shipped as slaves from the Bights of Bonny and Benin to either the cotton belt of

¹Ibid., p. 149, including Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 4-11, 49-50, 61; Alagoa et al, in Africa in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 730-1, 734.

²Ibid., Dike, pp. 47-8, 72-4, 93.

³Ibid.; Latham, Old Calabar, p. 22.

⁴Ibid.

the Southern U.S., or the sugar plantations in Cuba and Brazil.¹ Compared to the eighteenth century pattern of exporting slaves from the Delta region, a majority of its exports in the nineteenth century were taken from the interior of the hinterlands. These slaves were largely male, a large proportion being women and children. According to historian Inikori, while the Niger Delta region exported the largest proportion of female slaves to the Americas, the Kongo/Angola exported males.²

The Bight of Bonny averaged about 12,500 per year in its export of slaves to the Americas between 1821 and 1830, with its peak in 1825 reaching 17,000.³ Much of the slave-trading marts of Old Calabar, Bonny, Warri, Opobo, Lagos, and Badagry during the early decades of the nineteenth century—just as in some parts of the seventeenth and certainly during the eighteenth centuries—dominated as the leading slave-exporting centers. This was particularly true for Calabar and Bonny than for other port-cities, where, for example, “Between October 1820 and July 1821, 162 cargoes of slaves left Old Calabar” for the Americas.⁴

Bonny, again, was the busiest slaving mart in the Niger Delta basin during the preceding period. In 1822, it controlled the largest share of the slaves in the Niger Delta, selling not fewer than 20,000 annually; some 16,000 of these slaves were “members of one nation called Heebo [the Ibos].”⁵ Reportedly, not less than 320,000 Ibos were taken to the Americas during the early decades of the nineteenth

¹Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 51-4; Manning, “The Impact on Africans, Africa, and the New World,” Globalization of Forced Labour, p. xxi.

²Ibid.; Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, pp. 77-80; Inikori, “Africa in world history....,” in General History of Africa, Volume V, pp. 103-104.

³Ibid., Northrup, p. 57.

⁴Latham, Old Calabar, p. 20.

⁵Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 29; Olaniyan, Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 115-116.

century.¹ Overall, the Ibo slaves probably reached about 370,000; about 20,000 of the others were “Ibbibbys /Ibibios or Quaws” and “natives of the brass country” from the Cross River basin.² Also included in the ethnic origin were the Hausas.³

Another variant in estimate is that the Niger Delta exported “at the lowest calculation” about 200,000 slaves between 1827 and 1834 to the New World.⁴ Old Calabar alone probably exported between 133,600 and 250,000 slaves.⁵ Between the late 1820s and early 1830s, the British trading on palm oil rose from 4,700 tons to 13,945 tons, “besides exporting, at the lowest calculation, during the same period, 200,000 slaves.”⁶ Northrup, on the other hand, concludes that “some 227,000 slaves were shipped from this region [Bight of Biafra].”⁷ While some of these accounts are extraneous, given the position of recent scholarship on the number of West African slaves exported to the New World, nevertheless, they suggest the extent to which the region was involved in the slave trade.⁸

For, undoubtedly, throughout the 1830s, the tensions between “man stealers” and “the legitimate traders” shaped the political economy of the entire Niger Delta. By 1833 the Delta allegedly had “thirty-six slavers,” which included both Spanish and French slave merchants scrambling in Old Calabar and Bonny.⁹ The Bight of Bonny, in retrospect, became the most likely area to meet “white crews of captured

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, pp. 60-61.

⁴Dike, *Trade and Politics*, p. 29.

⁵Latham, *Old Calabar*, p. 23.

⁶Quoted in Dike, *Trade and Politics*, p. 51.

⁷Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, p. 57.

⁸Ibid.; Fage, *A History of Africa*, p. 266; Dike and Ekejiuba, *The Aro*, p. 33. Also see Tables 4-5, and 7.1.

⁹Dike, *Trade and Politics*, pp. 52-3.

slaves.” Dike further tells us that these were victims of economic collision “dumped at Delta ports without shelter or food.” Between 1830 and 1840, “every Delta port” especially Bonny and Calabar, was frequented by notorious Spanish and French slave dealers.¹ Dike makes the point that the “Brass River had been, commercially speaking, a Portuguese stronghold for upwards of two hundred centuries and was not open to English legitimate trade until about 1850.”²

Thus, with the introduction of legitimate trade, it was also the attitude of Portuguese and French slaving merchants, as well as of the old British slave-trading merchants that influenced the continued practice of the slave trade and slavery in the Niger Delta basins.³ Despite the patrol of the British ships, until the 1850s no abrupt drop occurred in the overall volume of the Atlantic slave trade. According to one view, increased visibility of the French and Spanish slave-trading ships to Sao Tome, along with those of the Brazilians, the Portuguese, and the Dutch, was to turn that island region toward the demise of the trade on human cargoes—as at its beginning, into “a collection point.”⁴

For the slave-trading centers of Old Calabar and Bonny, locations where the British interests were more entrenched, the shift toward legitimate trade took various directions. Despite the initial opposition to the suppression, between 1841 and 1842 the kings of Old Calabar signed a treaty with the British abolishing the foreign slave trade.⁵ Bonny also finally signed a treaty abolishing the foreign slave trade.⁶

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; pp. 67-8, 84, 93-4.

⁴Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers*, p. 55.

⁵Dike, p. 87; Latham, *Old Calabar*, p. 22; Udo, *Who Are the Ibibio*, p. 10

⁶Ibid., Dike, p. 63.

Downward the westward bend of the Niger Delta basin was the Yoruba heartland. As we saw earlier, until the late eighteenth century, some part of this region did not export huge volumes of slaves to the New World. Most of the slaves exported to the New World from such powerful Kingdoms as Oyo and Benin had passed through Dahomey. Similarly, from the close of the eighteenth to the opening of the nineteenth century, a period when the numbers of Yoruba slaves exported to the New World increased again, the bulk of the slaves from the Yoruba region passed through Dahomey.¹

Probably during the later stages of the nineteenth century, the increases in the volume of Yoruba slave exports were associated with the development of the ports of Porto Nova, Badagry, and Lagos. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the “power politics” resulting from the collapse of the Oyo Empire provided most of the slaves shipped via the latter region to the New World.²

The port of Lagos, which would become the first federal capital of independent Nigeria, was—by the first decade of the nineteenth century—the leading slave trade outlet. Lagos was an important point north of the Niger for exporting large numbers of slaves to the Americas before and during the conflicting decades of the legitimate trade.³ Based on one estimate, the total number of slaves shipped to the New World from all the major ports of Nigeria “must have approached an annual peak of 30,000.”⁴ Historian Lovejoy has observed that, until the 1850s, the Bights of Bonny and Benin remained important sources of exporting slaves to the Americas.

¹Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, p.119; Gordon, *Nigeria's Diverse Peoples*, p. 47-8.

²Ibid.; Ryder, “The Benin Kingdom,” *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, p. 120.

³Ibid., Olaniyan, p. 120.

⁴Ibid.

But ironically, however, after 1830s the slave trade shifted its spheres of importance from the Bight of Bonny to Bight of Benin. While the actual number of slaves imported from Africa to the U.S. between 1808 and 1860 may still be indeterminate, there is no doubt that a larger proportion was from the Bights of Bonny and Benin.¹

Thus, a majority of the reportedly 54,000 slaves imported into Southern U.S. between 1808 and 1860, either directly from Africa or through Latin America, came from the Bights of Bonny and Benin.² That is, there cannot be any doubt that modern Nigeria had one of the most concentrated demographic representations of the forced migrants from West Africa into mainland North America.

Part 3: The Enslavement of Africans in Mainland North America

Historians Berlin has provided some excellent evidences that the first English settlers to arrive Virginia in 1607 shared in the notion of developing an integrated biracial community. The fact that such biracial unison did actually occur in colonial Virginia was seen in the early collaborative relations involving Native Americans, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English settlers.³

As regards, for example, the so-called “twenty odd Negroes” brought into colonial Virginia in 1619, the general historical emphasis of the early colonial era strongly suggests that their status would not have differed very significantly from

¹Lovejoy, “The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade,” in Globalization of Forced Labour, p. 64.

²Ibid., Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 51-2, 81-2, estimated that “between 1808 and 1860, 300,000 slaves were imported into the U.S.A.” This was cited from an earlier study by C. Lloyd, The Navy and the Slave Trade (London, 1938, pp. 24-7). Dike’s estimate appears to be extraneous in light of Curtin’s revisionist data (Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 87), which estimated some 54,000 slaves imported into the U.S., for example, between 1808 and 1850. The Curtin position has found support in Rawley’s The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 330.

³Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 29; Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom, pp. 44, 70-1, 153.

that of European servants. While scholars have varied in their explanation of the official status of these early Africans, however, the underlying emphasis is that they were more of indentured servants than slaves. For, as Berlin states, “through the first fifty years of English and African settlement in the Chesapeake, black and white workers lived and worked together in ways that blurred racial lines.”¹

Other scholars have argued that, from the onset of the colonial experience, the racial distinctiveness of Africans placed them under a unique position of degradation. Their more distinctive background also presaged their future status both as slaves and later as a peculiar free people of African descent in America.² There is no doubt then that the early effort to exploit the African workforce was of equal importance to the white merchants of the first thirteen British colonies of mainland North America.³

Despite the above fact, the attitude leading to the permanent enslavement of Africans emerged rather slowly as well as manifested itself simultaneously at different stages and at different locations in accordance to the inordinate-subordinate

¹Ibid.

²For this emphasis, see the literature in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. For other related background, see example: Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitude toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968), p. 73; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, pp. 154, 297; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, p. 41; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom, pp. xxiii-xxxii, 3-27; Willie Lee Rose, ed., A Documentary History of Slavery in North America (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 15-16.

³Ibid. Also see: E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 22-3; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America (New York: Touchstone Books, 1987), pp. 42-3; Michael L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis, eds., Africans in the Americas: A History of the Black Diaspora (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 26-7; Edward Countryman, ed., How Did American Slavery Begin? (Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 3-4, 17; Steven Deyle, “By Far the Most Profitable Trade: Slave Trading in British Colonial North America,” in Slave Trades, 1500-1800 Globalization of Forced Labour, Vol. 15, ed., Patrick Manning (Brookfield, U.S.A: Variorum, 1996), pp. 107-8.

status of black-white socioeconomic demand.¹ The large-scale origin of this labor exploitation of Africans can be traced to the period between 1630s and early 1640s, when it became apparent that they were unlike any other colonial peoples.²

Historian Morgan has argued that the Chesapeake colonies of Virginia and Maryland “would have expired without a steady flow of workers.”³ Yet, as he further tells us, the sharp increase in Virginia’s population after 1644 was not due to any serious corresponding rise in the number of new arrivals, but rather to the fact that the newcomers were beginning to live much longer than previously.⁴

Throughout the 1640s, however, the classification of racial distinction although present from the onset, was not very strong among the early populations of white settlers and Africans. Both in colonial Virginia and Maryland, the required workforce still rested heavily on their exploitation.⁵ There is a firmer ground then for surmising that a majority of Africans during the early colonial era were not slaves in the later sense of the term.⁶

On the other hand, however, historian Jordan argues that although Africans occupied degraded status in Virginia from the onset, their overall status as slaves was

¹Blackburn, The Making of the New World Slavery, p. 460; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 28.

²Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, pp. 154, 297-301; Lorenzo J. Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England (New York: Athenaeum, 1974), pp. 15-21.

³Ibid., Morgan, p. 180.

⁴Ibid., pp. 154-7, 180-1.

⁵Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 29; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 460.

⁶See, for example, Jordan, White Over Black, p. 73; Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom, pp. 298-301; Rose, Documentary History of Slavery in North America, pp. 15-16; Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, pp. 42-3; Conniff and Davis, Africans in the Americas, pp. 26-7; Morris, Southern Slave Law, 1619-1860 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina, 1996), pp. 40-1; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom, pp. 15-6, 18-66; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 29; Deyle, “By Far the Most Profitable Trade,” pp. 107-8.

not clear.¹ The attitude leading to the permanent enslavement of Africans was traceable to later developments, and these were closely linked to the birth of the plantation revolutions. With the demand for cheap labor in Virginia and Maryland between 1660 and 1664, Africans were increasingly being ushered into permanent enslavement.² For example, in 1662, the Virginia statute laws took the first step in Southern colonies of imposing the status of chattel slavery on Africans, thus establishing the basis of their inferiority. The same law later provided a legal basis for the enslavement of slaves' children as well as made a provision for them to become either slaves, or free people in accordance to the status of their mothers.³

Later on, of course, Maryland's slave code of 1715 made all blacks slaves, along with "their children."⁴ Nor was the classification of Africans in the lowcountry Carolinas any different from one found in the Chesapeake colonies of Virginia and Maryland. Indeed, the drive to enslave Africans on the basis of their race due to the demand for cheap labor in South Carolina was a central colonial experience that shaped the white-black relations since the early decades of the eighteenth century. With this came the enactment of new civil codes aimed at the general subordination of Africans.⁵ The South Carolina rigid statute slave code of 1712 imposed a life- serving slavery for the Indians, mulattoes and blacks, including

¹Ibid., especially Jordan, White Over Black, p. 73, Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 29; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, pp. 154-7.

²Rose, Documentary History of Slavery in North America, pp. 17-24, Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 42-3; Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom, Jr., pp. 15-16, 18-66.

³Ibid., Higginbotham, pp. 15, 31-8; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 43-4.

⁴Ibid., Morris, pp. 45-6.

⁵Peter A. Wood, The Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina From 1670 through the Stone Rebellion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 6-7, 43-7, 105-11; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 72; J. E. Holloway, ed., "The Origins of African- American Culture, in Africanisms in American Culture, p. 4.

their children. The enactment of the North Carolina slave code in 1741 followed closely the rigid measures of South Carolina. Georgia, the last of the English colonial settlements, also adopted the South Carolina slave code in 1770 to sustain the permanency of the African workforce under slavery.

But in the Northern colonies, where only some nine-tenths of the white populations were farmers, and where domestic and personal needs were dominant, the inclination toward the enslavement of Africans was early in the making although less rigorous.¹ For example, in colonial New England and Pennsylvania, the enslavement of Africans was somewhat less rigid as in the Southern colonies. With increases of Africans in the general population and the corresponding demand for cheap labor, the legal basis for their enslavement followed almost a similar pattern found in the Southern colonies.²

Lorenzo Greene argues that the basis of Negro servitude and enslavement in New England existed before the establishment of the Massachusetts Bay colony in 1629. "It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that Negro slavery was introduced into New England sometime between 1624 and 1638, with the weight of evidence weighting toward the latter date."³

If Lorenzo is correct, it would then mean that the general socio-cultural platitude for enforcing legalized slavery on Africans in colonial New England was

¹Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 45-6.

²Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, pp. 27-31; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, pp. 15-16; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 460; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 54; Berlin, Generation of Captivity, pp. 22, 52, 81-3, 98; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 307, 310; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 34-5, 40-41.

³Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, pp. 15-16, 17.

fairly well established by the 1640s¹—that is—before the Southern colonies. Yet, prior to this period, the New England colonists developed their resources without resorting to extensive labor of even the white indentured servants. However, between 1650 and 1708, its statutory slave codes were fairly well in place. Not only did its codes follow the precedent set by Virginia, they formed the basis upon which other Northern colonies enforced their legal status on African slaves.²

Only in the Dutch colony of New Netherland was the experience of Africans under slavery relatively mild with the least form of legal codification. Of the status of African slaves, Horton and Horton document that: “If they were free, blacks were often accorded the same rights as whites in the colony. They could own property, pursue trades, and even intermarry with Whites. Race was a factor in that being a black carried with it a probability of being enslaved, but blacks were treated as free people so long as their white neighbors knew that they were free.”³ Therefore, until 1664, when the Dutch colony passed hands under the British as New York, the rigid attitude toward the permanent enslavement of Africans was least apparent.⁴

In New York, the enslavement of Africans along with rigid legal measures, developed between 1684 and 1706 around the major rural and urban centers. Similar to the rigid slave laws in the Southern colonies, those in New York were designed to impose complete enslavement of Africans for the required workforce. Furthermore, its slave-merchants even established strong links with the major slaveholding

¹Ibid., pp. 18-21; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 40-1; Meier and Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto, pp. 42-7.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., Horton and Horton, pp. 36-37; Berlin, Generations of Captivity, pp. 34-6; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 310-311.

⁴Ibid., Horton and Horton, pp. 38-41; Berlin, pp. 81-8.

counties North of Maryland.¹ Consequently, by the early decades of the eighteenth century, a system of hereditary slavery was fastened permanently upon Africans in the colonies of British mainland North America. By 1706, the ruling that slaves were not made free even by baptism affirmed their status in degraded servitude in the colonies of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New York, and New Jersey. From the 1720s onward, planters all the slaveholding colonies were irrevocably tied to the permanent enslavement of Africans on the basis of their race and demand for cheap labor.²

By the Constitution of the new United States, Africans as slaves and as white property, comprised only but three-fifth of a human being.³ On the other hand, this permanent enslavement of Africans went hand in hand with the explosive rivalries among the major European powers involved in the commerce of racial capitalism.

Significantly, until the replacement of the Iberian leadership on the West Coast of Africa and later in the Americas by the competing states of Western Europe, the population of African slaves in mainland North America was fairly thin. For example, in colonial Virginia and Maryland, it was not until after the closing decades of the seventeenth century that the volumes of African-slaves began to increase. And these increases, to be sure, occurred after England had achieved a dominant status in the colonial struggle and after the plantation revolution had ordained and indeed transformed the climate of racial commerce among the major powers.

¹Ibid., Horton and Horton, p. 37.

²Ibid.; Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, pp. 45-6; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 45-6; Russell R. Menard, "From Servants to Slaves: The Transformation of the Chesapeake Labour System," in The Worlds of Unfree Labour, Vol. 16, p. 231.

³Edward Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), p. 83.

Direct and Indirect Build-up of African Slaves, 1650-1750

So, the import of the African workforce into mainland North America was fairly thin during the early colonial decades. Prior to 1650, for instance, only but a very small proportion of them from time to time found entry into colonial Virginia.¹ Only between five and six percent of the slave population in the Americas entered mainland North American colonies; about 95 percent were in the tropical colonies.² The estimated 1,600 Africans in 1650 which entered the British North American mainland represented their first serious build-up. Another wave of 3,900 slaves arrived in 1675.³

However, Africans were only of slight importance in the Chesapeake during a greater part of the 1670s; their enslaved population represented less than 5 percent of the inhabitants of Maryland and Virginia. Despite some 6,600 of them entering the Chesapeake through Barbados in 1680, historian Menard concludes that, "it was very rare at this time to have a Negro ship come to this country directly from Africa."⁴ The next major waves of Africans numbering 23,000 arrived in 1700.⁵

Between 1700 and 1720 most the slaves were imported directly from Africa. An estimated 1,000 slaves per year entered the British North American colonies, rising to "over 2,500 in the next two decades," and reaching "a peak of over 5,000 per year in the 1740s and 1750s."⁶ Overall, between 1715 and 1750, an average of

¹Ibid.; Palmer, The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xviii.

²Ibid., p. xix; Countryman, How Did American Slavery Begin, pp. 4-5.

³Ibid.

⁴Menard, "From Servants to Slaves," p. 216.

⁵Palmer, The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. xix; Countryman, How Did American Slavery Begin, p. 4.

⁶Deyle, "By Far the Most Profitable Trade," p.108.

about 2,500 slaves was imported each year into North America.¹ If this figure is compared to the total population of Africans in 1750, it becomes apparent that the system of self-reproduction of slaves was an underlying factor of their population growth during and after the peak decades of the eighteenth century.²

Historian Berlin makes the point that these early waves of African slaves were mostly “Atlantic Creoles,” or in his preferred term, “the charter generation.” If so, they were often the offspring of mixed marriages with the early Iberian merchants on the West Coast of Africa.³ They bulk of them were familiar with European ways. No wonder, being among the first to be imported via the Atlantic coast and Europe to the Americas, they were somewhat more familiar with European ways. Besides, their experiences were almost similar to those of white indentured servants.⁴

As the preceding emphases suggest, the medium of entry of the early waves of African slaves into mainland America had varied, and requires some understanding. This is important for ascertaining further clarity in explaining the demographic varieties of racial capitalism. There is a basis then for surmising that the early importation of slaves into mainland North America came through the West Indies. “At first, Negroes imported to the English North American colonies came primarily from the West Indies.”⁵

¹Peter M. Bergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 27.

²For example, Curtin’s The Atlantic Slave Trade (p. 268), estimated about 399,000 Africans were imported into mainland North America. Also, see Tables 6.1-6.3 of this dissertation.

³*Ibid.*, Berlin, Generations of Captivity, pp. 22, 30-3.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Bergman, Chronological History of the Negro in America, p. 28.

To what extent then were the varied routes of importing slaves into the Southern and Northern colonies relevant to an understanding the variant in the early waves of the forced migration? To begin with, historian Rawley, for example, has argued that there is inadequate explanation about the medium used in importing slaves into the Northern and Southern colonies. Rawley further argues that the fact that the West Indies was the primary source for American slaves until the American Revolution may have led scholars to a hasty conclusion and misunderstanding. This misunderstanding was due to the fact that the first Africans entered the mainland North American colonies of Virginia and South Carolina through the West Indies.¹

But, according to historian Klein, until after the American Revolution, nearly all the slaves imported into continental mainland North America entered by way of the West Indies.² Menard, responding to Klein's thesis, argues that African slaves were imported from the West Indies as well as directly from Africa, that is, almost simultaneously.³

So, which medium was dominant? There cannot be any doubt that where the West Indies had first served as the pioneer lanes of importing African slaves into mainland North American colonies, the same medium could not have remained the only one for obtaining large-scale shipments of workforce in the era of intensive plantation agriculture and corresponding commercial and industrial revolutions. Probably the American Revolution had some influence on the medium of transshipment of African slaves at least within a specific historical period. For, with

¹Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, p. 332.

²Herbert S. Klein, "Slaves and Shipping in Eighteenth Century Virginia," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, III 1975, pp. 383-412; Morgan, *American Slavery American Freedom*, pp. 298-9; Menard, "From Servants to Slaves," in *Unfree Labour*, pp. 216-9, 231.

³Ibid.

the grievances of the British colonists, which later resulted in the “war with American colonies” and later corresponded with the birth of an independent United States of America, a smooth medium of importing slaves through the West Indies was likely to be constrained.¹

Rawley again makes the point that the West Indies route was more applicable to the Northern colonies while direct import from Africa was more applicable to the Southern colonies.² Probably Rawley’s explanation is the more adequate for understanding the early medium of slave imports into mainland North American colonies. For the basis of his explanation lies more in understanding the early relations between Southern and Northern colonies with the West Indies and Africa, along with the instrumental colonial diplomacy that shaped the American Revolution and the plantation revolutions.³

Raw statistical arithmetic is equally supportive of differing concentration of slaves in both the Southern and Northern colonies: of the 44,866 slaves in 1710 in British colonial North America, 8,303 were in the North and 36,563 in the South. In 1715, when the overall population of British North America was 436,600, with whites totaling 375,570, a majority of the 58,850 blacks were in the South.⁴

Furthermore, in 1720, when there were 68,839 slaves in British North America, 14,091 of them were in the North—and 54,748 in the South.⁵ Between 1715 and 1765, New York and New Jersey imported 4,551 slaves, of which “only

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 202, 332; Edward Countryman, The American Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 14-24; Segal, The Black Diaspora, p. 53.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Bergman, Chronological History of the Negro in America, pp. 25-8; Berlin, Generations of Captivity, pp. 272-4.

⁵Ibid.

930 were from Africa.”¹ When, on the other hand, New England’s total population was estimated at 90,000 in 1700, the black population was perhaps not “more than a thousand.”² In 1715, the first general New England census by race recorded approximately 158,000 whites, with only 4,150 blacks. Between 1771 and 1776 New England’s black population rose to 16,034 in a total population of 659,466.³

The Southern concentration of African slaves not only contrasted with the Northern patterns, it also suggested the medium of imports. With the American Revolution, the West Indies medium of transshipment of African slaves into mainland North America could have been affected. This perhaps explains why direct importation of slaves from Africa was more suitable to the Southern scheme, and why such major slave societies as Virginia, Maryland, Georgia, and South Carolina, for example, relied on the direct import of slaves from Africa. Virginians imported far larger numbers of slaves direct from Africa than West Indies long before the American Revolution.⁴ On the other hand, while South Carolina had its first permanent settlement from the West Indies—like Virginia—it also imported directly from Africa. Admittedly, of the 83,825 slaves entering South Carolina between 1700 and 1775, a majority of about 67,269 came directly from Africa.⁵

Again, in retrospect, between 1700 and 1730 all but 5,000 of the over 54,000 Africans entering the Chesapeake came from Africa.⁶ Virginia alone recorded 38,418 slaves between 1708 and 1750, or “roughly 45,000 slaves between 1700 and

¹Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, p. 332.

²Greene, *The Negro in Colonial New England*, p. 73.

³Ibid., pp. 73-4.

⁴Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 332-3.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Deyle, “By Far the Most Profitable Trade,” p. 149.

1750.”¹ Of its 6,609 imports of slaves between June 1699 and October 1708, only 679 came through the West Indies. Moreover, of its 52,507 imports between 1710 and 1769, exactly 45,091 were from Africa; another 69,006 came between 1699 and 1775.²

There is then a valid basis that the early waves of Africans first entered the British mainland North America “primarily from the West Indies.”³ As indicated earlier, this medium was probably most viable when both the plantation and commercial revolutions had not yet reached their take-off stages. As, for example, in the case of colonial Virginia, Klein demonstrated that some 53 percent of its slave imports between 1710 and 1718 entered via the West Indies. Only about 42 percent were direct from Africa.⁴

Accordingly, Menard concludes that: “If it is assumed that all the ships registered in Great Britain that appear in the records of slave imports from the West Indies had in fact merely stopped at the islands on their way to the Chesapeake from Africa, then only 16.5 percent of the slaves brought to Virginia between 1710 and 1718 were from the West Indies and 78 percent were from Africa.”⁵ Hence, even where the observations by Rawley and Menard seem more convincing, the differences between Southern and Northern colonies were glaring enough from the onset. By mid-1750s, of course, the Southern colonies had already begun to be poised as the circumstantial homeland of a majority of the descendants of slaves (Tables 6.1-6.3).

¹Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, pp. 301, 308.

²Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, p. 10.

³Bergman, Chronological History of the Negro in America, p. 28.

⁴Klein, “Slaves and Shipping in Eighteenth Century Virginia,” pp. 383-412.

⁵Menard, “From Servants to Slaves,” in Unfree Labour, p. 219.

Table 6.1

**Slaves Populations in the Chesapeake/Upper Southern
Colonies/United States, 1680-1860**

Colonies/ States	1680	1700	1720	1750	1770	1790	1810	1820	1840	1860
Chesapeake/ Upper South	4,876	20,752	42,749	171,84 6	332,84 5	520,96 9	810,62 4	965,514	1, 215,497	1,530,229
Delaware	55	135	700	1,496	1,835	8,887	4,177	4,509	2,605	1,798
Maryland	1,611	3,227	12,499	4,350	3,681	103,03 6	111,50 2	107,397	89,373	87,189
Virginia	3,000	16,690	26,550	107,10 0	187,60 0	292,62 7	392,51 8	425,153	449,087	490,865
North Carolina	210	1,000	3,000	19,800	69,600	100,57 2	168,82 4	205,017	245,817	331,059
Kentucky	----	----	----	----	----	12,430	80,561	126,732	182,258	225,483
Missouri	----	----	----	----	----	----	3,011	10,222	85,240	114,931
Tennessee	----	----	----	----	----	3,417	44,528	80,107	183,059	275,719
District of Columbia	----	----	----	----	----	----	5,395	6,377	4,694	3,185

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, (Washington, DC, 1995), Vol. 2: 1168; Ira Berlin, *Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 272-3.

Table 6.1 shows the slave populations of the Chesapeake. As shown, their overall population was at its heights during the eighteenth century. From 1680 to 1740, Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina had the largest population of slaves. Between and 1720 and 1730, these slaves were employed in the tedious cultivation of sugar and tobacco crops in Virginia and Maryland. Both climatic factors and the required plantation workforce influenced their concentration.¹

Table 6.1 also shows the slave population of North Carolina. Prior to the mid-century, its growth pattern was smaller compared to Virginia and Maryland. Delaware had the smallest slave population, as well as the smallest distribution of the African population.² From the 1770s onward, the growth of slaves in the Chesapeake began to correspond with the active demand for their labor. By the 1790, Kentucky and Tennessee began to record their slave populations (Table 6.1).

¹Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, pp. 465-6.

²Berlin, *The Generations of Captivity*, pp. 272-3.

Based on the data on Table 6.2, African slaves were densely concentrated in the Lowcountry South Carolina from 1680 to 1750. With only 3,000 slaves recorded in 1750, by 1720 the number rose to 11,828 and to 39,900 in 1750. Between 1768 and 1773, when tobacco, indigo, and rice were the three major plantation crops of the Lowcountry, its slave populations increased in proportion to the general trend of the labor demand.¹ By 1770, the figure rose to 92,178.

According to Table 6.2, Georgia was not involved in plantation slavery until the mid-eighteenth century. Once involved, however, Georgia's planters not only imported large quantities of slaves to work in their plantations, they also maintained a distant second to South Carolina. With approximately 30,000 slaves by the century's end, it had added considerably to the lowcountry black majorities.²

The variation both in the population and distribution of the African slaves in the Lower Mississippi is noticeable enough: they had no recorded figures between 1680 and 1700. The scanty population of 1,385 slaves recorded in 1750, and the almost 5,000 recorded in 1770—close to the eve of the Revolution—are strong indicators of the late entry of the region into plantation economy based on racial slavery. Another reason might have been the overall effect of high mortality deaths of slaves in the region. For example, of the about first 2,000 population of slaves brought into the colony during the early decades of 1700, less than 700 were alive by October 1720. Also of the 450 imported directly from Africa in April of 1729, only 363 reached the Mississippi River.³

¹Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 459; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 64, 105; Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, pp. 4-5.

²Berlin, Generation of Captivity, p. 68.

³Ibid.; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 82-3.

Table 6.2
Slave Populations in the Lowcountry/Lower South and
Lower Mississippi Valley Colonies/United States, 1680-1860

Colonies/ States	1680	1700	1720	1750	1770	1790	1810	1820	1840	1860
Lowcountry/ Lower South	200	3,000	11,838	39,900	92,178	136,932	303,234	408,129	633,699	926,349
South Carolina	200	3,000	11,828	39,000	75,178	107,094	196,365	258,475	327,038	402,406
Georgia	----	----	----	600	15,000	29,264	105,218	149,654	280,944	462,198
East Florida	----	----	----	300	2,000	574	1,651	----	----	----
Florida	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	25,717	61,745
L. M. Valley/ Deep South	----	----	1,385	4,730	7,100	18,700	51,748	145,394	637,130	1,497,118
Louisiana	----	----	1,385	4,730	5,600	18,700	34,660	69,064	168,452	331,726
West Florida	----	----	----	----	1,500	----	----	----	----	----
Alabama	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	41,879	253,532	435,080
Mississippi	----	----	----	----	----	----	17,088	32,814	195,211	436,631
Arkansas	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	1,617	19,935	111,115
Texas	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	182,566

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, (Washington, D.C., 1995), vol. 2: 1168; Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves (Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 272-3.

Until the 1730s the termination of the enslavement of the Native Americans, the importation of slaves into colonial Louisiana was less visible. This meant increased importation of African slaves, as well as increased pattern of internal self-reproduction in Louisiana and other related enclaves of the Lower Mississippi Valley.¹ By 1731, for example, the black population of nearly 4,000 in Louisiana not only outnumbered whites, but also represented about 60 percent of the entire population. Louisiana, settled early in the eighteenth century by the French, had about 4,700 slaves in 1746, whose prospects of future growth were bound to mature in the era of the cotton kingdom.²

By the early decades of the eighteenth century, the combined share of African slaves in the Lowcountry and Mississippi Valley surpassed that in the Chesapeake

¹Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 4-5.

²Ibid.

(Table 6.2). Prior to the cultivation of rice in South Carolina, Virginia had the largest share and lead over the rest of the English colonies in its control of the total population of slaves. By the eve of the Revolutionary War about four out of every ten blacks lived in Virginia.¹

Similarly, after the first decades of the eighteenth century, the share of South Carolina slave population began to surpass the numerical superiority of whites. By 1724, its African population of 32,000 contrasted sharply with only 14,000 for whites. By the mid-century, blacks comprised about 90 percent of the population.²

When blacks made up about 60 percent of the population in all but three parishes of the Lowcountry in 1730, South Carolina countryside “looked more like a negro country than like a country settled by white people.”³ The least irony for the build-up in the region was that the skill associated with their cultural background facilitated their enslavement.⁴

Collectively Tables 6.1 and 6.2 confirm that the strongest demographic variant in the Southern colonies is evident in the sharp contrasts with their Northern counterparts (Table 6.3). As shown, in 1680, only 1,895 slaves were recorded in the entire Northern colonies. The population of these slaves rose to 5,206 in 1700 and to 14,081 in 1720. By mid-century, when the plantation revolutions were at their heights in the South (Tables 6.1 and 6.2), only New York, New Jersey,

¹Ibid.; W. A. Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981), p. 685; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, p.308.

²Ibid.; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, p. 4; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 31; Berlin, Generation of Captivity, pp. 68, 272-3.

³Ibid.; Holloway; Berlin, p. 68; Wood, Black Majority, p. 132

⁴Charles Joyner, Down by the Riverside: A Slave Carolina Slave Community (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 57-9, 71; Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 6-8, 9.

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, were the most densely or sparsely populated areas of African slaves.¹

Table 6.3
Slave Populations in the Northern Colonies/United States, 1680-1860

Colonies/States	1680	1700	1720	1750	1770	1790	1810	1820	1840	1860
North	1,895	5,206	14,081	30,172	47,735	40,420	17,081	19,108	1,113	64
N. Hampshire	75	130	170	550	654	158	----	----	1	----
Massachusetts	170	800	2,150	4,075	4,754	----	----	----	----	----
Connecticut	50	450	1,093	3,010	5,698	2,764	310	97	17	----
Rhode Island	175	300	543	3,347	3,761	948	108	48	5	----
New York	1,200	2,256	5,750	11,014	19,062	21,324	15,017	10,088	4	----
New Jersey	200	840	2,385	5,354	8,220	11,423	10,851	7,557	674	----
Pennsylvania	25	430	2,000	2,822	5,561	3,787	795	211	64	----

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, (Washington, DC, 1995), Vol. 2: 1168; Ira Berlin, *Generations of Captivity: A History of African American Slaves* (Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 272-3.

Massachusetts, the largest slave holding colony in Southern New England, did not have a uniform black population: it had no less than 200 slaves in the colony in 1676.² By 1690, it had about 150 slaves and fewer than 500 in 1710, about 2,000 in 1715, and 2,600 in 1735.³ By the mid-century, Massachusetts had the most slaves—5,235 in a total of 224,185. In 1776, their population was 5, 249 in a total population of 349,094.⁴

While Rhode Island had the largest proportion of slaves, New York had the largest population of slaves in the entire North. By mid-century, its more than 10,000 slaves represented about 15 percent of the population, rising again to “more than nineteenth thousand slaves” on the eve of the Revolution.⁵ When compared to the South, however, the general growth pattern of Northern slaves in the eighteenth

¹ See Tables 6.1-6.3; Berlin, *The Generations of Captivity*, pp. 272-4.

² Greene, *The Negro in Colonial New England*, pp. 79-80.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.; Morison, *Oxford History of the United States*, p. 149.

⁵ Horton and Horton, *Hard Road to Freedom*, p. 37.

century was as similar as it was markedly distinctive.¹ For example, during the first century of settlement in the North, the black population comprised a small fraction of the population in New England and the Middle Colonies.² The black population totaled only 8 percent of the population in New Jersey and less than 4 percent in Massachusetts and Connecticut.³ By mid-century, when slaves made up 61 percent of the colonial population of South Carolina, 31 percent of them were in Maryland, and 46 percent in Virginia—only 2 percent were in Pennsylvania, 7 percent in New Jersey—and 14 percent in New York.⁴

Geographic and Demographic Varieties of Racial Slavery and Racial Capitalism

Figure 5 shows the varying stages in the maturity of racial slavery and racial capitalism in British mainland North America, later the United States from 1660 to 1790: the first transformation begun along the major routes of imports and exports within the American regions from the plantation revolution to industrial revolution. Second, and perhaps of far greater significance of this development was tied to the major lanes of commercial exchanges of slave societies and societies with slaves.⁵

So each generational phase of human interaction in mainland North America, that is, from the early colonial settlement to the birth of the United States, corresponded with the expanding varieties of racial slavery and racial capitalism. This development was closely linked to the evolving patterns of the major port-cities

¹For example, the Southern and Northern colonies were as similar as they contrasted with each other in their rigorous pattern of internal self-reproduction.

²Frazier, *The Negro in the United States*, p. 34.

³Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, p. 54.

⁴Horton and Horton, *Hard Road to Freedom*, pp. 33-34.

⁵For example, see Berlin, *Generation of Captivity*, pp. 22, 52, 98.

and port-towns in both the Southern slave societies and Northern societies with slaves. The vast coastal plains of the Chesapeake, the Lowcountry, Middle colonies, and Northern colonies evolved in accordance with the generational gravitation of racial slavery within the new Atlantic system of world capitalism. These were later to become the major industrial centers, with gigantic modern facilities, along with dense populations. The known commercial varieties of the major port-colonies of British mainland North America, later the U.S., dictated the distribution of the slave workforce across the major regions (See Tables 6.1-6.3).

Such counties as Tidewater, which had the largest slave plantation in British North America along with subtropical climate, were where the bulk of the slaves converged.¹ This region was closer to the slave markets; moreover, its location eased the gradual extension further inland along the dangerous frontier zones. This perhaps best explains why most Southern port-centers such as in piedmont, Virginia, and Charleston, South Carolina had large slave populations.² African slaves entering South Carolina arrived via a single post.³

Almost all the slaves in Carolina, and later Georgia and the East Florida, representing about 40 percent of pre-Revolutionary population—first entered via the port of Charleston. This was “the largest mainland slave mart,” and here “Africans disembarked on its wharves by the thousands.”⁴

¹Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 31-2; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 72; Berlin, The Generations of Captivity, pp. 67-8, 70; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, p. 4; Wood, Black Majority, p. 132

²Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 461; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 332.

³Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 72.


⁴*Ibid.*; Berlin, The Generation of Captivity, p. 70; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 32

Again about 100,000 of the slaves entering the Charleston port-town were bound for its rice-growing economy. These dominated the rice plantation parishes in Charleston in about a ratio of three to one majority over white. Moreover, South Carolina's wealthiest and most established plantations were also near the port of Charleston. By the end of the eighteenth century, these plantations controlled more than 60 percent of the slaves.¹

¹Ibid., Horton and Horton, pp. 31-2; Berlin, pp. 68, 272-3; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 72; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, p. 4.

Figure 5

Generational Overview of Major Regions,
Port-Colonies/Towns of Chattel Slavery and Racial
Capitalism in Mainland North America, 1660-1790



Source: See, for example, Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in Mainland North America (Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1998), pp. 16, 94, 217.

Variations were noticeable in the settlement patterns as well as in the sizes of slave households in the Chesapeake and the Lowcountry plantations. During the 1720s, for example, about 29 percent of the Lowcountry slaves were in estates of thirty or more slaves. By 1749, this number rose to 54 percent, and before stabilizing, about three quarters of the slaves resided in estates with fifty or more slaves. Almost during a similar period, more than half of the slaves in the Georgetown District lived on plantations of over fifty slaves, and more than one-fifth of them were in units of one hundred slaves or more.¹

Similarly, “seven” of the bulk of the eighty-eight slaveholders owning from 300 hundred to over 500 slaves in the South Carolina, were located on the Waccawaw, and in the All Saints rice plantations.² An additional fourteen planters owning “more than 500 slaves” were all located in the Waccamaw. Overall, South Carolina had the largest slave plantations markets in British North America, and later in the United States.³

On the other hand, however, African slaves in the Chesapeake plantations were brought entered via a variety of routes: port-towns and port-cities. This meant the port-outlets were areas of dense concentration of African slaves. Virginia’s early and mid-eighteenth century concentration of Africans in the York and Rappahannock river basins was triggered by the spread of tobacco into the Southside and central piedmont. Those counties that produced the best grades of sweet-scented tobacco for the English market had the highest concentration of slaves. Conversely, those

¹Ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 463.

²Joyner, Down by the Riverside, p. 34.

³Ibid., pp. 23, 34.

counties with marginal producers of tobacco had the smallest proportion of slaves.¹

Generally, the concentration of slaves in Maryland diminished gradually as one moved away from the York River to the bay areas. Their distribution across other areas of the colony also stretched from Accomack to Northampton to the Southside of the James River. Slaves were densely concentrated in the tobacco growing counties of Central Western Shore-Calvert, Prince George's, and Anne Arundel. Those counties with the heaviest investment in tobacco had about 30 percent blacks in their population.² Such counties as Charles, St. Mary's and Baltimore had their enslaved populations ranging from 20 to 25 percent. With the exception of Kent County, where the slave populations ranged from 10 percent to 15 percent in the Eastern shore region, the Eastern Shore had one of largest concentrations, followed by their counterparts in Northern and Southern counties.³

Unlike in the Lowcountry, large plantations in the Chesapeake had crews of between ten to fifty slaves. Those with smaller plantations had fewer still.⁴ In Amelia County, Virginia, where the number of slave households increased from 23 percent to 76 percent between 1736 and 1782, the median number per household rose from two to six. Compared to Chesterfield County established fourteen years after Amelia County, with 40 percent proportion of adult African slaves in 1775, and

¹Phillip D. Morgan & Michael L. Nicholls, "Slaves in Piedmont Virginia, 1720-1790," in Plantation Societies in the Era of European Expansion, Vol. 18, ed., Judy Bierber (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1997), p. 163; Barbara J. Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland during the Nineteenth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 1-22; Menard, The Worlds of Unfree Labour, p. 233.

²Ibid., Menard, pp. 232-3.

³Ibid.

⁴Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 461.

about 27 percent in 1782.¹ Piedmont had the bulk of its slaves residing in plantation quarters of fewer than ten slaves. After one or two decades, however, a majority resided in plantations with more than ten slaves. By 1780, “about 40 percent of slaves in most Piedmont counties lived on plantation of more than twenty slaves.”²

Most piedmont slaves did not live in large plantations of thirty or more slaves such as in All Saints South Carolina, but like in Middle ground colony, had a certain degree of communal life.³ However, compared to slave societies, societies with slaves differed markedly in their application and distribution of the African-slave workforce. Unlike in the North, with the large slave plantations and dense settlement patterns of the Southland, slaves enjoyed greater communal bonding. In the North not only were blacks both enslaved and free thinly populated, they exhibited a scattered pattern of settlement.⁴ Like their Southern counterparts, however, such port-colonies like Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New York, and Massachusetts, for example, were enclaves of their dense populations.⁵

During the first decades of the eighteenth century when slaves made up more than one-sixth of the population of Philadelphia, their population seemed almost representative of other Northern cities.⁶ For example, in 1767, Philadelphia alone had about 1,400 slaves living in no more than twenty blocks of developed urban

¹Morgan & Nicholls, “Slaves in Piedmont Virginia, 1720-1790,” p. 164.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 184-5; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 461, 463; Joyner, Down by the Riverside, p. 34.

⁴Gary B. Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community 1720-1840 (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 14.

⁵Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, p. 54.

⁶Ibid., pp. 58, 369; Berlin, The Generations of Captivity, p. 272; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, p. 34.

spacing.¹ During the same period, this port-city was home to about 590 slave-owners, with nearly 1,400 slaves in a total population of 18,600. Eight years later, when the city recorded an overall 25,000 population, the number of slaveholders declined to 376 and the slave population to less than 700.² Slightly past the mid-century, almost 8 percent of the blacks in Philadelphia were urban slaves.³

Southern New England colonies/states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island ranked first among the slave-trading regions. Their largest populations of slaves were in the Bay region.⁴ Slaves were concentrated in Bristol, Plymouth, Lincoln, Duke, Cumberland, Nantucket, Berkshire, Cambridge, and Worcester counties.⁵ Boston, throughout the entire colonial era, had the largest number of blacks. As of 1687, “there was not a house in Boston that had not one or two slaves.”⁶

Rhode Island contained fully one-third of all slaves, with nearly half of them in Newport. The largest number of the black population, comprising almost half was in Newport. Connecticut’s black slaves were densely concentrated in the port-cities of New London and Hartford.⁷

New York—unlike its counterparts in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island—had from one-fifth to one-third of its slave population in the rural areas. Throughout the eighteenth century, its large slave populations were concentrated in the Long Island estates and the Hudson River Valley.⁸ New York’s

¹Nash, Forging Freedom, pp. 11, 14; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 33-42.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; Berlin, The Generations of Captivity, p. 272.

⁴Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, p. 79.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 58.

⁷Ibid.; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, pp. 26-7, 86-7.

⁸Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 37, 40.

Narragansett region, where the tobacco growing was located, had the densest concentration of slaves. This region looked more like South Carolina than any one of the Northern colonies.¹ By mid-century, it had begun to lose its pre-eminence in slave population to Charleston, then to New Orleans. From one-fifth to one-quarter of all slaves in colonial New York were in New York City.²

Northern slave-merchants were skewed more toward the ethno-regional merits of their slaves.³ Most Northern merchants—like those in piedmont—often placed more value upon the youth and skill of their slaves. Compared to their Southern counterparts, where most of the young slaves participated equally in the tedious plantation routines, slaves (boys and girls) in the North were mostly in domestic service. This had the predictable effects of allowing Northern slaveholders to train their slaves in the required domestic activities.⁴

Even where slaves were involved in the rigorous task of ship building in the major port-cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Newport, for example, their tasks were often flexible, and unlike the blatant exploitation characteristic of Southern slavery.⁵ This represented an important variant with its Southern counterparts, as well as a decisive factor in their future rift.

Nigerian-West African Background of Slaves in Mainland North America

As we saw much earlier in Chapter 1, the Nigerian background formed the crux of the human cargoes that were shipped to the New World. This was

¹Ibid.

²Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, pp. 54, 58.

³Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 334.

⁴Ibid., pp. 334-5.

⁵Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 4-6; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 33-42.

particularly the case during the eighteenth century, when, as Gordon documents, “almost one-third of the slaves came from Nigeria.”¹

Indeed, an estimated 3.5 million people from the Nigerian regions were shipped to the New World over the entire span of the slave trade.² As we also saw earlier, a majority of these slaves were from the Ibo and Yoruba ethnic origins, followed by Efik/Ibibio, Hausa-Fulani, and Ijo.³ Therefore, at this juncture, it might be helpful to delineate their demographic distribution in mainland North America (See Tables 7.1-7.3).

Table 7.1

Estimated Number of Slaves Exported from Africa,
by British Ships, by Region, by Period, 1662-1807

Period	Senegambia	Sierra Leome	Gold Coast	Bight of Benin	Bight of Biafra	Central Africa	South East Africa
1662-70	1100	400	8000	13700	32500	4100	100
1671-80	3800	1300	17500	17200	22900	8300	300
1681-90	8000	2700	12700	40100	18200	19800	5400
1691-00	9800	3300	17100	33400	10500	17200	200
1700-09	7800	2600	47100	43500	15400	9300	-
1710-19	11200	5000	91100	47600	24500	17500	11000
1720-29	22900	8300	78900	50200	44700	61500	9400
1730-39	40300	5300	32000	25200	53300	136500	-
1740-49	6500	4400	51100	6700	95300	45100	-
1750-59	30100	41000	62600	14800	91300	33600	500
1760-69	40300	94200	79300	27100	145500	38200	-
1770-79	38100	77200	84800	24700	120400	16000	-
1780-89	6700	34700	71800	19000	157700	16600	-
1790-99	5200	37400	5310	20600	133900	100000	-
1800-07	3800	19400	46000	12500	101100	72500	-
Total	235600	337200	753100	396300	1067200	596200	26900
% Share	6.9	9.9	22.1	11.6	31.3	17.5	0.8

Source: David Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” in *Black Experience and Empire*, eds., Philip D. Morgan and Sean Hawkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 67.

¹Gordon, *Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples*, p. 54.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Also, see earlier notes on the demography of the slaves, including Tables 4-5.

Table 7.1 shows a general overview of the regional estimates of slaves exported from Africa via British Empire ships from 1662 to 1807. Based on the data, the bulk of the British transshipments during the transatlantic slave trade came from West Africa. Further revealing is that the major slave exporting centers were in the Bight of Bonny, with 31.1 percent of the total share, followed by the Gold Coast (22.1 percent), Central Africa (17.5 percent), and Bight of Benin (11.6 percent).¹

With regard to British mainland North America, about 40 percent of the newly arrived slaves in the Chesapeake during the second and third decades of the eighteenth century were from Calabar in the Cross River basin area and Iboland in the Niger Delta basin region of the Bight of Bonny.² By the mid-eighteenth century, the bulk of the “Guinea Africans” imported into Virginia were from Cross River basin and the Niger Delta regions of Old Calabar and Bonny.³

Based on Table 7.2 (1690 to 1807), the British importation from the Bight of Bonny (30.1 percent), had the largest share among the major suppliers of slaves to North America. Next was the Gold Coast, with 18.4 percent, followed by the Windward Coast (11.6 percent), and the Bight of Benin (11.3 percent).

Table 7.2 confirms the data on Tables 5 and 7.1, particularly in relation to the pattern of West African slaves entering mainland North America. For example, the Bight of Bonny (Biafra) in modern Nigeria had the largest share of slaves imported into Virginia between 1710 and 1769. Virginians received less than one-sixth of

¹For detailed elaboration, see the insightful essay by historian Richardson, “Through a Looking Glass,” pp. 66-7.

²Holloway, *Africanisms in American Culture*, pp. 6-11; Berlin, *The Generations of Captivity*, p. 59.

³*Ibid.* Also, see Tables 4 and 5.

their slaves from Senegambia, one-sixteenth from the Gold Coast, one-sixth from Windward Coast, and about 38 percent from the Bight of Bonny region.¹

Table 7.2

African Slaves Imported into Mainland North America,
by Region, by Percentage, 1690-1807

Region/Coastal Origin	Virginia 1710-1769	South Carolina 1733-1807	British Slave Trade, 1690-1807
Senegambia	14.9	19.5	5.5
Sierra-Leone	5.3	6.8	4.3
Windward Coast	6.3	16.3	11.6
Gold Coast	16.0	13.3	18.4
Bight of Benin	-----	1.6	11.3
Bight of Bonny [Biafra]	37.7	2.1	30.1
Angola	15.7	39.6	18.2
Mozambique/Madagascar	4.1	0.7	-----
Others	-----	-----	0.6
Total	100	100	100

Source: Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 157.

Similarly when Virginians imported some 52,000 slaves between 1710 and 1769, with the origin of 20,000 given as “Africa,” some 9,224 of them—representing the largest—were from the Bonny and Calabar in the Cross River basin and Niger Delta regions.² This confirms that the bulk of the slaves imported into Virginia were from present-day Nigeria, and mostly from the slave marts of Bonny and Calabar, and Benin and Dahomey (See Tables 4 and 5).³

For South Carolina slaveholders (Table 7.2), their imports were stronger from Senegambia (19.5 percent) and Angola (39.6 percent), Windward Coast (16.3 percent), and Gold Coast (13.3 percent). Imports of slaves from the Bight of Benin

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 334-5. Also, see the Nigerian demographics in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, especially Figures 51-5.2 and Table 9.

²Ibid.; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, p. 11.

³Ibid., pp. 4-10; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, pp. 144-5; Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past, p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 28-9; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-8, 20-2.

(1.6 percent) and Bight of Bonny (2.1 percent) comprised the lowest shares.¹ This contrasted sharply with Virginia, which imported only 15.7 percent of its slaves between 1710 and 1769 from Angola, compared to South Carolina's 40 percent.

Throughout a greater part of the eighteenth century, South Carolina imported slaves from Central Africa than from any other region (Table 7.3). Like Virginia, a majority of these slaves were primarily from the "Guinea" region. By the mid-1700s, about 70 percent were of Bantu origin. This pattern continued up to the end of the eighteenth century.²

Unlike South Carolina, however, Virginia had a less restrictive policy in its imports: a majority of its slaves were from the Bights of Bonny, followed closely by the Gold Coast, Windward Coast and Senegambia. Virginians therefore imported slaves from more diverse regions of Africa than South Carolinians.³

A careful study of the overall population of slaves import into South Carolina may even reveal that neither Angolans as a specific group nor Central Africans as a general regional workforce were the majority in its population (Table 7.2). For example, about 18,240 slaves imported into South Carolina between 1752 and 1807 were from the Guinea Coast, and reportedly taken from the Gold Coast to Calabar.⁴ Collectively, slaves entering South Carolina from all the West African coastal plains comprised about 60 percent from the eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries.⁵

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 335.

²Wood, Black Majority, p. 6; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 6-10.

³Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 156-7; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 334-5; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 144-5; Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past, p. 36; Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 28-9; Latham, Old Calabar, pp. 17-8, 20-2; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 4-11.

⁴*Ibid.*, Holloway, p. 9.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. That is, from the Senegambia to the Bights of Benin to Bonny.

Table 7.3

Nigerian-West African Background of Slaves Imported
into South Carolina, by Number, by Region,
by, 1733-1744

Coastal Region	Number of Slaves	Percentage
Senegambia	1,031	6.2
Sierra-Leone	----	---
Windward Coast	34	.2
Gold Coast	1,184	7.2
Bight of Benin	----	----
Bight of Bonny	609	3.7
Angola	9,831	59.7
Mozambique/Madagascar	-----	-----
Others	3,844	23.2
Total	16,533	

Source: Joseph E. Holloway, "The Origins of African Culture," in Africanisms in American Culture, ed., J.E. Holloway (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 7.

The difference in the above analogy appears then to have been closely associated with the diverse concentration of slaves in the two Southern slave societies. For example, the data on Table 7.2 confirmed that the imports of slaves from the Bights of Bonny and Benin into South Carolina were not as concentrated as in Virginia. During the early period—1733 to 1744—most of its slaves' imports were from Angola, Windward Coast, and Senegambia. Only 609 slaves were from the Bight of Bonny, with no recorded import for the Bight of Benin.

The preceding suggests the extent to which the slave merchants showed a certain degree of preferences in their imports of West African slaves. First, nearly all the ethnic preferences of West African slaves in mainland North America were dictated by the needs of the plantation economy.¹ Second, the character of Southern slave societies not only influenced the ideology of plantation agriculture, but also

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 334

how planters selected their human cargoes from one region of Africa over the other. Often these preferences occurred because slave merchants wanted strong, full-grown male slaves with the required skills who could endure the rigor of the plantation workforce.¹ As, for example, in Virginia, where tobacco growing required brute force, its slaveholders and plantation system exhibited a certain degree of flexibility in their patterns of slave import. South Carolina's extensive rice plantations required specific skills, so planters imported from Senegambia and Angola. Between 1683 and 1721, roughly half of Virginia's imports sailed from Senegambia—near the Niger Valley.² Reportedly, moreover, Virginia alone imported an average of about 800 slaves a year from the Bight of Bonny late in the second decade of eighteenth century, and at least twice that number by the middle of the third decade.³

Other evidences suggest that the attitudes of white slave merchants toward slaves from regions of modern Nigeria were as mixed as they were often modified. For example, the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba slaves were among those who were “artisans” and “house servants,” for such were commonplace skills among them.⁴ Their counterparts such as the Ibo and Calabar/Efik and Ibibio were mostly the field hands. Indeed given the ethnic history of a majority of the slaves imported from the Bights of Bonny and Benin [Nigeria], it is quite likely that a majority of them were field hands. Consequently, some merchants imported slaves from certain regions because they were known to be less prone to rebellion.⁵

¹Thomas, The Slave Trade, p. 403.

²Berlin, The Generations of Captivity, p. 59.

³Northrup, Trade Without Rulers, p. 54.

⁴Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 4-14; Thomas, The Slave Trade, pp. 399-402; Berlin, Many Thousand Gone, pp. 144-5; Wood, Black Majority, pp. 12-15.

⁵Ibid.

Within the superstructure of the Chesapeake and Lowcountry plantation systems were the dreaded white overseers. Under them rested the supervision over the varied hierarchic statuses of enslaved Africans: house servants, artisans, rice cultivators, and field slaves.¹ Some slaves were considered less rebellious, and more obedient, industrious, and submissive; such slaves, particularly the house servants, often differed from the fieldworkers.²

General Growth and Transformation of Black Captivity in the Era of Freedom: 1780-1865

The growth of the black population in colonial British North America, later the United States, was due to both the considerable degree of self-sustaining reproduction of slaves as well as direct importation.³ This can be further explained by understanding the pattern of fluctuation in the growth of slaves between the Caribbean slave societies and mainland North America. For example, slaves in the Caribbean were less likely than their counterparts in mainland North American colonies to have large families of children.⁴

Both socially and demographically, the practice of racial slavery and racial capitalism was more freestanding and autonomous in the British colonies of mainland North America and later the United States than in Central and South

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Stanley L. Engelmann, "Changes in Black Fertility, 1880-1940," in Family and Population in Nineteenth Century America, ed., Tamara K. Hareven and Maris A. Vinovskis (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 126; Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 60-1; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 460.

⁴Ibid.

Americas. This meant that colonial slavery survived more independently in North America.¹

When an estimated 264,000 slaves were imported into the British West Indies between 1640 and 1700, the total black population was about 100,000. Similarly, between 1712 and 1762 the importation of 150,000 slaves to Barbados only raised the black population to 28,000.² Brazil's import of about 4 million slaves over the entire span of the Atlantic slave trade represented some 38 percent. Yet, about 33 percent of the number comprised local Brazilians population when slavery ended, and only 36 percent were Afro-Americans of the Western Hemisphere.³ Similarly, the Caribbean import of 5 million slaves represented 43 percent of the total trade, with only 3 million Afro-Americans when slavery ended in 1866. This number represented an average of 60 percent of its local population, comprising only 18 percent of the total population of Afro-Americans in the Western Hemisphere.⁴

Table 8 shows the general pattern of the growth of black population from 1620 to 1860: a period representing the colonial and birth of an independent United States. This growth represented the fastest in the entire Western Hemisphere.⁵ About eighty years after their first settlement in North America, slaves numbered 27,000 by 1700, representing some one-sixth in the British Caribbean.⁶ By 1720, in fact, more blacks were born in the colonies than were being imported; by 1740, they

¹Ibid., Blackburn, pp. 459-60.

²Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, p. 301.

³Knight et al., in *General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. VI, p. 766.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Manuel D. Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special Studies," in *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical Review, 1790-1978*, Series P. 23, No. 80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1790-1978), p. ix.

⁶Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 329-30.

were mostly American-born, with about fourteen percent of them being represented in the entire population.¹

Furthermore, their general growth pattern represented about eighty percent of the entire population of the British and French Caribbean. Apparently this same population increased twice as rapidly as the rate of importation between 1700 and 1780.²

Slaves, who produced about three-quarters of the exports around 1770 in mainland North America, comprised 18 percent of the colonial population and 40 percent of the population of the Southern colonies. This meant that the slave population of North America was larger in the Americas in 1770 than it had been throughout the Americas in the 1700.³

Between 1700 and 1750, for example, the Chesapeake colony of Virginia, which imported roughly 45,000 slaves, had a black population increase ranging from 8,000 or 10,000 to over 100,000.⁴ By the 1760s, on the other hand, South Carolina had a clear black demographic distinction over white. Also, by mid-century onward, its percentage share of black population ranked first in the entire American population.⁵

¹Coniff and Davis, *Africans in the Americas*, p. 132.

²Rawley, *The Transatlantic Slave Trade*, p. 330.

³Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, pp. 459-60.

⁴Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, pp. 301, 308.

⁵W.A. Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed., *Encyclopedia of Black America* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1981), p. 685.

Table 8

General Growth Pattern of African-American and White Populations, by Percentage, by Decade, 1619/20-1860

Year-Decade	Afro-American	White	Percent Afro-American of Total Population
1619/20	20	2,180	1.0
1630	60	4,586	2.0
1640	597	26,037	2.3
1650	1,600	48,758	3.2
1660	2,920	72,138	3.9
1670	4,535	107,400	4.0
1680	6,971	144,536	4.6
1690	16,729	193,643	8.0
1700	27,000	223,000	11.1
1710	44,000	286,000	13.5
1720	68,000	397,000	14.8
1730	91,000	538,000	14.5
1740	160,000	745,000	17.7
1650	236,000	934,000	20.2
1760	325,000	1,267,000	20.4
1770	459,000	1,588,000	21.4
1780	575,000	2,204,000	20.7
1790	757,000	3,172,000	19.3
1800	1,002,000	4,305,000	18.9
1810	1,378,000	5,862,000	19.0
1820	1,772,000	7,867,000	18.4
1830	2,329,000	10,537,000	18.1
1840	2,874,000	14,196,000	16.8
1850	3,639,000	19,553,000	15.7
1860	4,442,000	26,923,000	14.1

Source: W. A. Low and Virgil A. Cliff, ed., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981), p. 685.

At the birth of the new nation, the black population was estimated at about “462,000 for 1770 and 562,000 for 1780.”¹ The bulk of blacks, representing about 85 percent of all mainland slaves, were in the South, and mostly in four states: Virginia, the largest, held 220,582 slaves; South Carolina had 97,000; North Carolina held 91,000 slaves; and Maryland had 80,515. South Carolina’s black majority comprised some two-fifths of Virginia’s population, compared to one-third in North

¹Plotkin, “Current Population Reports, Special Studies,” p. 6.

Carolina and Maryland.¹ New York, the fifth largest slave colony, had 21,054 Blacks, followed closely by Georgia with 20,831.²

By the late 1780s, when all of New England had abolished the foreign slave trade and slavery, all the leading slave societies of the Southern states were entering another era of boom in cotton production based on intensive slave labor.³ By the 1790s, therefore, all Northern slaving institutions entered a course toward a mixed climate of voluntary⁴ formal extinction of the foreign slave trade via gradual emancipation.

Definitely by 1790, the American-born progeny of slaves numbered 757,208 in a total population of 3,929,214.⁵ Ironically, the first U.S. Census taken during this same period showed that four Southern slave states were the major enclaves of black America: Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina. Of the 86 percent of blacks under slavery during the pre-War era, about 90 percent resided in the South.⁶

Also, in 1790, of the 67,120 or 67, 474 of blacks in the North, some 40,087 were slaves. New York, with 25,978 blacks and New Jersey, with 14,185 blacks, held the edge over the rest of Northern states for both the numbers of enslaved and free blacks. Massachusetts' 6,001 blacks were all free compared to about 2,700 in

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 331-2.

²Ibid.

³Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, pp. 3-4; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, pp. 75-6.

⁴Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. vii-ix, 3-6, 39-41.

⁵Countryman, How American Slavery Began, pp. 4-5

⁶Frazier, The Negro in the United States, p. 34; Plotkin, "Current Population Reports, Special Studies," pp. ix, 6; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 372-3; Berlin, The Generations of Captivity, pp. 272-4.

Connecticut still under slavery.¹ By early nineteenth century, more than 2 million blacks from the Atlantic seaboard to Delaware to Florida to east of the Mississippi river, were in the former slave societies.²

Accordingly, by 1810, the year of the first U.S. Census after the abolition of the foreign slave by the Congress in 1808, about 1,377,080 blacks were recorded in the population. Of this number 1,191,362 were slaves, 186,466 or some thirteen percent freemen.³ Almost at about the same time, South Carolina “legally imported nearly 40,000 Africans.”⁴

From 1790s to 1850s, which was the height of cotton productions, was marked by the growth of black population in Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee.⁵ On the other hand, however, was virtually abolished in the North by 1830. Ironically, at about a similar period, Missouri had 25,000 slaves. By 1850, when Georgia and South Carolina had each over 380,000 slaves, Virginia recorded 470,000 on its count. Louisiana, with a slave population of 34,000 during the 1810 Census, had about 245,000 in 1850.⁶ By 1860, when ninety percent of blacks were American-born, the U.S. produced five million bales of cotton, as compared to three million in 1852 and one and a half million in 1822.⁷ Only two million of the seven

¹Ibid.

²Knight et al., in General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI, p. 760.

³Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 329; Bergman, Negro History, p. 92.

⁴David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 121.

⁵Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, pp. 3-4; Plotkin, “Current Population Reports, Special Studies,” p. 6. Also, see Tables 6.1-6.3.

⁶Litwack, North of Slavery, p. 14; Morris, Southern Slavery and Law, pp. 4-5; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, pp. 82-4.

⁷Bergman, Negro History; Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, pp. 3-4.

million whites in the South owned slaves during this same period. About seven percent of the white population in the South owned “nearly 3,000,000 of the 3,953,760 slaves.”¹

By 1860, only 448,070 of blacks were free out of a total of 4,441,830.² About seventy years after, the black population had grown from “almost six-fold to 4.4 million.”³ Thus, very little variation occurred in the proportion of enslaved black population after the legal prohibition of the practice by the U.S. Congress. This meant that the law in fact had little or no impact on the growth of the slave population, or on the illegal importation of slaves into the country.⁴

Both enslaved and free blacks made up a sizeable proportion of city populations of pre-Civil War Southern and Northern states. Baltimore’s 28,000 blacks represented the largest in the nation, seconded by New Orleans with more than 24,000. Charleston—with 17,146 blacks was followed closely by Richmond (14,275), and Washington (10,893).⁵

On the other hand, in Northern states pre-Civil War black population was much less conspicuous and much smaller: their densest concentrations were in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Within these areas their patterns of urban settlement were also far stronger than for most Americans. These Northern blacks made up between 1 and 3 percent of the population of large cities.⁶

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., Bergman, p. 221.

³Plotkin, “Current Population Reports, Special Studies.”

⁴Ibid.

⁵Bayrd Still, Urban America: A History with Documents (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1974), p. 132.

⁶Ibid.

Although the proportion of their total population dropped between 1840 and 1860, this did not seriously affect their patterns of urban cluster. Philadelphia, which abolished slavery in 1808, had the largest Northern black community in 1860: its 22,185 blacks represented nearly 4 percent of the total population. Other Northern cities with sizeable black populations included: Brooklyn (4,313), Cincinnati (3,731), and Boston (2,261). Newark, Pittsburgh, and Detroit had black populations exceeding one thousand.¹

When President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation in 1865, abolishing chattel slavery forever, the U.S. had about 4.5 million African-Americans.² As Americans of a peculiar history, this marked the beginning of a new cycle of struggle for the generation black captivity.

Summary

A majority of the varied West African slaves imported into mainland North America/U.S. from the Bights of Bonny and Benin were from the present-day location of modern Nigeria. Slaves imported from these regions were mostly from the Niger Delta/Niger-Benue and the Cross River basins.

Based on the data on Tables 4-5 and Tables 7.1-7.2, slaves imported from the Bights of Bonny and Benin were greater in the Southern slave societies of Chesapeake than in the Lowcountry South Carolina.³ The distribution of slaves of

¹Ibid., p. 127; Nash, *Forging Freedom*, p. 14.

²Ibid.; Knight et al., p. 766.

³For example, see Tables 6.1-6.3; Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, pp. 156-157. *Note that the demography of West African slaves, largely of the "Niger Delta valleys" and the related regions of the "Guinea," forms the central basis in our explanation as well as summary of the Nigerian background of American slaves.

the Nigerian ethnicity had one of the widest spread: one out of every four Africans forced in chains into mainland North America was from the Nigerian region.¹ The spread of these Nigerian ethnic traits went as far as the former Senegambia and the Gold Coast.²

¹Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 156-157; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 7-12; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, p. 113; and Tables 4-5, 7.1 and 7.2,

²Ibid., Curtin, p. 156; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 334-5; Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 4-11.

CHAPTER 3

MODERN NIGERIA: A REVIEW

The first section of this chapter examines the pre-colonial settings of modern Nigeria, its geographic and ethno-regional zones before and after the beginning of the British colonial rule, and the activities leading to the unification of the Northern and Southern Protectorate in 1914. The second section discusses the differences between Southern and Northern peoples of Nigeria: both in relation to the Islamic cultures as well as European colonial/Christian Missionary influences, it explains the extent to which the ethno-regional differences of Nigerians, particularly in preferential policies, are the products of the colonial era. Additionally, it explains the pattern of Nigerian immigration to the United States, along with the regional distribution of Nigerians.

Background and Demographics

Modern Nigeria, with a compact area of 373,250 square miles is located in the extreme corner of the Gulf of Guinea, in West Africa, and extends from the Gulf Guinea in the South to embrace the Sahara Desert in the North. Its North-South geographic features have two distinctive yearly climatic zones: the dry season and the rainy season. The dry season, beginning from November to March is often driven by strong Harmattan winds from the Sahara Desert in the north. The rainy season, which lasts from April to October, is moisture-laden southwest trade winds blowing on-shore toward the interior and toward other parts of the country. Modern

Nigeria is bounded on the west and north by Dahomey and the Niger Republic and in the east by Lake Chad and the Cameroon.¹

The physical features of Nigeria can further be divided into two geographical zones, with the open savannah zone lying to the north, and the southern forest zones adjoined at the middle Niger and Benue rivers.² Often viewed as separate zones, the Niger and Benue rivers form the heartland of the “middle belt.” On the other hand, however, they are important transitional points between the peoples of the savannah and the southern forest zones. Also, these rivers are not only important compacts between the savannah belt and the forest zones, but can be seen stretching across the mountains to the northeast of Sierra-Leone to embrace the whole of the French Sudan before entering via the south of the Gulf of Guinea.³ Nigeria has other important rivers such as Bonny, Qua Iboe, Delta, and Katsina-ala. The presence of Kainji hydroelectric dam has made some of these rivers navigable all year round within West Africa and far beyond.

Prior to European contact, these vast geographic regions were linked to distant civilizations.⁴ Historian Collins observes that although the Sahara has been known to affect contacts with the outside world, “its barren wastes have never totally prevented contact between Africa and the Mediterranean world.”⁵

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 11.

²Biodun Adediran, “The Origins of Nigerian Peoples,” in Nigerian History and Culture, p. 10.

³Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 11.

⁴Robert O. Collins, Western African History: Text and Readings (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, Inc., 1990), p. 3.

⁵*Ibid.* Also, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Part 1: Alien Influence in Pre-colonial Nigeria: Islamic Factor

As we saw briefly in Chapter 2, the Islamic factor in pre-colonial Nigeria, especially in its Northern region, had tied its peoples to the outside world and hence to the influences of alien cultures. The introduction of Islam into this region in about the fourteenth century not only preceded European contacts but formed the basis of human development as well as crisis in the unity of the peoples of pre-colonial Nigeria during both the colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.¹ So before the imposition of informal British mandate in the Niger Delta basins, Islam had already been a dominant religion in the bulk of the Hausa-Fulani north. This region was inhabited mostly by a race of cattle breeders, who lived a nomadic life. According to tradition, they had emigrated from the Senegal River Valley to Northern Nigeria around the beginning of the twelfth century. By the late sixteenth century several clans in what is today Northern Nigeria had come under the influence of Islam and the Fulani. These influences, along with their subsequent distribution across the region, extended throughout Hausaland as far as east of modern Adamawa.²

By the early nineteenth century, the Fulani nomads under the leadership of a famous scholar in Gobir, Usman dan Fodio began to expand the spheres of Islamic influence in Northern Nigeria. The roots of this expansion began in 1804, when dan Fodio led a Jihad or Holy War aimed at establishing a pure form of Islam upon the

¹This is in reference to the Euro-African relations in the Niger Delta basins; see earlier notes in Chapter 2.

²See, for example, Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 264-5; Akin Olorunfemi, "The Fulani Jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century," in Nigerian History and Culture, ed., Richard Olaniyan (Ikeja, Ibadan, Owerri: Longman Group Limited, 1985), pp. 123, 128-133; J. O. Hunwick, "The Nineteenth-Century Jihads," in Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, eds., Joseph Anene and Godfrey N. Brown (Ibadan and Nelson: Ibadan University Press, 1966), pp.291, 293-8.

so-called infidel. Within a few years, dan Fodio and his adherents had succeeded in overthrowing most of the Hausa kings and, with the exception of Bornu, had established the Fulani rule throughout Northern Nigeria.¹ Between 1807 and 1830, the Fulani Jihad extended to such great ancient cities as Katsina and Kano, and later still the across the whole of Northern Nigeria (although with the exception of Bornu, parts of Kebbi and Gobir, and the hilly areas of the Middle Belt). With Islamic expansion, the Hausa states in Northern Nigeria, and those as far as Southwestern Nigeria, came under the Fulani domination. The greatest achievements of the Fulani Empire over a vast area of Northern Nigeria were in the development of commerce and stimulation of learning.²

If one considers, therefore, the introduction of Islamic civilization as an alien culture into Northern Nigeria before European contacts, the inference would certainly be that both the region and its peoples had had contacts with distant regions of the ancient world. It would also be obvious that they had been exposed to some trends of human development, and were therefore being shaped accordingly by the exchanges occurring out of such contacts. There is then a basis for understanding the nature of cultural exchanges, intellectual, scientific, architectural, and religious that occurred via the downward and upward pulls of the Sudanic belt and North Africa, Mediterranean Arab, Far-East Asia, and Europe.³

Given the preceding background, Coleman's position that, the "physical location of Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea limited intercourse and encouraged

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³For example, see this background in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

isolation,”¹ is correct but also somewhat misleading. As Coleman further documents: “Until the modern development of roads, railroads, air travel, and ports and harbors, however, neither the land-borne impact from the Middle east nor the sea-born impact from Europe was of any great significance in bringing Nigeria into the general stream of world events and forces.”² Shaw agrees with Coleman, arguing that until the European colonial era, Nigerians of the interior were isolated from the rest of the world.³ Thus, in the opinion of both Coleman and Shaw, colonialism was a central factor in integrating the varied races of pre-colonial Nigeria into the modern world. This position later received extensive elaboration by such scholars as Gann and Duignan who emphasized the benefits of European colonialism in black Africa.⁴ This consideration goes along with the processes in which tropical Africa, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, gradually became integrated into the capitalist world economy.⁵

It cannot be denied that colonialism was a major factor in the integration of tropical Africa into the modern world. It does seem however that there is an over emphasis regarding the extent to which the current location of modern Nigeria was isolated from the outside world. As we noted earlier, prior to European contacts, commercial and cultural exchanges from the current location of modern Nigeria had taken place with the outside world. While the exchanges might not have been as

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 12.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; Thurstan Shaw, “Prehistory,” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, ed., Obara Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books), pp. 35-6..

⁴L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1977), pp. vii-xvii, 3-47, especially, 119-161.

⁵Ibid. Also, see: Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, Inc., 1986), pp. 68-9, 101.

huge as those occurring between North Africa and the Mediterranean world, or between the Swahili coastal city-states and Far East Asia, as well as with Europe, its functional existence through contacts with the outside world cannot be denied.¹

Indeed, as we saw earlier—that is, prior to 1914—it would have been misleading to deny vital contacts among the varying ethno-cultural zones of the Niger Delta regions. Taken together, “the pre-amalgamation history of Nigeria is not just the individual stories of diverse groups but a credible story of meaningful contact and dynamic relationships between various groups.”² Contacts among pre-colonial Nigerians were able to link traders and scholars through the signing of treaties and through warfare, regional expansion and integration, and through cultural and religious borrowings. There is hardly any disagreement about the significant cultural impact of the Fulani on the Hausa or the Yoruba on the Bini, or of the Ibo on the Ijo and Efik/Ibibio vis-à-vis, nor of their involvement with the outside world of the pre-European era through commercial exchange.³

Perhaps, as we also hinted earlier, one explanation for the isolation of pre-colonial Nigeria from outside contacts lies in the often misunderstood pathways of its ancient exchanges. For, in attempting to explain the isolation of tropical Africa from the rest of the world, it may not be right to overlook the relationship between the ordered geographic pathway of the ancient world and its pattern of development. This misunderstanding appears to have deepened, rather than lessening the conflict of modern Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan regions.

¹Dike, *Trade and Politics*, p. 5; Aderidan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, pp. 10-18; Falola, *Nigerian History and Culture*, pp. 56-7; Sowell, *Conquest and Cultures*, pp. 112-113.

²Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, p. 4.

³*Ibid.*, p. 5. Also, see related references in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Sowell, for instance, places the problem of underdevelopment and isolation of tropical Africa on its insufficient river lanes and absence of linkages to the major water highways of the world. He shows great understanding in pointing to the clearly perceptive facts of modern geographical factors.¹ Regrettably, however, he does not explain the relationships between the ecological changes taking place in Africa over a broad span of historical cycles from that occurring purely due to attitude of the modern world.

There is thus an understanding of the extent to which both the geographic and commercial lanes linking inland Africa to the outside world are being misunderstood. To be sure, this misunderstanding does not even include the failure to explain the more visible modern crisis which began from the fifteenth century to undermine the ordered pathways of ancient contacts in Africa with distant regions of the world. For, while black Africa does not have great water highways and favorable harbors like Europe and Asia,² there seems to be more to this problem.³

Of course, the enormous ability in explaining post-modern world problems of human development does not quite justify ignoring the implications of the historic shift that began to take place along the Afro-Asian lanes in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean from the fifteenth century onward. This has a lot to do with the current status of modern Africa. It could very well be that some of the underlying problems of Nigeria in the modern world, indeed of Africa south of the Sahara, are traceable to the disruptions of ancient lanes by the expansion of world capitalism. It is not for

¹Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, p. 172

²Ibid.

³This is the ultimate consequences of the enclosure structural of Afro-Asian lanes which began in Ceuta, North Africa, in 1415, which we mirrored as resulting in the sealing of the major lanes of inland African contacts with outside world.

nothing that the tenuous unities of the races of modern Nigeria are often shaped by attitudes resulting from Western interests in the Mediterranean Asia. The Muslim and Christian factions of modern Nigeria have traceable historical roots. This suggests that the disruption of the ordered pathways of ancient exchanges has some inescapable relationship with the current state of human underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. By the current state of world capitalism, perhaps this development calls for greater understanding of the types of structural curves that began to take place along the Afro-Asian lanes from the fifteenth century onward.¹

Historian Rawley makes the point which suggests that the Euro-African contacts during the opening of the modern era were oppositional to the earlier pattern of commercial organization: "it seems probable that people along the Gulf of Guinea, from western Ghana to the Bight of Biafra, carried on a maritime trade before the arrival of the Portuguese. The Atlantic slave trade, therefore, did not initiate long-distance trade among the Africans; rather, it tended to redirect trade from a south to north movement to a north to south flow."²

Clearly, based on the previous chapter, as well as an unequal pattern of Euro-African world exchanges, the above observation by Rawley appears to point toward the origin of the bulk of the current problem of modern Africa. Even while he did go far enough in exploring the effects of that historic shift on the status of Africa south of the Sahara, his hints strongly suggest the beginning of the contraction of the ancient lanes of Africa's exchanges with the outside world. This development applies as well to the loss of its strategic lanes which had hitherto supported the

¹Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, pp. 268-9.

²Ibid.

downward and upward pull of commerce and cultural exchanges via the Afro-Asian lanes. Prior to the 1500s, these were more favorable to inland Africa.¹ No wonder, historian Ajayi argues that, in the particular case of pre-colonial Nigeria, the emergent colonial mandate did little to foster linkages along earlier lanes of regional contacts. Ajayi is even conclusive that, while “they [British/Europeans] ignored the traditional trade routes,” they lured improvements toward railways and seaports, for example, to ensure transshipments in their interests.² Earlier, historian Dike argued that the impenetrability of the West African interior by Europeans was due more to the strategic position of its middlemen during a particular historical era rather than the claims of the diseases and swampy forests of West Africa.³

While diseases and swampy forests were there, nevertheless, indigenous African merchants and their European counterparts worked as partners on the Niger Delta coastal basins for more than “400 years.” Until Europeans possessed enough military technology to conquer as well as to penetrate into the interior of the Delta hinterlands, their merchants were neither able to compete effectively in the lucrative coastal trade nor to outmatch indigenous Africans.⁴ Nor should it be forgotten that the achievements of the Great Medieval Kingdoms of the Western Sudan transcended the boundaries of Mediterranean Asia and Europe, while those in the forest states of inland Africa, preceded the era of European dominance.⁵ We are likely to see further down this chapter that it may even be that the Islamic intrusion

¹For example, see Chapter 2, early pattern of European contacts with the Delta basins, etc.

²Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 269-70.

³Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 3-10, 19-20; Davidson, Africa in History, Themes and Outlines, pp. 149-153.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.; especially, Davidson, Africa in History, Themes and Outlines; Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 262-7.

did not adversely, undermine the ethno-cultural stability of pre-colonial Nigeria as did European attitudes and influences later on.¹ The difference, therefore, in the beginning of a dominant British cycle in the Niger Delta valleys had a lot to do with both the development of modern Nigeria as well as the making of its current crisis.

Alien Influence in Pre-colonial and Colonial Nigeria 1830-1950: The British and Christian Missionary Factor

For Great Britain, therefore, the road to the historic Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885 that partitioned Africa among the major European powers lies in its desire to control the Niger Delta Valleys. Dike argues that it was the desire of the British to dominate the trade in the Niger Delta and later of the entire political boundaries of the Niger basins that influenced its position in the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885, and later resulted in the creation of the fragile unity of Nigeria in 1914.² The desire to control the Niger Delta valleys can be traced through the varied cycles of informal colonialism, particularly from the 1830s-1860s. This involved the peoples to the east and west of the Niger Delta basins and Niger-Benue confluence, as well as the Cross River.³

The era of informal British colonialism, beginning with the new epoch of so-called legitimate trade, was influenced by the British Parliamentary Act of 1807. This alternative to the abolition of the foreign slave trade was supported by the British Naval Squadron. This marked as well the beginning of a new round of “gun

¹In addition, the earlier background in Chapter 2, especially on the Niger Delta basins mirrors some insightful regional differences that further reveal the thrust of the imposition of Islam and Western influences.

²Ibid. Dike; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 41.

³See further details of the diverse unities of the pre-colonial peoples of modern Nigeria in Chapter 2, the background on Niger Delta basin regions, especially Figures 2.1 and 2.2.

boat diplomacy,” in which the indigenous Delta peoples were coerced into commercial and political treaties in the interests of the British merchants and the metropolitan power.¹

On the other hand, however, formal colonialism in the Niger Delta valleys commenced from 1861 onward when Lagos became a Crown Colony of Great Britain. Dike, in further elaboration of this background, argues that the often-worrisome commercial rivalries between the varied peoples of the Niger Delta valleys and the British merchants presaged the latter development.² Just as the British merchants dominated the trade on the human cargoes, they also dominated the era of legitimate trade on palm oil.³

The preceding emphases meant that between 1830 and 1885, the major geopolitical crucibles of the former Niger Delta city-states formed the corner stone of modern Nigeria. Similar to the experience of Native Americans in colonial North America, the British imperial mandate succeeded in welding its political and commercial interests through coerced treaties that included “all territories in the basin of the Niger and its affluent, which are and may be for the time being subject to the government of the National African Company.”⁴

By 1900, however, the British Government took over from the Royal Niger Company and proclaimed it the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. This move was later to result in consolidating power over the peoples north of the Niger-Benue

¹Dike, *Trade and Politics*, pp. 47-8, 72-4, 93; Latham, *Old Calabar*, p. 22.

²*Ibid.*; Dike, p. v. Also, see earlier notes on chapter 2, including Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, pp. 40-4; Olaniyan, *Nigerian History and Culture*, pp. 20-87; E. J. Alagoa et al., *General History of Africa in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 724-748.

³*Ibid.*; Olaniyan, pp. 97-119.

⁴Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, pp. 41-2, Sally Dyson, *Nigeria: The Birth of Africa's Greatest Country*, Vol. One (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1998), p. 5.

basin. Besides, it enabled the British mandate in 1900 to take over the Niger Coastal Protectorate and renamed it the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. It was this background, which in 1906, made it much easier for Sir Frederick Lord Lugard to merge the Crown Colony of Lagos with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Again, it made it much easier later to merge the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Crown Colony as well as the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1914 into one Protectorate known as Nigeria. This then was how the varying similarities and dissimilarities of the former regions of the Niger Delta valleys and the Cross River were welded into modern Nigeria.¹

As, for example, the negative implications of the coerced union of Southern and Northern Nigeria, Sowell observes: “What the British attempted [in Nigeria] was what might be called low budget imperialism.”² By this inference, it is clear that the British colonial interests far exceeded those of the indigenous peoples. For, as Sowell further documents: “The very idea of making such disparate regions of the British empire in West Africa into one country was a belated and perhaps ill-advised decision.”³

Thus, it cannot be denied that the consequences of the new era of the British legitimate trade in the Niger Delta basins were revealed in the vast disruption of ethno-cultural zones. This was also in direct opposition to the diverse commercial unities that had previously tied the Bights of Bonny and Benin across West Africa and beyond. With the more insidious conflict of colonial dispossession, the new

¹Dike, *Trade and Politics*, p. v.

²Thomas Sowell, *Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 98.

³*Ibid.*, p. 109.

cycle of British commerce was accompanied by unusual relocation of the indigenous peoples across geographic zones under the colonial mandate. While some parts of Yorubaland, Hausa-Fulani states, and Efik/Ibibio people were under the British, others were under the French, and others were thrown into Benin Republic (former Dahomey) and Togo, with others still spreading along the West Coast of Africa.¹

To what extent then was the apparent disregard for the future cohesion of the varied peoples of the Niger Delta valleys by the colonial administration to blame for the state of human crisis and underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria? First, based on our discussion thus far, there cannot be any doubt that modern Nigeria began as an artificial British creation. Second, it cannot be denied either that its creation was mostly designed to ease the burden of administrative nuances in the interests of the empire state. Both the ethno-regional variant as well as the corresponding tension of modern Nigeria meant that it would be difficult to foster the diverse unities among people who were coerced into one country.²

This first official seedling of Nigeria's "artificiality" lies in the historic venture of 1900. "The present unity of Nigeria, as well as its disunity, is in part a reflection of the form and character of the common government."³ In order to upset financial problems, Lord Lugard, the Chief British architect of indirect rule, ignored every opposition to merging culturally dissimilar regions and groups together in 1914.⁴ Wright has observed that it was this background that lured Lugard into the

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background, pp. 41-49; Alogoa et al., pp. 724-7.

²Ibid., Coleman, especially p. 45; Thomas Sowell, Preferential Policies: An International Perspective (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990), pp. 70-71; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 98, 109.

³Ibid.; Coleman, pp. 44-6.

⁴Ibid.; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status, p. 15.

prescription of “indirect rule” in Nigeria. Further, according to Wright, this Lugardian policy,

enabled revenues from the southwest to be drawn on by other regions, particularly the hard pressed north; but he maintained separate bureaucracies to run the north and south. A system of “indirect rule” evolved in the northern region to facilitate taxation and avoid stretching the colonial administration’s limited staff. The emirate mechanism openly admired by most colonial officials and by the influential Mary Kingsley for its ability to control and tax the northern population, was retained to levy taxes to be passed over to the colonial authorities in return for allowing the emirs to retain some traditional power and authority within the region—even though the north was still under the supreme authority of the crown.¹

If the substance of success of the British Protectorate Administration through the system of “indirect rule” was somewhat clearer in the North, this was not the case in the South. Initiated in Western Nigeria between 1916 and 1919 and Eastern Nigeria in 1927, indirect rule was directly and indirectly irreconcilable and problematic. For example, in the South—particularly in the eastern region—where the notion of chieftaincy was loosely defined, indirect rule was a marked failure. For, its mandate through “warrant chiefs” or “white man’s chiefs,” as well as through the new cadre of district officers and clerks, collided against the earlier patterns of organizing the diverse unities of Nigerians.²

Between 1900 and 1930s, and—indeed up to the 1940s—neither the general policies of formal colonialism nor the more specific projection of indirect rule

¹Ibid.

²For example, this is supported by our earlier discussion of the Niger Delta basins in Chapter 2. For alternate shift of modern changes and problems, see earlier notes on Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, along with Ebenezer O. Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities in Nigeria’s Development: Lessons and Challenges for the 21st Century (Latham, New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2000), pp. 116-118. Thus, some of the emphases by Sowell on Nigeria are important, except though that they tend to reflect the transformation of the crisis of a much earlier period: that is, of the new colonial imperialism as well as of the inexperience of post-colonial leaders of modern Nigeria.

showed that the British colonial administration seriously intended to unite the varied ethno-regional zones and peoples later to become the nucleus of an independent Nigeria. Nowhere were these differences as revealing as in the manner in which the British colonial and Christian Missionary policies attempted to assimilate the peoples of Southern and Northern Nigerians into European cultures. Through both its unification act of 1914 and the official attitudes of indirect rule, as well as the Christian missionary programs, the colonial mandate placed the ethno-regional unity of Nigerians in a unique state of inevitable centrifugal crisis.

But how did the above design begin? First, as Coleman tells us, by emphasizing ethno-regional differences rather than similarities, “Few Nigerians were aware that they belonged to any other community than their lineage, their tribe, or their race.” Second, such identification was later to favor the “subordination to a race of the opposite color.”¹ Ajayi, on the other hand, argues that the colonial assumption believed “Nigeria was a collection of self-contained static tribes with no previous history of contacts.” So, accordingly, the colonial agenda

.... failed to realize that they reason [pre-colonial Nigerians] could not maintain a viable boundary between Benin and Yorubaland in Southern Nigeria, or between Ilorin and Nupe in Northern Nigeria and Yorubaland in Southern Nigeria was because of the history of pre-colonial inter-group linkages. They [colonial officials] did little to foster these pre-colonial linkages—for example, they ignored the traditional trade routes—though the institutions they created promoted other types of linkages..... to the new urban centers of British administration, ports, major railway stations.... and motor roads.²

As Ajayi further elaborates, under colonialism,

Every Nigerian was classified into a *tribe*. The tribes were labeled as to certain characteristics perceived by the British which, for example,

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 210.

²Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, p. 269.

made the Tiv and Idoma more suitable as army recruits, the Yoruba and Igbo as non-combatant auxiliaries and the Hausa as non-commissioned officers. The “tribes” also began to be classified according to the degree of privilege they could expect: centralized communities were easier to deal with than “stateless” ones; Muslims were better behaved than Christians. The Hausa were better people than the Tiv; etc. Thus, colonialism did much to foster a new sense of “tribal” and ethnic consciousness.¹

Ebenezer O. Aka, Jr., following almost a similar line as Coleman and Ajayi, argues that the British colonial mandate was the chief cause of inter-ethnic rivalries and fierce competition for the dominance of the nation by one region over. Aka further argues that the British colonial mandate had shaped the attitudes of its subjects toward recognizing their differences among member regional and national groups.²

If the aforementioned emphases are correct, then, the idea of preferential policies or even of affirmative actions for some Nigerians—especially Northern Nigerians³—cannot be viewed as a healthy exercise but certainly as a development requiring a more careful examination. This calls for explaining the relationships between the races of Northern and Southern Nigeria side by side with the attributes of both the British and the Christian Missionary missions.

For, as Coleman’s emphases suggest, the disparity between Northern and Southern Nigeria—particularly in terms of varying modes of human development—had corresponded with the manner in which the two regions came into contact with European cultures. If so, there are some factors that can explain the cycles of human underdevelopment in modern Nigeria. First, to a certain extent, both the relationship

¹Ibid., p. 270.

²Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities, p. 116.

³Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 69-74; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 95-105.

between the coastal plains, where Southern Nigerians first met European merchants and the marked distance of this background from Northern Nigerians, corresponded with both their national and cultural differences. Thus, the effect of early isolation of the Hausa-Fulani North from European cultural influences cannot be denied.¹ Yet, even this understanding does seem an inadequate basis in explaining the profound issue of regional and national underdevelopment of Nigeria.

Aside from the problem of an unequal degree of early exposure of the two regions to European contacts, both the official policies of the colonials and the Christian Missionary mandates had varying impacts on the socio-cultural orbits of Southern and Northern peoples of Nigeria.² For example, in 1900, Lord Lugard, the British Commissioner, reportedly “agreed to maintain, on behalf of Queen Victoria, all pledges and understandings which had been assumed by the Royal Niger Company, including its policy of not supporting Christian missions in the Muslim North.”³ This agreement, allegedly in keeping with the request of the Emirs of some part of Northern Nigeria, might support Sowell’s view that the Muslim North did not want the infiltration of Christian Missionary schools.⁴

Retrospectively, however, the preceding development only confirmed the extent to which Northern Emirs were later to be faulted for an act that was inherent in the colonial stratagem.⁵ For this later corresponded with the attitude of the Northern Emirs toward Western education as well as with the fact that the leaders of

¹Ibid., Preferential Policies, especially pp. 70-1; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 133-5.

²Ibid., Coleman.

³Ibid., p. 133.

⁴Ibid. and Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, p. 98.

⁵Ibid., Coleman, pp. 136-7.

the feudal North were to blame for the lag in the human capitals of their region. Sowell, in fact, argues that such an attitude was disastrous in the general thrust of human development of the Nigerian nation.¹ That such an attitude later corresponded with the backwardness of the largely Hausa-Fulani North in Western education, as well as resulted in the burdensome policies of quota system and preferential treatment in postcolonial Nigeria, cannot therefore be denied.²

However, to digress a little on the side of popular viewpoint, there are undeniable evidences that both the colonial and Christian missionary education did reach Northern Nigerians. Moreover, other evidences are supportive of the Christian missionary educational activities in some sectors of the Islamic North. There are even some evidences that—through the same official invitation of its Emir—the Church Missionary Society (CMS) did open a school in Nupe in 1903, and in Zaria in 1905.³ Yet, comparably, apart from the elevation of the Katsina Teacher Training College to the status of a full secondary school by the colonial government, along with the training of Northern artisans as agricultural inspectors, not much had occurred in the Muslim North via the colonial and Christian missionaries mandates. The original plan to develop Katsina College into a University College—similar to the Yaba College in the South—was later abandoned.⁴

Probably it was in the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani North that the notion of “low budget imperialism,” alluded to earlier,⁵ had its strongest human toll in colonial Nigeria. Certainly while fiscal constraints accounted for some of the

¹Ibid., Sowell, pp.99-114; Preferential Policies, pp. 70-6.

²Ibid.

³Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 133-136.

⁴Ibid., pp. 137-8.

⁵Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, p. 98.

attitudes of the British colonial mandate in the North: such was not nearly the case in the South. Equally significant, while some of the alien cultures were helpful in laying the foundation for the Northern awakening, its continuing lag behind Southern Nigeria cannot be blamed on negligence alone.¹

Indeed, in approaching the largely Muslim North, “Christianity and mission schools were not excluded simply because their presence would indirectly violate a promise or would offend the religious sensibilities of the Muslim population.” But, as Coleman concluded, the “reason was Lugard’s beliefs that Christian and Western education will militate against the successful development of his system of indirect rule.”² On the other hand, a far stronger basis therefore exists which may explain the early isolation of the Muslim North from Western education: this was probably due mostly to the colonial and Christian Missionary attitudes toward the races of tropical Africa. These attitudes had some enduring effects on the general development of the region and its human capitals.³ When the statistics of the Christian Missionaries and British colonial policies, along with those of their related visions of human development are carefully examined, the differences are likely to be seen in terms of the varying effects of projected policies of divide and rule in Nigeria.

By 1926, when there were 138,349 Nigerian children in primary schools, only 5,210 were in Northern Nigeria. “Of the 518 secondary schools, none was in the north.”⁴ By 1947, only 251 students in the North—a figure representing 2.5 percent of the total enrollment in secondary school in Nigeria—were at attendance in

¹Ibid.

²Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 136-7.

³Ibid., p. 210; Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities, pp. 116-118.

⁴Sowell, Preferential Policies, p. 72.

secondary schools. This was when it controlled 54 population of Nigeria.¹ Too, of the total population of seven years of age examined in Nigeria in 1952, “8.5 percent were literate in roman script in all Nigeria, 16 percent in the Eastern Region, 18 percent in the Western Region, and 2 percent in the Northern Region.”²

By itself, of course, within Northern Nigeria, the so-called pagan provinces of the Middle Belt that had come under the influences of Western education recorded some 3.3 percent literacy rate for its people, compared to only 1.4 percent in the predominantly Muslim provinces.³ By 1959, in fact, the North with 55 percent of Nigeria’s population had 9 percent of Nigeria’s population, with only 4 percent in its secondary school population. The representation was equally low in higher education: by 1937, only one Northerner attended Yaba College; and by 1951, only one person had a university degree.⁴

Southern Nigerians dominated in higher studies overseas as well as in higher education within Nigeria itself. While Northerners were 9 percent of the 1,051 students at the University of Ibadan in the academic year of 1959 to 1960, only 2 percent of them [Hausa-Fulani] were among those studying abroad as of 1966.⁵ Similarly, while there were 160 physicians in Nigeria by late 1950—76 of them Yoruba and 49 Ibo—only one was Hausa-Fulani. Again, of the estimated three-quarters of the riflemen in the army who were Hausa-Fulani, four-fifths of the Nigerian officers commissioned before independence were from other regions. Together, these strange disparities perhaps best explain why, in the Muslim North,

¹Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, pp. 133-5.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*; pp.113, 134-5.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 137-8; Sowell, *Preferential Policies*, p. 72.

⁵*Ibid.*

professional jobs requiring Western education were dominated either by foreigners, or by Southern Nigerians.¹

Even if Lord Lugard's policy of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria had no serious constraints, it is doubtful that it would have been able to sustain the rift between the natives and Europeans. It is also doubtful whether it would have been able to contain the built-in intra-regional "class distinctions," which was an extension of the British colonial super structure as well as an underlying contention of inter-ethnic differentiations among Western-educated Nigerians. The colonial mandate even feared that the premature teaching of English to its subjects would inevitably lead to utter disrespect "for British and native ideals."²

... by far the most important single feature of British policy was the effort made to preserve the Muslim North in its pristine Islamic purity by excluding Christian missionaries and limiting Western education, by denying northern leaders representation in the central Nigeria Legislative Council during the period 1923-1947, and by minimizing the contact between the northern peoples and the more sophisticated and nationally-minded southerners temporarily resident in the north. All these aspects of British policy, and others, tended to perpetuate the individuality and separateness of the north.³

Whereas the orientation toward Western values was somewhat deep-seated in Southern Nigeria among the Christian adherents, in the North both the attitudes of the colonials and the Christian missionaries were tactfully oppositional. Even in the South, evidences of blatant racism and discrimination by Christian missionaries toward the "Soros" confirmed that mutual exchanges rarely took place with the most direct admirers of European ideals. The Soros were the ex-slave re-captives freed by the British Naval Squadron from the high seas, following the Parliamentary Act

¹Ibid., p. 71.

²Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 136-7.

³Ibid., p. 322.

abolishing the foreign slave trade in 1807.¹ These were among the most educated of the indigenous peoples of Nigeria to embrace the values of Western civilization. Desirous of moving themselves and those who had sold them toward development along Western lines, the history of their efforts and of their inherent contradictions, as well as ultimate betrayal by both the colonial and the Christian leaderships, is indeed a sad one. Thus, in every sense, these were Southern experiences that mirrored both the attitudes of the colonial and Christian missionary policies toward the predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslim North.

Southern Nigeria then—more than its Northern counterpart—occupied a unique position in the early development of nationalist thought in Nigeria. By the early decades of the twentieth century, it had already involved its varying masses in opposition against oppressive colonial policies. This early political ferment was stronger in the Southwestern region. This was also where the emerging indigenous political leaders and organizational structures were much stronger.²

Prior to the entry of Northern Nigerians into the national liberation struggle, Southerners as a whole dominated the political scene. By 1947, Northern Nigeria had neither identified its national identity nor developed a united political front, for example, with such Southern political parties as National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). In 1948, however, the stake involved in further loss of its

¹E. A. Ayandele, The Educated Elites in the Nigerian Society (Ibadan: University Press, 1974), pp. 22-41

²Moyibi Amoda, "Background to the Conflict: A Summary of Nigeria's Political History from 1914-1964," in Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood—An African Analysis of the Biafran Conflict, ed., Joseph Okpaku (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 16-19, Coleman, Nigeria: Background, pp. 196-200, 220-5, 227-9; Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, eds., "Early Political Organization in Nigeria: Obafemi Awolowo," in The Africa Reader: Independent Africa (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 77-80.

colonial status to the South led directly to the formation of the Northern People's Congress (NPC). With the founding of NPC, such leaders as Aminu Kano, Sir Tafawa Balewa, and the Sarduna of Sokoto began to identify themselves with the idea of nationalism.¹

If the preceding emphases are correct, it would mean that a major proportion of the thesis on preferential policies in post-colonial Nigeria² requires more substantial re-examination than even what is being attempted here. The conclusion then has to be that the presumption of the thesis is not clearly validated by all the underlying historical crises in modern Nigeria: that is, from pre-colonial to colonial to post-colonial eras.³

The preceding might explain why, until the late 1990s, the amalgamation historiography of Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914 had been unable to document a viable chapter of human development in Nigeria based on the British model.⁴ This strongly suggests that there is an underlying problem of explaining the relationships between colonial benefits and the pace of human development in post-colonial Nigeria.

First, from a cultural point of view, it has to be noted that the lag in the human capitals among Northern Nigerians—a position luring the nation into the unfruitful policies of preferential policies—may not necessarily have been due to the constrained medium of Western cultural values, especially in education. One can accept the value of Western education without necessarily arguing that it is the

¹Ibid., Moyibi Amoda, pp. 22-3.

²For example, see: Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 70-2.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 210; Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities, pp. 116-118.

reason for all the major phases of national underdevelopment in Nigeria, as suggested, for example, by Professor Sowell.¹ Second, the long duration of Hausa-Fulani dominance in Nigeria may not be explained solely as emanating from undue imposition of political and economic interests over their more educated Southern counterparts. Prior to late-1990s, the dominance of political power in Nigeria by Hausa-Fulani Nigerians as well as other related northerners corresponded with their cultural advantages over the more obvious weaknesses of a majority of their Christian-based Southern counterparts.

Similarly, Islam exhibited a more commendable basis of regional unity among Northern Nigerians. This development sometimes embraced Nigerians who were not of Islamic adherents.² Again prior to the late-1990s, these Northern cultural features appeared to have positively influenced the regional dominance of political power among a majority of Northern Nigerians at the national level than necessarily the case for their Southern-Christian counterparts. This is not an acquiescence of the obvious weaknesses of some Northern political and cultural leaders of modern Nigeria. Rather, it is worth point out again that, whereas Western education has been an undeniable basis for the acquired skills of most Southern Nigerians in administrative—in medical, in the military, and in political advantages over the

¹Sowell, *Preferential Policies*, pp. 70-3.

²*Ibid.*, p. 70. This is an excellent position by Professor Sowell although one requiring an understanding of the inherent disunity among Southern Nigerians. This Islamic factor has a general socio-cultural impact on the attitudes of non-Muslims in the Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern Nigeria. Northern minorities, who are Christians, sometimes differed significantly with their Southern counterparts. This might reflect their perception of the balance of power within both the regional as well as the larger national context. Besides, there is Nigerian Southern-Christian arrogance with regard to cultural and intellectual endowment over the so-called backward North, which most Northern Nigerians resent.

feudal north¹—the strange irony still lies in the internally sustained incrimination of the latter along lines of excessive European cultural influences.

The author of this dissertation argues that the Northern Hausa-Fulani underdevelopment of its human capitals in post-colonial Nigeria was first embedded in the colonial policies. Even the moral basis for the attitude of “Northernization” in the Hausa-Fulani North can be traced to the official policies of the British mandate.² Professor Ajayi has observed that the British practice of trying “to run Northern and Southern Nigeria as two separate countries” encouraged rather than discouraged regional differences. “In Northern Nigeria, southern immigrants were located in “zangos (strangers quarters) separate from the Hausa towns.”³ This perhaps best explains why the largely Muslim North—with Hausa as lingua franca—was restricted to the activities of Christian missionaries. It explains as well why the predominantly Christian South encouraged missionary activities.⁴

The British colonial and Christian-missionary attributes were later translated into the strengths and weakness of one region over the other.⁵ Northern Nigeria occupied an unfavorable status compared to Southern Nigerian in the overall geo-strategic schemes of British imperialism in tropical Africa. It is therefore doubtful that the position which Sowell admits regarding the dissimilarities between the two Nigerian regions could have failed to correspond with human underdevelopment

¹Ibid.; Preferential Policies, pp. 70-3. On the other hand, however, Ayandele, The Educated Elites in the Nigerian Society, pp. 24-47, is still an excellent framework for understanding the extent of the cultural incrimination of Western-educated Southern Nigerians.

²Ibid. For British colonial attitudes, see earlier notes on Aka, Jr., Regional Disparities; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism; and Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa.

³Ibid., Ajayi, pp. 269-70

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

during and after decolonization. Sowell, in fact, does not refute the inevitable outcome.¹

To be sure, as hinted much earlier, before colonial rule was established in Northern Nigeria, Christianity and Western education had had a foothold in Southern Nigeria for “nearly fifty years.”² If one goes far enough with the broader effects of British colonial and Christian missionary mandates in Nigeria, it could even be seen that the unhealthy policy of “Northernization”³ was indeed a reflex of the inherent tensions between Southern and Northern peoples. For example, Southern Nigerians featured prominently in the British expeditionary force of 1903 that invaded and defeated the so-called backward Hausa-Fulani North.⁴

Surprisingly, however, it is even rarely remembered that during the colonial era, the largely Muslim North enjoyed a somewhat more favorable cultural status than the Christian South in the eyes of the British colonials. As historian Ajayi explains it, because the Hausa language had been written in Arabic as early as the 17th century, the colonials had no problem—as compared to their experience in the whole of Southern Nigeria—in selecting which written form of Hausa to be included in Roman script.⁵ Besides Hausa being the officially sanctioned medium of administration in Northern Nigeria, it was also the lingua franca of the Nigerian Army. The written form of Hausa was more adequate and successful than written form of Ibo and Yoruba. The success of written form of Hausa therefore acceded to

¹Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 70-3; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 98, 110-111.

²Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 137.

³Sowell, Preferential Policies, p. 73.

⁴Wright, Struggle for Stability, p. 14.

⁵Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 268-9.

the North “the growth and expansion of pan-Hausa culture.”¹ This internally respectable foundation of cultural cohesion in the predominantly Muslim North under Islam, has a yet to be more carefully examined and compared to the obvious fracture of Southern Nigerians under both the British colonial and Christian cultural orientations.

Prior to 1800, furthermore, both in the eyes of early visitors and scholars alike, the so-called backward Hausa-Fulani North was far more advanced in some aspects of cultural, literal, administrative and commercial organizations than Southern Nigeria. We pointed out earlier that this was due mostly to its strategic location, which was closer to the Sudanic belt, and which facilitated contacts with Islamic civilization within and beyond.² So, the variant in scale both in the British colonial attitudes and European-Christian missionaries visions toward Southern and Northern Nigerians represented the making of lopsided patterns of human development in post-colonial Nigeria.

Between the 1940s and early 1950s, a more sporadic split occurred in the unity of Southern political leaders under the NCNC. This resulted in the emergence in 1951 of an opposition political party known as Action Group (AG). This built-in conflict among Southern Nigerians pointed toward greater ethno-regional differences with the far more distinctive and culturally perceptive peoples of Northern Nigeria. The most explicit evidence of this development took off in 1941 with the “fateful Ikoli-Akinsanya incident,” and revolved around the Nigerian Youth Movement.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. Also, see the related emphases in Chapter 2.

This represented the making of future national conflict.¹ That the Southern fracture first took off among the elite branches of Western-educated Southerners, may even suggest that the current underdevelopment of Nigeria has perhaps its strongest corroboration in the attitudes of Southern Nigerians. If so, this fact is closely linked to deep-seated socio-cultural crisis of colonial incrimination.²

Surprisingly, this readily traceable character of the incrimination of Southern Nigerians under both colonialism and Western-Christendom appears to have been overlooked. With freedom from alien rule, the Hausa-Fulani North knew too well how to exploit the profound weaknesses of the Christian South. One of these weaknesses manifested itself through a military coup, allegedly dominated by Southern Nigerians.³ We hope to show slightly down this chapter that this attitude⁴ reflected the height of the Southern misunderstanding of their Northern counterparts. Besides, this development corresponded with the consummation of the intricate crises of ethno-regional attributes sanctioned in Southern and Northern Nigeria under both the Christian Mission as well as the colonial policies.

Despite the preceding emphases, however, the diverse unities between the Southern and Northern political representatives under colonial rule prevailed in full gears throughout the struggle for independence in Nigeria. Collectively, their agitation for freedom from the late 1940s to the 1950s earned for Nigeria the official representation within the colonial mandate. Between 1953 in London and 1954 in

¹Ibid., Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 70-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 98-99, 109, 112-114; Amoda, Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 18-21; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 227-8.

²Ibid., Amoda, pp. 18-21; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 227-8.

³Oliver, The African Experience, pp. 267-9.

⁴Ibid.

Lagos, their collective effort was to open the door to Constitutional Conferences that framed, albeit hurriedly, the birth of an independent nation in 1960.¹

This ultimate birth of an independent Nigeria can be traced to the emergence of a new order of indigenous nationalist liberation movement from the 1920s. Within the colonial super structure, the attitudes of these nationalists were somewhat more favorably aligned with American than the British colonial ideals.² By the late-1930s, especially after the Second World War, the struggle for freedom in Nigeria began to shift from the leadership of the Lagosians—mostly of Yoruba-brand of British-educated nationalists—to American educated nationalists. This shift was influenced by the American-inspired nationalist ferment of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. His emergence as the ablest leader in rallying the battle cry of Nigerian liberation movement from colonial yoke marked a turning point in the struggle for independence.³

With his newspaper, West African Pilot, the Zik brand of nationalism reflected the beliefs in the soundness of American institutions. His political struggle was based on beliefs in the effectiveness of America's practical education, and the uniqueness of the racial character of the black experience. The latter reflected his beliefs in the black struggle for freedom from slavery in the Americas to colonial liberation in Nigeria as well as the entire continental African landscape.⁴ Therefore, along with the freedom of a majority of African states from alien rule in the 1960s,

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 183-191, 369-378; Amoda, Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 16-23; Robert Emerson and Martin Kilson, eds., The Political Awakening of Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prince Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 55-60, 63-73.

²Ibid., Coleman, pp. 220-225, 239-246.

³Ibid.

⁴Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 220-225, 239-246.

the birth of independent nation of Nigeria—including the much earlier one in Ghana, in 1957—marked the beginning of a new cycle of race relations between Africans in the diaspora and the homelands. This was the consummation of the broader Afro-atlantic historical struggle for equal place first begun by the descendants of slaves. This as well was the crowning result of the influences of New World blacks on African students—vis-à-vis the Atlantic triangle.¹ During the colonial era, as in post-colonial Nigeria, the Nigerian media remained one of the most potent institutions for the elaboration of the new order of changes. Their enormous public influences represented and still represent one of the most lasting legacies of America's political media heralded by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first elected Executive President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Part 2: The Nigerian Nation 1960-1990: A Review

Accordingly, both the concept and character of modern Nigeria as well as of its ultimate birth, was a British conjecture.² Therefore, in becoming a new nation in October 1960 and a federal republic in 1963, Nigeria inherited the nature of internal colonial fractures, which as we saw earlier, were bound to be problematic and overwhelming for its varying peoples. Some of these fractures were to be revealed in the expanding imbalances of its pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial ethno-regional peoples and populations. With more than forty years after independence, Nigeria is currently the most populous African nation. In 1960, its population was

¹This is in further support of our earlier emphases in Chapter 1, as referenced, for example, in Shepperson, "Notes;" Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 14; Colin Legum, "The Roots of Pan-Africanism," in Africa: A Handbook to the Continent, ed., Colin Legum (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), pp. 413-414.

²Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 45.

estimated to be 55,000,000. By 1970, this population rose to 70,000,000; in 1980, it rose to 80,000,000; in 1990, it reached 117,000,000, and 126,000,000 in 2000.

So, as the evidence suggests, post-colonial populations of Nigerians have evolved in direct correlation with their ethno-regional growth. Nigeria alone has more people than the whole French-speaking West Africa and Equatorial Africa: one out of every eight Africans is a Nigerian.¹ The major ethnic groups are the mainspring giving shape to the dialectical variants among Nigerians, as well as to the politico-cultural features that define their directions within the larger nation-state. We saw earlier that these dialects have either slight or closer affinities or more distinctive dissimilarities to the major language families within or beyond Africa.²

Thus, the difference between the colonial and post-colonial eras in Nigeria is revealed in the very fact of an evolving ethnographic demography. This explains the links between the earlier colonial fracture and efforts made by the emerging leaders since becoming a nation to reconcile the imbalances imposed upon modern Nigeria. Wright, writing about the struggle for stability in Nigeria, observes that, “By the 1960s . . . ethnicity appeared to be the primary determinant of political life, undermining the wider attachment to the concept of Nigeria.”³

As Figure 6.1 shows, the major ethnic confluences of modern Nigeria—as in pre-colonial times (Chapter 2)—comprise of diverse geographic zones, along with some inherent ethnographic distributions. With more than 350 hundred dialects formed around the three major ethnic groups—Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo—each

¹Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 95-6; Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, pp. 42, 50.

²Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, p. 264. Also, see earlier notes on Joseph Greenberg and others on African language families on Chapter 2.

³Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, p. 32.

numbers about half the population dominating the region into which the country was divided between 1939 and 1963.¹ Apparently eight other ethnic groups comprised about 30 percent of Nigeria's population: the Kanuri to the north-eastern corner of Lake Chad; to the north of the Niger-Benue Rivers are the Junkun, Nupe, Borgu, Igalla, Tiv, and Idoma; the Efik-Ibibio are to the Southeast; the Ijo of the Delta are in both the Mid-West and the East, and to the West are the Edo and Itsekiri.²

Figure 6.1

Map of Nigeria Showing the Major Ethnic Groups



Sources: James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism p. 15; (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960); Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 32.

The varied ethnic dialects of Nigerians, along with their traditional cultures, make Nigeria truly multilingual—with English as the official language of business and political transactions. This “English language” factor remains the most potent legacy of British imperialism. Despite a troubling political climate, Nigeria has

¹Ajayi, in Tradition and Change in Africa, p. 262.

²Ibid.; Biodun Adediran, Nigerian History and Culture, pp. 10, 21,35; K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics, pp. 1-46, and Alogoa et al., pp. 724-40.

managed to maintain a high level of press freedom within its many dialects perhaps more than most African nations.

Table 9 and Figure 6.2 show the evolving dissection of the Nigerian federation along ethnically approximate lines. Beginning in 1964, when the federation comprised four regions, the Hausa-Fulani peoples collectively controlled the largest share of Nigeria. Although ethnically Nigeria has no national majority, this background perhaps best explains why the First Republic attempted to absorb the ethno-regional sympathies of the dominant groups.¹

Northern Nigeria—by far the largest region—is predominantly Muslim: with between 28 and 30 percent of the population. The Yoruba, with 17 percent and the with Ibo 18 percent—mostly Christians—live in the Southwestern and Southeastern sections of Nigeria.² This vast lead of Northern Nigeria over the rest of the Nigerian regions appears to have justified the creation of eight additional states in 1967, bringing the total number to twelve (Figure 6.2 and Table 9).³

Table 9 also summarizes the beginning and perhaps the end of the numerous re-arrangements of Nigeria's Federal Republic along multi-ethnic lanes. What is different between 1964 and 1996 in the re-arrangements of Nigeria into thirty-six states, has been most revealing in both the regional and national liberation of the dialects of the much smaller ethnic minorities from those of the dominant groups. As hinted earlier, this first began as an effort to both correct as well as reconcile the

¹Wright, *Struggle for Stability and Status*, p. 33.

²Ibid. Sowell, *Affirmative Action Around the World*, pp. 95-6; Moses S. Osaghae, "What Have We Achieved," *Nigerian News Digest* (Charlotte, North Carolina, October 4, 1991), p. 6.

³Wright, *Struggle for Stability*, pp. 50-51, 67-8; Oliver and Anthony Atmore, *Africa Since 1800*, pp. 307-8.

undue imbalances in the political relations between the dominant and peripheral ethnic Nigeria. Ironically, the creation of more states was not largely because one group did not understand the dialects of other due to irreconcilable ethno-regional differences. Rather, it was mostly because of failure among the dominant groups to intimate a stronger sense of collective survival with their less influential ethnic counterparts both regionally and nationally.

Moving the country from four states in 1964 to twelve states in the federation in 1967 might have been a sound basis for re-ordering some of the well-known ethno-regional imbalances of Nigerians (Table 9 and Figure 6.2). But this effort was to mark the beginning of the systemic dissection of Nigeria's national mind. Rather than uniting the country, the result was further fragmentation along ethnic lines.¹

Seven more states were created in 1976, bringing the total to nineteenth within the federation. By 1987, when the new military leaders felt that the problem of an unequal distribution of the national resources was unresolved, two additional states were added bringing the number to twenty-one. Another set of military leadership carved out nine more states in 1991, bringing the number to thirty states.² Finally, in 1996, under General Abacha, the number reached thirty-six states.³ This then were the corresponding imbalances emanating from "Nigeria's constitution," which, according to Oliver and Atmore, "had been negotiated with great care by the British government with the Nigerian politicians" to provide "for a federal structure with a central authority and three partially autonomous regions."⁴

¹Wright, *Struggle for Stability*, pp. 50-51, 67-8.



²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Oliver and Atmore, *Africa Since 1800*, p. 307.

Figure 6.2

Map of Nigeria Showing the First Four, and Twelve States, and last Thirty-Six States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1964-1996



The Multi-Statal Reconfiguration of the Nigerian Federal Republic, by Ethnic Regions, by Major Historical Eras, by Number, 1964-1996

Source: Based on Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 51.

Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that understanding the basis of America's foreign policy toward Africa requires one to place Africa and America in their historical relationship within an evolving world economy.¹ So, given both the effects of the Atlantic slave trade and of the colonial factor, as well as of the late-entry of the U.S. foreign policy into Africa, the absence of the long duration of linkage between the two regions meant that there was very little opportunity for what

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Wallerstein again terms as “overt diplomacy” from 1789 to 1960. American approach toward Africa during a greater part of this period was marked by a “foreign policy of indifference.”¹ Not only was the American foreign policy toward Africa far apart and behind, it also corresponded with the expectations of the old colonial states of Europe.

Not until around or after the 1960s did Nigeria begin to enter into an historic relationship with the United States. This was due largely to its wealth as the richest and most populous African country. Since then, the viability of Nigeria emerging as a pro-western democratic leader has been the cornerstone of the U.S. policy.² These hopes were realized in 1979, when the government of President Shehu Shagari commenced on the same pattern of the American constitutional structure. Similarly, along with its extensive population, size, and untapped wealth, Nigeria has since then continued to have a close economic relationship with the United States. This partnership has been especially stronger in the realm of oil businesses than other areas. For instance, in 1973, Nigeria emerged as a major oil supplier to the U.S. due to the Middle East War and the subsequent oil embargo produced by the crisis.³

Except for some part of the 1970s and 1980, when Nigeria’s political relationship with the U.S. was not as good as its economic phase, the two countries often sought and maintained a good working understanding. By itself, however, these grievances corresponded with the fact that, up to 1960, “the economic histories

¹Ibid., p. 80.

²African Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries, Report of a Congressional Study Mission Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Somalia, Angola, and Nigeria, August 4-22, 1981 Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Press, June, 1982), pp. 50-1.

³Ibid.

of the two regions have had mutually no direct linkage.” A greater part of American interests after the World War II focused on Asia rather than Africa.¹ Political scientist Mazrui has observed that ambivalence existed between the two countries due to changes in political and economic circumstances during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.² The Reagan era represented a direct nullification of the somewhat more favorable goodwill engendered toward Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa during the Carter presidency.³

For, as the greatest country in Africa, American policies toward other parts of Africa required some consultation with the Nigerian government. Sadly enough, such was rarely the case during the Nixon and Reagan eras. American policies during the bulk of the Nixon and Reagan presidencies were neither respectful of the concerns of a majority of Africans nor willing to consult nor to collaborate with Nigeria as the major spokesman of African affairs.⁴ The Nixon era, just as during the Reagan era, was noted for its negative attitudes toward black America and black Africa. Hersh—like Apraku—painted a picture of officially sanctioned racial slurs during the Nixon and Reagan eras and among their officials that reinforced open bigotry toward African-descended peoples as a group.⁵

The Nixon era, in particular, was a period when the White House officials were cynical of African diplomatic corps in America. The fact that African diplomatic representatives—like their black American counterparts—were

¹Wallerstein, *Africa and the Modern World*, pp. 80, 93.

²Mazrui, *Dynamics of African/Afro-American Connection*, pp. 50-1.

³Roberts, *Afro-Arab Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia*, p. 101; *Trotter Review*, p. 32

⁴Mazrui, *Dynamics of African/Afro-American Connection*, pp. 50-1.

⁵Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 110-111; Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, p. 19, 110.

sometimes viewed as inferior and as “jungle bunnies,” probably explains why some White House representatives in Washington could not stand their “smell.” Nor did the varying strivings among African diplomatic corps to occupy “all the good embassy spots” make them acceptable to the Nixon White House officials. Rather, the inroad of an unwanted African diplomatic representation might explain why some White House officials felt they “couldn’t live on Sixteenth Street any more” due to their “dusky friends.”¹

Not surprisingly, by mid-1990, some American scholars identified not Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia, for example, but Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia as among the new U.S. foreign policy “dominoes,” worthy of geo-strategic alliances, as well as general support.² The U.S., as they even argued, needed to prioritize pivotal states in order to effectively manage the delicate relationships involving the major global powers of Western Europe with Japan, Russia, and China, along with such powerful allies “as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, South Korea, and Israel.”³ Since the U.S. “has the most to lose,” it was argued that “its interests lie in the status quo.” This background, in part, perhaps best explains why the Clinton administration was less inclined to get involved in the crisis in Rwanda during the summer of 1994.⁴

However, despite the crises of the Nixon and Reagan eras, along with their foreign policy of indifferences toward black Africa, from the early to mid-1990, Nigeria has continued to maintain economic and political partnership with the U.S.

¹Ibid.

²See, for example, Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February, 1996), pp. 33-51, especially, p. 37.

³Ibid., pp. 33, 35.

⁴Ibid., p. 36.

This partnership has also continued to be due largely to its enormous oil resources and strategic importance.¹ Besides its size, during the 1970s and 1980s, its politico-economic partnerships with the U.S. acceded to Nigeria the largest share of African immigration into this country. These immigrants, along with the much earlier and continuing settlers, testified to the carry-over by American-educated Nigerians of the influences of American institutions. This further explains the extent to which American institutions have influenced modern Nigeria and its post-colonial cultures.²

Nonetheless, it is worth noting in retrospect that it was not until the late 1970s, when President Carter established a ground-breaking policy of respectable relationships with African states—that a new course in the U.S.-African partnership really began to be poised. The significance of his historic visits to Liberia and Nigeria lies in the fact that it occurred as an alternation from some of his favorable policies toward black America. For, one of the great heights of the Carter presidency was his appointment of Andrew Young, as the first black U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. This appointment was to become supportive of the independence of Zimbabwe and later of other African states—including the collective struggle around the world to end apartheid policy in South Africa. As we hope to show again slightly down, the Carter era along with his rapport with black America as well as black Africa, had some relationship with the build-up of African immigrants in the U.S., especially between the late 1970s and 1990s.³

¹Time Magazine (January 16, 1984), p. 24.

²Coleman, Nigeria Background to Nationalism, pp. 241-6; Geiss, Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-381; Trotter Review, p.32; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 23-30.

³For example, see Chapter 4. Also, for the corresponding links to this background, see Roberts, Afro-Arab Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia, p. 101; Trotter Review, pp. 24-6, 31; Oliver, The African Experience, pp. 307-8.

Generally, from the 1990s onward, African issues began to receive greater attention in American foreign policy agenda. Since then, Nigeria also entered into a new cycle of political and economic relationship with the U.S. For example, under President Clinton, Nigeria and America entered into what might be safely regarded as an era of cooperative partnership. President Clinton, like President Carter, made attempts to show some sympathy with Africa's issues and image. Collectively, during their eras, Nigeria also attempted to push forward with democratic institutions, as well as with policies that were seemingly supportive of reforms, however the obvious violations of human rights in the bulk of the military era.¹ By around mid-1990, Jonathan Winer observed that: "Nigeria's size, population and influence in Africa—and increasingly elsewhere in the world, dictate well-defined foreign policy objectives" by the United States.²

Nigeria's status within the U.S. foreign policy consideration, in turn, sets "the context of ongoing diplomatic efforts to promote a speedy transition to civilian, democratic rule and respect for human rights."³

As Winer further noted,

With some \$4 billion of U.S. investment in Nigeria, we also have significant economic interests, principally in the petroleum sector. As with every large and influential nation, we also have with Nigeria the objective of enlisting and sustaining Nigeria's cooperation on a range of regional and international issues. We also realize that, without doubt, every interest we have in Nigeria, including law enforcement,

¹Olusegun Obasanjo, Democracy and Development in Africa From Transition to Transformation: Address by His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, at Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: ARCO Forum for Public Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, October 30, 1999), pp. 4-8.

²Winer, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee, p. 2.

³Ibid.

is directly tied to the Nigerian Government's... its own citizenry according to international standards.¹

What is depicted above as a new working relationship between Nigeria and the U.S. was probably strongest in their joint fight against international narcotics. On the other hand, however, the origin of Nigeria's association with international narcotics probably came to the fore during the Reagan era. We are likely to see in Chapters 4 and 6 that the alternatives presented by the Reagan policies were such that had the likelihood of luring some Nigerian immigrants who were stranded into deviant social behaviors.² By the time that Winer made his report to the United States Subcommittee on Africa, both the Nigerian nation and Nigerians had become one of the most identifiable groups in international narcotics and fraudulent network. Winer's report shows further understanding of this trend:

Our law enforcement agencies attest that Nigerian criminal enterprises are organized and active in at least 60 countries around the world. They are adaptable, polychrome organizations. They launder money in Hong Kong, buy cocaine in Andes, run prostitution and gambling rings in Spain and Italy, and corrupt legitimate business in Great Britain with their financial crimes.³

Thus, from President Clinton to President George Bush, Jr., one can surmise that, in the face of crises resulting from an intense global integration of the capitalist world economy, the U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa has the effect of strengthening the status of the Nigerian-U.S. partnership than ever before. With the political campaign and ultimate election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria in 1998, this partnership continued to show signs of steadfastness and maturity.

¹Ibid.

²Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Ken Igboanugo, The Experience: Nigerians in America (Houston, Texas: Global Publishing House, 1992), pp. 27-9.

³Winer, Statement before the U.S. Subcommittee on Africa, p. 2.

Speaking at the Harvard University Forum for Public Affairs in 1999, President Obasanjo assured his distinguished audience that:

our commitment to democracy and its values is not at all a theoretical matter. It is not a leisured pretense for one constitutional norm against others. It is, on the contrary, a gut reaction to a lived and abhorrent experience. We uphold today the principles of freedom and individual liberty, and renounce tyranny in all its forms, because we have seen where dictatorship can lead us, what it can do to the human soul.¹

Evidences of continuing collaboration between Nigeria and the U.S. were obvious enough in such areas as community policing and shared information on international terrorism from the 1990s to the opening of the new millennium. These collaborative efforts were transformed between December 2003 and March 2004, when Mr. Tafa Balogun, Inspector General of Police in Nigeria, visited three major American cities—Houston, Atlanta, and Chicago—to examine and extract some lessons on effective implementation of community policing back in the homeland.² More significant, in taking after American system, Nigeria seems poised to establish a more secure political structure for its suffering masses. By the early 2000, this fact corresponded with the efforts to develop joint economic partnerships with the United States toward further constructive democratic changes. It is widely believed that these efforts could open doors for sustained partnership between the two countries in a greater part of the twenty-first century.³

¹This based on the excerpt of President Obasanjo, Address at Harvard, p. 4.

²This conclusion was supported by the exploratory survey of U.S.-Nigerian relations in the United States.

³*Ibid.* This fact is supported by earlier notes on President Obsanjo's Address at Harvard; Winer's Address to the Congressional Subcommittee on Africa; African Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy, p. 51; Eyobong Ita and Helen Okpokowuruk, "Come and Invest: IBB Urges Foreigners," Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina, November 15, 1991), pp. 1, 3.

Internal and External Crisis of Post-colonial Nigeria

It is worth noting at this point that, some of the weak links in the Nigerian-U.S. relations, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, emanated from both the internal and external crises of post-colonial Nigeria. Within its external front, it is probable that the misunderstanding alluded to earlier between Nigeria and the United States, was due more to the absence of a substantive diplomatic base from Nigeria in Washington, D.C. For, this was a period of incessant political changes in Nigeria, when the initiatives of its diplomatic representation in America did not always reflect effective choices by the central leadership. During this period, moreover, the diplomatic initiatives of the Nigerian representatives revealed neither a clear perception nor a clear understanding of the Nigerian national crisis.

Neither did the official attitudes of its diplomatic corps reveal any clear mastery of the socio-cultural crises confronting most Nigerian immigrants.¹ Rather, the 1980s was a period when—in responding to the increased retardation of both its national and international ego—the Federal Government in Nigeria undertook a serious effort in Washington, D.C., to polish its American status. This began by hiring an image-building and crisis-sensitive public relations agent.

But, whether, and in what sense, this approach was helpful in restoring the low image of Nigeria's diplomatic corps and of the Nigeria nation among Americans and Nigerian immigrants, is as yet to be clearly explained. Within both the American and Nigerian national contexts, the 1980s marked the beginning of far more serious crises for Nigerians. Given the overwhelming crises confronting

¹For example, see "Nigerian Embassy Reaches Out," Newsbreed Magazine (Chicago, July, 1991), pp. 8, 10, 12.

Nigerians in the U.S. and back in the homeland during the same period, it is doubtful that the expenses incurred in hiring a public relations agent were of much help.¹

And, it cannot be determined any clearly what type of relationship Nigeria had had with black America between late 1970s and early 1980s. For, aside from the historic visit by President Jimmy Carter to Nigeria in 1979, in which Andrew Young—the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. was a key player—it is generally doubtful that much had taken place as regard sustained relationship between Nigeria and black America.²

This external fracture in the Nigerian-U.S. diplomatic relations was mostly a deflection of the internal crisis of post-colonial Nigeria. It does seem that a brief explanation of the pattern of this internal fracture will shed further insight to the still evolving crisis of modern Nigeria. For, as shown so far, the ineffectual representation of Nigeria and of Nigerians in Washington emanated from the crisis of the homeland. This crisis, as our emphases have also shown all along, began almost with the birth of the nation, and can be traced to the fragile union between the largely Muslim North and the largely Christian South.³

This then was the clearest evidence of the consequences of the coerced union between Southern and Northern Nigeria discussed earlier in this chapter. The climax of this crisis reached its height on May 1967 when Eastern Nigeria under the leadership of Colonel Ojukwu declared its new sovereignty as the republic of Biafra. This development, along with its related civil unrest, was to result in the so-called

¹“Nigeria hires a public relations firm in U.S.” The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Good Hope Publishing Enterprise, Dallas, June, 1990), p. 6.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 81-2.

³For example, see earlier notes on Coleman, Sowell, Wright, and Aka, Jr.

War of Nigerian Unity.¹ By the time this war began, Biafra had neither a clear strategy for resolving the central concerns of its varying smaller ethnic minorities nor the precise forums to direct its interests in what would certainly have been an Ibo-centered government. By all the available criteria, Biafra was an experiment that a majority of Ibos nearly accepted while its peripheral but strategic ethnic minorities openly rejected.²

The euphoria of the Northern based federation to re-unite Nigeria also lacked a concise vision of national direction. Besides, their initiative toward national unity envisioned through the creation of states along ethnic lines, seemed to be a basic strategy for dismembering the Ibo-dominated Biafra. Most Southeastern Nigerians believed that the creation of twelve states in July 1967 from the existing four in 1964 by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was designed as a knell against their status within an internally tense inter-ethnic federation.³

Of course, the above perception was particularly influential among the Ibos. They were the most affected base of ethnic Nigeria in the largely Northern counter military coup d'état of July 1967 that overthrew the Supreme Military Government of General Aguiyi Ironsi. This view might have been justified because—along with the corresponding attitudes of the Muslim North and of its related ethnic minority groups within the federation—the coup was mostly targeted unfriendly toward Eastern Nigerians, especially the Ibos. Specifically, this development exposed them to greater ill-treatment and murder as well as to insecurity at the hands of their fellow

¹Sir Rex Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity (New Jersey: Rowland and Littlefield, 1971).

²Peter N. Ekeh, "Citizenship and Political Conflict: A Sociological Interpretation of the Nigerian Conflict," in Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, ed., Joseph Okpaku (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 105-111.

³Ibid.

national brethren. This resulted in enormous loss of their hard-earned property in both Northern non-South-eastern regions of the Nigerian federation.¹ This should be remembered as a sad era in the struggle of Nigeria for stability after alien rule.

Nonetheless, the manner in which the first republic was terminated by the alleged Ibo-dominated military coup might explain the attitude of the counter coup. It might also explain why there emerged between 1967 and mid-1990s in Nigeria, a more direct Northern dominance of political power. The death tolls accompanying the first coup that affected the Moslem Hausa-Fulani Nigerians than Nigerian-Christians galvanized deep-seated suspicions and fears among the major political contenders. Worse still, the succeeding military government of General Aguiyi Ironsi failed to demonstrate a proper contextual mastery over the delicate set-up of the Nigerian peoples and regions. His thrust toward a unitary government, amidst the existing political ferment, only helped to deepen the crisis and to unite the Northern fears about a possible Southern domination of the federation.²

Certainly, General Ironsi's thrust toward unitary government was a bold act of statesmanship. Given the political context in Nigeria, he nearly exonerated the Ibos—in particular—as more conscious advocates of national unity.³ But, given the underlying ethno-regional disparities during the first military coup, his attempt was viewed as inimical to the interests of Northern Nigerians, particularly to those of the

¹Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 75-8; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 103-4.

²Udofia, Research Report, p. 5-8; Olesgun Obasanjo, Nzeogwu: An intimate Portrait of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1987), p. 107; also see, "The 30-Month Tragedy: A Nation is Engulfed in Fratricidal War," African Concord, No. 151 (Ikeja: Lagos, July 21, 1987), p.16; Sowell Preferential Policies, pp.75-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 103-4.

³*Ibid.*; Sowell; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 165-174.

dominant Hausa-Fulani enclaves. This perception also tended to have corresponded with how some Christian and Muslim ethnic minorities within Northern Nigeria mirrored in themselves as well as their interests in responding to the first Ibo-dominated coup.¹ Hence, General Ironsi's unification decree was totally at variance with the Northern interests:

Despite enormous support in the South and the army for the abolition of regionalism and inauguration of a unitary state, the very mention of amalgamation with the south, other than on basis of northern control, was enough to send the North to the war path, which was exactly what happened.²

To surmise, however, that "the basis of northern control" alone explains the alternative to the "war path" in Nigeria is somewhat misleading.³ If the counter military coup of 1967 dominated by Hausa-Fulani officers, is seen as a direct reaction to the one dominated by Ibo military officers, the alternative to the "war path" may ultimately be traced to a web of irreconcilable ethno-regional differences that were compounded by the miscalculation produced and politicized by the first coup.⁴ This particular military coup probably most succeeded in compounding the ethno-regional as well as national political miscalculation of Southern Nigerians. Moreover, it revealed a greater part of post-1960s Southern miscalculations in

¹This fact is supported by the general socio-cultural attitude of non-Muslim Nigerians in Northern Nigeria toward their Southern counterparts, especially the Ibos. Real or unreal, the uneven death tolls resulting from the first coup had the chief effect of uniting even the Northern Christians against the fear of Ibo domination in their region as well as in the federation. General Obasanjo, in his *Nzeogwu*, pp. 107, 134-6, attempted to explain this overstretched blames on the Ibos during the first coup.

²*Ibid.*; see, "The 30-Month Tragedy: A Nation is Engulfed in Fratricidal War," p.16.

³Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, pp. 332-367.

⁴*Ibid.* For example, in the immediate cause of the crises leading to the civil war, General Obasanjo's account states that: "Nzeogwu was by nature and upbringing, incapable of planning, let alone executing a coup d'etat to deliberately suppress one tribe politically" (p.107).

approaching the so-called largely backward Muslim Hausa-Fulani North. Thus, in Obasanjo's explanation one sees only the outer layers of events pertaining to the North-South variant within the nation-state but certainly not the actual origin of the conflict.¹ Even if the Nigerian Civil War was long overdue,² the most direct catalyst lies in the character of Southern Nigerians as well as in their miscalculation.³ First, as we saw earlier, the first coup that toppled the republic not only was dominated by Ibo military officers in fact its execution was most successful in the Muslim North. Second, and perhaps the most significant, the irony of the failure of the coup in the largely Christian-Southeastern Nigeria, where the majority of the coup planners originated, made it difficult to rationalize the tragic disparity of ethno-regional loss.⁴

So, how does one honestly reconcile the historic disparity that occurred in terms of the loss during the first military coup in Nigeria? This had a lot in common with later course of events in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, the Northern counter coup of July 1967 was more of a response to the first. As terrible as it was, it was as well the result of the "miscalculation" of the so-called Ibo-dominated military coup.⁵

The term "miscalculation" is real, because, it means that the failure of an earlier action had left open conceivable possibilities that were otherwise very

¹Ibid. Also, see: Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, pp. 12-26.

²Ibid.; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp.347-8; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp.52-60, 94, 167-8.

³Ibid.; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 75-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 98-104.

⁴Ibid. Also, see Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp.176-8; Obasanjo, Nzeogwu, p.107; "The 30-Month Tragedy," p.16. Actually, the references cited here did not seem to have calmed the nerves among Nigerians in the unfortunate cycle of their post-colonial history. Rather, they provided a basis for grasping the larger trend in the ethno-regional tensions unleashed during the first and second coups, along with a succession of all others.

⁵Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 75-6; Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 98-104.

dangerous. It was this background, as already indicated, which later came to merge into the facts of Nigerians' regional fears, disparities, and ethno-regional differences. This might mean that, much of the later attitudes of Northern Nigerians toward the Ibos were embedded in the bitter ethno-regional expression of cultural indifferences within the conflicting political setting of post-colonial Nigeria. Scholars like Sowell, for example, tend to downplay the extent to which post-colonial crises in Nigeria are the basic transformations of the inherent contradictions of the colonial mandates. Yet, from 1914 to the current period, these crises have had very strong bearings with the making of the national contest between the peoples of Northern and Southern Nigeria. This has been particularly evident in their national orientations.¹

On the other hand, however, at stake was that the success of the Ibo dominated coup was mostly celebrated in the Southeastern region as a triumph over backward Northern-influenced federalism. The so-called backward attitude of the Hausa-Fulani dominated government was to blame for the crises of the new nation.²

It did not even occur to a majority of Ibos that, a change of the Federal Government that was more successful in violently eliminating principal cultural figures of the Hausa-Fulani North was, by Islamic principle, an act of war. Further exacerbating the regional tension was the immediate striving toward a new framework of unitary system within the nation-state.³ Where this seemingly honest

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 332-367, especially 347-8; Ajayi, Tradition and Change in Africa, pp. 62-275.

²For example, from a Western point of view, Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 69-76; and Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, pp. 93-114, have perhaps the most developed summary of this background of human crises of underdevelopment among Nigerians and their nation.

³Ibid.; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 104-5, 144-5; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 167-172.

proposition could not diffuse the perceived variances in regional and cultural grievances, it badly succeeded in furthering the North-South variant at a historically sensitive intersection of Nigeria's philosophical direction. Between 1943 and 1948, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), comprising mostly of Southwestern and Southeastern national political strands, advocated “a federal system of government for Nigeria based strictly upon tribal unit.” But, according to Coleman, “at the NCNC convention held at Kano in September, 1951, the NCNC leaders suddenly decided to abandon federalism and switch to a unitary position, because of their belief that the government and anti-NCNC Nigerian were using federalism as a cloak for dismembering Nigeria.”¹

Barely sixteen years after the Kano Conference, Ironsi's Unitarianism had the most direct effect of resurrecting earlier grievances of Nigeria's federalism in which the North and South only managed to forge hurriedly between early and late 1950s in order to be granted independence in 1960. The resolution of this development was one reason for the intricate crises surrounding the substance of Nigeria's institution, as written and as influenced by Britain on the eve of independence.

The above then was a background that the so-called Ibo-led coup probably misunderstood and hence miscalculated in approaching the North. Consequently, between mid-1960s and late-1990s, the devastating result of this contest was ultimately to reveal how the first coup had succeeded in transforming the unsettled backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s in favor of Northern dominance of the federal republic of Nigeria.

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 347-8; Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 52-60, 167-8, Ekeh, Nigeria, Dilemma of Nationhood, p. 94

Therefore, military intrusion into the affairs of Nigeria, or claims by military leaders to save the republic from politicians who were ruining it, could not have meant that they would be more effective in directing the delicate marriage between culturally dissimilar groups and regions.¹ Even if the resultant War of Nigerian Unity, as Sir Rex Niven later argued, began with the understanding that national stability and pride in the oneness of Nigeria would be restored, evidences of such rationalizations were long openly rejected.² From the beginning of the Civil War in 1967 to its end in 1970, neither the resolute determination of the Northern influenced federalism to re-unite the country nor the policies that resulted from their leadership able to resolved the crises which directly led Nigerians to the Civil War. The end of the war was rather remarkable for the emergence of a more structured ethno-centrism, along with accompanying mismanagement and corruption at the highest places of leadership.³

Having demonstrated some of the ethno-regional grievances surrounding the idea of unitary federalism proposed by General Ironsi, let us briefly tackle some of the official choices of his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon: a Christian of Northern ethnic minority. As army Chief of Staff in the Nigerian Army, it can be argued that Gowon was ushered into national leadership by the Northern dominated military coup of July 1967. First, it should be noted here that it was a Christian of ethic minority from the dominant Muslim North that led Nigerians through one of its

¹Obasanjo, Nzeogwu, pp. 82-99.

²Research Report, p. 6; Sir Niven, The War of Nigerian Unity.

³Chido Nwangu and Lai Adelagun, "Change Is Imminent in Nigeria," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, May/June, 1991), p. 40; Jack E. White, "Shamed by Their Nation," Time Magazine (September 6, 1993), p. 36; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 69-76; Sowell, Affirmative Action around the World, pp. 98-114.

darkest periods in history. Second, the pre-eminence of his leadership at that particular historical intersection strongly suggests that the Nigerian crisis required more substantive explanation than one often offered by most Nigerians and others.

It is well to keep in mind, as we hinted earlier, that the counter military coup that overthrew General Ironsi and brought in Lt. Colonel Gowon included Northern soldiers who were of ethnic minorities: both Christians and Muslims. Second, it seems quite likely that, as a Christian of ethnic minority background, Gowon himself had some experience that strengthened his insight to reconcile and re-unite the fragile emblem of ethnic Nigeria within a federal body. By moving Nigeria from four states to twelve states, he inspired goodwill and hope among the more affected ethnic minorities.¹

The question worth asking at this point is: to what extent then was the creation of additional states by Gowon before the secession of Eastern region as a sovereign state of Biafra in July 1967 a design to weaken the Ibo-dominated republic? To begin with, we saw earlier that the creation of additional four regional states, making a total of twelve states in the federation by Gowon, could be seen as an attempt to dismember the Ibo-dominated Biafra. There cannot be any doubt that he intended to exploit the ethno-regional differences within the new nation to advance his federal and national status. Yet, the Gowon interlude on the state creation in Nigeria at the time requires a more careful evaluation. This is because both the first and second counter coups in Nigeria had already imposed very clear political options that were supportive of a genuine effort to reconcile the centrifugal imbalances between the dominant ethnic groups and their peripheral ethnic

¹Wright, *Nigeria: Struggle for Stability*, p. 33.

minorities. Thus, the Gowon era coincided with an era when most Nigerians, especially the ethnic minorities, were either striving to recover from the loss of their regional and national imbalance, or to sustain their interests among the dominant ethnies. A more fundamental ambivalence within the Hausa-Fulani influenced federation from July 1967 to 1975 may have been in the fact that Gowon was both a Christian as well as a representative of the ethnic minorities' struggle for status within the Northern belt as well as larger nation-state.¹

Given the tenacity of ethno-regional rivalries among the dominant ethnic groups in modern Nigeria, it may not be an overstatement to surmise that their much smaller ethnic minorities have often shown greater desire for the unity of the nation-state, as the core of collective aspirations. The underlying historical circumstances that propelled Gowon to the center of Nigerian leadership—that is, after General Ironsi—seems to have borne out this fact, however some of the questionable ethics of his era and of his officials. Coincidentally, the breakdown of the alphabets in “Gowon” reads: “go on with one Nigeria.”

How the preceding background influenced the policy of creating additional states in Nigeria, as a response to the declaration of Biafra, can then be viewed with greater insight with regard to the re-direction of the varying interests of the peoples of Nigeria. Writing of the Gowon era, Wright observes: “Immediately prior to the civil war, Yakubu Gowon attempted to diffuse ethnic competition by creating twelve states out of what was four regions.”² Fundamentally, as we hinted earlier, the ultimate execution of the Nigerian Civil War, which Gowon first undertook as a

¹Wright, *Struggle for Stability*, pp. 30-2.

²*Ibid.*, p. 33.

punitive police action and later under full-scale military operation against a deviant Southeastern region, lay in the irreconcilable backgrounds of the 1940s and 1950s.¹

If the preceding is true, how do we explain the attitude of some Nigerians toward such changes affected them after the first military coup? That is, to what extent was the overthrow of the first republic by force justified? For, some Nigerians have varying opinions about the coup. Among them, therefore, the extent to which the official corruption, bribery, greed or excessive display of tribalism and ethnocentrism—justified the overthrow of the First Republic²—is still debatable.³ And often these debates have seemed irreconcilable.⁴ This is because between 1960, when Nigeria became an autonomous nation and early 1966, when the republic was finally overthrown, some Nigerians were aware that both the country and its leaders would have been unable to master all the complex structures of a new nation-state. There were others as well who supported the criteria first employed under the unitary system to resolve the expanded centrifugal contradictions of colonialism in Nigeria.⁵

By forcefully overthrowing the first republic, and going as far as eliminating the core principal political and cultural leaders of influence in the largely Muslim North at both the regional and national levels, the first coup inadvertently released the deeper centrifugal layers of the Nigerian nation. This might explain why the

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 319-366; Okpaku, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 14-131; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, pp. 20-27.

²Obasanjo, Nzegwu, pp. 82-99.

³Nearly all the chapters in Okpaku's Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood are attempts by scholars to substantiate the nature of the centrifugal contradictions which some Nigerians misunderstand. Also see, Part 1 & 2 of Monday O. Anigboro's article entitled, "Has Nigeria Fared Better Under Military Regimes," African Business Source (Houston, Texas, May 1992), pp.26-7 and (June/July 1992), pp.26-7.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Amoda, Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood, pp. 167-173; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 75-6.

Northern counter offensive had a swift advantage over the weakness of the Ibo dominated coup in bringing about a clear and resolute determination to influence the direction of the nation. Between 1967 and late-1990s there emerged a more structured ethno-centered national configuration of Northern Nigerians in nearly all phases of the military and political establishments. We have already argued that these were not necessarily adherents of Hausa-Fulani faith, but almost of an equal representation of Northerners of both the Christian and Muslim faiths. They were all in a position to reap from the weaknesses of their Southern counterparts. From the presidential crisis of 1993, when the election of M. K. O Abiola—a Yoruba of Muslim background was annulled—to the era of General Sani Abacha, Nigerians were acting out the external convulsions of an internally explicit cycles of their historical crises.¹

The preceding emphases were due mostly to the profound disunity among Southern Nigerians. Until the late 1990s, the absent of a united Southern front, along with its inherent fracture within both the regional as well as national context, had either directly justified or indirectly made it much easier for Northerners to dominate the country. This background is an important basis for understanding the seedling of the dangerous policies of quotas and preferential treatment as well as of the underdevelopment of Nigeria.² More insight appears to be required in explaining the thesis of human underdevelopment in post-colonial Nigeria.

Since the 1960s, what the British colonizers anticipated and strategically calculated, by way of indirect and indirect rule in Nigeria, some Southern Nigerians

¹Wright, Struggle for Stability, pp. 30-52, 67-96;

²Ibid.

and Nigerians misunderstood.¹ This poor grasp of their historical context has determined how most Nigerians related with their country, with each other, with themselves, and with the vital course of international affairs in an era of explosive competition and confrontation. If Nigeria's national crises are more operative within its tribal and ethno-regional lanes, this is precisely the case because its center has for too long been paralyzed by political opportunism among its dominant blocs.²

Due mostly to this background, nation-state culture in Nigeria is highly dysfunctional because it has never been properly instituted and because it is deeply engrained in vigorous tribalism and ethnocentrism.³ This unhealthy background corresponded with the chronology of sustained military rule in Nigeria, as well as with their dominance over every important arm of its economic and political establishments. After General Gowon came General Murtala Mohammed in a bloodless palace military coup in 1975.

Except therefore for the brief period of General Olesgun Obasanjo (1975-1979), following the assassination of Mohammed, and later of the interim Presidency

¹Ibid. On the other hand, Sowell's examination of "Nigeria" in his Preferential Policies along with his Affirmative Action Around the World are two important documentations on issues of vital concern in the development of modern Nigeria. However, his important contributions might even have been much stronger if he explained the clearly recognizable implications of "low budget imperialism" (pp. 98, 102), which he noted with regard to the British colonial attitudes in Nigeria/tropical Africa. On the other hand, however, most of the backgrounds he referenced in Coleman's Nigeria: Background to Nationalism contained information that could have offered further insights on the irreconcilable nature of ethnic and regional differences before and after freedom from foreign rule.

²Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 85. See Jack E. White's article "Shamed by their Nation, Time (1993); Dr. Beford N. Umez, "May Case with a Typical Nigerian," The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (September 1991), pp. 12, 14; Beford Umez. "State Creation in Nigeria is Bum Kum" (Good Hope Publishing Enterprise, February, 1992), p. 12, 14; "Religious Riots in Kano: Over 300 Killed" and "Important Dates in Nigeria's History," African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, October 1, 1993), p. 3.

³Udofia, Research Report, p. 8.

of Ernest Shoneka—after the annulment of the Presidential election of Chief Abiola in 1992—Northern military leaders dominated Nigeria.¹ Since 1960, Nigeria has moved through seven different phases of government: from parliamentary democracy (1960-1966) to military dictatorship (1966-1979); presidential democracy (1979-1983); military dictatorship (1983-1993); make-shift interim civil/military government (1993); a full-scale return to military dictatorship (1993-1998); and back again to parliamentary democracy (1999).²

The cycles of Nigeria's historical struggle for stability appear to have entered a period of some maturity with the re-entry of Olusegun Obasanjo, who was democratically elected as President in 1999. Elected with the support of American republic during both the first and second terms, the Obasanjo era perhaps represented the beginning of power shift from the largely Muslim North to the somewhat largely Christian-South.

If the current trend represents the pattern of the future, there is then a basis for making an educated guess about the future gravitation of political power in modern Nigeria: that is, more than thirty-five years since the Nigerian Civil War, the annulment of the Presidential election of Chief Abiola in 1992, marked an important transitional point in the power shift from the North to the South. The future of this development may depend on the maturity and wisdom of the emerging Southern and Northern political elites.

Another educated guess is that the current thrust of political power in Nigeria suggests the beginning of maturity in mastering its centrifugal question since its birth

¹Ibid., p. 68.

²Osagae, "What Have We Achieved," p. 6; Oliver and Atmore, *Africa Since 1800*, p. 362.

as a nation.¹ Generally, the political and social metamorphoses of Nigeria described thus far, have meant crisis for its enormous populace, particularly in the spheres of economic development. As Onoche S. Ikedionwu noted:

Nigeria has gone from the fertilities or riches of the 1960s and 1970s to the fallows or failures of the 1980s... The 1970s brought abundant but ill managed oil resources and revenue to Nigeria. The future of the 1980s include the unabated sky rocketing public expenditures and the mismanagement of the funds thereof. Cost efficiency and cost effectiveness were utterly ignored.²

Because of poor management and the decline in its oil revenue and foreign exchange reserve in the 1980s, Nigeria became a debtor nation, with liabilities in the billions. "Nigeria's external debt grew from \$12.7 billion in 1985 to \$35 billion in 1990."³ But, as President Obasanjo told his Harvard audience in 1999: "It is at the level of international economic relations that the idea of free market economy begins to show the contradictions and distortions inherent in it."⁴ Further, he observed that, during the "mid-seventies" the U.S. Agency for International Development even had to suspend aid to Nigeria because it believed "Nigeria did not ... require international financial aid, mainly because of the revenue ... from oil exports."⁵ According to President Obasanjo, during the said period, a great deal of pressure was put on successive Nigerian governments of the time

by international financial institutions and multi-national companies, to go out and borrow. Successful borrowing, the governments were told, was a persuasive index of the financial and economic health of the country. The first "jumbo" loan was obtained from the World Bank at

¹Davidson, *Africa in Modern History*, pp. 301-302, 322-323.

²Onochie S. Ikedionwu, "Perpetual Creation of New States: A Mythical Conception," *Nigerian News Digest* (Charlotte, North Carolina, February 14, 1992), p. 4.

³*Time Magazine* (1984), p. 24; Samuel Esemuede, "The Good Borrower, A Desirable Title?" *Nigerian News Digest* (Ashville, North Carolina, December, 31, 1991), p. 4.

⁴President Obasanjo, *Address at Harvard*, p. 7.

⁵*Ibid.*

this time. It was, in relation to the massive indebtedness of Nigeria today, a mere pittance.¹

The huge debt crisis explains why, in an effort to lure foreign investors into the country in 1991 alone, the Federal Government of Nigeria allocated \$3 billions of its foreign exchange for only debt servicing.² By 1999, as President Obasanjo further disclosed, “Nigeria’s debt burden stands at over 30 billion U.S. dollars, and continues to escalate, not because of any further borrowing, but because of the interest that continues to accrue on the money already borrowed.” So, in asking for relief from the huge interests accrued in the debt, he argued that such an avenue “would naturally leave us with greater resources to dispose not only of our domestic responsibilities, but also of our international obligations.”³

When the industrialized nations convened in a Summit in Scotland in July 4, 2005, Nigeria’s foreign debt reportedly stood at \$35 billion.⁴ That this crisis affected the Nigerian nation to the extent it did was revealed in the general spheres of the Nigerian nation between the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in the corresponding unwillingness of Nigerian students in the U.S. to return to the homeland after studies. Once among the foremost group of immigrants to return to the homeland, Nigerians began to reverse that pattern.⁵ By early 1990s, they represented the largest build-up of what Apraku correctly entitled, African Émigrés in the United States: A Missing

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. Samuel Esemuede, “The Good Borrower, A Desirable Title?” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, December, 31, 1991), p. 4.

³President Obasanjo, Address at Harvard, pp. 7-8.

⁴This is based on the “Meeting of the Industrialized Nations in Scotland,” CNN News Around the World Report, July 4, 2005. This Report focused on economic crises in Africa, especially on Nigeria.

⁵Udofia, Research Report, p. 10.

Link in Africa's Social and Economic Development.¹ This calls for an evaluation of the general pattern of Nigerian immigration to the U.S.—from pre-colonial to colonial to post-colonial eras.

Part 3: A Review of Pre-colonial and Colonial Immigration from Nigeria/Africa to the United States, 1820-1950

Table 10.1 represents the general pattern of foreign-born immigration to the U.S. from 1821 to 1880. For Nigerians as a specific group or Africans within the larger context, this pattern of American immigration, which falls under the pre-colonial era, had no determinate relationship. This was a period when their representation in voluntary American immigration was either largely non-existent or regionally constrained. Between 1821 and 1880, the population of European immigrants admitted rose to about 8,981,565 compared to Asian (230,683), North American (744,113), and South American (8,715). Only 1,005 entered from Africa.

The most adequate explanation for this low level of African immigration was racial slavery. The fact that transatlantic slavery intersected with largely voluntary immigration of the races of Europe, Asia, and the Americas to the U.S., meant that the general flow of immigration from Africa was bound to be affected. A greater part of the era identified as pre-colonial in Table 10.1 was one in which more slaves were shipped from the Bights of Bonny and Benin to Latin America as well as to the U.S. Also, this was when the current location of modern Nigeria featured as one of the major regions where the 54,000 slaves exported into the U.S. between 1808 and 1850 were taken.² This background in turn has a lot in common with the later

¹Apraku., African Émigrés in the United States.

²Lovejoy, Globalization of Forced Labour, p. 64; Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 87; Rawley, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, p. 330.

distinctiveness of post-colonial black African immigration to America. Besides, it sheds further light on the general pattern of voluntary African immigration to the Western Hemisphere in the decades following decolonization.

Table 10.1

Foreign-born Immigration to the United States
by Regions, by Decades, 1821-1880

Continent	1821-1830	1831-1840	1841-1850	1851-1860	1861-1870	1871-1880
Europe	98,797	495,681	1,597,442	2,452,577	2,065,141	2,271,925
Asia	30	55	141	41,538	64,759	124,160
N. America	11,033	32,568	58,890	73,496	165,210	402,916
S. America	531	856	3,579	1,224	1,397	1,128
Africa	16	54	55	210	312	358
Aus., N.Z.	--	--	--	--	36	9,886
Not Specified	33,032	69,911	53,144	29,169	17,969	1,818

Source: U.S. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985).

Skinner argues that the transatlantic slave trade created an atmosphere in which the degradation of African-Americans under slavery also influenced how voluntary African contacts with the U.S. were likely to be shaped. The Skinner observation appears to be a likely explanation why very few Nigerians/Africans sojourned in the U.S. for Western education during the colonial era. Unlike white ethnics and Asians “who arrived on the shores of the future United States of America from recognizable nation-states or empires, the Africans were plucked from societies that had no political status in the emerging concert of nations and sold as servants.”¹

¹Skinner, *In Defense of Black Nationality*, pp. 7-8.

As Table 10.2 shows, the small proportion of pre-colonial African immigration to America was somewhat slightly higher during the colonial era. Based on the data, some 32,421 Africans were admitted into the U.S. between 1881 and 1950, compared to Europeans (24,100.633), Asians (876,083), North Americans (3,868,468), and South Americans (96,257). Even with the slight increases over the previous cycle, a specific basis for determining immigration from Nigeria (1820-1900) is still indeterminate. Only a few Africans, representing less than 30 per year—were able to enter the U.S. voluntarily during the 19th century (Tables 10.1 and 10.2).¹

Table 10.2

Foreign-born Immigration to the United States
by Regions, by Decades, 1881-1950

Continent	1881-1890	1891-1900	1901-1910	1911-1920	1921-1930	1931-1940	1941-1950
Europe	4,735,484	3,555,352	8,056,040	4,321,887	2,463,194	347,552	621,124
Asia	69,942	74,862	323,543	247,236	112,059	16,081	32,360
N. America	424,663	37,897	344,608	1,101,772	1,474,501	152,234	332,973
S. America	2,304	1,075	17,280	41,899	42,215	7,803	21,831
Africa	857	350	7,368	8,443	6,286	1,750	7,367
Aus., N.Z.	7,017	2,740	11,975	12,348	8,299	2,231	13,805

Source: U.S. Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985).

The patterns of immigration from “Africa” to the U.S. began to have some identifiable phases during the early decades of the twentieth century. Exceptions were slightly more favorable between World War I and World War II than any other period. This was when African immigration recorded its highest entries, with its

¹For example, see: U.S. Foreign-born Immigration by Continents and by Decades, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985). For specific explanation of especially post 1900s African immigration, see Thomas C. Holt, “Africans,” in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, ed. Stephan Thernstorm et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 5.

average closer to 1,000 a year.¹ After the first and second world wars, both the Great Depression and restrictive legislations affected African immigration to the U.S. In addressing this background, Hawk observed that, “Africans under European colonization seldom enjoyed the freedom of international travel.”² From the 1900s to 1950s, the effects of the restrictive immigration legislations were unfavorable to African immigration. A greater part of the varied restrictive laws passed by the U.S. Congress were designed to preserve the ethnic composition of the Anglo-Saxon ideals in the U.S. “Black migrants from Africa and the Caribbean were seen as a threat.”³

Until the early decades of the twentieth century, the bulk of Africans entered the U.S. via the medium of African-American missionaries and White Philanthropic organizations. Such a white Philanthropic organization like the Phelps Stokes, for example, played a major part in the 1920s in the immigration of African students to the U.S. for training in vocational education.⁴ The Phelps Stokes stamp on the vocational education of Africans was based on the Hampton and the Tuskegee models. The basis for sponsoring these Africans to the U.S. was to acquire a medium of education in agricultural science to function under colonialism capitalism.⁵ The attachment of the Hampton-Phelps Stokes-Tuskegee models to African education in the U.S. was closely linked to the historical relationships

¹Ibid.

²Hawk, “African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” p. 261.

³Ibid.

⁴Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 103, especially chapters 2-3.

⁵Ibid.; William H. Watkins, The White Architects of Black Education: Ideology and Power in America, 1865-1954 (New York and London: Teachers College, Columbia University, 2001), pp. 9-23.

between chattel slavery and colonial dispossession. This early effort represented an attempt to educate and assimilate blacks both in America and Africa under the inordinate-subordinate order of the newly industrializing and expanding worldwide capitalism.¹

Significantly, after slavery, the pattern of voluntary African immigration to the U.S. differed from that of Europeans and Asians. Whereas immigrants entering the U.S. from Europe, Asia, and other parts of the Americas (Tables 10.1 and 10.2) were mostly labor-driven,² their counterparts from black Africa were largely education-driven.³ These Africans were mostly students who first attended predominantly black American colleges and universities.⁴

Table 11 shows the beginning of clearer pattern of a specific immigration from Nigeria to the U.S. during the colonial era. As shown, between the late 1930s and mid-1950s, Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was mostly education-driven. Table 11 is further supportive that the decades after the first and the second world wars were when most of the educational waves of Nigerian [African] immigration to the U.S. in the colonial era occurred.⁵ By 1938, some twenty Nigerian students entering the U.S. were mostly sponsored by the missionary societies for religious

¹Ibid.

²David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 2-7.

³Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 239-248; King, Pan-Africanism and Education, pp. 103, especially Chapters 2-3, Adell Paton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians, 1968-1978," pp. 149-151; Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-376.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 242; Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-375.

studies.¹ Between 1938 and 1945, twelve Nigerians sailed for America. After the World War II, however, some 175 of them entered between 1946 and 1948, with another 318 entering between 1953 and 1954 (Table 11).² During the three decades preceding the 1960 (Table 11), both Southeastern and Southwestern Nigerians comprised the dominant waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S.

Table 11

The Population of Nigerians Educated in the United States, 1938-1954

Period	Ibo: Number	Percent	Yoruba	Efik/Ibibio	Others	Total
Pre-1938	1	5	5	2	12	20
1938-1945	8	67	1	3	0	12
1946-1948	114	65	45	11	5	175
1953-1954	168	51	51	38	43	318

Sources: James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 246.

From Southeastern Nigeria came such ethnic groups as Ibo, Efik, Ibibio and Ijo. From Southwestern region came the Yoruba and the related ethnic groups. Over the entire colonial period, the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria had a striking lead in the share of Nigerian students who sojourned in America for the purpose of Western education. Until the late 1940s, more than two-thirds of Nigerian students were Ibo. Up to the late 1954, Ibos comprised a majority of the Nigerian immigrants in America. Given the proportion of their American and Nigerian regional shares, the Yoruba were next to the Ibo, followed by the Efik/Ibibio and Ijo.³

Also, the specific pattern of Nigerian immigration during the colonial era corresponded with the earlier pattern of African concentration at predominantly black-owned colleges/universities. One reason for this choice might have been racial

¹Ibid.; Coleman, p. 246.

²Paton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians, 1968-1978," pp. 149-151; Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, pp. 374-376.

³Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 245-6.

constraints. However, after being seasoned in predominantly black institutions, they usually transferred to predominantly white colleges/universities for further studies.¹ Consequently, a majority of the early waves of Nigerian/African immigrants (1920s-1950s) had very little or no need to remain in America after their studies.²

As already hinted, of course, there was the natural difficulty of being able to function effectively during the early post-Reconstruction era due to the racial factor of the black experience. Hawk observes that this was a period when “Black Americans were considered a problem to be assimilated.”³ Reid agrees, arguing that this was also an era when the fragmented racial backgrounds of the Old and New Worlds of the Negro immigrant affected his American assimilation.⁴ Although Nigerians/Africans were foremost among those who found supports from the black American institutions, they were unable to establish themselves in America as a settler community after their studies. They were more certain of their future security back in the homelands within the colonial structure. Their perceived aspirations as the future leaders of independent Africa proved stronger in their decisions not settle down, that is, to leave American shore.

Toward Post-colonial Immigration to the U.S.: The Making of the Nigerian Diaspora of Colonialism, 1960-1990

Prior to the 1960s, black Africa had no recognizable status in the U.S. foreign policies agenda capable of influencing the immigration of its varying peoples into

¹Ibid.; p. 242; Adell Paton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 150-1; Immanuel Geiss,, Pan-African Movement, pp. 375-6.

²See, for example, Kenneth King James, especially, pp. 1-2 and his chapter 2; Patton, Jr.; Shepperson, “Notes;” and Geiss.

³Hawk, “Africana and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” p. 262.

⁴Reid, The Negro Immigrant, pp. 107-117.

the country. Even for such a populous nation as Nigeria, it was not until the 1960s that American foreign policy began to show some understanding of its existence.¹

Only a few immigrants from Africa—as distinguished from those who entered on student visas between some part of 1900 and 1960—were indigenous Africans. For example, in 1910, 1930, and 1960, the U.S. Censuses show that 88 percent or 89 percent of African-born peoples entering were whites and were mostly from British colonies.² This is not surprising because, prior to 1960, the U.S. Census Bureau rarely recorded the specific regional origins of African immigration.³ Even the few identifiable African sojourners entering mostly as students around the World War I and post-World War II eras often confronted socio-cultural stigma resulting from their racial “otherness.” During this period, some black African immigrants were sometime kept apart from contacts with their ancestral kin. Despite the constraint, approximately 14,000 entered the U.S. between 1951 and 1960.⁴

Perhaps the rise in the number of African immigrants in the U.S. to 43,046 between 1950s and 1960s—although still much smaller compared to Europeans (2,449,003) and Asians (577,877)—was influenced by the new U.S. immigration law of 1965.⁵ This represented the first significant recorded population of African

¹See, for example, the earlier background by Immanuel Wallerstein on the African-U.S. relations in this Chapter.

²Holt, “Africans,” Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, p. 5.

³*Ibid.*; Reid, The Negro Immigrant, p. 24; Wortham, “Contemporary Black Immigration to the United States,” p. 201.

⁴*Ibid.*; also, see Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education, especially pp. 1-2 and Chapters I and II; Skinner, “The Dialectic between the Diasporas and Homelands,” pp. 39-41; Ali Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980,) pp. 21-43; Holt, “Africans,” p. 5.

⁵Hawk, “Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” p. 162; Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, pp. 234-5.

immigration to the U.S. since the end of chattel slavery.¹ From the 1960s onward, therefore, Nigerian immigration to the U.S. entered an era markedly dissimilar from all the previous ones. As we saw earlier, the passage of the 1965 U.S. immigration law accounted for this development.² Hawk, in an excellent examination of “African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” associated the prior policies of American law with the constrained patterns of African immigration.³

To a certain extent, the 1965 U.S. immigration law, resulting from an amendment by the Congress to the McCarran Walter Act of 1952, had some effects on the course of African immigration. This new law dealt perhaps more equitably for the first time with the applicants into the U.S. on the basis of their skills, family ties—not their race or place of birth. Hawk has argued that, with the new immigration law, the dominant liberal civil rights spirit of the 1960s was committed to correcting past failures, to respecting the equality of individual differences, and “to the ideal that government could play a decisive role in making opportunity available to those to whom it still remained elusive.”⁴

After 1965, the U.S. Congress enacted other immigration laws in 1976 and 1978 that removed for the first time in its history the hemispheric limits on foreign

¹Ibid. Also, see for example, Tables 1-2, 13.1-13.2.

²For some emphases on the 1965 U.S. immigration law, etc. and the new immigrants, see, for example, Reed Ueda, Postwar Immigrant America: A Social History (Boston and New York: St. Martins Press, 1997), pp.44-50; Michael J. Greenwood and John M. McDowell, Legal U.S. Immigration: Influences on Gender, Age, and Skill Composition (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999), pp. 20-25; Hawk, “African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” pp. 4-17; Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Records Straight (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1994, p. 25); Quiroz, “Community Innovation Project: Together in Our Differences an Communities” (Washington, D.C.: The National Immigration Forum, 1995, pp. 17-29).

³Ibid., especially Hawk, p. 271.

⁴Hawk, “African and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” p. 271.

immigration, moving toward “a worldwide immigration system” based on “a single policy that applies uniformly to all nations.”¹ Between 1968 and 1995, 18.2 million persons were legally admitted to the U.S. This represented an annual average of 651,716 and an average of 193 percent from 1820-1921, and 313 percent from 1922 to 1967.² Thus, from the 1970s onward, Nigeria became the largest exporter of largely voluntary immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S.³ This fact was made more explicit by the corresponding uncertainties in the cycles of economic and political stability in Nigeria.⁴

Scholars have sometimes varied in their explanation of the factors leading to the immigration of Nigerians (Africans) to the U.S.⁵ For example the “push-pull” model has received some attention as one of the causative factors behind African immigration. Danso argues that, in the case of Africa, the “pull-push” factor tends to overstress the “instrumental motivation” because it conflicts with the reasons people immigrate from place to place.⁶ Further, with regard to sub-Saharan Africa, Danso argues that the causes of immigration are multi-faceted. High on the list is the fact that the “push” causative factor has traditionally been economic. Africans immigrate

¹Ueda, *Immigrant America*, pp. 44-5.

²Greenwood and McDowell, *Legal U.S. Immigration*, p. 20.

³Apraku's *African Émigrés*, pp. xv-xvii, xix-xxiv, 42-6. The Apraku study was one of the first by an indigenous African scholar in the U.S. to look at the effects of institutional crisis on the political and economic features of post-1960s build-up of African trained personnel in the U.S. By the mid-1990s, the Apraku effort made it much easier for Kwaku Danso to explore the “Explanations for African Immigration,” in *Trotter Review*, pp. 27-29, and “The Political Issues for African Immigrants in the United States,” *Trotter Review*, p. 31, as well as “Nigerians in the United States: Potentialities and Crises,” *Research Report*; Gordon, *Nigeria's Diverse Peoples*, p. 236.

⁴*Ibid.*; Ndubuike, *The Struggles, Challenges, and Triumphs*, pp. 39-43.

⁵*Ibid.*; also, see Danso, *Trotter Review*, p. 27.

⁶*Ibid.*

to America largely in order to improve their economic condition and well-being.¹ Elsewhere, however, Apraku's study supports the crisis of Africa's institutions, which serves as the underlying factor influencing the brain drain. This suggests that the general state of institutional crisis in Africa has close links to its political and economic instability, and hence a key influence on the decision by its skilled class to emigrate to the U.S.² But, as Danso argues: "The ease of entry of African professionals into the international labor market has been facilitated by the non-indigenous nature of African educational and training institutions. These institutions, largely inherited from colonialism, prepare Africans for foreign-oriented qualifications."³

Thus, there is an undeniable basis that immigration from Nigeria to the U.S. has its strongest historical roots in the character of colonial dispossession than in any other features of post-colonial crisis.⁴ Historian Davidson offers further explanation that may help to understand this scope of the ongoing emigration of the African skilled class to the U.S. Almost similar to Danso, he argues that black Africans suffer largely from the crisis of inherited European "institutions," which were constructed in opposition to their natural orbit of collective development.⁵ These imported institutions were direct nullification of pre-colonial African institutions, and were the child bearers of frustration and anger, unstable leadership, ethnic

¹Ibid.

²Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, pp. xxvii, xix-xxii, 19-24, 33.

³Danso, *Trotter Review*, p. 28.

⁴Ibid. Also, see example, the emphases on the colonial experience by President Obasanjo and Professor Mazrui in Chapter 1.

⁵Davidson, *Africa in Modern History*, pp. 294-7; Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Book, 1992), pp. 8-13; Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, pp. xxvii, xix-xxii, 19-24, 33.

clientilism, military dictatorship, general political misrule, and indiscipline.¹ Considered along with evidences in Nigeria, the enormous problem of this background was ultimately to lead to the American build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism.

Figure 7 shows that prior to 1980s, there were three identifiable waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. During the first wave, Nigerians made up less than 10 percent of the total number of African-born immigrants in the U.S.² This background suggests that the Nigerian Civil War did not really lead to an immediate emigration. Thus, unlike Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan, for example, whose shares of American immigration were characterized by refugees, the Nigerian civil crisis was not a clearly identifiable feature of its early immigration—although it cannot be excluded as one of the features during the 1970s.³

Other evidences suggest that the few Nigerians and other Africans who immigrated to the U.S. prior to the 1970s and the early 1970s were those with high skills. Of the 417 Nigerians admitted into the U.S. from June 1962 to June 1967, 255 were immigrants with skilled occupations; 131 were professionals and technicians; 31 were engineers; 9 were physicians, while 34 were professional nurses.⁴ Between 1962 and 1972, some 2,334 African scientists and engineers, and 912 physicians and surgeons were admitted into the U.S.⁵

¹Ibid.

²“Socio-economic Characteristics of U.S. Foreign-born Population: Detailed in the Census Bureau Tabulation,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington [C84-179], October 17, 1984) Table 1, p.3.


³Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. vii, 99; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 18 and 21; Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 234.

⁴Apraku, African Emigrés in the United States, p. 42.

⁵Ibid.; p. 46.

The second wave of Nigerian immigration began between 1970 and 1974. With a strong leap in the numbers admitted to the U.S. during this period, the growth of Nigerian immigrants ultimately rose to about 22 percent. It is probable that this sharp increase in the growth of Nigerian immigration was a by-product of the civil turbulence of the 1960s and the consequent oil boom economy accompanying the end of the Nigerian Civil War.¹

Figure 7



Source: Based on "Socio-economic Characteristics of U.S. Foreign-born Population: Detailed in the Census Bureau Tabulation," (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census Washington [C84-179], October 17, 1984), Table 1, p. 3.

By itself, however, the early 1970s was a period when Nigeria enjoyed enormous wealth and when a sizeable number of its immigrants in American colleges and universities were either on federal government scholarships or were

¹Udofia, Research Report, p.13; Levinson and Ember, American immigrant Cultures, p. 949.

funded directly by their regional governments.¹ Similarly, the early 1970s waves of Nigerian immigration were also linked to the beginning of serious political and economic crises in Nigeria. This was a period when the political machinery of the Federal Republic of Nigeria began to mismanage the oil resources of the country on policies that were inimical to the future of the Nigerian nation.² The 1970 to 1974 waves therefore reflects a mixed group of Nigerians: those who were self sponsored and those who were on government scholarship, as well as those who left Nigeria due to the mounting national crises that were later to result in the overthrow of General Yakubu Gowon in 1975.³ The 1970 to 1974 configuration represented the very first clearly identifiable phase of Nigerian build-up in the U.S.⁴

The period between 1975 and 1980 marked the third wave of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. Immigrants admitted during this phase from Nigeria into the U.S. recorded well over 68 percent compared to Angola, for instance, with almost 70 percent.⁵ The third phase of immigration was marked by increases in female pairing for such sub-Saharan African groups as South Africa (8,250), Nigeria (6,733), Cape Verde (5,119), and Ethiopia (3,256). Nigeria's rate of 279 males per 100 females' immigrants was the highest in the entire African bloc, as well as greater part of non-European immigration. This suggests that most Nigerians or Africans were married. As Apraku's study later found, about 77 percent of African emigrants in the U.S.

¹Ibid.; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 13-14; Allen and Turner, We the People Atlas of America's ethnic Diversity, pp. 150-1; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 236.

²Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report, p. 13.

³Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, pp. 50-1; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 13-14.

⁴Ibid.

⁵U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Socioeconomic Characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-born Population," Table 1, p. 3.

were married.¹ Like their predecessors, Nigerians who migrated to the U.S. during the third waves were mostly students. Taken as a block, the second and third waves of Nigerian immigration constituted a major proportion of the American build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism. The bulk of these predominantly student immigrants did not all return home after studies; they were later to form the nucleus of the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States.²

The third wave of Nigerian immigration can be explained in terms of ancestral linkages with black America. When black America voted approvingly for Jimmy Carter in 1976, his resultant policies generated internal changes that were somewhat favorable to African Americans and hence to African states. African build-up during that period also seems to correspond with the kind of domestic and international policies that the Carter Administration generated toward black Africa.³

The general pattern of African immigration during the 1970s showed that Nigerians were the most identifiable group with wide ranging national support for further studies in the U.S. Nigeria alone sent more college and university students to the U.S. than any other country in Africa: its 16,000 students' body represented 37 percent of their ancestry group.⁴ Nigerian immigrants also had substantially higher educational status, especially among the sub-Sahara African groups in the U.S.: 96.7

¹See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Ancestry Group Report for the United States," Detailed in the Census of the Population (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980), Table 2, p. 13. Also see the 1980 and 1990 Nigerian ancestry population cited in Chapters 1 and 3, along with the Nigerian foreign-born census population 1980-1990, including the Apraku African Émigrés in the United States, p. 2.

²Udofia, Research Report, p. 14.

³*Ibid.*; Trotter Review, p. 32.

⁴See, for example, U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Foreign-born Population, Table 2, p. 5; Leon F. Bouvier and Robert W. Gordon, "Immigration to the U.S.: The Unfinished Story," Population Bulletin (November 1986), Table 8.; Allen and Turner, We the People Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity, p. 150-1;

percent of them had higher school diplomas while about 49 percent were college graduates.¹ During the 1990s, moreover, Nigerians comprised the largest base of educated foreign-born Africans in the U.S (Table 12.1).²

From the mid-1980s onward, when the official U.S. immigration policy toward the so-called Third World began to be stricter, the allotment accorded to African immigrants compared, for example, to the Asians and Europeans also became smaller.³ Not surprisingly, Nigerians admitted to the U.S. between the mid-1980s and early 1990s were those in such highly skilled specialties as the medical and technical sciences, academia, and administrative positions.⁴ Only a very small number were in non-technical fields and fewer still had student visas.⁵

Table 12.1

Overview of Nigerian Physicians in the United States
by Number, by Regions of Professional Certification, 1994

Region of Professional Certification	Number	Percentage by Region
Africa	789	60
America	446	34
Europe	60	5
Middle East	14	1
Russia	5	.4
Total	1314	100

Source: Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States 1994 (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical Directory, 1994).

¹Ibid. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Socioeconomic Characteristics."

²Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 236-7.

³Udofia, Research Report, pp. 15, 47. For further demographic details, see, for example, Fix and Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the records Straight, pp.10-29, and INS Statistical Report on Foreign-born Admittances 1970s-1990s.

⁴Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 2, 13-14, 43-6.

⁵See, for example, INS Reports on demographic analyses of national categories of foreign-born immigrants, admitted into the U.S. by country and regions of birth and by major occupation categories, Fiscal Years 1985-1995, Statistics Division, Demographics Statistics Branch (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, 1985-1995); Udofia, Research Report, pp. 15 and 47.

Table 12.1 shows the number of registered Nigerian physicians practicing in the United States in 1994 by region of professional certification. Based on the data, more than 1,300 Nigerian physicians certified by ANPA were recorded in practice in the U.S.: 60 percent of them were trained in Africa, 34 percent in America, and 5 percent in Europe.

Table 12.2 shows that on the average, the number of registered Nigerian physicians from all regions in the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas (ANPA) almost doubled between 1994 and 1996. As shown, their number rose from 789 to 1925—with an additional 1136 physicians—representing percentage increases of about 100 percent (See Table 12.1). Almost a similar pattern is reflected for other regions. But in terms of the proportion of regional certification of Nigerian physicians, only those trained in Africa had a significant increase from 60 percent to 62.5 percent between 1994 and 1996 (Tables 12.1 and 12.2).

Table 12.2
Overview of Nigerian Physicians in the United States,
by Number, by Regions of Professional Certification, 1996

Region	Number	Percentage by regions
African	1925	62.5
Americas	960	31.2
Europe	134	4.4
Asia	31	1.0
Russia	29	0.9
Total	3079	100

Source: Based on data from Sunmolu Beckley, Emeruwa, Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada, 1996 (Riverside, CA: ANPA, 1996), and Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Physicians in the U.S.

Americas, on the other hand, experienced one percent drop in the proportion of physicians by 2.7 percent: this represents a fall from 34 to 31.2 percent. Russia

also witnessed an increase in its proportion of trained Nigerian physicians from 0.4 to 0.9 percent while Middle East and Europe had a slide increase of about 1 percent each. This, in sum, would mean that the number of practicing Nigerian physicians in the U.S. increased by over 100 percent from 1314 to 3079.¹

Some explanation of ANPA—an Association of registered Nigerian physicians in the Americas—seems necessary at this point. First, it is worth noting that not all the registered Nigerian Physicians were represented in the Nigerian Medical Directory. For example, as of 1994, the Nigerian medical directory claimed to have a record of “2000” practicing professionals in the U.S. “This maiden edition lists all Nigerian Physicians—about 2,000—currently in the United States.”² However, after examining this “maiden edition,” the total count of Nigerian physicians was 1,314, a bit way off from the recorded number.³

But, with newer arrivals and certifications, the number of registered Nigerian physicians is probably much higher than represented in the Medical Directory.⁴ Indeed, the unofficial data on Nigerian physicians estimated a much higher population than one recorded between 1994 and 1996 (Tables 12.1-12.2, Figures 8.1-8.2).⁵ Along, therefore, with other resident doctors who were [are] as yet to be

¹Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States 1994 (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical directory, 1994; Sunmolu Beckley, Emeruwa, Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States and Canada, 1996 (Riverside, CA: Association of the Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, 1996).

²Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States 1994 (Riverside, CA: Nigerian Medical directory, 1994), p. 1.

³Udofia, Research Report, p. 47.

⁴Ibid.

⁵This fact is supported by exploratory examination of Nigerian physicians in the U.S.; Sunmolu A. Beckley, eds., Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special Edition (Riverside, CA: ANPA, 2000); and African Business Directories in the United States, 1990-2005.

registered in ANPA, the population of Nigerian physicians was more likely to be on a higher scale by the end of 2000.¹ Going by the United Nation's Human Development Report, there were about 21,000 Nigerian physicians in the U.S. in 1993.² This appears to have been the same figure that Gordon recalled in 2003.³

Without any clear explanation, however, the estimation of "21,000" Nigerian physicians in the U.S. by either 1993 or 2003, would appear somewhat extraneous. If the numbers of Nigerian physicians were that high, then why they were not registered in the ANPA medical directories between 1994 and 2000, requires some explanation, which at this point is somewhat uncertain. Probably the general population of Nigerian physicians in the U.S., including those in the related paramedical profession, is somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000.⁴ Yet, between 1993 and mid-2000, for example, the population of Nigerian physicians could have risen to about 27,000 or even beyond. This would have been the case where all the medical scientists trained in Nigeria/Africa or outside Africa currently in the U.S. not certified as medical doctors (MD), but included in the United Nation's Human Development Report.⁵ Indeed, there are evidences that not all trained physicians from Nigeria were certified as currently practicing in the U.S.⁶

¹Research Report, p. 16.

²Sako, in "Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection," *African Issues*, p. 26.

³Gordon, *Nigeria's Diverse Peoples*, p. 236.

⁴This is based on my examination of ANPA and the general exploratory survey of the Nigerian medical archives in the U.S. For example, most skilled Nigerians—particularly those trained in Nigeria were working outside their fields in the U.S. Some Nigerian physicians trained in Nigerian medical schools, or elsewhere, were often perceived as emigrants from less developed region. Thus there are the problems of professional and cultural adjustment, which could also explain why some of them were uncertified. Besides, not all medical degrees awarded by Nigerian/African universities were explicable within the American medical establishments.


⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

According to a study of ANPA's data in 1996,¹ about 24 percent of Nigerian physicians currently practicing in the U.S. were certified in the 1970s. On the other hand, however, a majority representing 64 percent were certified in the 1980s (Figure 8.1). The likelihood of an American emigration for those trained in indigenous African medical schools must have been at an all time high during the 1980s and thereafter.²

Figure 8.1

Graphic Overview of Nigerian Physicians in the United States,
by Decade of Professional Certification, 1950s-1990s




Source: Graphic tabulation is based on analyses of the data on the Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States, The Nigerian Medical Directory (Riverside: California, 1994).

If one were to examine the socioeconomic and politico-cultural crises in Nigeria—particularly from the mid-1980 onward—the links between years of professional certification of Nigerian physicians and American emigration would be closely linked. As shown in Figure 8.2, a majority of these physicians came from the more established traditional Nigerian medical schools: Ibadan over 35 percent, Lagos over 20 percent and Nsukka over 15 percent.

¹Research Report, p. 16.

²Ibid.

Figure 8.2
Graphic Overview of Graduation Weight Levels of
Nigerian Physicians in the U.S. Educated at
African Universities, 1950s-1990s



Source: Graphic tabulation is based on The Nigerian Medical Director (Riverside, CA, 1994) pp. 5-102.

Aside, therefore, from the intermittent leads held by Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985, and 1993 to 1994, more Nigerians were admitted to the U.S. than any other sub-Saharan African groups between 1981 and 2000 period (Table 13). This pattern of immigration can best be described as the “merging” of the first, second, and third waves that also incorporated a succession of related waves that came much later.¹ This meant that a majority of Nigerians in the first, second, and third waves (1960s-70s), who did not return home after their studies, were among the first to establish their communal base on American soil.² These were mostly the pioneer-waves who provided the required contextual plateau for the successive adjustments of other waves of chain immigration from Nigeria from the mid-1980s onward.³

¹Udofia, Research Report, p. 17.

²Ibid.; Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 217-219.

³Ibid.; Research Report, p. 17.

Table 13
Major Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
Admitted to the U.S., 1981-2000

Countries	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Angola	144	126	116	146	120	116	146	110	143	141	132	103	92	75	81	125	75	66	57	88
Cape Verde	849	852	594	591	627	760	657	921	1118	907	973	757	936	310	968	1012	920	814	909	1083
Cameroon	69	95	92	145	123	130	132	157	187	380	452	210	936	810	506	803	898	691	826	865
Ethiopia	1749	1810	2643	2461	3362	2737	2156	2571	3389	4336	5127	4602	5276	4335	5960	6086	5904	4205	4272	4061
Ghana	951	824	976	1050	1041	1164	1120	1239	2045	4466	3330	1867	1604	1458	3152	6606	5104	4458	3714	4344
Guinea	16	27	23	11	17	21	26	33	45	67	84	91	102	268	152	220	158	46	6	3
Ivory Coast	28	29	54	55	57	55	63	78	98	184	347	230	250	1017	289	432	430	364	305	439
Kenya	657	601	710	753	735	719	698	773	910	1297	1185	953	1065	1017	1419	1666	1387	1696	1412	2210
Liberia	556	593	518	585	618	618	622	769	1175	2004	1292	999	1762	166	1929	2206	2216	1617	1358	1575
Nigeria	1918	2257	2354	2337	2846	2976	3278	3343	5213	8843	7912	4551	4448	3952	6818	10221	7038	7746	6769	7853
Senegal	65	74	71	59	91	91	92	130	141	537	869	135	178	213	506	641	435	373	370	555
So. Africa	1559	1434	1261	1246	1210	1566	1741	1832	1899	1990	1854	2516	2197	2144	2560	2966	2093	1904	1580	2833
Sierra Leone	277	283	319	368	371	323	453	571	939	1290	951	693	690	698	919	1918	1884	955	976	1590
Tanzania	423	304	364	418	395	370	385	388	507	635	500	352	426	357	524	553	399	339	316	481
Uganda	410	304	332	369	301	401	357	343	393	674	538	361	415	391	383	422	400	355	250	423
Zaire	77	87	101	85	109	135	102	139	140	256	238	182	233	237	355	433	414	155	88	124
Zambia	165	165	160	146	169	168	161	182	259	209	228	202	225	198	222	226	262	213	143	211
Zimbabwe	167	162	193	200	222	221	252	216	230	272	261	294	308	246	299	385	274	186	184	325

Source: United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Statistics and Demographics Branch* (Washington, DC, 1981-2002).

At this point, however, it is worthy noting that the “merging of the first, second, and third waves” of Nigerians does not mean that a commonly identifiable pattern of neighborhood settlement had occurred among their varying waves of settlers in America. Such a view would be misleading. For, there are strong socioeconomic and ethno-political as well as cultural constraints within both the American and the Nigerian settings that tend to weaken the idea of sustained neighborhood bonding among Nigerian immigrants. This context explains why Nigerian immigrants are more susceptible to a detached neighborhood bonding with African-Americans—even while they are demographically and culturally aligned.¹

Perhaps the most underlying reason for the detached pattern of neighborhood distribution among Nigerian immigrants is associated with their socio-cultural experience in America. Next is their internal ethno-regional fracture during and after colonialism. But in America, this cycle of problem may have a lot in common with the socio-cultural crisis confronting some Nigerians. To a certain extent, therefore, this problem has further aggravated their inter-class conflict in the diaspora.² So, in retrospect, the merging of earlier and newer waves of Nigerian immigrants from the 1960s to 1970s with those in the early and mid-1980s meant that the former waves had provided a broad contextual plateau which enabled the subsequent build-up of Nigerians to converge in America. This development had the chief merit of lessening the contextual tensions in the successive re-distribution of Nigerian immigrants across the American landscape between mid-1980s and early 1990s.³

¹Research Report, pp. 20-1, 25.

²Ibid., pp. 38-40. This development will be further elaborated in Chapter 4, particularly in Chapter 6.

³Research Report, p. 17.

Consequently, the fourth wave of immigration began from the early to mid-1980s as the political, and economic turbulence in Nigeria deepened. This wave consisted of mostly of American-educated Nigerians who had returned to Nigeria when the country was in a more stable condition. With despair and increasing instability, they were first among those who seized upon the slightest opportunity to re-emigrate back to the U.S.¹

The fifth wave of Nigerian immigration included those mostly educated in Nigeria, or outside the American system, and followed similar cycles of socioeconomic and politico-cultural turbulence that compelled their American-trained counterparts to flee. A more evolving phenomenon, the sixth wave of Nigerian immigration comprised mostly of political exiles who fearing persecution for harboring views that were contradictory to ruling military dictatorship, took to flight in the U.S.²

The seventh wave of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was built around the foreign policy directives of post-modern America. Popularized as the “Diversity Immigrant Visa Lottery,” and designed as a part of supplementary program to the Immigration Act of 1990, the INS made available about 55,000 permanent resident visas annually to persons from countries with low rates of immigration to the U.S.³ The fact that all African countries qualified for the DV Lottery programs, perhaps

¹Ibid. See Figures 7, 8.1-8.2, Tables 12.1-12.2, 13.

²Nigeria does not quite have a history of refugee immigration to the U.S., as do such countries as Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan. Despite the enormous hardships, not even the Nigerian Civil War was known to have triggered massive immigration of refugees into the U.S. Prior to 1965, this problem seems to have been tied to the American foreign policy, as well as to its ambivalence toward immigrants from the sub-Saharan Africa. Generally, earlier emphases by Hawk and Skinner should then be viewed as considerations which accounted for the small population of African immigration to the U.S.

³Badru Rabi, “1996 Visa Lottery survives,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October 17, 1996), p. 1; Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 235.

because of the historic negligence accorded them by American institutions, also explains why this marked the most unique wave of their immigration.¹

From 1994 1995, many Nigerians won the visa lottery and were admitted into the U.S. By mid-1990s, however, when Africans won about 37 percent DV Lottery program, highly diversified waves of immigrants were able to enter America.² Nigerians who entered the U.S. via the DV Lottery Program were among the least prepared groups to emigrate to the U.S. This may explain why a majority of them were those with minimal educational status. Thus, the seventh wave of Nigerian immigration, as one might say for the general phase of African immigration, was markedly dissimilar from all the previous ones. Collectively, the fifth to the seventh waves represented the most direct loss of Nigeria's skilled manpower to America.³ This seems to have been the core of what Gordon terms the "cream of the crop."⁴

One major difference between Nigerians who emigrated to the United States prior to the fifth migration waves and those who came afterwards is that a sizeable number of them—perhaps more than necessarily the case with other foreign-born counterparts⁵—are often required to undergo further professional training or orientation. This latter development, which is more characteristic of Nigerian professionals in the technical and medical training, appears to correspond with the general presumption that African immigrants are from cultural regions where modern development along technical lines are least accessible. So along with their

¹Ibid. For the attitude U.S. Government toward African immigration, see: Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law;" Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-11.

²Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 235.

³Research Report, pp. 19, 47-8.

⁴Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 235.

⁵See, for example, Reid, The Negro Immigrant, especially the Chapter entitled, "Characteristics of the Negro Immigrants."

earlier backgrounds, re-adapting themselves to the socioeconomic milieu of American civilization often requires complex patterns of intra-cultural adjustment. Others, who had studied in fields not directly explicable to the American job markets, are primarily among those returning to either full-time or part-time schooling to re-orient their earlier fields, or even to take up new professions altogether. Depending on their fields of expertise, this re-orientation or what this author terms “re-negotiation,” is often defined by the unfavorable racial character of American civilization.¹

Regional Distribution of Nigerians in the United States

There is then a basis for understanding the regional distribution of Nigerian immigrants in the U.S. As already hinted, the crisis of racial otherness, which affected Nigerian immigrants, also corresponded with their regional concentrations. This makes it somewhat easier to understand why their regional concentrations are not truly united in terms of inter-ethnic cooperation among varying related and unrelated national groups, or in terms of sustained partnerships within the black base or mainstream America.²

Beginning in 1980 with a population of 25,526 immigrants, Nigerians were the largest sub-Saharan African-born group, and those with the highest ancestry group figure (47,847).³ If their ancestry group population of 1980 were compared to

¹Hawk, “Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” pp. 261-2, 271; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 59-82, 90-92, 94-7; Apraku, African Émigrés In the United States, pp. 19, 110; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-11; Landry, America at Century’s End, pp. 202-3.

²See earlier notes. We hope to show more details in this pattern of socio-cultural crises in Chapters 5 and 6.

³U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Ancestry Group Report for the United States 1980,” Census of the Population (Washington, DC, U.S. Printing Office, 1980), Table 2, p. 13.

1990, the growth level of the Nigerian ancestry over that decade would be 31 percent.¹ Table 14.1 shows that the regional distribution of the sub-Saharan African ancestry group population in the new millennium follows the pattern characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s.

Table 14.1

The Major Regional Distribution of sub-Saharan African Ancestry Group Populations in the United States, by Countries, by Number, by Decade 2000

S.S. Countries	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Sub-S. African	400,013	306,793	741,248	258,873
Cape Verdean	83,226	785	4,616	3,189
Ethiopian	8,670	14,175	35,385	27,373
Ghanaian	20,744	6,590	18,186	3,914
Kenyan	3,694	3,663	6,847	2,714
Liberian	9,496	5,855	8,284	1,505
Nigerian	41,692	24,217	75,332	20,427
Senegalese	2,787	700	1,924	508
Sierra-Leonean	3,153	964	7,252	870
Somalian	2,594	16,591	9,107	7,695
South African	8,018	5,370	14,867	13,577
Sudanese	2,729	3,923	5,565	2,418
Ugandan	1,326	678	1,457	1,166
Zairian	202	196	930	175
Zimbabwean	702	826	1,902	832
African	217,138	214,430	529,817	166,210
Other sub-Saharans	13,915	7,730	19,777	6,280

Source: U.S. Census, First Ancestry Reported: U.S. 2000 Summary File 3 (SF- 3), 2000.

Based on Table 14.1, the Southern geographical landscape (741,248) continues to control the largest share of the inter-generational growth of African ancestry, followed by the Northeast (400,013), Midwest (309,793), and the West (258,874). Apart from an intermittent leads by Cape Verdean in the Northeast (63,226) and Ethiopian in the West (27,373), the combined total of the Nigerian

¹See INS Report on Naturalized Africans by Region and Origin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995-2000); and Table 2.

in the Northeast (41,629), the Midwest (24,317), and the South (75,332), were the largest in 2000. For Nigerian immigrants, as for the related sub-Saharan, their ancestry populations were also strongest along the Southern lanes, followed by the Northeast, the Mid-west, and the West. In 1990, such states as Texas, the District of Columbia, and Georgia were areas with large population of sub-Saharan African ancestry group.¹

Table 14.2 confirms that a decade ago [1990], the general population of Nigerians was denser in the South (26,033); South Atlantic (13,614); Northeast (13,501); Middle Atlantic (11,202); South Central (10,693); Midwest (8,053)—and the Pacific (6,669). During the same period, when the U.S. Census Bureau recorded a total of 363,819 African immigrants, 123,933 of them were naturalized American citizens. Of the 55,350 Nigerians included in the latter figure, only 10,036 were naturalized Americans compared to 45,314 non-citizens (See Table 14.2). This represented 46 percent growth over the one decade prior to 1990. Too, of the 131,487 naturalized African-born Americans in the U.S. between 1950 and 1994, only 13,544 were Nigerians.² By 2000, when the U.S. Census Bureau recorded about 1,000,000 Africans in the U.S., 282,247 were naturalized as American citizens compared to 557,300 non-citizens. Nigerians—with 134, 000 in their population, had one of the largest shares of naturalized American citizens.³ Collectively, the

¹For example, see Tables 13.1 and 13.2; and Allen and Turner, pp. 146-150.

²Udofia, Research Report, p. 19.

³Dennis D. Cordell and Manuel Garcia y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas: Working Paper (Dallas, and Arlington: Southern Methodist University, Dallas, and University of Texas, Arlington, 2005), p. 4; and Census Population of the United States, 2000 (www.census.gov).

data on Tables 14.1 and 14.2 show the specific regional distributions of Nigerian immigrants across the fifty American states.

Table 14.2

Census Population of Major Foreign Born Sub-Saharan
Africans in the United States, by American Geographical Regions,
by Citizenship and Non-Citizenship, 1990

COUNTRIES	NO. FOREIGN BORN	NATURALIZED CITIZEN	NOT A CITIZEN	N. EAST	SOUTH	MIDDLE ATLAN- TIC	WEST	SOUTH ATLAN- TIC	MID- WEST	NEW ENGLAND	SOUTH CENT- RAL	E. N. CENT- RAL	PA- CIFIC	W. N. CENT- RAL	E. S. CENT- RAL	MOON- TAIN	W. S. CENT- RAL
AFRICA	363,819	123,933	239,886	123,760	115,619	89,789	82,902	77,026	41,538	33,971	32,418	30,350	73,301	11,188	6,175	9,601	32,418
ANGOLA	2,252	871	1,381	1,471	272	685	416	226	93	786	30	90	360	3	16	56	30
CAMEROON	3,161	463	2,698	612	1,943	371	178	1,309	428	241	574	271	156	157	60	22	574
CAPE VERDE	14,368	5,311	9,057	13,917	239	524	161	185	51	13,393	40	36	137	15	14	24	40
ETHIOPIA	34,805	6,900	27,905	4,661	14,154	3,378	11,918	10,464	4,072	1,283	3,225	2,496	10,536	1,576	465	1,382	3,225
GHANA	20,889	5,180	15,709	9,751	6,596	8,426	2,045	5,018	2,497	1,325	1,378	2,019	1,780	478	200	265	1,378
KENYA	14,371	3,743	10,628	3,491	5,244	2,704	3,530	3,080	2,106	787	1,882	1,559	3,292	547	282	238	1,882
LIBERIA	11,455	2,713	8,742	5,021	4,052	3,688	891	3,126	1,491	1,333	761	884	826	607	165	65	761
NIGERIA	55,350	10,036	45,314	13,501	26,033	11,202	7,763	13,614	8,053	2,299	10,693	5,918	6,669	2,135	1,726	1,094	10,693
SENEGAL	2,287	332	1,955	1,484	374	1,228	284	304	145	256	56	116	253	79	14	31	56
SIERRA LEONE	7,217	1,259	5,958	1,954	3,853	1,603	843	3,171	567	351	552	351	801	216	130	42	552
SOMALIA	2,437	667	1,770	701	1,128	484	397	920	211	217	163	133	299	78	45	98	163
SOUTH AFRICA	34,707	13,537	21,170	8,566	9,900	5,978	12,577	5,824	3,664	2,588	3,225	2,785	10,989	879	851	1,588	3,225
TANZANIA	6,282	2,466	3,816	1,701	2,166	1,439	1,695	1,636	720	262	457	595	1,418	175	73	277	457
OGANDA	6,684	2,403	4,281	1,929	2,040	1,373	1,303	1,454	1,412	556	478	1,109	1,189	303	108	114	478
ZAIRE	3,387	735	2,652	806	1,396	633	662	1,175	523	173	199	298	563	225	22	99	199
ZAMBIA	2,954	808	2,146	524	1,104	408	830	710	496	116	294	345	773	151	100	57	294
ZIMBABWE	4,767	1,373	3,394	1,106	1,568	851	1,575	871	518	255	510	327	1,313	191	187	262	510
OTHER AFRICA	136,446	11,135	26,267	13,973	11,617	11,068	7,418	8,327	4,394	2,905	2,633	3,120	6,300	1,274	657	1,118	2,633

Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, The Foreign Born Population in the United States; (1990, PH-6-98), Ethnic and Hispanic Branch (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1990), Table 13, pp. 21-33.

The strong Southern pull of Nigerian or African immigrants can be explained by geography, economics, and cultural history.¹ This fact is supported by the data on Tables 14.1 and 14.2. Thus, it is in the Southern United States that the fullest scope of the Nigerian concentration can be gauged. The make-up of this Southern heartland of Nigerians reflects not only an understanding of favorable geographic distribution of black communities in the Southern belt, but also of their proximity to areas of black political and cultural institutions, and colleges/universities. Although

¹Ibid.; U.S. Census Demographic Profiles on the Foreign-born Pattern of Regional Settlement in 2000.

these factors are found in other regions, they are more directly identifiable in the South.¹ Taken as a block, the entire Southern geographical landscape controlled more than half of the population of Nigerian immigrants both in terms of their number, as well as their ancestry group concentrations in America (Tables 2, 14.1 and 14.2).²

Some explanation of this Southern thrust of Nigerian immigrants seems to be in order at this juncture. For, as hinted earlier, their strong Southern build-up along African American lines does not quite mean that the two groups have developed sustained neighborhood cleavage as historically related and affected groups. Rather, it means that the regional distribution of Nigerians follows a similar pattern of the geographic and historical concentration of black America.³ How much of this is influenced by a consciousness of racial “otherness” will hopefully be clearer in our discussions in Chapters 5 and 6.

Table 15 is a highlight of the varying types of cultural groups catering to the well-being of Nigerian immigrants. There are far stronger basis that the varying ethnic clusters of Nigerian cultures/entertainments in the U.S. are dominated by immigrants from Southern Nigeria, not only from Yoruba, as Levinson and Ember, for example, observed.⁴ By the early 2000, entertainment organizations comprising the Yoruba and Ibo ethnic backgrounds constituted the dominant cultural wings of Nigerian immigrants, followed by the Efik/Ibibio, Ijo, and Edo, etc. These were

¹Udofia, Research Report, p. 20; Allen and Turner, We the People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity, pp. 146-150.

²Ibid. Also, see Tables 2 and 13.1, as well as the U.S. Census Bureau on Ancestry Report, 2000.

³Ibid.

⁴Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures, p. 946.

mostly from Southeastern and Southwestern regions of the Nigerian homeland. They also constituted the largest rampart of the current build-up of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the U.S.¹

Too, based on Table 15, ethnic associations from Northern Nigerian or the dominant Hausa-Fulani North, have the least demonstrative representation in America. This might imply that the population of Hausa-Fulani peoples of Northern Nigeria was not as much. If so, the emphasis is that, given the ascendancy of the predominantly Northern Hausa-Fulani leadership in the homeland, their adherents who were more likely to have fared better within the system were also less likely to emigrate to the U.S.²

Up to the 1980, the patterns of immigration of Northern Nigerians to the U.S. were markedly dissimilar compared to those from Southern Nigeria. During a similar period, the bulk of the immigrants from Northern Nigeria in the U.S. were ethnic minorities, and mostly Christians than Muslims. Even these groups differed somewhat in their general pattern of American concentration compared to a majority of their counterparts from Southern Nigeria. But immigrants from the Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern Nigeria began to be more visible in the U.S. from mid-1980s onward. This development probably explains why they were less densely concentrated in Southern U.S. as Southern Nigerians during a greater part of the 1980s and 1990s.³

¹Research Report, p. 20.

²Ibid.

³For example, this is based on Nigerian Business Directories in America. The extensive population of the Nigerian/African immigrant churches provides the strongest basis for evaluating the Judeo-Christian base of the largely Southern Nigerian immigrants in America.

Table 15

**Sample Profile of Nigerian Ethnic Organizations
in the United States**

<p>The Majestic Ekimogun Club, USA, Inc., Providence, RI Calabar Cultural Dance Club, Washington, DC The Greater Owerri Club, Houston, TX Enugu State Women Cultural Group, Houston, TX Oyemekun International Club, USA, Inc., Baltimore, MD Fredimo Cross Cultural Production, Philadelphia, PA Igbo Language Service, Washington, DC Itsekiri Cultural Club, Southern California The Ogor Okpala Women's Cultural Group, Houston Umuahia Cultural Dance, Houston, TX Owo Heritage Club, Dallas, TX Akwa Ibom State Women Association, Houston, TX Rivers State Association, Houston Enugu State Association, Houston The Wazobia Club, Washington, DC Akwa Ibom Christian Fellowship and Cultural Club, Houston The Nigerian National Cultural Association Akwa Ibom Dance Club The Nka Nkaiiso Obio Nyin Cultural Group Umuahia Cultural Dance Nigerian Eagle Soccer Club, Inc. Akwa Ibom State Women Association Ibo Congress Union, Houston Ichie Association, Houston Kalabari Association of Greater Houston Enugu Provincial Association, Houston Umuahia Association, Houston The Yoruba International Association</p>	<p>The Ikwauno/Umuahia Association of Dallas Mbaise Family Association Nfokwa Association Abia-Imo Union of North Carolina Orlu People's Association Ikwerre Community Association of S. California Mbano People's Association The Association of Nkporo People in America Igbo Union, USA Okigwe Family Union of Southern California Oron Development Union Ubiom Social Group Ukwa Group Ijebu Association Ekite Association Ibekwu Association, Houston Etinan Group, Houston Adamawa-Taraba Cultural Organization Zumunta Organization, USA Movement for Chubbunawa Unity Club 30 of Abuja Club 30 of Lagos Igbo Union of Atlanta Eku's Organization, Inc. Adamawa-Taraba Cultural Organization Movement for Chubbunawa Unity Organization for African Self-Determination TheIgboUnionofAtlanta</p>
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Sources: (1) Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Immigration in the U.S. 1990-1994 and an examination of three Nigerian Immigrant Community Media stationed in Southern in America.

The above then means that the largely Southern pull of Nigerians in the U.S. is mostly Judeo-Christian-based, and mostly characteristic of immigrants from Southern Nigeria.¹ This Judeo-Christian wing, as will be seen again in Chapters 4 and 6, represents the strongest institutional feature of Nigerians in the diaspora. Besides, its socio-cultural experience also corresponds with the historical struggle of the descendants of slaves.²

¹Udofia, Research Report, p. 20.

²Ibid.

Summary

Prior to the Islamic and European contacts, the current location of modern Nigeria stood at the crossroads of ancient contacts with the other distant worlds. While it was at the extreme end of human contacts, its peoples exchanged ideas with, and borrowed via North Africa, Mediterranean Arab, Far East Asia, and Europe. The introduction of Islam into Northern Nigeria around the 14th century provided some crucial basis for commercial, administrative, cultural, and literary development. This set the stage for an evolving pattern of internal and external transformation. The 19th century Islamic Jihad or Holy War can also be seen as part of an expanding integration of human organizations in cultural, economic, and political spheres before being halted by the Europeans/British.

The differences between Northern and Southern Nigeria were sharpened by the attitudes of the British-colonial and Christian missionary mandates from 1830 to 1861, and again from 1900 to 1940s—and thereafter. Prior to European contact, such distinctions in differences as existed among the races of pre-colonial Niger Delta valleys did not necessarily result in commercial or institutional disruptions (Chapter 2). The distinctions produced by the effects of colonialism particularly against the Islamic North were linked to the inimical policies of preferential policies.

Since the birth of the Nigerian nation, Southern Nigerians have tended to misunderstand their national context in relating with the largely Muslim North. The more sustained incrimination of Southern Nigerians under the British colonial and Christian missionary mandates remains an underlying factor in their misunderstanding of the Islamic North.

Both the alleged Ibo-led military coup of 1966 and the counter coup dominated by the Hausa-Fulani/northern soldiers were the enactments of postcolonial ethno-regional contradictions. The current representation of thirty-six states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria along ethnic lanes sums up the centrifugal dissection of the Nigerian mind. The result of institution disruptions in Nigeria corresponded with the immigration of skilled class of Nigerians to the U.S.

Prior to the 1950s, the general thrust of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. was indeterminate. From 1820s to 1950s—representing pre-colonial and colonial eras, the few Nigerians who came to America were students, compared to the vast volume during slavery. Similarly, the early waves of post-colonial Nigerian immigration to the U.S. were dominated by students, and later by Nigerians educated within and outside Nigeria. The distribution of Nigerians in the U.S. has a strong Southern pull.

CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY IN AMERICA

Chapter 4 contains the development of the Nigerian immigrant community in the United States. The major emphases in this chapter are examined and discussed under: (1) A Brief Historical Development (2) The Instruments of Nigerian Community within the African American Context (3) Adjusting into the American Mosaic, (4) and The Nigerian Immigrant Community Leadership.

Part 1: A Brief History, 1970-1990

As we saw earlier, prior to the early 1970s, the American build-up of Nigerians was fairly thin.¹ This development in turn reflected the general pattern of Nigerian or even of the entire African immigration to the U.S. prior to 1960s. Thus, the 1970s pattern of Nigerian build-up in the U.S. reflected a shift from that of an era when Nigerians were mostly trained at either the British or European colleges/universities.² Therefore from the mid-1970s onward, the contextual visibility of Nigerian immigrants began to be more obvious in the U.S. This was particularly the case in their distribution in the South, Northeast, and the Mid-West.³

Against the preceding backdrop, the early waves of Nigerians comprised mostly of the student sojourners. By all the available criteria, the nucleus of a

¹For example, this is supported by evidences in Chapter 3.

²Patton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians 1868-1978," pp. 143, 149-155; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 3; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, p. 23; Cordell and y Greigo, The Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas: Working Paper, p. 7.

³See, for example, Chapter 3 for demographic data; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 13-14; Udofia, Research Report, p. 17; Oliver, The African Experience, p. 308; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3, 45.

Nigerian community in America began with these early waves of students.¹ The socio-cultural orbit of this new community reflected a strong Southern pull along African American lanes. As we saw in earlier chapter, this Southern thrust was also dominated by Nigerians from the Southern region of the homeland.²

This build-up of Nigerians in the U.S., which was largely voluntary, represented the second historic consolidation of Africans in this country since the demise of chattel slavery and colonial rule. Seen within this context, the development of “largely students’ waves of a Nigerian immigrant community” simply meant that these immigrants were unwilling to return voluntarily to the homeland after their studies. They feared being unemployed or caught back in the homeland in the web of incessant military coups and political changes that had become characteristic of their nation between the mid-1960s and 1970s. Unlike most immigrants fleeing political persecution or resettlement crisis as refugees, the early build-up of Nigerians in America was due largely to the disruptions of civic institutions in the homeland. This development in turn influenced the negative cycles of economic and political instability in Nigeria, as well as the decision of Nigerians to settle down after their studies in America.³

To a major extent, then, it was the attitude of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria that dictated the choices which the large body of its students’ immigrants had to make regarding the decision to settle down in America. As we saw earlier in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the defeat of the secessionist wing of the

¹Ibid., Udofia.

²Ibid.

³Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 27; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 13-32.

Nigerian Federation and ultimate reconsolidation of power by General Yakubu Gowon in the early 1970s did not necessarily lead to a viable vision of national redirection or of a concise line of human development. The enormous oil boom resources that provided most of the incentives for funding some Nigerian students in American and British universities during the 1970s were squandered under the Nigerian military. And the military government had no programmatic plans to gainfully re-absorb those students studying abroad and willing to return to the homeland. Ironically, this was period when the Federal Government of Nigeria urged its citizens abroad to return and participate in the process of national development.¹ As the crises in the Nigerian homeland deepened, Nigerian immigrants were compelled to develop an historic foothold as a settler community in America. The decades of rushing back to the homeland after studies had ended.²

By mid-1980s, Nigerians had developed a strong consciousness of urban clusters across major American cities. In such cities like New York, Washington, D.C., Houston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, and Los Angeles, their peculiar socio-cultural orbit revealed the arrival of the newest of the “new Americans.” Within these urban centers, their collective strivings provided the necessary contextual settings for the successive waves of later settlers from Nigeria to converge side by

¹Osaghae, “What Have Achieved,” p. 6; Part I of Monday O. Anigboro’s article entitled, “Has Nigeria Fared Better Under Military Regimes, African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, May, 1992), pp. 26-7, _____ Part 2 (Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992), pp. 26-7.

²For example, see the general build-up of Africans in Chapters 1 and 2, especially Tables 1 and 2, 12.1-15, including U.S. Bureau of the Census Report entitled, “U.S. Bureau of the Census, Socio-Economic Characteristics of the U.S. foreign born population,” Detailed in Census Bureau Tabulations, Released CB 84-1679 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 3, 27, 103; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 1-15, 42-3; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 14-15.

side with the much earlier waves, as well as with those who were still students.¹ This would mean that the nucleus of a Nigerian immigrant community comprised largely of the students from the first to the third waves.²

Thus, the first successive consolidation of chain-waves of immigrants from Nigeria in the U.S. was more closely identifiable among those who immigrated from the fourth through the sixth waves.³ These waves, which comprised mostly of American-educated professionals, were later followed by Nigerians educated either within or outside Nigeria. Among them were also Nigerians who had returned to the homeland after their studies who seized upon the slightest opportunity to emigrate back to the U.S., as the political and economic situation worsened.⁴

Instruments of the Nigerian Immigrant Community Within the African American Context

Certainly the build-up of Nigerian population in the U.S. from the 1970s marked the beginning of a new chapter within an earlier strand of Afro-Atlantic exchange.⁵ For, this particular build-up of largely voluntary waves of ethnic Nigeria in America—like the one during forced migration—was dominated by ethnic groups from the Niger Delta valleys, which embraced the Bights of Bonny and Benin.⁶ This same region is where the transatlantic slave trade had one of its largest shares of the

¹Udofia, Research Report, p. 17.

²Ibid. Also see Chapter 3.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.; Udofia, Research Report, p. 19

⁵See, for example, the reference on shared socio-cultural experiences between descendants of slaves and voluntary Nigerian immigration in the U.S. in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. On the other hand, newer strands have been introduced by the Nigerian/African offspring.

⁶See Chapter 2: Background/Ethno-regional Typology of the Niger Delta Basins. Also, see Figures 3.1 and 3.2, in particular, for their related demographic composition.

human cargoes exported to the Americas. It is also where evidences of the residual effects of that bitter cycle of the black experience still abound in the varying socioeconomic and politico-cultural attitudes of the region and peoples.¹

And, since the 1970s, the demographic diffusion of the voluntary waves of Nigerian settlers from the Niger Delta valley regions in America has been closely aligned with the black base. Earlier evidences confirmed that the inter-generational experiences of the descendants of forced migration were almost similar to those of their counterparts under voluntary migration from Nigeria. Corresponding with this background is also the fact that the contextual development of Nigerian immigrants is closely linked to the historical cycle of black America.² Thus, the most visible feature of the Nigerian immigrant community that emerged from the early students' waves of settlers was obvious enough in its susceptibility to the socio-cultural crises of "the physical and permanent fact of color."³

This Nigerian experience is unlike that of most America's immigrants from Europe and Asia. Unlike Asian, Latino, and European immigrants who often settle along their ancestral lines, and are somewhat more closely bonded, in the South or elsewhere in the U.S., Nigerians are neither consciously organized under a neighborhood-based structure among themselves nor side by side with African-Americans, nor are they emboldened by the mainstream notion of an American

¹Ibid. This conclusion is also supported by evidences in Chapter 3. Also, see related notes on the relationship between the ethno-regional make-up of involuntary migration from West Africa/Niger Delta basins and voluntary post-colonial migration to America.

²Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans."

³Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Vantage Books, 1990), p. 358; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 106, 110; Udofia, Research Report, p. 25.

amalgam—nor by its inherent racial indifference. If Nigerians are culturally and demographically aligned with African-Americans, they sometimes exhibited markedly dissimilar demographic characteristics toward the black base. Both cultural and socio-economic forces have determined how the two kindred groups perceived and indeed sought to relate with each other.¹ Such crises as violence in the black neighborhoods and other related socio-cultural tensions, to a great extent, often influenced how Nigerians made decisions regarding their residential distribution in the U.S. This suggests that their pattern of neighborhood distribution requires further information beyond such factors, for example, as class and ethnic differences, as hinted in Chapter 3.²

Whether for Nigerians, as a specific national group, or for black Africans within a broader base of sub-Saharan African immigrants—it cannot be denied that their more peculiar socio-cultural experience is more susceptible to racial indifference. This uneasy experience has an equal effect on their collective unity. Nor is the extent to which this experience has affected sustained relations with African-Americans deniable.³ Therefore, along with racism and discrimination, the negative experiences of Nigerian immigrants are further exacerbated by the socio-

¹Ibid.; Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4, 72-9; Udofia, "Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 54-60, 254-63, 285-291. Based on the fieldwork undertaken on Nigerians/Africans in America, the reactive nature of racial indifference toward the black base also affected how Nigerians/Africans immigrants mirrored themselves in relation to the available opportunities both individually as well as collectively. For further understanding, see Chapter 3. We hope to show in Chapters 5 and 6 how the conflicting cultural cycles of native-born black Americans have impacted on the choices Nigerian/African settlers make in America—especially in their patterns of neighborhood distribution.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

cultural effects of American slavery.¹ Thus, the Nigerian immigrant community currently occupies one of the most vulnerable and powerless bases of ethnic America. To be sure, the earlier pluralist model by Riesman, Dahl, and Newman on the conflict of incorporating ethnic groups into American mosaic² is perhaps more clearly linked to the context of the Nigerian or the black African immigrant experience.³ A similar pattern of intra-group stratification identified by Jennings for black Americans⁴ appears to be closely linked to the racial experience of most Western hemispheric blacks, including black Africans in urban America.⁵

As a result of this tension, which we hope to return to again further down, Nigerian immigrants exhibit patterns of an American incorporation that are markedly dissimilar from those of non-African descent groups. Their striving for economic survival, which is supported by excellent education, corresponds with increases in

¹Ibid. Additionally, Blackburn views the New World slavery as a "curse" on the descendants of the Middle Passage. This background can be explained in relation to the socio-cultural crises confronting Nigerian immigrants in such places as Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta. See: Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, p. 4.

²David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 213-214, especially Chapter 10; Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 3, 36; William E. Connolly, ed., The Bias of Pluralist (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 9; William M. Newman's American Pluralism: A Study of Minority Groups and Social Theory (New York and London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 54-8.

³Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 13-16; Ike Onyia, "The Making of a Scape-Goat: Nigerians and the Image Problem," African Business Source Magazine (November 1992), pp. 26, 40; Tom Kennedy, "Some Nigerians Specialize in Fraud," Houston Post (January 22, 1984).

⁴James Jennings, "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," in Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America: Status and Prospects for Politics and Activism, ed., J. Jennings (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 144-154.

⁵Ibid.; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-10; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, especially, pp. 83-6, and Chapter 3; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 72-7; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Sanford J. Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 258-9.

their median-income status as well as cultural stress. Consequently, their hard-won success, which is part of the all-time American myth of the triumph of the common man, warrants greater pathos as it bears directly on how they have attempted to rise above the social ostracism and denigration which confronted them to participate in the free enterprise system.¹ We are likely to see further down that the swiftness with which Nigerians adapted themselves into American society during the early decades of their settlement was rather remarkable.

Given the preceding background, it was not surprising that during the early decades of its American development, the Nigerian immigrant community could only have been more clearly defined within the African American context. From the late mid-1970s to early 1980s, the unmistakable fact of “slavery” and of the “Negro color,” as Alexis de Tocqueville once argued,² determined how Nigerian immigrants conceptualized relations with black America.

On the other hand, however, the peculiar socio-cultural experience associated with the Nigerian-African background determined the extent to which these Nigerians exploited the African American context for survival. Between the 1970s

¹In reference to the socio-cultural crises as well as the educational and median income status of Nigerians/Africans, see, for example, Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 80-2, 90-2, 94-7; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9, 19, 24, 110; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 14-15, 25; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 46-8. On the other hand, however, some re-adoptive character of American success of some Nigerians, which is inherent in the tradition of the homeland, follows almost a similar pattern of the struggle of the common people identified among early Euro-Americans. See for example, Mazrui, “The World Economy and the African/Afro-American Connection,” p. 51; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 29-31; L. Jesse Lemisch, Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography and other Writings (New York: A Signet Classic, 1961), pp. vii-xiii; John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: 1955), pp. 1-46; and Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition & The Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 18-32, 118-123.

²Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 357-8.

and early 1980s, Nigerian immigrants understood and indeed appreciated the historical benefits of their African-American context. This context was their immediate source of cultural reliance and survival, when the going was tough. Also, it was their most identifiable base.¹ The exploitation of the “African-American context” implies an understanding of the landmarks constitutional achievements of blacks in America, particularly after the 1960s, which the sojourning Nigerian students adapted to advance their interests.²

Retrospectively, however, the preceding background might also explain the extent of the accuracy of the claims made about the economic success of some middlemen minorities in America.³ For, admittedly, some of their ingenuity is closely linked to the exploitation of historically marginalized ethnic minorities.⁴ So, the exploitation of the “African-American context” is apparent in the manner that most immigrants—including Africans—sometimes utilized their more pliable socio-cultural backgrounds to exploit the indelible crisis of the American black base.

For example, just as the vulnerable status of Nigerians reinforces their exploitation of the black base, its volatile racial crisis exposes them to exploitation among the more fortunate hierarchies of American immigrants. During the mostly

¹For example, the term “African-American context,” as used here implies an understanding by Nigerian immigrants of the landmarks civil rights achievements of African-Americans, which are accessible to them. .

²Ibid.

³See Chapters 1 and 3 for earlier emphases on Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, especially “Introduction” and Chapter entitled “Migration Patterns;” Sowell, Conquest and Cultures, 1998), pp. 1x-xi, 3-20, 153-173; D’Souza, The End of Racism, pp. 397,472-6, 526-8; Barone, The New Immigrants, 2001), pp. 9-11, 17-21.

⁴For example, an article by Landry entitled “The Enduring Dilemma of Race in America,” pp. 202-203, could be an excellent rebuttal against some of the emphases by Sowell, D’Souza, and Michael Barone. Also, see Chapter 1, “Context of an Existing Problem,” and other related explanation of this background.

non-settlement decades of the 1960s to early 1970s, Nigerians understood and indeed appreciated the historical benefits of their African-American context. The black American context and its related institutions were their immediate enclaves of cultural reliance and urban survival.¹

Of course, the kind of the “exploitation” tying Nigerian/African immigrants to the African-American context can also be explained by some inherent commonalities and dissimilarities under undue alien influences. This fact in turn explains the extent to which they two related groups could either collaborate as ancestral partners, or elsewhere, tilt against their collective interest.²

Beyond the preceding explanations, the exploitation of “African American context” also means that, while Nigerian immigrants often derived their contextual stamina from the African-American context, they were likely to be seen exhibiting a loose or detached settlement patterns along the African-American lines. That is, as hinted earlier, while the politico-cultural gains of the black base were important components of interaction within the mosaic, such did not necessarily result in a side by side pattern of neighborhood bonding with black Americans.³

Yet, this exploitation of the “African American context” had one of its strongest bearings in the contextual transformation of Nigerian indices during the 1980s. Indeed from the mid-1970 onward, with increased socioeconomic and political crises back in the Nigerian homeland, Nigerian immigrants began to adapt themselves, along with their cultural mechanisms, into the African-American

¹Trotter Review, p. 32. Also, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, section entitled, “Regional Distribution.”

²Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, p. 342.

³Ibid.

context.¹ The extent to which they were successful in this undertaking was closely tied to the historical cycles of two American Presidencies: Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Probably the development of a Nigerian immigrant community would have been much slower but for the alternate socioeconomic and politico-cultural wheels of black America under two American presidencies.²

The first reactive build-up of Nigerians in the U.S. corresponded with the somewhat more favorable domestic policies of the Carter presidency toward the black base. These policies were further strengthened and indeed transformed by the much earlier gains of the civil and the voting rights bills, as well as by the corresponding passage of the 1965 U.S. Immigration legislation.³ As Ueda has observed, "The liberalization of immigration policy was concomitant of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the federal pacemaking laws designed to abolish racial discrimination, particularly against black Americans."⁴

Despite some of the failings of President Carter, as Klinkner and Smith have argued,⁵ to a certain extent, his presidency was able to record some favorable points toward racial minorities in America as well as toward non-European regions of the world. Therefore, in retrospect, some of his policies were more favorable in approaching black America and black Africa. Of this development, another observer

¹Udofia, Research Report, pp. 29-31.

²Ibid., pp. 14, 26; Trotter Review, pp. 32; "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 106-9.

³For example, see earlier discussion in Chapter 3, especially the related emphases by Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 266-9.

⁴Ueda, Postwar Immigrant America, p. 44.

⁵Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 298-300.

noted that, “when Black America voted approvingly for Jimmy Carter in 1976, the resultant policies of his presidency generated internal changes more favorable to African Americans and African states.”¹

Therefore, viewed against the preceding backdrop, “African build-up in the American world reflected the kind of domestic and international policies which the Carter Administration generated.”² Blackwell's research on the relationship between African-Americans and President Carter supports the alternate shift of tide under President Reagan. Blackwell observes that African-Americans gave their overwhelming support to Carter during the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections by voting approvingly for him. President Carter responded by appointing them to highly visible and important positions:

President Carter appointed the first black male as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the first black to serve as Secretary of the Army, and the first black woman to a cabinet position. Of the 1192 appointments made by President Carter during his four-year term, 12.2 percent were black . . .³

President Carter's appointments to judicial positions included 16.1 percent black, and 15.1 women. His official policies supported popular issues among American minorities, especially among blacks in such areas as Affirmative Action and busing for school desegregation. Carter's personal commitment for minority programs through the Office of Civil Rights, the Justice Department, and the Attorney General made “blacks feel that once again, they had a friend in the White

¹Udofia, Trotter Review, pp. 32.

²Ibid.

³See, for example, James E. Blackwell's examination of “The Reagan Administration and Blacks” and the “Relationship Between Blacks and Presidents Carter and Reagan,” in The Black Community: Diversity and Unity, Second Edition (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers1985), pp. 77, 270.

House.”¹ The alternate social attitudes that accompanied the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980, along with the subsequent policies of his administration, brought changes for African-Americans as well as African states and hence Nigerian (African) immigrants. “When President Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan,” Blackwell further writes, “the black community was gripped with trepidations about the future.”²

President Reagan, Blackwell continues, failed to articulate views favorable to racial harmony. Worse still, his policies opposed Affirmative Action, busing and job opportunity programs—just as his relentless pursuit of budget cuts undermined civil rights enforcement. Ultimately, as Blackwell concludes, the Reagan support for tuition tax credits to private school and tax exemptions for schools, discriminated against blacks and other minorities, as well as encouraged open bigotry.³

Under the Reagan presidency, “minorities represented only 6.6 percent of the 287 appointments made in the 13 departments, compared to 16.7 made by President Carter as of October 1980, near the end of his fourth year.”⁴ The sharp contrast between the policies of President Carter toward blacks and minorities and those of President Reagan was compelling:

Only 2.5 percent of President Reagan's appointments have been black (as of 1983), and 8.3 percent have been women. Over 12 percent of President Carter's appointments to positions as U.S. attorneys and marshals were minorities while only 4.3 percent of President Reagan's appointments in this category have been minorities. In addition, both

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; Klinkner and Smith, The Unsteady March, pp. 300-5.

⁴Ibid.

minorities and women have a low representation in the foreign service.¹

If the preceding emphases were true for African Americans, then, the effects were translated into the broader socioeconomic and politico-cultural constraints for Nigerian immigrants within mosaic. For, during the Carter administration, Nigerians had a certain degree of economic and social comfort. Generally, African immigrants, who were more operative within the African-American context also had benefited from President Carter's goodwill. His defeat in the 1980 and the ultimate election of Reagan as the new president was an important turning point for African-Americans as well as Nigerian/African immigrants.²

"In 1980, when President Carter lost his bid for second-term to challenger Ronald Reagan, Black America's historic civil rights began to crack, and concomitantly, African immigrants also suffered, including those with advanced education and high skills."³ Earlier, Apraku's observation of the new socio-cultural turbulence of the Reagan era concluded that:

Recent racial incidents and U.S. domestic policy have only acted to fuel the racial issue. For example, the eighth years of Reagan regime saw attacks and attempts by the governments to roll back some of the basic civil rights achievements of the 1960s, an assault on Affirmative Action and voting rights, and the cutting of social programs that have traditionally supported blacks. The upsurge of racially motivated crimes and racial intolerance in the absence of any moral leadership from the Reagan administration heightened racial feelings in this

¹Ibid. Also, see, for example, Ronald Water's treatment of President Carter's and President Reagan's relationships with black America in Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 68-84; and The State of Black America 1990 (1990), pp. 25-50.

²Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.

³Ibid.

country, and Africans in this country have not been spared or sheltered from such feelings.¹

Thus, the swift changes in the direction of American presidential philosophy under Reagan had some profound consequences on African descent groups, especially those from south of the Sahara:

So when the 'all American' Ronald Reagan became president of the United States of America in 1981 ... the agenda kicked in with a new ball game. America began to negotiate from the so-called position of strength. Things began to fall when the center ceased to hold for the foreigners.²

Further, Igboanugo's account shows that, Nigerians—as the most populous base of African immigrants—were more directly affected by both the economic and politico-cultural changes brought about by the Reagan era:

... by the early 1980s, the Nigerians who came to the United States seeking the land of opportunity only met what could be considered angry lions and lionesses, people who lost their jobs ... their unemployment benefits ... their homes ... and insurance coverage. Many could only hear of the good old days, but not to live the good time any more.³

It was therefore the socioeconomic and politico-cultural underpinnings of the Reagan presidency which compelled most Nigerian immigrants to begin taking the necessary steps to control their destinies and to search for an alternative means of surviving in "the land of opportunity."⁴ So, at a time when the political and economic convulsions back in the homeland were deteriorating, the Reagan policies marked the direct reversals of the gains of the Carter era.⁵ During the Reagan era,

¹Ibid.

²Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 28.

³Ibid., p. 29.

⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁵"The Light that Failed," Time (January 16, 1984), pp. 24-5.

moreover, the shadow of Nigerians as respectable immigrants from a rich oil-producing country faded away.

Adjusting into the American Mosaic

Nevertheless, the Reagan tide had the effects of enabling Nigerian immigrants to converge into a communal vocal point in America. This development, as hinted earlier, had first taken a form of socioeconomic and cultural hardships. For, not all Nigerians, who were mostly students at the time, had the skills needed to adjust successfully into the American setting. As a result, the opening of the Reagan era caused the bulk of them with college degrees to become more and more under utilized. Those who were neither able to adjust readily nor to return to the homeland after their studies, saw the Reagan policies as an unfriendly development. These Nigerians argued that, while their nation was faithful in its oil relationship with the United States, the Reagan policies were opposed to their well being.¹

Since the Reagan policies did not view Nigeria as a spokesman for black Africa—quite apart from the blunders of Nigerian leadership at about the same period—Nigerian immigrants began to seek independent means of self-sufficient development. Most of them did whatever they had to do to survive. With neither the precise job experience after their studies nor the financial base to function independently in a capitalist society, this class of largely educated but handicapped and under utilized Nigerians began a slow but painful retreat into self re-discovery.²

¹Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 15, 28-9; and supported by fieldwork and interviews undertaken for this dissertation. Also see Chapter 3, U.S. Congressional Report on Africa (1982), pp. 50-1.

²Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 37-40, 100.

Probably the negative image crises that affect most Nigerian immigrants currently in America first began as a reflex action to the Reagan policies. On the other hand, however, some of the negative characteristics of the Reagan years corresponded with some of the deviant undertakings of a few Nigerian immigrants involved in criminal activities. For, there were several forms of official scams and ethical crises among the Reagan men in the 1980s that might have influenced the breakdown of the moral fabric of the nation. This was equally a period of increasing drug businesses, crimes, breakdown of the American families, rising trend of racial indifference, including the development among foreign-born peoples of a more identifiable form of negative tendencies in America.¹

Despite the preceding constraints, Nigerian immigrants held a strong awareness that they belonged to the great American mosaic. They faced the challenge of mastering their African-American context, the seedbed of their American germination. With this success, they re-adapted their indigenous skills to the American settings and developed newer survival skills to function within the mosaic. Even the distressful socio-cultural milieu of the Reagan era had the alternate effects of forcing them to refocus in order to survive independently and more effectively. This meant that the longer-term impact of the Reagan policies was rather more helpful to Nigerian immigrants as well as to the emergence of their infrastructures in urban America. Nigerians were compelled to re-invent themselves in light of the uncertainties that confronted them in a foreign land and back in the

¹See, for example, "Probing the Mess, Fresh Money Trails; The CIA Role; An Interview with Casey," in Time (December 22, 1986), pp. 14-20; Richard Ikiebe, "Reagan's 'Watergate Trial,'" Newswatch (Lagos, December 15, 1986), pp. 27-8.

homeland. Norman Martin captures the Houston background of this development in his explanation of the crises of Nigerian immigrants. He focuses on a whole range of issues affecting them as newcomers in terms of their national settings, size of immigrants, educational background, and the socioeconomic circumstances of their American crises.¹

Going by Martin's emphases, it cannot be denied that the 1970s was a period when an average Nigerian immigrant sought a degree for both economic and social status back in his/her native homeland. This was when they had more faith in university degrees.² From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the hope for educational reward back in the homeland among the largely students' waves of Nigerian sojourners began to wane.³

For Nigerian immigrants, the preceding development marked the end of an era and the beginning of another. During the 1970s, when the political ferment in Nigeria was less turbulent and the oil wealth was the magnet for American courtship, most American universities and colleges flooded the Nigerian regions with applications for students, who responded by coming to the "New World." This was a period when the relationships of most American universities with Federal Government of Nigeria were happy ones. This was as well when the huge financial gains resulting from the oil boom compelled some American institutions to open their doors to Nigerians—particularly the students. Indeed, during this period, the relationships between American colleges/universities and the Federal Government of

¹Norman Martin, "Nigerians Here Say Heroin Cases Wrongly Tarnish Image," Houston Chronicle (May 1992). Also, see earlier notes by Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-9.

²Ibid.

³Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 115-119.

Nigeria were a part of compromise linking Nigerian students to some well-known America institutions.¹

Emmett George reported that during the late 1970s, about 1,000 Nigerian students were supported in their studies by the Nigerian government while the U.S. AID program helped them to function in the country. Students from Nigeria were “taking mid-level technical and business courses at some 100 institutions in 35 states over the next two years. This means about \$17 million for the schools.”² Perhaps this background explains in part—why, during the decade of 1970-1980—some 16,000 of the Nigerian students were spread across Ohio State University (Franklin County), the University of Wisconsin (Dane County), Kansas State University (Riley County), Alabama A&M (Madison County), Texas Southern University (Houston, Texas), and Howard University (Washington, D.C.), Southeastern University, in Washington, D.C.³

By the late 1970s, the transference of economic and political hardships back in Nigeria, which we noted earlier, had begun to influence as well as to compound the prospect of sustained settlement of Nigerian immigrants in America. The most expedient angle of refocusing undertaken by Nigerians during this period was in their occupational choices and re-education for economic survival. By the 1980s, Nigerian immigrants—like other sub-Sahara African immigrants—had also begun to

¹Emmett George, “Africans Among Us,” Dawn Magazine, Vol. 6 No. 6 (July 1978), pp. 15-16.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Also, see: Allen and Turner, “People of African Origin,” in We The People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity, pp 150-1; “Nigerians Image,” Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-8, 76; “TSU - Nigerian Connection: Africans give Granville Sawyer Princely Responsibility,” The Houston Post (February 11, 1979).

show greater interest in United States citizenship. The policy of the Nigerian government, which at about a similar time made room for dual citizenship abroad, made it much easier for Nigerian immigrants to apply themselves equitably to the American setting.¹ Therefore, the fact that the Nigerian federal government did not accept dual citizenship for its citizens prior to the 1980s had some bearing on the low figures of Nigerians who had U.S. citizenship during the 1990s.²

Undoubtedly, then, the Reagan era represented a crucial transitional period in the contextual adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic. This development, as already observed, embraced the entire bloc of the black African immigrants. Significantly, in their striving for an American foothold, Nigerians rediscovered patterns of survival mechanisms typical of 19th century “Black America” when the ideology of Euro-American racism, at least in the view of Booker T. Washington, implied that the “Negroes” must develop technical and industrial skills for their economic and urban survival.³ Pressed by the demand for technical skills, some Nigerians went back to school to “retool” their bachelors, masters and doctorate degrees for associate degrees in such economically high-demand fields as electronics, auto mechanic, nursing and electrical works:

Some Nigerians used to prefer to continue their education into the graduate level, and sometimes all the way to doctorate while remaining unemployed or underemployed. However, that trend has been reversing itself. There are many who obtained graduate degrees but to their disappointment, have remained under utilized. Now, they

¹“Nigeria Adopts Dual Citizenship,” African Business Source Magazine (November, 1992), p. 28; F. Nwankwo, “U.S. Citizenship Can Empower Africans,” African Newsbreed (July, 1991), p. 34; C. Ihejireka, “The Exile Must Adapt,” Nigerian News Digest (June 17, 1991).

²For example, see data on Nigerian immigrants in Chapter 3; Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 101-102.

³*Ibid.*, Udofia, pp. 117-118; Research Report, p. 26.

attempted to obtain a simple diploma (Associate Degree) in a heavily paid profession, like nursing, electronics.¹

Igboanugo further laments that:

It is unfortunate for Nigerians to have spent four years or more getting the college degree(s) before realizing . . . the job market requires . . . a smart move.²

If job market strategies for Nigerians implied an adjustment through the community colleges for survival skills, most of their relationships to university education implied control over their occupational independence and status. So the re-education of some Nigerians identified by Igboanugo for economic survival had a broad contextual applicability between 1980s and 1990s. Most Nigerians during this period saw themselves and their education in two terms: first—for the short-term survival in America, they re-educated their skills in areas that would enable them to survive as a viable community while in the diaspora; second—for the longer-term survival, they strove toward the control of their destinies by re-developing their professional training in order to master the racial character of American civilization.

Today in America, Nigerians who focus on technical education are the beneficiaries of the opportunities of this land. . . . Those who remain in the areas of academics are doing fairly well. However, those with technical knowledge are even more enterprising The technicians like plumbers and auto mechanics are investing their skill in the challenge of America—the land of opportunity. Realizing that there is no free lunch in America, they have taken out time to evaluate the reality of living in America; what Nigerians ought to be doing.³

The particular case of a Nigerian—Chef Abu Abukokha Amed—of Philadelphia, is worthy of note. Chef Abu's background offers a more explicit

¹Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, p. 40.

²Ibid., pp. 75-76.

³Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, p. 33.

overview of the general course of the refocusing of Nigerian immigrants in the 1980s. As chef Abu himself observes:

Back in the 1980s, the first thing I noticed upon my arrival in the U.S. was the near total lack of African restaurants, despite the fact that America had a sizeable population of continental Africans.¹

So, after graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in business management, Abu, who was immediately absorbed by “Bloomingdale’s department store” as a sales person, began to explore “what venture was most promising in terms of financial security and satisfaction.” Assured that he could apply his background in business studies to a restaurant based exploit, he began his “lunch-truck business” on a “trial and error” basis. Abu started selling such American fast food as “hot dogs, cheese, hot sausages and things like that.”² Then, after mastering the market and determining his potential audience, he made a very personal but important decision:

I therefore decided to sell what other traders did not provide—African food; this was the only chance I saw open to me for economic survival. And so I started selling the so-called ethnic food.³

Kwame Okoampa-Ahoafe, Jr., the chronicler of “Chef Abu of Philadelphia,” indicated that, when Abu began to count his triumphs, he never forgot those who helped “to make me what I am today.” Abu reveals the kind of social adjustment undertaken by most Nigerians in the 1980s. As Abu finally observes,

You know, I never thought I was going to end up working in a food truck . . . my traditional African mentality taught me that a scholar

¹Kwame Okoampa Jr., “Chef Abu of Philadelphia,” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, October 11, 1991), p. 20.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

should always work at a white-collar job. This attitude prevented me, for a long time, from seeing myself the way I am today.¹

As suggested by the statement of “Chef Abu of Philadelphia, by the early 1980s Nigerians had completed the enormous task of re-adapting themselves along with their communal features into the American mosaic. This success was accompanied by efforts to organize themselves and their varying national images into the mosaic. Further, it was followed by efforts to extrapolate the inherent beauty of their cultural diversity into the mosaic. Unsurprisingly, along with their inherent entrepreneurial spirit, these Nigerians began to stamp their marks permanently on American society.

Table 16.1 shows the varying types of entertainment and cultural groups that began to cater to the general direction of Nigerian immigrants following their successful adjustment into the American mosaic. As shown, their organizational representations have political wings, which are the bases for rallying Nigerian immigrants collectively within and without. This is important for understanding how they are beginning to employ the influences of American institutions to agitate for some political changes back in the homeland.

By mid-1980s, therefore, Nigerians were already well ahead of the fact that the decisive questions in America’s civic and democratic future were those concerning whether it would be truly possible to incorporate ideas of multi-cultural inclusiveness on the basis of racial equality. By late-1980s, they had envisioned the context of their American interaction and their efforts in the realm of entertainment,

¹Ibid.

cultures and economics were beginning to rest on the certain but complicated foothold that Julia Teresa Quiroz discussed in Together in Our Differences.¹

Nigerians understood that changing and forging a social contract that was imaginative and inclusive within the American confluence required much assertiveness due to the racial crisis of American society. Also, they understood that the varying concept of America's multi-cultural inclusiveness—or even its exclusiveness—was not very difficult to fathom and to transform in their terms.

Table 16.1
Sample Profiles of Nigerian - U.S. Based
Entertainment and Cultural
Organizations, etc., 1990-2000

<p>African Network TV, LA Nigerian Club International, Seattle, WA Fredimo Cross Cultural Production, Philadelphia, PA The Nigerian Foundation, Houston, TX The Nigerian Club of Tampa, FL Nigerian Eagle Soccer Club, Inc., Washington, DC Organization of Nigerian Professionals, USA, Inc. Council of Nigerian People and Organization Organization of Nigerian Nationals The Nigerian American Nationals The Nigerian Association of the Research Triangle Area, Inc. The Nigerian Studies Association, Inc. Organization for the Nigerian Women in Health The Nigerian AIDS Foundation, Atlanta, GA People Club of Nigeria, USA Branch, Houston, TX People's Club of Nigeria, Houston, TX Nigerian Power Club, Washington, DC The Nigerian Democratic Alliance, Washington, DC Global African Independent Cable TV Network</p> <p>The Washington Soccer Club of Nigeria Cultural Club, Houston The Nigerian National Cultural Association The American-Nigerian Foundation for Child Health/C Patriotic Youth Movement of Nigeria Congress of Nigerians Abroad Congress of Patriotic Nigerians, NJ</p>	<p>Club 30 of Abuja Club 30 of Lagos The New Nigerian Forum Movement for Nigeria Unity Organization for African Self-Determination The Nigerian Political Forum African Cultural Dance, Atlanta Nigerian Chambers of Commerce, Atlanta Nigerian Information Service Center, NY Africa House, Atlanta Council of Nigerian People and Organization (CONPO) Association of Nigerians in America, Philadelphia Association of Nigerians Artists, New York, NY Congress of Nigerian Abroad, New York, NY Minnesota Institute for Nigerian Development, Minneapolis, MN Nigerian Community, Coalition of America Nigerians for Nigeria, Washington, DC Nigerian Ministers Council, Washington, DC Nigerian Watch, New York, NY Nigerian Women for Family Growth, Washington, MD Sacramento Association of Nigerians, Sacramento, CA The Nigerian Family, USA, Sicklerville, NJ The Nigerian Friendship Association, Baltimore, M Nigerian Physicians in the USA, Inc. Congress of Patriotic Nigerians, NJ</p>
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Source: Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Communal Indices, 1990-2000.

¹Teresa, Together in Our Differences, p. 1.

Even those Nigerians, who did not understand the American settings during the early decades of their American settlement, had found some ways of responding to their circumstances. But those who understood immediately saw their proximity to Black America as an important foothold to explore opportunities.¹ With the emerging economic implications of Afrocentric renaissance during the 1980s, these Nigerians were in a position to re-adapt themselves along with their enormous assets within the African-American context. They were among the first to discover that African-Americans were interested in African artifacts and Afrocentric wares and could become important liaisons in the effort to market the African identity. Between late 1980 and early 1990 the bulk of their cultural mechanisms were readily identifiable within the black base, both as a natural impulse of their ancestral relationship as well as an imperative of racial identity.

Definitely by mid-1990s there were grounds for optimism with regard to the success of Nigerians in adjusting into the American mosaic. This success was accompanied by their mastery of American free enterprise system. The extent then to which the ethics of the American institutions had collaborated with the inherent aggressiveness of Nigerian immigrants was crucial to their overall transformation.² This fact was supported by the visibility of many Nigerian-owned businesses and private property holders in America. Between mid-and late 1990s, such thickly populated cities like Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, New York, and Houston had strong evidences of the emergent strengths of Nigerians

¹Trotter Research Report, p. 30.

²Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, p. 51.

within the American capitalist system.¹ Within these highly populated industrial centers were unmistakable evidences of their professionals in computers, law, academics, automobile dealerships, medicine, and the real estate businesses.²

Often seen among Nigerian settlers in urban America are the identifiable displays of their hard won successes in such grandiose styles as the kinds of cars they drive, the neighborhoods they live in, the clothes they wear, and accentuations to their professional titles, and even up to the names of universities or colleges they attended. These cities are as well where extensive myths of the success stories of Nigerian immigrants are often displayed with a stare in their community repertoire by both admirers as well as the detractors of this most recent of the newest settlers.³

Part 2: Toward an American-world Unity of Ethnic Nigeria

The most identifiable feature of the Nigerian immigrant community which emerged between the 1970 and early 1980 in America was its Judeo-Christian base. This represents the strongest arm of an American world institution of Nigerians in the diaspora. A majority of the early and later waves of Nigerian settlers, who formed the core of the Judeo-Christian foundation, were mostly from Southern Nigeria.⁴ It all began during the early 1970s. However, from the mid-1970s, a few make-shift/in-room clusters of Nigerian Christian assemblage had emerged. Such metropolitan centers like Houston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Washington,

¹Trotter Research Report, p. 30.

²Author, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3, 45-6. This is further supported by my fieldwork.

³Ibid.

⁴This is based on supported the characteristics of Nigerian immigrants. For example, see Chapter, especial their "Regional Distribution."

D.C, and Atlanta, are the most likely enclaves to see the visibility of the Nigerian immigrant churches. However, it was not until the 1980s that the contextual evidences of the Nigerian immigrant churches in these cities became more obvious. By 1990s, therefore, an extensive Judeo-Christian assemblage of the Nigerian immigrants had emerged as their most visible and strongest institutions in major urban centers and all across America.¹ This development corresponded as well with the visibility of the Judeo-Christian emblem of African settlers.²

As Table 16.2 shows, the names of the Nigerian churches have strong Biblical associations within their Judeo-Christian fellowships. This may suggest the extent to which syncretism has taken place between Nigerian religious traditions and Judeo-Christian mores. Since Nigerians attach strong meanings to their names, it cannot be denied that the fusion of indigenous religious beliefs with Judeo-Christian ethos has either been transformed or Americanized within the mosaic.³

By the early 2000, there were more than one thousand branches of the Nigerian immigrant churches in America. What makes the churches the most identifiable as well as visible feature of an American institution of Nigerians, is perhaps best explained by how their pulpits often attempted to weld the varying tribal and ethnic fractures of their adherents into a diligent collective national voice. Thus, the Judeo-Christian assemblage of Nigerians reflects a more respectable bonding among Nigerians in the diaspora.

¹“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 138-140. 141-142; Research Report, pp. 22-4.

²Ibid. The socio-cultural orbit of the Nigerian Judeo-Christian wing is but a specific expression of the larger Judeo-Christian aspiration of African immigrants.

³Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 238.

As hinted earlier, however, some of these churches were being housed in the homes of the faithful; others assembled with their zealots in clusters of urban setting, and were susceptible to movements from place to place.¹ Despite such constraints, their territorial integrity has served the noble role of uniting the fragile inter-ethnic divergence of ethnic Nigeria in the diaspora.²

Table 16.2
Selected Samples of Major Branches of Nigerian Immigrant Churches in the United States, 1970-2000

The Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, Atlanta The Universal Cherubim and Seraphim Church, New York Riches of Christ Fellowship Church, California Universal Fellowship Church, Broadway, Los Angeles Praise Chapel Church, Los Angeles All Souls Miracle Church, LA Christ Apostolic, LA All Nations for Christ Church, San Jose Universal Holy Ghost Church, LA Celestial Church, Atlanta The Sanctified Mt. Zion Church of Nigeria, Atlanta Akwa-Ibom Church, Houston Chapel of Praise Church Chapel of Restoration Church	Christian Fellowship Center Amazing Grace Church First Square Gospel Church Celestial Church United Church of Christ Christ Apostolic Church Masters Vessels Church Believers Bible Church Jesus Women Prayer Band Living Faith Christian Ministries Word Alive Fellowship Word of Hope Bible Church Friendship Bible Church Later Reign Assembly Reunion Church Foundation of Peace Miracle Church
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Sources: Exploratory survey of Nigerian owned churches in the U.S. (1992-93) and (2) "Social Calendar," African News Weekly (Nigerian News Digest), 1992-1996; and Exploratory Survey of Nigerian/African Immigrants 1980-2000.

Generally, the socio-cultural features of the Nigerian immigrant churches in America offer one of the strongest mechanisms for sustained linkages with African-Americans. Beyond this fact, however, the socio-cultural context of its Judeo-Christian origin flows from nearly a similar historical and racial despair that

¹This explanation is based on my follow-up examination and exploratory survey of Nigerian churches in the U.S. between late 1990 and the early 2000.

²See details of this background in Chapter 6.

influenced the founding of first Black Church in America in 1794.¹ Due to this inherent problem of racial indifference within the Judeo-Christian emblem in America, the Nigerian immigrant churches have the noble functions of serving as centers of hope over the deep-seated socio-cultural crises confronting their adherents. Like the earlier experience of their ancestral kin, most Nigerian churches were established as the necessary responses to the desire to defend their humanity within the larger Judeo-Christian associations of American civilization.²

America's egalitarian paradox, which justified and still justifies the cultural sanctity of independent native-born black institutions after freedom,³ also offers some faithful basis for Nigerian immigrants to develop their independent institutions. The fact that the Judeo-Christian wing of Nigerians has the strongest wing of their American institution is then a basic recreation of the historical cycle of descendants of slaves.⁴ Nor was it very surprising that the first elected Nigerian in America, Rev. Emmanuel W. Onunwor, mayor of East Cleveland, Ohio, came out of the Christian ministry.⁵

Like the black churches in America, Nigerian churches are where their adherents derive substantial community influences on economic and cultural matters. However, unlike a majority of African-American churches, whose members have

¹Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 132-143; Gary Nash, Forging Freedom, pp. 125-129; Igboanugo, Nigerian Experience, pp. 15-16.

²Ibid. This background is also based on the field work undertaken in this dissertation, in which I examined the socio-cultural context of the African immigrant churches in America.

³Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 4-7; James McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York and Oxford, 1988), pp. 63, 126-9; Patrick Rael, The Black Identity & Black Protest in the Antebellum North (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 24, 50; Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 135-7.

⁴"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 139-147.

⁵Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 143-5.

active political interests in the larger civic cultures of the nation, a majority of the adherents of the Nigerian immigrant churches are as yet to fully incorporate politics into their evangelical mission. If this development is influenced by the late entry into the American Judeo-Christian establishments, it could then mean that they are still struggling to define their ideological confluence. The ideology of the Nigerian immigrant churches in the diaspora will very likely be determined by how they seek to adopt moral platforms to address the socio-cultural crisis that confront the faithful adherents. Meanwhile, however, that consideration is as yet to be clearly defined.

Thus, given the preceding consideration, by the 1990s it did not seem that Nigerian church ministries and their adherents were fully cognizant that the pulpit was a viable political vehicle of an American power.¹ A majority of the early decades of African settlers did not quite see the strong tide of racial indifference confronting them as an issue calling for a united political front via their churches. This absence of a united response has a lot to do with their overall contextual instability. While this attitude has been changing, the future thrust of this dynamic does seem to be a development that the American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants will very likely transform. Where Nigerians will later recognize the political implications of their Judeo-Christian emblem, their church ministries might become the avenues for molding more substantive influences in the diaspora. The medium of the Nigerian churches is capable of uniting the faithful within the rising tide of Judeo-Christian political ferment in post-modern America.²

¹Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp 166-7.

²Ibid. pp. 278-283.

If the Nigerian immigrant churches are the medium for some economic and cultural support, they are as yet to bend their enormous underlying powers into a populist movement aimed at addressing the socio-cultural concerns of their adherents. The Nigerian immigrant churches are well-known for their sermons on moral diligence while the faithful adherents confront racial slurs and work place discrimination almost on daily basis in society.¹

This slow response of the Nigerian immigrant churches to populist political activism evolved not out of any peculiar cultural weakness, but rather perhaps more directly from a carry-over of the crisis of colonial dispossession. Initially, in post-colonial Africa, Christian churchgoers were more likely to be seen distancing themselves from the relationship between religion and politics. To a certain degree, it was this highly conditioned ideological mindset that justified both their piety as well as interpretation of the holy script. Comparatively, however, the perspective of pre-colonial Africa on the relationship between religion and politics was closely linked. Mostly through the medium of divine fellowship, pre-colonial African leaders administered and welded enormous power over their varying peoples. Among pre-colonial African kingdoms and city-states, it would have been difficult to deny the organic unity between politics and religion: for the elders who represented their vast kingdoms were often viewed as divine leaders. The unity between religious and political piety was the essence of responsible administration of justice, taxation, and maintenance of social systems and institutions.²

¹Ibid.

²For example, see Davidson, The Search for Africa: History, Culture, and Politics, pp. 21-4.

With colonialism, however, and the resultant European missionary evangelical missions, most Nigerian Christian adherents were compelled to disavow the earlier unity between religion and political power. While colonialism provided Judeo-Christian traditions a moral function to advance the interest of its political and economic doctrine, the same principle served as a basis for the nullification of the ideological unity between religion and politics among a majority of Africans.¹ With a few modifications, the Judeo-Christian features of post-colonial Nigeria, particularly in Southern Nigeria—are deeply rooted in colonial dispossession. It is this background that influences the isolation of religion from politics just as it collaborates with the official attitudes of the Nigerian Christian ministries in the diaspora. On the other hand, however, the arduous history of the black experience is closely linked to this trend. That is, the more peculiar racial otherness of the Nigerian immigrant churches in America tends to suggest that their Judeo-Christian status might be more secure at distance from political arena.

The above may explain why the Judeo-Christian ministries of Nigerians in the diaspora are likely to be different both in terms of their orientation as well as in terms of some aspects of their adaptation of the cultures of the homeland. Unlike a majority of their African American kin, most Nigerian pastoral ministries are led by preachers whose call rarely began at the theological seminaries. Apart from those entering the Christian ministries through such well known denominations as the Catholic Church, Anglican Church, Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church, and

¹See, for example, Ayandele, The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, especially his Chapter entitled “Deluded Hybrids and Collaborators,” which mirrors the confusions, myth of Judeo-Christian claims, self-aggrandizement, and denials of their indigenous cultures among adherents of early Christian missions in Nigeria during the colonial era.

Lutheran Church, for example, most Nigerian pastoral ministries are based on spontaneous responses to the call by the Christian deity. This development tends to defy some of the more familiar norms of early pastoral preparations characteristic of African-Americans and Euro-Americans within the trademarks of Western Christendom. Often the predominant training that justifies the claims of some Nigerian preachers to the pulpit derives from association with practical Christianity, mysticism, and the corresponding results of the syncretism between indigenous and Christian religious values.¹

Perhaps the preceding explains why most Nigerian churches in the diaspora are likely to be led by highly educated ministers. Usually, these pastors had first been gainfully employed outside the Judeo-Christian setting. A majority of them were academicians, physicians, engineers, and accountants before being re-claimed to the Christian mission. The fact that this embraces highly trained Nigerians might suggest that the alternative to the Christian ministries occurred either voluntarily with a strong spiritual and religious leaning among a majority of the faithful, or even involuntarily due to the expedient search for an internal mechanism to overcome and transform their problems in the diaspora.²

Luckily, for most Nigerian immigrants, the enduring socio-cultural experiences acquired between late 1980s and early 1990s were the resources upon which some careful choices were later made regarding their American agenda. By itself, however, the general state of their powerlessness and skepticism about

¹This is summary of the data derived from fieldwork in the course of examining the profiles of Nigerian/African immigrant churches in the U.S. For elaboration, see the earlier sequences in Chapter 1 of this dissertation entitled, "Methodology: An Interpretation."

²Ibid.

America's racial indifference did not necessarily mean that they were not active participants within the mosaic. There are, of course, undeniable evidences of their participation in the making of America's politics, as well as of its entertainment businesses, scientific, intellectual, and cultural developments. While the racial agony of American civilization has been real, most Nigerians have re-adopted its powerful egalitarian principle to advance their diverse interests. Hence despite some constraints, there have been favorable rewards.¹

There are indeed Nigerians who have been elected into important political positions in America as mayors and city councilmen.² Quite possibly, given the electoral requirements of American politics, these newer phases of historic developments are taking place in regions where native-born blacks and Africans are densely concentrated.³ Possibly these are also regions where Blacks, Latinos, and Asians have developed more favorable intra-ethnic coalitions along with their liberal White allies.⁴

Thus, based on the evidences we have shown up to this point, there cannot be any doubt that the general socioeconomic and politico-cultural settings of Nigerians in the diaspora are being shaped by the generational and historical cycles of black America. Yet, the active application of their communal indices, are somewhat more

¹Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, especially pp. 137-167.

²Ibid., pp. 143-4.

³See, for example, Chapter 3 "Regional Distribution" of Nigerian/Africans.

⁴Ibid. Also, in some cases of electorate successes of Nigerians into mayoral and councilmanic political seats, it is quite conceivable that such would have occurred through active coalition networks involving African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans, Hispanics, Asians, and liberal Whites. For details of this development, see James Jennings, "Changing Urban Policy Paradigms: Impact of Black and Latino Coalition," in Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America: Status and Prospects for Politics and Activism, ed., James Jennings (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 3-15.

identifiable with the adoptive and re-adoptive values of mainstream America. This strongly suggests that Nigerian immigrants have accepted the criteria offered by mainstream America that good education is an effective pathway toward sustained and viable economic status.

By the early 1990s, Nigerian immigrants had acquired the material status which in some cases, was well above that of average Americans.¹ Those who had not done so well, fortunately, were still well off through a combination of several jobs, which might result in more money although more fatigue. Many Nigerians in the latter class were most successful as independent entrepreneurs. The bulk of them owned and controlled the Afrocentric world businesses, indigenous African cultural artifacts, African restaurants, and African grocery stores. By the mid-2000s, Nigerian immigrants owned and controlled the bulk of the media outlets and related informational sources catering to the varied needs of Africans in the U.S.²

If the version of free enterprise and individualism to which Nigerian immigrants have adapted is inherent in the American cultural psyche, it is also based on that of their homeland. That is, they have re-adopted their traditional ethics to the

¹For example, see "1991 30 most outstanding Africans in U.S.," African Business Source Magazine (December-January, 1992) pp. 16, 24, 32, 35. Also, in Apraku's study, the income status of African emigrants is impressive. Nigerians, as the largest base of sub-Saharan Africans both during the 1960s and 1990s, were also likely to have had the largest median income. By 2000, both the size and growth of Nigerian professionals in America corresponded with their median income base. See Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 1-17, 41-6; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 46, 154-171; Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 138-167; Cordell and y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas.

²Ibid. This fact was further confirmed through: (I) Exploratory survey of the Nigerian immigrants (II) an examination of the Nigerian community record, and (III) Community Media. On the basis of the general population of Nigerians, along with their socioeconomic indices as well as cultural networks, have a vast lead and control over the rest of the African blocks in the U.S. Moreover, they dominated as well as controlled the emerging African-U.S. infrastructures, as well as the bulk of their informational sources.

American circumstances and transformed them. As Mazrui writes, capitalism among Nigerians “is relatively assured” because of their “vigorous level of Individualism,” and because they have a “highly developed acquisitive culture.”¹ Further, in Nigeria, Mazrui continues, there is an “underlying attachment to liberal values, which embodies structural pluralism in the society, diversity of power centers ethnically, regionally, and in terms of religious differentiation.”²

There is a basis here for explaining the extent to which there are cultural similarities and differences between Nigerian immigrants and Americans. As found in this study, their similarities and dissimilarities were linked to issues of national identity, individualism, and ethnicity. On the American side, the Bellah et al. argues that a typical American individualist is often isolated into a personal world. This world, it is believed, is also often shaped by a deep sense of individualism.³

Dahl, however, goes much further in his Democracy and Its Critics in reconstructing some of the weaknesses of the Bella thesis, which was exclusive of multiculturalism—a fundamental feature of American republicanism. Dahl emphasizes a continuous upward development of the individualist for a more fulfilling services and benefits to both the personal selfhood as well as to the larger collective selfhood of the nation-state.⁴

Dahl’s strength, it seems, lies more in his grasp of the organic relationship between “just distribution of freedom and fair opportunities for self development,” as

¹Mazrui, Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection, p. 51.

²Ibid.

³Robert N. Bellah et al., Habit of Heart: Individualism an Commitment in American Life (New Your: Harper Row, 1985), pp. 3-26.

⁴Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 217-218, 280-2, 322, 332.

well as for the common good of all citizens within the democracy. Dahl stresses the importance of enlightened citizenship, control of agenda and racial inclusiveness as a basis for collective development of individuals' self-interests in a multi-racial democracy. To Dahl, moreover, the "common good" of all Americans within the democracy is plausible when citizens seek to develop strong sense of selfhood at the highest level as the basis of national service.¹ The Dahl position on racial inclusiveness is one the Bellah scholars tend to misunderstand.²

So, where then does Nigeria stand with regard to the American paradigm? First, the concept of selfhood along with its relationship to national identity among Nigerian immigrants contrasts sharply with that of Americans. Second, among Nigerians the notion of individualism within the nation-state is informed by greater isolation into one's tribal and ethno-regional setting. This background is perhaps due mostly to their inter-ethnic fracture during colonialism.³

Thus, in retrospect, the general difference between Nigerian and American definition of the idea of national identity lies more in their historical background. Due mostly to the centrifugal contradictions imposed by colonial dispossession, the Nigerian citizenry after independence exhibits one of the highest forms of what one late English historian termed "tribal clientilism" in the day-to-day orientation of their civic and institutional functions.⁴

¹Ibid.

²For example, see earlier notes on Bellah et al. (pp. 3-26), in which multi-culturalism or elements related to racial inclusiveness, received no substantive explanation. Only the Euro-American experience informed the Bellah thesis (Ibid.).

³Udofia, Research Report, pp. 32-5; Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability, pp. 30-40;

⁴Davidson, The Blackman's Burden, pp. 11-12.

The system of tribal or ethnic clientilism—whether in Nigeria or elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa—in turn reflects the pathological characteristics of the contemporary post-colonial or neocolonial nation-states, which resulted from decolonization.¹ Consequently, in the civic cultures of modern Nigeria, the concept of individualism is more likely to be shaped by family patronage, tribal, and ethno-regional loyalty and support. This suggests that attachment to the tribal and ethno-regional political cultures is stronger than what takes place within the larger nation-state. Comparatively, then, while an American individualist operates more on the level of selfhood and very often recognizes the essence of the national umbrella, the Nigerian operates within his tribal and ethno-regional point of national selfhood, and often tends to compromise the essence of the nation.²

But by and large, the ethic of hard work is an important similarity for both Americans and Nigerian immigrants. Americans and Nigerians have enormous adaptive and re-adaptive skills as hard working peoples. On the other hand, however, even the strong sense of tribal or ethnic consciousness of Nigerians does not mean that the idea of their national identity has been lost. Rather, it means that the impulses of their varied dialects, which have lacked focused leadership, are often in conflict with the direction of the Nigerian nation. This background of Nigerian

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. Regardless of some emphases by Bellah et al., Americans are generally very patriotic in spite of their self-serving individualism. On the Nigeria side, however, such articles, for example, by Bedford Umez, "My Case with a Typical Nigerian," The Good Hope News (Dallas Texas: Good Hope Enterprise, September, 1991), pp. 12, 14; Beford Umez, "State Creation in Nigeria is Bum Kum," The Good Hope News (Dallas Texas: Good Hope enterprise, February, 1992), pp. 12-14; and Jack E. White, "Shamed by Their Nation," Time (September, 1993), p. 36—appear to have directly confirmed the extent to which most Nigerians affirmed their tribal/ethnic aspirations over their national unity.

crisis will very likely become clearer in our explanation of the major leadership models of Nigerian immigrants in America.

Part 3: The Nigerian Immigrant Community Leadership: Context and Interpretation

The basis for understanding the leadership models of the Nigerian immigrant community in America began more than ten years ago. The initial effort was influenced in part by the evidences available to the author of this dissertation between mid-1980s and early 1990s.¹ Based on the fieldwork and available evidences, it was possible then to develop and explain the criteria for understanding the three models of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership under: The Ethnic Conscious-Type Leadership, Elected-Type Leadership, and the Attorney-Type or Representative-Type Professional Leadership.²

Those three models of Nigerian leadership were explained in the context of the carry-overs of the cultural traditions of the Nigerian homeland, as well as of the influences of American institutions. I argued then that the Ethnic Conscious-Type Leadership of Nigerians reflected the strong ethno-regional set-up of Nigerian immigrants. While the Elected Type Leadership was an elected body of Nigerian leadership—with a strong ethnic consciousness—the Attorney or Representative Professional-Type Leadership reflected the extent to which professional classification enjoined some Nigerians with leadership responsibilities while the diaspora.³

¹“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 16-20.

²Ibid.; pp. 125-137.

³Ibid.

What determined the direction of the professional leadership, in particular, was the extent to which the American institutions influenced both the roles and attitudes of its representation of Nigerians in the diaspora.¹ However, with the recurrent changes over the past ten years, the Representative Professional-Type Leadership (Attorney-Type Leadership) has been amended and appended to accommodate the emergent role of Nigerian Physicians-Type Leadership. Because the physician leadership is one of the most established bases of Nigerians in America,² a more extensive explanation as well as evaluation of its historiography and leadership role has to be noted in this dissertation.

There are of course varying forms of representative-type professional leaderships of Nigerian immigrants. Such professional categories as academics, industrial engineers, and accountants, for example, have several representative bodies serving the interests of Nigerians in the diaspora. However, on the basis of the research undertaken in the course of this dissertation, some of the professional wings noted here did not meet the criteria employed in evaluating the Nigerian immigrant community leadership. The extent therefore of their influences over their less established wings was not as strong.³

Generally speaking, even the more established bases of the representative professional-type leaderships of Nigerian immigrants were not as stable as might often seem. That they represented a measure of socioeconomic success within the

¹Ibid.

²Shoroye and Emeruwa, Directory of Nigerian Physicians, 1994; Sunmolu Beckley, et al., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in United States and Canada (1996), pp. 7-8, 142-3, 145-6, 152-169; Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special Millennium Edition, (2000), pp. xi-xx, 372-469.

³Udofia, Research Report, pp. 39-40.

American capitalist system was an unquestionable fact. But their status was often a source of social and cultural stress among the less fortunate community brethren. Then, the racial resentment operative within the Euro-American professional set-up reinforced their instability. The fact that this class of Nigerians is in the high median income bracket may not always guarantee strong influence over their less established brethren.¹

By the late 1990s, however, the preceding evidences led to the decision to re-examine the earlier models of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership. By the early 2000s, for example, the Nigerian-American Youth organizations had emerged as an important component of the Nigerian immigrant community, worth understanding and examining as well as appending to the earlier models.

Accordingly, in responding to these newer settings, it was possible to re-construct the leadership models of Nigerian immigrants as the unfolding of an organic process in which the roles of women and the Nigerian youth were increasingly becoming the dominant features of direction in the diaspora. The result was two additional models of leadership: (1) Women-Type Leadership, and (2) Nigerian-American Youth-Type Leadership. Despite some modification, there is

¹For example, emphases made here are based on the fieldwork and examination of the Nigerian-U.S.-based media, community records, and interviews, including some understanding of Apraku's African Émigrés, pp. 1-16. As shown earlier, since Nigerians comprised the bulk of Apraku's major respondents (pp. 13-14, 41-6), it is conceivable that, on the basis of their size, they also controlled the largest share of the median income tabulated on African skilled professional class (pp. 1-9). The notes on "1991 30 Most Outstanding Africans in U.S.," African Business Source (Dec./Jan., 1992); and Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 137-167, and Authur, pp. 154-171, were also used as bases for conceptualizing some portions of the conclusion reached in this section of the dissertation. Yet, as I observed in 1996 (Research Report, pp. 39-40), for Nigerians—as for the larger Black African skilled migrants in America—impressive economic status rarely resulted in their strong attachment and cohesion within the brethrens' communities.

basic persistent unity between the earlier and newer models.¹ Therefore, in retrospect, the extent to which Nigerian immigrants succeeded in adjusting into the American mosaic as newcomers was accelerated by how their varied leadership models had served them within a specific as well as the general context.

Definitely, between the mid-1980 and early 2000, five phases of leadership models were visible within the Nigerian immigrant community, and still continue to exist in their organizational features. They are: the Ethnic Conscious-type Leadership, the Elected-type Leadership, the Nigerian Women-type Leadership, Nigerian-American Youth-type Leadership, and the Representative or Professional-type Leadership.²

Ethnic Conscious-Type Leadership

The ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerians reflects a strong consciousness of ethnic affiliations. It is made of community brethren who are the senior members of the community. Usually charismatic, knowledgeable, and wise about the traditional values of their people, ethnic conscious leaders are not always democratically-elected in the familiar manner found among the larger ethno-regional

¹This author has borrowed extensively from his earlier research in reconstructing the current models of Nigerian leadership in America. See Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 125-131.

²Ibid., pp. 125-136; Research Report, pp. 22-38. For the leadership of Nigerian physicians, see: Yinka Shoroye and Acho Emeruwa, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States, 1994 (Riverside, California: The Nigerian Medical directory, 1994); Sunmolu Beckley, Acho Emeruwa, and Yinka Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in United States and Canada (Riverside, California: Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, 1996), pp. 7-8, 142-3, 145-6, 152-169; Who's Who of Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special Millennium Edition (Riverside, California: The Association of Nigerian Physicians in the America, 2000), pp. xi-xx, 372-469.

context of Nigerian immigrants. Within their much smaller enclaves, ethnic conscious leaders are more operative on the basis of ethnic solidarity. Leadership among Nigerians in this category is directly linked to a consciousness of the tribal clansmen, or related ethno-regional affiliations. Yet, in the final analysis, leadership in this class must at least reflect the interests of the clan members within the U.S. and sometimes back in the homeland, depending on the scope of established power. But where one looks at ethnic leadership from the standpoint of the broader consensual agreement reached and accepted between related and unrelated ethnic memberships, the form of traditional sets involved in the election or nomination of its representation, would be mostly democratic.¹

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the process of choosing ethnic-conscious leaders from a broader ethno-regional base is different from one involving a much smaller tribal/ethnic base. Within the much smaller ethnic bases, the consent of the community brethren is often in unison as well as in recognition of the mantle of “elder” clansmen leadership. This background in turn explains why the ethnic-conscious leaders from smaller bases are mostly to be the senior or elder members of the community. Within the crossroad of their American sojourn, the idea of democratic representation of Nigerians is as American as it is Nigerian in the socio-cultural and organizational context of their collective well being and development.²

¹For example, ethnic-conscious leadership whose demographic composition incorporates groups with tribal/ethno-regional variants, are most likely to be democratically elected. The example of Akwa-Ibom State Association, U.S.A, Inc. shows how a specific ethnic-conscious leadership—representing a vast ethno-regional zone with related but somewhat differing dialects and tribal visions—can also hold its adherents together under democratic principles.

²Ibid.

The most important feature of ethnic-conscious leadership within a small tribal enclave is that its nomination often takes place with the full “consent of the clansmen.”¹ The kind of democratic consultation which operates within this enclave is often one in which the clansmen and their elder leaders are mostly in agreement on matters concerning their collective well being within the U.S. or back in the Nigerian homeland. The extent to which leadership in this class is elected is often determined by how an ethnic base consults its existing structures.²

But, as we hinted earlier, in circumstances, where there are broader lanes of ethnic fusion with related native tongues, the traditional method of nominating ethnic-conscious leadership is almost similar in its orientation to the same pattern found in most modern institutions. Where such is the case, then, community brethren who are supporters of ethnic leadership often adopt a written constitution, with its articles of faith and by-laws, as the basis for electing leaders.³

To a certain extent, the ideological circumference of ethnic-conscious leadership of Nigerian immigrants is a consequence of sustained post-colonial balkanization along ethnic lanes during the bulk of the military era.⁴ Fortunately, in the U.S., this crisis offers the opportunity for reconstructing the ethnic-conscious

¹Ibid.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 127-8.

³This is based on an examination of Akwa-Ibom State Association Profiles in the U.S. 1990-2000. For example, in the “Minutes of the First National Council/Board of Directors Meeting Held at La-Guardia Airport Marriott Hotel, Queens, New York, November 1st, published in Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria (USA), Inc., National Secretariat (New York, 1997), pp. 3-4, are explanations which are supportive of this reference. Also, another article by Engineer Sonny D. Abia entitled, “A Case for constitutional Amendment,” in Mbuk Akwa-Ibom State: National News Letter of Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria, U.S.A., Inc. (New York: New York, Summer 1998), p. 9, calls on member-brethren to amend a standing constitution of an ethnic-conscious leadership embracing diverse but historically and politically related ethnic tongues.

⁴See, for example, Chapter 3, especially Figure 6.2 and Table 9.

leadership under democratically elected platforms, serving broader ethno-regional constituents. Nigerians from such regions as Oyo State, Kwara State, Akwa Ibom State, Abia State, Ogun State, Plateau state, Niger State, and Bauchi State, Anambara State Association, Ogun State Association, Cross River State, and the Bendel State, can only uphold their collective national interests in the diaspora through democratically elected body of ethnic leadership.¹

Admittedly, within the American setting, the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria has been able to exhibit one of the best evidences of democratic representation of diverse ethnic groups under an ethnic-conscious type leadership of Nigerian immigrants. The ethnic leadership wing of the Akwa-Ibom indigenes may be said to have evolved the most advanced features of democratic rotation of power of any ethnic leadership groups of Nigerians currently in the diaspora. Despite varying odds, this leadership body has managed to rotate its national seat among member states over the many decades of sojourn across the American landscapes.

To the Akwa-Ibom national leadership belongs the credit for instituting yearly democratic colloquium aimed at unifying and seeking new directions among its varied member-affiliates in mainland North America. This medium not only assembles member-affiliates of Akwa-Ibom Association, USA, Inc., side by side with the traditional features of their ethnic communities from all dialects of the region, but often serves as a bridge in facilitating collective deliberations on their cultural, educational, economic, and political well being. Through this forum Akwa-Ibomites in chosen urban centers of the U.S. have been able to reveal the extent to

¹Ibid.

which their inter-ethnic based democracy is inextricable linked to the influences of American institutions. For, although ironically, their organizational umbrella has all the major features of ethnic-conscious leadership, the functional and institutional mechanisms of Akwa-Ibomites in America are deeply rooted in democratic traditions. Their institutional transformation can be traced to the effort to both blend their diverse ethno-regional lanes in the diaspora as well as to the effects of American institutions.¹

Despite some occasional crises,² the annual colloquium of the Akwa-Ibomites testifies to the systemic evolution of democratic consciousness among their varied ethnic clusters in urban America. Besides, providing the basis for gauging how American cultures are impacting on the values of a specific ethnic base of Nigerian immigrants, its colloquium reveals the larger development of the Akwa-Ibomites, their internal struggles for power, their corresponding crises in the diaspora, and their larger relationships while in the diaspora with the Nigerian nation.

The preceding then means that the larger the ethnic base of an ethnic-conscious leadership of Nigerian immigrants, the greater the imperative for democratically established framework. The example of Akwa-Ibom State

¹“Akwa Ibom State Extravaganza-National Presidency Goes to California,” Nigerian News Digest (September 6, 1991) p. 14. In 1993, their national seat was at Oregon; in 1994 it was at Philadelphia—having already been in Houston, Atlanta, and Washington, DC, for example. Also see “Mbuk Akwa Ibom,” Newsletter of Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria U.S.A., Inc. (Philadelphia, Fall 1993), pp. 1-6.

²*Ibid.* There have been some worrisome attitudes of power conflict and ethnic rivalries within the leadership and the membership of the Akwa-Ibom, U.S. A., Inc. However, these squabbles rarely affected effective the transfers of power from one state to another, nor the understanding to organize in the general interest of its adherents in the diaspora, etc.

Association, USA,¹ shows that it is not unusual for ethnic-based leaders to embody the real gem of democratic leadership. This is especially the case, when the institutional functionaries of ethnic leadership have to combine both the aspirations of the smaller as well as of the larger ethnic branches into their administrative functions. Also, other related functionaries include striving to protect the national status of its ethnic affiliates in the diaspora, supporting missions of developing the homeland, and representing the Akwa-Ibomites among the varied branches of Nigerian immigrants.²

But whether democratically elected, or chosen in accordance with existing traditional norms, ethnic-conscious leaders are very effective within their specific group as well as the larger ethno-regional sectors. If there is no rightful ethnic figure within the much smaller base to rally his clansmen together, or a qualified choice is not readily available, the role can be assumed through consultations with clan folks.³

It would be very risky to assume the role of ethnic leadership without the consent of the clansmen. Group solidarity among Nigerians is much stronger at their much smaller and broader ethno-regional levels than in the much wider context of their national relationships. Examples of smaller ethnic-conscious leaders are those headed by such associations of Nigerian immigrants as the Ikwauno/Umuahia

¹Cited from "National Convention Update August 7-9, 1998," and its Editorial entitled "Honoring Statesmanship," in Mbuk Akwa-Ibom State: National News Letter of Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria, U.S.A., Inc. (New York: New York, Summer 1998), pp. 1-2; "Dr. Augustine B. Usoro, National Executive President, Akwa-Ibom State Assoc. of Nigeria (USA) Inc. [and the] 13th Annual National Convention and Cultural Extravaganza," in Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria (Houston, Texas, August 2000).

²Research Report, p. 34.

³Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 126-7.

Association of Dallas, Mbaise Family Association, Ubiom Social Group, and the Oron Development Union, Oduduwa Club.¹

So, unsurprisingly, within the larger ethno-regional context—particularly where the varied interests of the related ethnic groups converge—both the much limited and broader lanes of an ethnic-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants often assemble through democratic processes in examining relevant issues. Thus, efforts to direct ethnic clansmen on the larger issues of traditional values, regional well-being, and the larger national well being are the very imperatives which make the ethnic-based leaders circumspect to a composite democratic assemblage, markedly dissimilar from the much limited community-clansmen-type. It seems to be this strong ethnical cleavage along petty “Multi-Statal” lines, as Kwame Ahoofa, Jr., argues,² which justifies both the balkanization as well as the elective contest of ethnic-based leadership of Nigerian immigrants in urban America.

Seen against the aforementioned context, ethnic-conscious leadership often has the task of fashioning its roles in as a democratic a manner as will include all the inter-related groups within a region(s). Whether through the much smaller nomination forums by ethnic clansmen, or larger ethno-regional elective representation, ethnic conscious-type leadership has proven effective in directing its affiliates within both the specific clansmen’s enclaves as well as wider geographical lanes.³

¹Ibid. Also, see explanation in the “Regional Distribution” of Nigerians in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, especially Table 15; and Table 16.1, Chapter 4.

²Kwame Ahoofa, Jr., Nigerian News Digest, Vol. 2, No. 45 (Charlotte, North Carolina, December 20, 1991), pp. 20 and 22

³Udofia, Research Report, p. 34.

The official duties of the ethnic conscious leaders include being able to direct their tribal or larger ethno-regional folks on the requirements of their tradition while in a foreign land. As pivotal traditional links to the needs of their ethnic community, these leaders serve as immediate rallying centers and support transfers in times of crisis. Among Nigerians in this class are those who are highly educated and who are in good standing within their clansmen communities; some of whom are addressed by the official title of “chief.”¹ Depending on the traditional set-up of a given community, ethnic-based leadership often reflects the brunt of a carry-over of tradition from the homeland. Among leaders in this class are those who would have been made “chiefs” even if they were not in the U.S. Leaving their native communities for further studies in America does not abrogate being recalled home to assume traditional responsibilities. If they are in the U.S., their presence becomes an asset to those who recognize and rely on them. Some Nigerians in this class have had to step down from academia to take their rightful titles as traditional rulers back home.²

At this point, however, an explanation may suffice as to why the ethnic-conscious leadership is a powerful mechanism of Nigerian immigrants. First, as indicated in the preceding pages, Nigerians are strongly aligned along their ethno-regional lanes. This means that their approximation to one another, that is—as to language, cultures and traditional customs, compounds a much-needed sense of trust

¹See, for example, The Good Hope News The African Perspective (Dallas Texas: Good Hope Publishers, July, 1991), p. 1; and “Events and Banquet,” African Business Source (Houston Texas, 1990), p. 21.

²“Nigerian Professor Turned King,” Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina, January 31, 1991), pp 1-14.

not readily evident in their spurious national center. Second, by itself, the essence of ethnic-conscious leadership reflects the real brunt of the historical crisis of sub-nationalism back in Nigeria and among American-based Nigerians. The consciousness of the ethnic kinfolds as well as the hegemonization of regional power at the center is the major carrier of the ethnic-conscious leadership. Because ethnic leadership has a strong attachment to a consciousness of the clansmen, tribe or ethnicity, in the final analysis, its role must, at least, reflect the consent of the clan members within the U.S. and sometimes back in the homeland—depending on the scope of established national power.¹ One sees also from this complex setting that without any concise line of national community, the soul of the country is bound to become exhausted through the gruesome journey from specific ethnic enclaves to the larger ethnic regions and to the national center.²

Fortunately, some of the specificities of how the ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is nominated have the merit of defeating the inherent ambiguities of the “tyranny of the majority.”³ Alexis de Tocqueville, the discerning French social scientist, found more than a hundred and sixty years ago that the often irreconcilable “tyranny” of the dominant majority were identifiable features of crisis in American democracy. According to Tocqueville, the power of ultimate common good among Americans rested on the attitude of the majority, and out of their foibles the democratic process was most likely to be constrained.⁴

¹The ethnic-conscious leaders are more often seen operating on the basis of their tribal and ethnic solidarity in the U.S.

²Research Report, p. 33.

³Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 263.

⁴*Ibid.*; pp. 264-86, 271.

Nonetheless, how the Tocquevillean thesis might explain itself within an ethnic conscious-type setting of Nigerian immigrants can be far more dangerous for its adherents. First, ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants operates within a divisive national setting. Second, not every Nigerian understands that the problem of ethno-regionalism has a subtle effect on how they perceive matters of national governance. The function of inter-ethnic loyalties within the larger national well being continues to serve as the basis of crisis among Nigerians in America and back in the homeland. Third, while the wisdom of ethnic-conscious leaders is commendable, their enclaves are where Nigerians become entrenched in a worrisome pattern of national behavior. Their ethnic enclaves are where they are likely to be drawn into national bickering, which in turn affect their collective unity.¹

Elected-Type Leadership

In contrast to the ethnic-type leadership, the elected-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is operationally an elected body of Nigerian immigrants with some Nigerian national outlook at the core. Unlike the ethnic-conscious leadership, elected-type leadership—just as its name suggests—is more likely to rely on a working constitution in articulating the aspirations of its members. Like the ethnic-conscious leadership, however, the very fact of cultural and regional diversity of Nigerians creates a composite climate for inter-group and intra-group conflict and coalition for the alternately aspiring democratic tenet of leadership. Examples of the elected-type leadership are heads of the Nigerian organizations such as: the Nigerian

¹Research Report, p. 33.

Foundation, Association of Nigerian Professionals, the organization of Nigerian Professionals, etc.¹

At the very least, however, the elected-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is more definitive. This is particularly the case in terms of the duration of time required for service. The National President of a given chapter is expected to serve for two years or so before contesting for re-election.²

Sometimes, moreover, the presidential seats of the national chapters are in rotation, depending on the democratic machinery. Governing officers who are not trustworthy in the eyes of their electorates either voluntarily resign at the end of their tenure, or are expected to face rigorous re-election contests by presumably more trustworthy class of freshmen brethren. As often is the case during these changes, particularly where the leadership machineries of the national chapters are not well structured, the peripheral or marginalized ethnic groups/units often respond by breaking apart to form independent associations. This might very well explain why there are varying ramifications of national chapters claiming to serve the interests of Nigerian immigrants. This is also the central dilemma confronting Nigerian organizations with elected-type leadership in the U.S. Despite this problem some elected bodies of Nigerians have records of effective democratic leadership based on smooth rotation of power.³

¹Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 128. Significantly, because of the absence of precise lanes of national unity among Nigerians, Elected Type Leadership of Nigerians also exudes with vivid ethnic consciousness in its broader basis of collective leadership. Also, see Tables 9 and 15.

²Ibid.

³Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 129; and Research Report, p. 35.

The elected-type leadership of Nigerians might be said to operate in two contexts. First, its regional affiliates have a body of elected representation, who uphold the varying regional duties of its memberships. Second, the ultimate accountability of the powers of functional authorities is embedded in the national headquarters, and with an elected President. Depending on how the center is structured, the national chapters oversee the other regional bodies and keep records of events. Aside from the complex coordination of activities under the elected-type leadership, both the local and—indeed, all its regional affiliates and auxiliaries—are to actively support the national chapters.

Within the U.S., elected-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants is a most likely class with an institutional umbrella that strives to oversee as well as to serve the functional role of spokesman of Nigerians. This is also the class of leadership charged with the responsibility of catering to the varied interests of Nigerian immigrants locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally. Almost similar to the “attorney or representative-type leadership,” elected-type leadership is a most likely body of Nigerian immigrants re-directing the concerns of Nigerians to the Nigerian Consulates and American Government, and reporting back to the masses via the Nigerian community forums and media. In this way, the elected-type leadership embodies the diverse interests of the electorates it represents, etc¹.

Qualification for state and national levels of elected-type leadership requires an ability to connect with the wider spectrum of differing ethnic structures, especially those of the peripheral minorities. The elected-type leadership blends

¹Ibid., p. 130; Research Report, p. 36.

with a deep consciousness of class; sometimes this consciousness is a source of conflict for those who are not well connected.¹ This does not mean, however, that an elected type-leadership cannot involve ordinary branches of Nigerian immigrants. The emphasis is that success requires a substantial degree of organizational activism and grassroots mobilization of community brethren during elections.² Ultimately, stronger inter-ethnic solidarity among Nigerians at their immediate and larger ethno-regional settings and conflict at their intra-ethno-regional and national levels, are important for understanding their patterns of continuing national crisis in America.³

Women-Type Leadership

By mid-1980s, such cities as Atlanta, Houston, New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., for example, were the major enclaves where a much smaller representation of the Nigerian women organizations once under the male-based leadership, particularly during the 1970s, were being transformed. This development marked as well the beginning of more identifiable forms of women-type leadership within the Nigerian immigrant community. First begun as forums for shared collaboration among married and unmarried female spouses, it became a forum to

¹In examining the attitude of Nigerian immigrants in their community media, class conflict—if not ethnic/tribal differences—were often the likely sources of misunderstanding. See Richard O. Nwachukwu, “The JD Question?” The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (November, 1990), p. 13; Lai Adelagun, “Crisis Rocks the Nigerian Foundation . . . Aftermath of Akeem Roast and Toast,” African Business Source Magazine (March, 1991), PP. 26-7.

²Ibid. My attendances at the Nigerian meetings and examination of their election machineries are supportive of this view. For instance, during these attendances, I often noticed that, in a situation in which a Nigerian from the common folks was elected head of his state or national body, he must have had traits of vast talents and related successes to warrant acceptance by those from the dominant ethnic bases. Or elsewhere, he would have been able to mobilize sufficient support, especially among related or unrelated ethnic minorities to upset the buffer of the autonomous ethnies during election campaigns.

³Ibid.

weld and reconcile their differences and interests. Later, however, with increased palaver within the community, the women role began to take the form of weekly and monthly gatherings, ultimately becoming the basis for sustained deliberation.

The result was the emergence of organized forums with concerns over issues that affected Nigerian women within a specific as well as a broader context. Thus was born a distinct independent organization of Nigerian women leadership. This birth—in every sense—released the Nigerian women in the diaspora from the domination of the male-based leadership. Besides, it set them onto a course of liberation that was somewhat oppositional to their male counterparts. This also marked the beginning of a strong deviation from the experiences of the much earlier decades of their American sojourn. For example, the 1960s and 1970s were decades of much loyalty between the Nigerian female and their male spouses in America.¹

Author, who examines the general background of the black African women migrants,² also supports the strong socio-cultural context of the Nigerian women-type leadership. Nevertheless, Author does not explain any clearly why the socio-

¹For example, the emphases by Ndubuike, *The Struggles, Challenges, and Triumphs*, pp. 79-80, 93-4, are equally suggestive of the conflict resulting in the founding of independent women associations. However, this trend was more typical of the 1980s and 1990s than during the 1960s and 1970s. Author's *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 110-113, also mirrors this same background within the general context of the black African women migrants. While his emphases are supportive of the context of the Nigerian women-type leadership discussed thus far, my concern is that some of the emphases should have been more clearly linked. We need to understand why the socio-cultural features of the black African female migrants seem to be more effective than those of their male counterparts. We should also be made to appreciate why the socio-cultural bonding between the black African female migrants and black American women was stronger than that of their men (Author, pp. 120-121). These are important issues worth clearer explanation than Author's exposition allows (*Ibid.*). However, in the particular reference to the "Nigerian Women leadership," it is my understanding that the differences in their transformation are due more to the changes from one historical era to the other. I shall return again to this point in Chapter 5.

²*Ibid.*, Author.

cultural features of the black African women migrants seem more effective than those of their male counterparts. Nor, moreover, does he explain the underlying socio-cultural context that lures the black African female migrants toward sustained partnerships with their black American women counterparts than their male.¹

Unlike their male counterparts, the ideological basis of the women-type leadership cannot be said to be clearly democratic. This is the case because its orientation rarely reflects the vigorous inter-ethnic democratic contest operative within the male leadership cycle.² Similar to ethnic-type leadership, the women-type leadership is a carried over of the homeland traditions. For example, the women leadership is in a position to initiate for women entering child-bearing ages and adulthood the expectation of proactive roles in their familial, as well as the larger communal issues.

Like the ethnic-type leadership, moreover, the women-type leadership of Nigerians—whether elected or nominated—is often based on a generally agreed community norms capable of bonding its adherents together. This means that election/nomination process is more likely to be based on what a majority of women mutually agree to represent their collective interest. In their written constitutions, moderation of function toward contested election protocols informs the ideological basis of women leadership. The modalities governing how the varied women offices are assigned can therefore adapt to democratic or undemocratic settings, depending

¹Ibid.

²For example, what we saw under the Ethnic Conscious-Type and Elected-Type Leadership of Nigerian immigrants can be described as largely a contest involving their male-based leaderships. The infusion of female leadership within the male-based leadership branches of Nigerians does not necessarily mean that there is a strong-bonding and agreeable ideology of collective direction between them.

on how the internal structures of the pre-existing leadership envisions the realization of its objectives/goals. Thus, of all the varying types of the Nigerian leadership models in America, the women-type leadership is more goal-oriented and hence far less inclined toward such a complex contest as often occurs in the leadership functionalities of their male counterparts.¹

By downplaying the class status that affects male leadership, the women-type leadership is more able to triumph over some impediments in getting some things done. This background may very well explain—why, unlike the male dominated ethnic-leadership—the women-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants reflects a vibrant spirit of an intense and internally explicit collaboration. For, among its membership, ethnic differences are not strong basis for collective unison in achieving some sets of organizationally sanctioned objectives.

Indeed, the women leadership is quite versatile and capable of achieving sets of collective objectives among its varied adherents without necessarily overstretching hotly complex socio-cultural issues. This has allowed for internal cohesion than differences.²

Not only are the functions of the women-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants multifaceted, in fact, they often yield remarkable results compared to those of the male counterparts. Just as back in Nigeria, so in America married or unmarried women or those previously married, have convened in the interest of both their immediate families as well as the larger community to play multiple roles.

¹The reference is based on examination of Nigerian/African women leadership profiles as well as on interviews in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta between 1992 and 2005.

²This is based on my interview with Ufot of 49 F.M. Radio Free Georgia, July 2005.

The daily routines of the Nigerian women-type leaders involve them as workers in more than two jobs. In most instances, they are also house wives, child bearers, and nurturers within their families; in other cases, even head of the family households.¹ Thus, in coming together to build their identity in America, adherents of the Nigerian women leadership seek to foster a safe-haven for child rearing issues, marital ceremonies and sessions with marital problems, rites of passage for the Nigerian-American youth, naming ceremonies, and collective support for its varying memberships as well as the larger community.²

The strongest feature of the women-type leadership is its influences on, as well as, continuing assistance in the evolution of the Nigerian-American youth leadership. This is likely to be its strongest legacy in America: in examining the Nigerian youth profiles in America, the influences of the women leadership—as mothers—were found to be very strong. This is not to deny the role of males parents—but to admit of stronger influences where found.³ This success is more remarkable in that, in the process of seeking to cater to its mission, especially to the welfare of their offspring, its varying memberships have become transformed.

Besides, the role of the women leadership is strongest on issues of programmatic development, which involves married and unmarried women who are socially and economically handicapped. Also, its role involves funding scholarship programs for financially handicapped persons back in the Nigerian homeland. Too,

¹This is in reference to the multiple roles played by the Nigerian/African women. More Nigerian women are working and are redefining their roles within the American cultures (Athur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 117-124).

²Ibid.

³Ibid. For example, in the “A’Ibom State Youth Assoc. Progress Report,” in *Mbuk Akwa-Ibom* (1998), p. 10, the influences of the women leadership are much stronger.

its voices are increasingly being heard on other important areas of ventures of human development in America and the homeland.¹

The general socio-cultural crises of black males in America have corresponding effects on the status of African-male dominated leadership in America. Probably the enormous crises of this experience have further exacerbated the rift between the Nigerian women leadership and its male counterparts in America. One such rift is that the pressing demand of daily life in the diaspora has transformed the traditional feature of the Nigerian women leadership beyond the level compatible with harmonious relationship under its male-led leadership. What constitutes the Nigerian women-type leadership is the deflection of sustained conflict of male chauvinism. If it is partly the result of American cultural influence, this is not exceedingly different from its much earlier features back in the homeland.²

For all of the preceding reasons, the women-type leadership contrasts sharply with its male counterparts, both in its principles of democratic leadership as well as in its approach toward functional priorities. Its adherents are more likely to be heard saying, “we don’t want long talk, we know what we’re going to do and we’re going to do it . . . and this is how we’re going to go about it.”³ But this emphasis does not mean that sincerity toward achieving honest objectives within the community is the same as adopting reasoned processes and approaches, as well as tested principles. While this approach enables the women leaders to overcome the intense class

¹“Because of You... We Made a Difference,” Nigerian Women Association of Georgia (NWAG): Beacon 100 Campaign 2004 (Atlanta, Georgia 30324, 2004).

²Mfon Ufot, “Leadership in the African Immigrant Community: Conflict and Coalition,” Trotter Review, p. 36.

³Interview with Ms Mfon Ufot of 49 F.M Radio Free Georgia, July 2005.

struggle and bickering characteristic of their male counterparts, it is rarely the medium for solid resolution of the complex questions of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic difference confronting most Nigerian institutions in the diaspora.¹

Ufot, who essayed the functions and conflict in the African leadership structures, argues that African women were more effective as leaders than their men. “Since African women sometimes marry outside of their native tribes, they do not have such strong and unyielding loyalty to those tribes or ethnic groups as most men do.”² According to Ufot, moreover, because some women are married outside their tribes and the wider ethno-regional lanes, they tended “to be more open-minded in discussing issues that affect the entire African immigrant community and not solely their individual tribes.”³

So, as Ufot suggests, it is clear that the Nigerian women leadership contrasts sharply with its male counterpart, largely due to incessant cases of ethnic squabbles. Sometimes, for months or even years, the male-based forums were locales for aimless debates and inactions in seeking to achieve common goals. Unlike its male counterparts, therefore, the women leadership is informed mostly through the gathering of opinions and implementations of agreements based on compromise rather than complex debates. This, again, confirms that the women-type leadership is more likely to avoid such issues as ethnic tensions and class pandering than the male-type leadership of Nigerians.

¹Ibid. My interview with Ms. Ufot did not result in a clear insight as to how the particular crises of ethnic differences of Nigerians in America could be resolved by the women-type leadership. However, it did suggest that the women forums had some better grasp.

²Mfon Ufot, “Leadership in the African Immigrant Community: Conflict and Coalition,” in Trotter Review, p. 36.

³Ibid.

Thus, the women leadership of Nigerian immigrants has achieved some measure of positive results commensurate with their vision and style. But, as we hinted earlier, it does seem that it is the socio-cultural imperatives of American civilization that have placed them in a more effective leadership status over their men. In such major cities as Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, and New York, Nigerian women leaders are reportedly more effective than their male counterparts in re-adapting themselves to the varied needs of their young and unstable communities.

The Nigerian-American Youth-Type Leadership

Between the late-1980s and early 1990s, the ideological basis of the Nigerian-American youth-type leadership had already begun to identify itself within the Nigerian immigrant community.¹ Again, this development was especially stronger in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, New York, and Houston. Unlike the other branches of the Nigerian immigrant leadership, the Nigerian-American youth-type leadership—comprises mostly the offspring of Nigerians, who are either American-born or Nigerian-born. This means that most of its adherents were either born in America or in Nigeria. It also means that their grasp on the cultures of the Nigerian homeland is pretty weak even for those born in Nigeria. This is particularly evident where their parents had exposed them to a greater degree of Western influences than those of the Nigerian background.²

¹This based on an exploratory interview with Mfon Ufot, August 28, 1999; and July 3, 2005.

²Ibid.; also, see, for example, Ndubuike, The Struggle, Challenges, and Triumphs, p. 81; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 237-241.

There is no doubt that the youth-type leadership of Nigerians represents the most distinctive model of the Nigerian immigrant community leadership in the diaspora. This is because its consciousness of the Nigerian-African heritage is markedly dissimilar from that of their core migrant-parents. Given the growing deterioration of life in the Nigerian homeland, the connection between adherents of the Nigerian youth leadership and the homeland is more favorable to America. Also, in some instances their cultural connection is likely to be less orientated toward their parents. Despite this fact, however, this wing of the Nigerian immigrant leadership has the strongest bridge between America and Africa, and represents as well the strongest arm of ancestral relationship with the descendants of slaves.¹

By agreeing to come together to re-orient their American experiences to those of the traditions of the Nigerian homeland, adherents of the Nigerian youth leadership are better able to adapt themselves and their “skills to negotiate the treacherous waters of the two cultures.”² Thus, the youth-type leadership of Nigerians was created as a response to the conflicting socio-cultural milieu of Nigerians in a foreign land. As such, it was an attempt to secure a more stable cultural foothold for the descendants of voluntary post-colonial African settlers in America. Behind this objective was also the aim of helping the Nigerian offspring in the diaspora to blend their inter-generational experiences along with their varying cultural backgrounds.

The foundation of the youth-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants owes a greater part of its origin to the support of the women-type leadership. The emphasis

¹Trotter Review, p. 33.

²Ibid.; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 36.

on “women leadership” in no part denies the role of its male counterpart in the evolution of the youth leadership. The emphasis, however, takes into consideration that, in a greater part of their maturity from puberty to adolescents, the women as mothers, have had more direct contacts with the activities of the Nigerian youth in the diaspora.

Indeed, the role of women who are mothers and child-bearers follows a similar pattern as the inspirers of the youth movements in America. Together, with the support of their males, the women leaders have been able to transform the youth leadership into an arm of the Nigerian homeland development.¹

The age group required for the youth leadership varies from seven to thirty-five. However, each age group adopts itself and its mission to reflect the required variant in experience as well as membership. For example, those in the much younger ages are made aware of who they are and where their parents came from; moreover, they are made to learn about the traditions of the Nigerian homeland among their social peers.²

This form of internally generated attempt to sustain the consciousness of the Nigerian youth about the homeland among the faithful adherents of the youth-type leadership seems to have been helpful to the survival of Nigerian cultural values in the diaspora. Adherents of the youth-type leadership not only act as the gatekeepers,

¹For example, some portion of Authur’s *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 110-115, has been adopted to explain the Nigerian settings albeit in modified form in areas supported by my fieldwork. For instance, as already indicated, despite the important influences of the black African women migrants—especially as mothers in shaping the direction of their offspring in the diaspora—their success cannot be separated in some instances from the efforts of their male counterparts.

²Interview with Ufot.

but are also expected to re-orient themselves in accordance with the cultural values of their parents and those of the African homelands.¹ At another layer of the youth-type leadership is the age group striving to re-adapt itself to African songs, music, dances, and proverbs. Others are involved in passing Africa's socio-cultural features among themselves for shared keeping and memorization about the homelands. On the other hand, however, others are being made to learn about important personages in Nigerian cultures and history.²

Through the medium of the youth leadership, Nigerian cultural revivals have been assembled, recreated, and re-enacted and displayed for American audience. Such places as Emory University, in Atlanta, King's Center, Atlanta, Houston, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, have been homes to the varied forms of cultural entertainments exhibited by the Nigerian youth.³

Nigerian youth leaders whose adherents fall under the more concise age lines of 25-35 years are among those currently in a position to voluntarily re-channel their professional resources back to the Nigerian homeland. They are also among those willing to re-position themselves as well as their professional training toward the course of assisting human development back in the Nigerian homeland. This group includes professionals who are concerned about the increased deterioration of the image of their homeland as depicted by the American media, who are striving to leave their legacy as helpers back in the homelands.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.; also, see Ndubuike, The Struggles, Challenges, and Triumphs, p. 58; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 238.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Representative Professional-Type Leadership: Attorney-Type Leadership

As earlier stated, attorney-type representative-professional leadership of Nigerian immigrants is not a democratically elected body. The idea is based more on the professional representation as well as the functionaries of American institutional mechanisms. These features in turn fit directly into the domain of a particular training and a particular practice, which enable Nigerian attorneys to function as representative class of leaders in the diaspora.

Thus, the attorney representative-type professional leadership of Nigerian immigrants might be said to be both independent of elected branches of Nigerian leadership as well as closely linked. While this wing of leadership is made of legal professionals, yet, its functionaries are truly representative where it chooses to serve in the interests of the brethren's communities. The legal wing of the Nigerian leadership provides a clearer parameter for understanding the brand of professionals who have substantial contextual leverage on Nigerian immigrants. While they may not always be democratically elected, however, as attorneys and as representatives of their brethren, their role as spokesmen is inevitable. But since most are active members in other branches of Nigerian organizations with elected status, their official status as professional representatives of their brethren is recognizable. What therefore determines direction in the representative leadership of Nigerian attorneys is their credibility within the Nigerian immigrant communities.

There are some fundamental reasons for the pre-eminence of attorney-type professional leadership in the Nigerian immigrant communities in America. The

characteristics of American institutional mechanisms strongly suggest that Nigerian immigrants are more likely to be influenced by the legal wing of their native trained professionals. The American racism that confronts Nigerians, along with their image crisis,¹ often provides the battle lines for the Nigerian attorneys. Even before most of them were able to pass the rigorous board examination, their involvement with their brethren's communities provided the necessary practical orientation and experience for the profession.

Becoming certified and practicing professionals meant that Nigerian attorneys were in a position to take up the fullest load of defending their young communities from the negative image crises that often confronted them. They are often the liaisons with Nigerian consulates in Washington, D.C., or in Atlanta on how to explore an end to the crisis facing Nigerians in America. They are those who speak more clearly to the American media about the socio-cultural experiences of their brethren because they understand the American legal and the judiciary process.²

By actively supporting their brethren-communities in court cases, these Nigerian attorneys reap the reward in their socioeconomic status and hence are better able to compete as well as to sustain their interests on a professional level.³ If Nigerian immigrants are to be effective participants in the American mosaic, and are

¹"Prejudice at Comerica Bank," The Good Hope News; African Perspective (Dallas-Texas, July, 1991), p.6. Also, see earlier notes on Nigerian image crises in this chapter.

²"Nigerian Ambassador to Try to Ease Tensions in Visit Here," Houston Chronicle (Houston, Texas, March 17, 1989), p. 19a; Onukegen Nwachukwu, "Preying on the Weak: KXAS TV Zeroes in on Nigerians," The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas-Texas, Nov./Dec., 1991), pp. 1-11; Norman Martin's, "Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992); "African Bar-Association Formed," African News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, March 3, 1993), p. 1.

³Research Report, p. 37.

to develop the kinds of institutional mechanisms that other foreign-born ethnic groups have developed, they need strong legal expertise and representation. Indeed, Nigerian attorneys are foremost in the effort to carve out investment structures to enhance economic growth and intra-cultural networking through such notable organizations as the Nigerian Foundation and the Nigerian-African chambers of Commerce.¹

Although the income status of Nigerian attorneys is not very easy to gauge, some have won cases in the millions. Related evidences suggest that others have done quite well.² There is reason to expect limited financial security among Nigerian legal practitioners than among Whites, Asians, and African-Americans. Certainly the color line crisis of the American world is one factor. Besides this, the duration of professional stability in a stratified society, accounts for their disadvantage as a foreign-born group. Though some Nigerian attorneys have American clients, the market is polarized by an ambivalent cultural split, and by competition.³ This development, in turn, expresses itself in the contextual alienation of the Nigerian attorneys, resulting in the attachment to their brethren's communities for economic survival.

Unlike their American counterparts, some Nigerian attorneys are addressed by the title of a "Doctor:" this is in accordance to the official insignia of "Doctor of Jurisprudence" degree awarded them. Between the Nigerian "Juris doctors" and

¹Chido Nwangwu, "Chamber of Commerce: Strategy for the 1990s," African Business Source Magazine (Houston-Texas, April, 1991), pp. 30-1, 35.

²"Dr. Oji speaks at the African Chamber of Commerce," The Good Hope News: African Perspective (Dallas-Texas, August, 1991), p. 4; "Walter Oji: Connecting Law and Business," African Business Source Magazine (Houston-Texas, April, 1991), p. 34.

³See, for example, my earlier notes on Nigerian attorneys.

academic doctorates, there is a tilt of socio-cultural consciousness on the basis of class differences.¹ This development may not be surprising to anyone who understands the class cultures of Nigerians. Since most Nigerian attorneys had doctorate degrees—even before undertaking legal study²—they see nothing wrong for being called anything less than their academic worth. However, the irony is that, Nigerians who subscribe to the more prestigious but less title-conscious name of “attorney,” are reportedly more able to woo their brethren as clients: that is, they can connect at a level more acceptable to the professionally less-established community brethren.³

The Nigerian Physician-Type Leadership in America: A Historical Review

Given the nature of its mission, the physician-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants embodies some form of elected representation of leaders into key functionaries both in the diaspora and back in the homeland. Nevertheless, the extent to which this form of representation is adopted into organizational functionaries is rarely seriously contested, compared to the scale found either in the elected-type leadership or the elected wing of an ethnic conscious-type leadership of Nigerian immigrants.⁴ As one of the most economically established representative-

¹Ibid., including “The J.D. Question?” The Good Hope News, (November, 1990).

²This based on examination of the Nigerian professional establishments who wrote or advertised on the Nigerian community media.

³An interview with a Nigerian attorney in Houston, Texas (April 1993), led me to the conclusion that their attorneys (like the gentleman interviewed), who were less title-conscious, were also more able to connect successfully with their brethren as clients than those who sought to emphasize their status as “Dr.” But it must be noted here that even “this attorney” did not see anything wrong among his colleagues who chose to address themselves under the title of “Dr.” According to him, “That is what the degree is.”

⁴See earlier notes on models of Nigerian immigrant leadership.

professional-type leaderships of Nigerian immigrants, our inquiry into the founding of the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas (ANPA) has to begin with efforts to situate and explain its historical background as well as its current context in the U.S. This is important because, as we saw in our previous background, its official status in America came to the fore between 1990s and 2000. Besides, a majority of them comprised of medical scientists educated mostly at indigenous Nigerian/African universities.¹ Together, this calls for some knowledge of the history of medical education in Nigeria before and after the 1960s. Further, it requires some understanding of the national context of healthcare services and medical education back in Nigeria.

For, although the British influences began in the region later to be named modern Nigeria as early as the 1830s—reaching a formal colonial state in 1861, it was not until the early decades of the twentieth century that a clear evidence of Western-educated Nigerians became visible among its subjects. And it was not until after the Second World War that the colonial mandate began to shift from a well-known policy of discouraging the education of its subjects to some form of encouragement.² Very few Nigerians, as was also the case for the whole of tropical Africa, particularly during the pre-colonial and colonial eras—entered America for general education, not to mention medical studies.³ This is another evidence of the constrained pattern of contacts between sub-Saharan Africans and America and the

¹See Chapter 3, especially the statistical Tables on Nigerian physicians in the U.S.

²Norman R. Bennett, Africa and Europe: From Roman Times to National Independence, Second Edition (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 141-2; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 113-115; Sunmolu A. Beckley, et al., Nigerian Doctors in United States and Canada 2000: Special Millennium Edition, pp. xii.

³Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 143-5.

related Western European world after the Atlantic slave trade. This development corresponded with how most Africans were classified both during and after slavery under the varying colonial fragments of Europe rather than by their ordered isolation from the rest of the modern world.¹ This same background perhaps best explains why the bulk of Nigerians entering America for medical training between the first and second world wars concentrated at Howard and Meharry Medical schools.²

For, until the establishment of medical schools for the training of physicians in Nigeria through the University College Hospital (UCH)—just before formal independence—the access to medical education was fairly thin. Prior to the 1950s, the system of health care delivery in Nigeria was under the control of the British Army.³

Between the 1900s and 1950s, the bulk of the indigenous Nigerian doctors were trained abroad, and mostly in the United Kingdom, Scotland, France, followed by the U.S.⁴ This exposure to modern medicine in Nigeria during the colonial era was marked by strong ethno-regional disparities among Nigerians. For example, when there were only 12 physicians in Nigeria in the early 1920s, 8 of them were Yoruba and 4 were native foreigners; moreover, when there were 160 Nigerian physicians in the 1950s, some 76 were Yoruba, 49 Ibo, one Hausa-Fulani, and 34

¹Ibid., pp. 146-8; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-10; Hawk, “Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law,” pp. 159-4, 260-9; Immanuel Geiss, Pan-African Movement, pp. 169-170.

²Ibid.

³Sunmolu A. Beckley, et al., Nigerian Doctors in the United States & Canada: Special Millennium Edition, pp. xii-xiii.

⁴Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp.143, 149-155.

were categorized as “others.”¹ According to Table 17.1, until the mid-1950 Nigeria, had no representation in the study of medicine at Howard and Meharry, the two most established black American-owned medical schools. For the entire black Africa, the training of medical personnel during the pre-colonial era [1868-1900], was more favorable to Liberians, Sierra-Leoneans, and South Africans.²

Given the diverse ethnographic distribution of Nigerians across West Africa, it is probable that some medical students entering America, for example, via Liberia and Sierra-Leone were from the Nigerian background. These were regions where Nigerians were most likely to be found, especially among those freed from slavery en-route to the New World by the British Naval Squadron.³ On the other hand, Howard began to have clearer records on Nigerian medical students from the mid-1950s onward, while Meharry had none.⁴

Not surprisingly, more Nigerians entering the U.S. during the colonial era and early decades after the demise of colonialism [1900-1978], received their medical training from Howard and Meharry. Between 1955 and 1958, Howard alone graduated about seven Nigerian physicians. Again between 1961 and 1978, which represented the post-independent era, another 14 Nigerian physicians graduated from Howard compared to 8 from Meharry.⁵

¹Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, p. 142; Sowell, Preferential Policies, p.71. Also, see the general spheres of educational disparity between Southern and Northern Nigerians in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

²Ibid.; Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 143-5, 145-8.

³Davidson, The Curse of the Nation State, pp. 23-30; Ayandele, The Educated Elite, pp. 10-14.

⁴Patton, Jr., Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 149-151.

⁵Ibid., Patton, Jr., pp. 149-155

Table 17.1

Nigerian Graduates of Howard University and Meharry
Medical Schools, by Pre-colonial, by Colonial and Postcolonial Eras, 1870s-1970s*

	Howard Medical School		Meharry Medical School	
	Year	Number	Year	Number
Pre-colonial Era	1872-1900	-----	1860-1900	-----
Colonial Era	1900-1960:	2	1900-1960	-----
	1955	1		
	1956	4		
	1958			
Post-colonial	1960-1975		1960-1978:	
	1961	1	1961	2
	1969	1	---	-
	1970	1	---	-
	1971	2	1971	2
	1973	3		
	1974	4		
	1975	3		
	1976	-		
	1977	-	1977	2
	1978	-	1978	2
Overall Total: 29		Total: 21		Total: 8

Source: Adell Patton, Jr., "Howard University and Meharry Medical Schools in the Training of African Physicians 1868-1978," in Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora, pp. 149-155. *The population of African medical graduates trained at Howard and Meharry during the period indicated above is not shown here except for the specific region of modern Nigeria. However, in order to understand the general trend it seems useful to begin from the above period.

The preceding background also suggests when the visibility of indigenous medical personnel really began in Nigeria. As we have hinted earlier, this began following the establishment of Nigerian medical schools in the 1960s. With the establishment of the first Local Teaching Hospital (LUTH) in the late 1950s, followed closely with birth of the Nigerian nation in 1960, more Nigerians began to receive medical training in their local medical colleges/universities.¹ Others still traveled as far as Russia and Asia for medical education, while a majority went to

¹Ibid., pp. 143-151; ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.; Patton, Jr.

Europe and the Americas.¹ Following the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil war, thanks to the early positive effects of the oil boom, efforts to train physicians in the local universities also increased. These efforts resulted in increases in the numbers trained indigenous physicians between the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, during the 1960s and 1970s, the prospects of medical education enjoyed an exceptional growth within both the local Nigerian universities as well as in the number of those graduating to become practicing physicians.²

By the 1970s, Nigeria—with 33 percent in its ranking status—had one of the highest per capital incomes in the world. This development corresponded with increased awareness of the quality of Nigeria's education as Africa's center of academic excellence in journals and in the opinion of experts around the world. During the period, Nigeria's medical education—similar to other forms of professional education—compared favorably with recognizable world class standards.³ According to one opinion, this was when the “University of Ibadan School of Medicine was listed among the top ten Medical Schools in the World, producing many great scientists and world-class clinicians.”⁴ This was also when Nigerian physicians had a certain degree of stability and support within the nation in their profession.

By the early 1980s, when political instability along with the general ineptitude among the ruling national elites began to set in, the organization of the Nigerian healthcare system entered into an era of serious deterioration. This was

¹Ibid.; Patton, Jr., pp. 149-155.

²ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.

³Ibid.

⁴ANPA (1996), p. 143.

also when the image of Nigeria as the giant of Africa began to wane, along with the status of its “highly educated people.” Reflecting on the era when most Africans saw Nigeria as the beacon light of the continent, “the South African icon Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1995,” reminded his readers in an interview by Africa Today how people like him felt about the current crisis of Nigeria, which once occupied an admirable status in the education of Africans.

I became aware of this when I was studying at King’s College, London in the sixties. I had Nigerian friends, fellow students, who were working for their Ph.Ds in subjects like electrical engineering. They were quite extraordinarily impressive. A good number of South Africans went to study medicine at the University of Ibadan, which became the best medical school in Africa. When I asked the dean how they had achieved this, he explained how they had appointed whites to all the important positions in the school and sent Nigerians to Britain and other places; encouraged them to get all the qualifications they could; to come back to Nigeria and understudy the white people. This they did, and these highly qualified people, who had fellowships from places like the Royal College of Physicians or Surgeons, soon took over.¹

By the mid-1980s, most Nigerians became “agonized on the shattered hopes and dreams, and the squandered opportunities.” Hunted by the dreams that were so destroyed, these “brains and talents” began to disperse around the world, where some of them became practically of “no use to their own country.”² This rather painful development can be traced to the ill-informed military fiscal policies of the early and mid-1970s, as well as to the ensuing depression of the era. Collectively, this development had the chief effects of exacerbating the socioeconomic despair of Nigerians. This then was the ultimate result of the gross mismanagement of the enormous resources of the oil boom, which resulted from the aftermath of the

¹“Nigeria at 40: time for the new generation,” Africa Today (U.K., October 2000), p. 5.

²Ibid.

Nigerian Civil War. These cycles of national hardships had worked hand and hand with the general state of economic crises in Nigeria: unemployment, socio-cultural crises, and political instability.¹

As ANPA documents in its editorial in 2000, the above period was also when much of the expanded program of immunization programs and medical supplies in Nigeria began to be provided by the World Health Organization (WHO). This was as well when the renowned achievements of Nigeria's medical professionals in Africa and the world over became a ghost of its former self.²

Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria ranked among the 13 poorest nations in the world.³ Similarly, between 1984 and 1994, the Federal Government of Nigeria spent from 1.1 percent to 2.8 percent of its overall budget on the healthcare system—below the minimum of 5 percent recommended by WHO. The result was increased in the healthcare problem of diarrhea, malaria, malnutrition, and pneumonia.⁴

Again, during the above period, the number of AIDS cases rose in Nigeria. For example, between 1986 and 1995 the AIDS cases rose in greater numbers in Nigeria compared to the early 1990s. The population of the victims of the virus in 1997 was greater in such states as Bornu, Plateau, and the Cross River.⁵ With enormous healthcare hardships in a country as populous as Nigeria, there were 12,806 hospitals by the 1990s: 182 Federal Government owned; 2,228, State

¹Wright, *Nigeria: Struggle for Stability*, pp. 73-81.

²ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xiii.

³Ibid., pp. xvi, 1-341; *Research Report*, p. 47.

⁴Ibid., ANPA, pp. 348, 351-2.

⁵Ibid., pp. 354-5; Victor Umuabor, "AIDS Through Obazees' Lens: Could AIDS be as Simple as Dr. Obazee sees it?" *African Concord* (Ikeja-Lagos, September, 1987), p. 8.

Governments owned; 9,840 Primary Health Care Centers owned; 553 Missions owned; one Orthopedic; and three Trauma centers.¹

The preceding of course mirrors some of the internal crisis leading to the exodus of Nigerian physicians to the U.S. Thus, ironically, at the time a majority of Nigerian physicians were fleeing to America in greater numbers during the mid-1980s and 1990s, the AIDS virus, “wild-type polio,” and the general healthcare system in black Africa was the most handicapped in the world. ANPA argues that, at about the same time, the healthcare problem in “Nigeria and parts of West Africa,” along with the additional epidemic of “wild-type polio,” combined to make the region the worst hit area in the world.²

Given this background, it was not surprising that in 1993, the United Nations Human Development Report estimated more than 21,000 practicing Nigerian physicians were in the United States.³ For, as we saw in Chapter 3, there were some likely demographic nuances in the estimation of the population of Nigerian physicians. This made more sense where an officially certified data of Nigerian physicians by ANPA, for example, was perhaps a more reliable basis for estimating the number of their population in the U.S.

Also, chances were even that the number of trained Nigerian physicians from Nigeria/Africa, or elsewhere, could be much higher than indicated by the United Nations Report if it included those not necessarily certified as practitioners but

¹ANPA (2000), p. 345.

²Ibid., p. xvii; Oluwambo Balagun, “One Step Aright: Enter a new health care system at the village level,” African Concord (Ikeja-Lagos, September 1987), p. 10.

³Sako, “Brain Drain and Africa’s Development: A Reflection,” p. 26; Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 236.

actually working within or outside the medical profession in the U.S.¹ There is a basis then for an educated guess, and that is: there is a strong probability that the number of Nigerian physicians entering the U.S. from Nigeria and other parts of the world—either certified, or uncertified—far exceeded 21,000 between mid-1980s and mid-2000s. This would mean that some of these physicians, especially those trained at indigenous Nigerian/African universities, for example, were not necessarily being employed as practicing physicians in the U.S, and hence were not registered in the ANPA directories.²

The United Nations Human Development Report can then be accurate on a more generic basis. This might mean that the number of Nigerians in the U.S. both certified and uncertified, who were trained or still under training as physicians, could very well have grown beyond 27,000 by 2000.

And physicians trained at indigenous Nigerian/African medical schools comprised the bulk of the brain drain of skilled scientists currently practicing in America. By 1994, about 60 percent of them—representing a majority—were trained at indigenous African medical schools: about 34 percent trained in the Americas, with the U.S having the largest share, followed by Europe and Russia.³ By 1996, when about some 3079 certified Nigerian physicians were examined in the

¹This position is based on exploratory survey and examination of Nigerian Medical Directories from 1990s to the mid-2000s. Also see earlier notes in Chapter 4, along with Yinka Shoroye and Ancho Emereruwa, (1994), pp. 1-103; Sunmolu Beckley, Acho Emeruwa, Yinka Shoroye, ANPA, 1996, pp. 12-140.; and ANPA (2000), pp. 1-320; Research report, p. 47.

²Ibid., Research Report. This development was supported by the result of the exploratory survey undertaken in the course of my research from the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.

³Ibid., especially Research Report, p. 13.

U.S., a majority of them were trained in Nigeria.¹ Between the 1980s and 1990s, the ratio of Nigerian physicians trained in the Western Hemisphere was greater in the U.S.² By 2000, when the population of certified Nigerian physicians published in the ANPA and African Business Directories and exploratory surveys were computed, the number rose to about four thousand. Their demographic composition still showed that a majority were educated in Nigeria/Africa, followed by the U.S. and other countries in the Americas.³

Nigerian physicians trained at indigenous Nigerian medical colleges were mostly from the more established Nigerian medical schools. Some of them were certified as far back as late as the late-1940s; others as early as the 1950s, followed by the 1970s and 1980s—with bulk of them emigrating to the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, their American-build up includes physicians trained when the first colonial medical infrastructures were established as well as before the first Local University Teaching Hospital (LUTH) was established back in Nigeria in the late 1950s. Besides, it includes the core physicians trained at the newest medical schools in Nigeria.⁴

¹This reference is based on examination of ANPA Directory, Nigerian-African Business Directories, etc., including Exploratory Survey of Nigerian Professional establishments in the U.S. See, for example, Tables 12.1-12.2; Figures 8.1-8.2.

²Yinka Shoroye and Ancho Emereruwa, Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States 1994, pp. 1-103; Beckley, Emeruwa, Shoroye, ANPA, 1996, pp. 12-140; ANPA (2000), pp. 1-320.

³Ibid., ANPA (2000), pp. 1-341; Saravic Directory of African Business in America & American Companies that do Business in Africa (Newark, NJ, 1999-2000); African Yellow Pages/Business Directory in the United States, 1999-2005; and Exploratory Survey of Nigerian-African Community Profiles in the United States, 2000-2005.

⁴ANPA (2000), p. xvi. Also, see Figures 8.1-8.2 and Tables 12.1-12.2, and 17.2

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L I B R A R Y

BETWEEN THE BLACK DIASPORA OF ENSLAVEMENT AND
THE NIGERIAN DIASPORA SINCE THE DEMISE OF
COLONIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
TWO HISTORIC MIGRATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation Presented

by

NSIKAN-ABASI PAUL E. UDOFIA

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The Nigerian Physician-Type Leadership: Rationale and Objectives

According to one view, the founding of ANPA in America can be traced to the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was when some physicians gathered in a quorum to discuss the medical intricacies confronting them in the U.S. and back in the Nigerian homeland. Other indications, however, point to the fact that some of the ideological strands of ANPA can be traced further back to the mid-1970s and early 1980s.¹

Thus, within the U.S. context, the Nigerian physician-type leadership first had its beginning as a collaborative forum for exchanging ideas among a few certified physicians. This early and much limited beginning among member physicians changed in the early 1990s when other occurrences emerged, which united their varying aspirations in the diaspora (Table 17.2). This development, as already indicated, was influenced and indeed later transformed by the deteriorating state of the healthcare system back in the Nigerian homeland.²

By mid-1990s, however, the official establishment of the Nigerian physician leadership as a forum for collective deliberation in the Americas owed its origin to two-related developments. The first of this was the historic publication in 1994 of the Nigerian medical establishment in the first premier Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States; the second was the first inaugural convention of the

¹This is based on exploratory survey of Nigerians as well as interviews undertaken in the course of my fieldwork in this study. Possibly some Nigerian physicians in America had some prior consultations on collaborative development both within the American and Nigerian context before 1994. The likelihood then is that the vision which became transformed in from 1995 to 2000 onwards could perhaps be traced to a much earlier period. See ANPA Directory 1994 and 1996.

²For example, see earlier notes on the poor state of the Nigerian healthcare system.

Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas and Canada on August 11, 1995, at Disneyland Anaheim, California.¹ Together, these two related events united and indeed defined the ideological vision of the Nigerian physician-type leadership.

Table 17.2
Nigerian Physicians in the U.S. Trained at Indigenous
Nigerian Medical Schools, by Decade,
by Names of Medical Schools, by Number, 1950s-1990s

Universities	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Univ. of Ibadan	2	39	215	427	24
Univ. of Lagos	--	12	87	293	19
Univ. of Calabar	--	--	--	14	2
A.B.University	--	--	12	29	2
Univ. of Ife	--	--	12	95	12
Univ. of Ilorin	--	--	--	62	6
Univ. Maiduguri	--	--	--	12	--
Univ. of Jos	--	--	--	75	4
Univ. Nsukka	--	--	46	234	17
Univ. Benin	--	--	17	110	14
Ogun State Univ	--	--	--	5	4
Univ. Sokoto	--	--	--	6	--
Univ. Portharcourt	--	--	--	5	--
Total	2	51	389	1,367	104

Source: Sunmolu Beckley, Acho Emeruwa, and Yinka Shoroye, eds., Directory of Nigerian Physicians in the United States, 1996 (Riverside, California: ANPA, 1996), pp. 9-141.

Table 17.2 also shows a representative sample of the ANPA network which resulted from the historic background of 1994. As a matter of fact, “The Directory which was initially started by the two founding Editors now becomes a corporate property of ANPA.”² This marked a first step in the pioneering effort of the ANPA adherents to tackle and correct the healthcare lag back in the Nigerian homeland.³

From the preceding backgrounds emerged the vision of the ANPA mission of

¹Shoroye and Emeruwa, ANPA (1994), pp. 1-103; Beckley, ANPA (2000), p. 391.

²Ibid., Shoroye and Emeruwa; ANPA (1996), pp. 7, 148; ANPA (2000), p. 391.

³Ibid.

redemption to the homelands. This formed the core of the physician-type leadership of Nigerians in the diaspora. Unlike the attorney-type representative leadership of Nigerian immigrants, which is more effective within the American mosaic, the physician-type leadership is both operative within the mosaic as well as in relation to its medical missions to the homeland. This development does not mean that the physician-type leadership is not very active within its brethrens' communities in America. For, there are evidences that Nigerian physicians have been assisting handicapped members of the Nigerian communities in such cities as Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York. Despite this effort, however, their strengths and effectiveness are home-bound via medical missions.¹ Both socio-cultural and scientific factors of the Nigerian homeland and America may adequately explain the similarities and dissimilarities of the attorney-type and physician-type representative-professional leaderships of Nigerian immigrants in the diaspora.

There is one crucial feature of ANPA leadership that is markedly dissimilar from all the leadership models of Nigerian immigrants: it is perhaps the one association of Nigerian professionals in America where tribal and ethnic differences may be said to be at their lowest point. This socio-cultural feature is also shared by both the women and Nigerian youth-type leaderships in the diaspora. This is because they are less tribally and ethnically fragile and hence more cohesive in their representative role within the brethren communities. However, ANPA owes much of its leadership unison to the ethical orientation of its profession rather than to any particular features of Nigerians.

¹This is based on a summary of ANPA profiles along with interviews.

ANPA therefore represents one of the strongest arms of Nigerians' professional leadership in America. Unlike other leadership mechanisms of Nigerian immigrants, the physician-type leadership has its strongest emphasis toward the development of the homeland. Its leadership role is made more realizable by the fact that a majority of Nigerian physicians are in a strategic position to negotiate with the mega giant companies in the U.S. in advancing the course of human development back in Nigeria and across sub-Saharan Africa. This homebound thrust, as we noted earlier, is influenced by the professional orientation of Nigerian medical establishment in the diaspora, as well as by the corresponding deterioration of the healthcare system in back in Nigeria.

First, ANPA and its adherents—unlike other professional wings of Nigerians in the diaspora—are cognizant that they have the acquired scientific and technological acumen that can help to redeem the medical lag back in the homeland.¹ Second, similar to the nursing profession, the ANPA membership comprises of professionals who are in an economically high demand fields in American society. This background is supported by the general degree of favorable socioeconomic stability among its varied memberships, compared to its counterparts in non-medical professions. Together, therefore, this stability is supportive of their influence as agents and medium of regeneration of the homeland. And, again, because the ANPA adherents are an economically more established base, they are in a more solid position to project the emerging new image of the Nigeria or Africa in their public outreach. Even if a majority of them are not paid as respectably as their

¹ANPA (2000), pp. xvi-xvii.

counterparts, their overall income status and services are still better. With this asset, moreover, comes an assuring public and national representation.

The emergence of ANPA marked one of the most established bases of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the U.S. During ANPA's "first Inaugural Convention at Anaheim, in California, in 1995," Dr. Iheanacho Emeruwa observed that, the organization's main purpose "is to begin to address collectively the problems of our homeland and the issues that we all confront as Nigerian physicians living abroad."¹

Dr. Emeruwa further observed that the founding mission of ANPA in America was designed to ameliorate the deteriorating healthcare services and facilities back in Nigeria. This deterioration, as he argued, included poor healthcare system in the country's hospital, poor medical school facilities, poor medical training, absences of necessary drugs and the lack of medical equipments.²

Dr. Yinka Shoroye, almost similar to Dr. Emeruwa, later took the position that the Nigerian physicians should "try to reflect in a humble beginning possible ways to improve the healthcare of our nation from the diaspora." Shoroye argued that medical missions from the diaspora to the Nigerian homeland should have behind them "a moral cause of building a transatlantic bridge between North America and the Bight of Benin and beyond."³ Additionally, Shoroye observed that the official mission of ANPA should strive to develop within the North American continent an organized collective effort "to give back to the homeland and more

¹ANPA, (2000), p. 391.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; ANPA (1996), p. 7.

specifically, assist the healthcare delivery of Nigeria by building a transatlantic bridge” between the America and Africa.¹

The ANPA objectives also included providing the required infrastructures for a functioning medical and industrial regeneration of Nigeria, and the whole of Africa; the reversal of the anticipated WHO’s projection of Nigeria or Africa’s healthcare problem in the twenty-first century in such areas as the AIDS virus and the related healthcare services.² The overall objectives of ANPA leadership toward Nigeria/Africa can be summarized as embracing the effort to address, correct, and put back to place an effective healthcare system catering to the needs of all from top to bottom. The ANPA objectives desires as well to correct the poor healthcare management policies, workplace indiscipline, shortage of competent staff; absence of reliable health statistics; assistance in reversing the low public morale and neglect of research on health education; and restoring the crumbling physical facilities which affected both the patients, and providing support for improved and better healthcare services in the decades ahead.³

Conceptually, however, the Nigerian physician-type leadership envisions from the diaspora, a Nigeria where government and the governed, as well as the varying healthcare systems, would benefit all and sundry. ANPA, accordingly, seems convinced that it can work within the nation and its institutions to move human development to a new phase of collective development.⁴ To be sure, the ANPA leadership as well as its membership along with admirers, shares in the belief

¹Ibid.,(1996), p. 8.

²ANPA (2000), p. 432.

³Ibid., pp. xvii-xix, pp. 455-465; ANPA (1996), pp. 145, 148.

⁴Ibid., (2000), pp. xiii-xix, 461; ANPA (1996), p. 8.

that, “Nigerian professionals” in the diaspora must work “together in finding solutions to the many problems facing healthcare in Nigeria and indeed Africa.”¹

This background might explain why ANPA shows interest in correcting the breeding of “incompetent generation” of Nigerians for the future. ANPA is even interested in improved standard of the quality of national life in the economic, technological, and industrial spheres. For, in its view, this is one way in which to enhance respectability for Nigeria and Nigerians in the eyes of the world.²

ANPA even sees itself as a philanthropic agent, or as a representative of the multinational corporations, in bringing Nigeria and the entire black Africa into an industrial age. Not only are its adherents willing to help the homeland, but are also willing to share in the understanding that, “it might do good and help the standard of medical education in Nigerian medical schools or hospitals by volunteering some free time to teach and see patients for longer than the short duration of the current medical missions.”³ ANPA thus shares in the noble fact that: “To whom much has been given much is expected.” Enshrined at the core of the ANPA mission is the motto of “social responsibilities to others,” and this is further elaborated in its official statement that: “As we work hard to raise funds by ourselves for ourselves, we might gradually be succeeding in breaking the old cycle of dependency with its psychological baggage and invariably promote a culture of self reliance, self-sufficiency and self determination.”⁴

¹Ibid., (1996), p. 162.

²ANPA (2000), pp. xvii-xix.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. xv.

ANPA recognizes that the ability to make long-term social projections is necessary to sustained development. It also recognizes that success in its objective ought to include getting Nigerians/Africans to understand the long stretches required in moving from one point to the other. A viable future back in the homelands, as ANPA argues, will only come if people are willing to undertake programmatic steps. The ANPA leadership understands and indeed also appreciates that where Nigeria and Nigerians want to be ten to twenty years from its current status requires laying the foundation as well as taking the necessary steps required in getting there.¹

By 1998, when ANPA held its Fourth Annual Convention in Orlando, Florida, entitled “African Mother and Child: Prospects for Better Health in the 21st Century,” the physician-type leadership of Nigerians had achieved a name recognition for its mission both in America and back in the homeland. That most of its conventions and medical exhibitions have been screened across the world by such popular communication network as the CNN further attest to its international status.

ANPA convention of 1998—like earlier ones—was designed to evaluate and develop programmatic medical strategies for healthcare and medical issues commensurate with the needed services back in Nigeria. This convention focused on how to arrest the problem of healthcare confronting the “African mother” and childcare system, as well as examined strategies aimed at catering toward sustained healthcare system for pregnant women in Nigeria.² During its Fifth Annual Convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 1999, the ANPA delegates dealt with “Public Health,” and examined ways in which to develop quality health facilities from the

¹Ibid., p. xviii.

²Ibid., p. 415.

diaspora for the Nigerian homeland, along with the related regions of sub-Saharan Africa.¹

Through these conventions, “the ANPA leadership” came out self-assured that its efforts “proved that dedication to a cause and the persistent pursuit of a goal can yield outstanding results.” This background perhaps explains why the ANPA leadership felt that, “The successes of our conventions should be a tribute to these selfless leaders of our association.”² Through its 1999 convention, in particular, a foundation was laid for investing in medical supplies, storage, and improved infrastructures for the future healthcare system in Nigeria in the years ahead.³

ANPA therefore represents a crucial first step toward greater interaction of Nigerian skilled scientists within the capitalist world system. Despite intense racial climate and discrimination confronting its adherents, its leadership seems poised to lead the way toward lasting development in Nigeria. While ANPA represents the clearest evidence of Nigeria’s loss of much-needed skilled class manpower to the Western Hemisphere, the objectives of its leadership illuminate this loss as equally an avenue of both human and national regeneration. The ANPA mission represents an important leap toward sustained integration and corresponding transformation of the Nigerian indices within the capitalist world system in the twenty-first century.

ANPA: Health Care Challenges and Redemption Missions to Nigeria

The ANPA leadership is further strengthened by its advantage as a non-profit organization. This status places both the ANPA leadership as well as its mission in a

¹Ibid., p. 432.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

position to collaborate with other scientific and philanthropic bodies in providing needed healthcare services to Nigeria and the related handicapped regions in Africa. With its official status, ANPA is thus in a position to provide facilities with adequate storage for vaccine products, facility for medical storage for patients and doctors, low-cost vaccine refrigerator, and volunteering to assist in administering immunization of patients back in the homeland.

ANPA has an exceptional record in collaborating with the local and federal medical governments back in Nigeria in undertaking medical missions to help restore faith in the breakdown of the profession (Table 17.3). This attitude represents its finest and indeed noblest feat.¹ ANPA has indeed introduced the practice of telemedicine into Nigeria. This represents another creative response from the diaspora linking its professional talents to areas of needed healthcare services back in the homeland.

The notion of telemedicine takes into consideration “the practical inability of specialist to regularly travel to Nigeria for time constraints.” Thus before a direct physical contact with the Nigerian homeland is undertaken, an on-line professional consultation with the Nigerian medical experts can be sought as needed through the “ANPA Clinic.” ANPA anticipates that online consultations “may alleviate some of the sufferings and expenses of many sick Nigerians who travel overseas at greater cost and the very many who cannot afford to travel abroad.”² In addition, success through the medium of telemedicine may encourage support for its mission as well

¹Ibid., p. xvii; ANPA (1996), p. 146.

²Ibid., (2000), pp. xiv, xvi.

exposure to the professional resources of the Nigerian medical scientists in the diaspora.

Table 17.3

ANPA Redemptive Missions to the Nigerian Homeland,
by Year, by Region, by Medical Procedure,
by Number of Patients Treated, 1997-1999

Date	Year	Location	Medical Procedure	Number Treated
April, 7-14	1997	Kwalla Plateau State	118 Operative Procedures, 70 Dental Extractions, 25 Cataract Surgeries	Over 2,000 Patients Treated
July, 4-11	1997	Akwa-Ibom State Iota Abia	OB-GYN / Surgery Operations	102 Treated
August, 4-11	1997	Gwagwalada Fed. Capital Territory	87 OB-GYN Surgeries	Over 200 Dental Patients Treated
March, 1-8	1998	Ifon, Ondo State	80 Surgeries Done	Over 3,000 Patients Treated
July, 13-20	1998	Issele-Uku Delta State	89 Surgeries Done	Over 300 Dental Cases Treated
Sept, 4-11	1998	Ovim, Abia State	120 Surgeries Done	Over 4,000 Patients Treated
March, 14-20	1999	Fuger, Edo State		
April, 11-12	1999	Calabar, Cross River State		
May, 3-8	1999	Epe, Lagos State	80 Surgeries Done	Over 3,000 Patients
August, 16-20	1999	Enugu-Ukwu, Abagana State		
October, 10-16	1999	Ilawe-Ekiti, Ekiti State		
November	1999	Yola, Rdamawa State		

Source: ANPA (Riverside, California, 2000), pp. 377-386.

Not to be forgotten is the fact that, in 1995, the ANPA leadership began a program entitled, "Information Technology," aimed at integrating isolated regions of Nigeria into the capitalist world economy. By 1999, ANPA not only had led the way in establishing "The first local e-mail in Nigeria," but also in extending its on-line services to about twenty-two universities including major hospitals, health facilities and other institutions."¹ Moreover, in 1999, its leadership successfully tested how to

¹ANPA (2000), pp. xi, 367-373.

re-adopt “video-broadcast live to computer screen on Nigeria medical needs around the world.” The result of this project proved the maturing as well as the arrival of the new status of one of black Africa’s most skilled scientific class on the world scene.¹

ANPA has already accumulated the impressive records of medical missions to the Nigerian homeland to provide help to the disadvantaged sections of the populace (Table 17.3). Besides, its steadfast response in linking Nigeria and Nigerians to modern scientific innovations is further indicative of its emerging leadership role in the diaphora. By linking its American-based resources to the program of empowering Nigeria’s healthcare system, its mission has served as an important foundation toward the larger goal of providing needed healthcare services to the whole continent of Africa. Between April 1997 and November 1999, the numbers of ANPA’s medical missions to Nigeria were fully representative of the areas of need within the current healthcare system of Nigeria. The number of patients examined and treated within short notice correlated with areas of dire medical need and services in Nigeria (See Table 17.3).

With its excellent status in seeking to move the Nigerian healthcare system forward, ANPA has been able to solicit assistance from, as well as collaborated with, such well known institutions as the Federal Ministry of Health in Abuja, World Health Organization (WHO), U.S. Center for disease and Control and Prevention (USCP), UNICEF, Rotary International, and ASAlD.² ANPA has also shown a willingness to work in liaison with the state/regional governmental bodies back in

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. xvii.

Nigeria, as well as with African governments to bring about the needed changes in the healthcare services. This is perhaps one reason why, in 1999, it praised the Federal Government for ending the year with promises toward sustained prospects in providing affordable national healthcare system in the years ahead.¹

ANPA, of course, recognizes that the huge volumes of long distant telephone calls made by its members from the diaspora vis-à-vis AT&T to the homeland are reasons enough why some of the mega-giant corporations should reciprocate in humanitarian-philanthropic projects aimed at boosting development in Nigeria. Further, its leadership is cognizant of the viability of communications to modern marketing interaction. Besides, it views philanthropic support from such mega corporations as AT&T, for example, as worthwhile and as rewarding because it receives its huge benefit of wiring the Nigerian regions and industrial sites with internet connections. The ANPA editorial in 2000 states its desire to “encourage for instance, the telephone long-distance carrier as the mega-giant AT&T to give something back to us as corporate donation given the large volume of humanitarian projects in Nigeria and some immediate problems like provision of bore-hole for some teaching hospitals where water shortage remains perennial.”²

ANPA and SANPA: Toward Sustained Linkages with the Homelands

ANPA has its greatest potential at the inter-generational base of the Nigerian medical association in the Americas. This fact is supported by its influence in founding the Student Association of the Nigerian Physicians in the Americas

¹Ibid.

²ANPA (2000), p. xv.

(SANPA) in 1998.¹ This organization comprises of medical students who are mostly American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants and of those born in Nigeria. Membership of SANPA therefore comprises of a much younger generation of mostly American-born or perhaps more accurately, western-influenced Nigerians. As a result, their socio-cultural orbit tends more to favor greater orientation with America than necessarily the case with the Nigerian homeland. This seems to be a major intersection of difference between the earlier decades of Nigerian immigrants (1960s-1970s) and the much later waves between mid-1980s and 1990s. Nigerian offspring both of the American and the Nigerian homeland origins represent an important wing of the Nigerian physician-type leadership in the diaspora.²

As a representative scientific body of Nigerian medical professionals, it is credit to the ANPA leadership for inspiring a younger generation of Nigerian medical students toward an early attachment of their training to the cultures of the homeland. SANPA is therefore being poised at the youth level as a back-up toward a more sustainable scientific and industrial exchange linking them in the diaspora to the Nigerian homeland. As a youth umbrella organization of Nigerian ancestry, SANPA is expected to help its members while in the diaspora to learn ways of dual co-existence with the professional cultures of the Nigerian homeland at its core.³ Members of ANPA who have American-born offspring recognize the complex

¹Ibid., pp. xii, xv, 362-365; ANPA (1996), p. 146.

²Ibid. ANPA (2000), p. 391.

³This reference is based on the exploratory surveys undertaken for this study, including interviews between mid-1990s and mid-2000s. For example, some American-born offspring of Nigerian ancestry who are in the medical profession sometimes take it upon themselves to return to the respective regions of their parents in Nigeria to serve within the healthcare systems. Their missions were also influenced by the incessant negative media portrayal of Africa's healthcare problems.

socio-cultural influences likely to impinge on their intergenerational basement of their American offspring.

Unlike a majority of the generation of forced migration who were unable to trace their points of separation from the homeland, most American-born offspring of Nigerian physicians can identify their precise lanes of separation as well as renewal between the diaspora and their ancestral homelands.¹ ANPA's legacy in helping to found SANPA lies more in its vision. This has made it much easier for the latter to begin an early process of intra-Atlantic cultural bridge exchanges aimed at molding the needed scientific skills for the future.²

There emerged therefore two closely knit professional and cultural visions between the ANPA and SANPA leaderships seemingly revealing of the likely pattern of the future: Their search for a solid collective foundation of sustainable interactions with the homeland appears to be genuine. The strength then in founding SANPA lies more in the aim to begin an early head start linking needed scientific skills of Nigerians in the diaspora to the homeland.³ ANPA and SANPA therefore appear to be the two most likely bodies of Nigerians capable of serving as faithful medium of transfers between Nigeria and the Western Hemisphere in a greater part of the twenty-first century. This likelihood was apparent in an examination of the SANPA in 1990s.⁴ For example, an interesting article in the students' forum entitled "Childhood Reflection: Raising a Nigerian Child Abroad," sums up the prospect of an evolving cultural consciousness between the offspring of Nigerian immigrants in

¹ANPA (2000), p. 391; ANPA (1996), p. 146.

²Ibid.; ANPA (1996), pp. 166-169.

³Ibid. Also, this was supported by the exploratory examination of the ANPA archives.

⁴Ibid.

the medical school in America and their relationships with the homeland. For example, in 1996, the attitude of one Moji Arowosegbe, a young Nigerian-American medical student at the Albert Einstein's College of Medicine, New York, accounted for the inevitable transformation of the SANPA dynamic toward the Nigerian homeland.¹

Additionally, Arowosegbe's article shows that she not only cherished the cultural values of her Nigerian ancestry but praised the wisdom of her parents for sending her back to live in Nigeria in order to learn the cultures of the homeland. Further, as her narrative shows, it was her stay in Nigeria which helped to reinforce the knowledge of the homeland cultures. The experience enabled her to update her cultural void as American-born of Nigerian ancestry living now in the diaspora.²

Arowosegbe, as a future physician, counsels that raising the offspring of Nigerian immigrants in a country like America depended more on personal convictions. These convictions, she argued, are based on the willingness to identify where one's own interests in love and in strength of daily survival are to be found in life. To Arowosegbe the essence of any little lasting development and contribution in life can be traced and linked to one's cultural traditions.³ They are, in her noble views, the core of any true development and any contribution in life.

As first generation Nigerian-Americans living in New York city, my parents thought it was very important for my siblings and I to know where we came from and much so learn through experience the Nigerian culture including language. My parents were very particular about language... They only had

¹ANPA (1996), pp. 166-9

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

one solution to the problem that children had to live in Nigeria and learn everything first hand.¹

Neither were the roads for Arowosegbe back to learning the Nigerian cultures in the homeland any easier. Despite her positive feelings, Arowosegbe reveals obvious pride in her American birth, acknowledging that personal experiences back in the Nigerian homeland were not always pleasant. “To be honest, it wasn’t the greatest 8 years of my life because I had to deal with attacks of malaria every 3 months, heat waves year round, electric power failures and other little mishaps.”² Yet, she shows gratitude to her parents as well as to her inherent fortitude during the experience in Nigeria. Her understanding of the way of life of her people as well as of their cultures became more mature mostly due to physical contact.

Besides those little inconveniences which I can now refer to as minor, I must confess that I gained a lifetime of education that otherwise may not have been possible. I truly benefited from the fact that I lived in a town full of history, heritage and rich in culture which made me decide that no matter where I live or who I become in the future, I will proudly bequeath this fine legacy to my children the way my parents passed it to me.³

The interesting story of Arowosegbe reveals several contesting experience confronting Nigerian parents and their offspring in America. The Arowosegbe experience typifies how some Nigerian offspring understand themselves and the cultures of their parents while in the diaspora. Beyond this point, her experience reveals that, in most instances, the attitudes of the Nigerian offspring toward the homeland are the reflex of those of their core parents. Arowosegbe seems right in arguing that, if many of the Nigerian parents in the diaspora “have no intention of

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³ANPA (1996), p. 146.

ever going back to reside in Nigeria so why should they bother to teach their kids the old culture and language since they won't be using it here.”¹

Her success in returning to the Nigerian homeland was due mostly to the attitudes of her parents. Also, it was the combined faith of her parents' beliefs and her own noble beliefs in the soundness of the cultures of the homeland that guaranteed the success of her mission. Those were the attitudes that reinforced and supported her mission. Such inherent attitudes of parental beliefs, along with her own positive maturity during the eight years back in the homeland, were what later transformed her homebound experience.²

Favorable parental support and favorable personal spontaneity which Arowosegbe exhibited toward the cultures of the homeland can be very rare among most American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants. For, she appears to have been thoroughly imbued both in her personal demeanor as well as the corresponding values of her parents toward the cultures of the homeland. “I have to admit that I did not originally feel strongly about going to Nigeria. As a teenager, I felt I missed out on so many things by not attending high school in America.”³

Among the things Arowosegbe missed during her eight years in the Nigerian homeland were cheerleading, gymnastics, science fairs, senior prom, and special scholarship programs. Yet, as she observes: “I am glad that I missed out on peer pressure-trying out drugs, guns and premature sex.”⁴ Consideration ought then to be given to the extent in which the attitudes of Nigerian parents, either toward the

¹Ibid.

²ANPA (1996), p. 146.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

cultural values of the homeland or toward the American cultures, are also either positively or negatively affecting the inter-generational circuits of their American offspring.

Taken together, however, the Arowosegbe experiences demonstrated how some SANPA members were being prepared toward the task of re-adapting themselves along with their professional training toward the cultures of the homeland. Their desire to help secure a viable climate of future scientific links with the homeland from the diaspora seems so far to be increasing with some understanding of their differing worlds. Like any other Nigerian-American youth leadership, it can be speculated that SANPA is likely to have a more sustainable bridge between America and the Nigerian homeland. As its adherents become increasingly dominated by American-born offspring, chances are that their future professional success will also very likely alternate more favorably toward greater attachment the varied communities of their brethren in the diaspora as well as on the cultural values of their homeland.

Thus, by her experience and triumph, Arowosegbe counsels that the American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants in the diaspora would be well served in the long run in knowing enough about themselves, about America, and about the homeland of their parents and cultures. She also counsels against the unknown nostalgia of the future. For, according to Arowosegbe, the Nigerian offspring “May want to associate themselves with the culture in the future or just want to visit the place, meet relatives and probably just want a place to identify

with.”¹ And, if such scenario ever comes to pass, she argues persuasively that the Nigerian offspring would be certain to have a place in the cultural values of the homeland. “Whatever the reasons, I think we all especially as physicians, have an obligation toward building the future of Nigeria. We can insure this by getting our children interested in their roots because it is this and the generation to come that will face the difficult task of bringing Nigeria back to be a pride to the entire world.”²

ANPA Missions to the Homeland: Jewish, Asian, or Pan-African?

However, in seeking to direct its scientific skills either toward the development of Nigerian or the entire African homelands, ANPA draws aspiration from the experience of both the Jewish and Asiatic diasporas. As a result, in its vision of developing the homeland, ANPA appears to share in the beliefs that the Jewish and Asiatic visions were similar to those of other branches of American races.³ This is probably one reason why “ANPA admires the Jewish Diaspora,” and why it believes that “the American-Jewish success story...keeps transcending generation after generation.”⁴ Shoroye, in an editorial entitled, “Giving back to the Bight of Benin and beyond,” draws the analogy between the ANPA achievements and its ongoing re-transfers of the medical and industrial skills from the diaspora to Nigeria.⁵ Again, drawing from the experience of the Jewish diaspora, Shoroye states

¹ANPA (1996), p. 146.

²Ibid.

³For example, as we hope to show slightly down in this chapter that the historical similarities of the Jewish-Asian and African experience are not exactly the same, although the general emphasis has been gaining ascendancy since the 1980s. Apraku, for example, emphasized the strengths of the emergent NIE countries on the world scene. See, Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 213-219; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 42-3.

⁴ANPA (2000), p. xv.

⁵Yinka Shoroye, “Giving back to the Bight of Benin and beyond,” ANPA (1996), p. 7.

that “The State of Israel is arguably what it is today because of the Jewish in the diaspora around the world.”¹ Therefore, as Shoroye argues, in reference to Nigeria, and particularly to the pace of its human development in the twenty-first century,

. . . we believe the intelligentsia in any country including ours have a leadership stake and a social responsibility to their future generations. We should draw counsel from the hindsight that the hard lesson of the past teaches. Our children and indeed our nation will only do well in an increasingly competitive global economy if we prepare them well. History is full of sacrifices.²

This kind of thinking perhaps further explains why, in 1998, ANPA enjoined with the effort of other membership in founding a supplementary umbrella organization known as SANPA.³ As is the case with the Jewish and Asian associations, SANPA is reportedly expected to function as a back-up to its core ANPA parent in the future.

That the ANPA effort in the evolution of SANPA leans more favorably toward the Jewish and Asiatic models further testifies of its willingness to go to any length necessary in developing the homelands.⁴ In its imagination of how the first generation of Nigerian-Americans of SANPA mission will help in developing the homeland, ANPA looks up to, and indeed, admires the effort of Sara Lee Schupf. As an American of Jewish ancestry, Schupf has good record of supporting her ancestral

¹Ibid., p. 8.

²Ibid.

³ANPA (2000), p. xii.

⁴Ibid., p. xv. Also, see notes on the Students’ Forum of the Students Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas [SANPA] by Moji Arowosegbe of Albert Einstein College of Medicine, New York, entitled, “Childhood Reflections: Raising a Nigerian Child abroad,” in ANPA (1996), p. 146.

homeland from the diaspora.¹ As Shoroye, President of ANPA 2000, observed of this background:

Imagine American Sara Lee Schupf who inherited from her father's estate and started a family foundation with an endowment. She wanted the foundation to encourage women in service. She contributed some funds for a female service professor's chair at Skidmore College in New York State. She further wanted to give something back to her parents' original homeland and she funded also a lecture series and prize for women at the Weitzman Institute of Science (a mini-NIH) in Israel. The Institute later wanted to build a woman's health center, and she also supported the cause.²

There is a similar admiration for the activities of the Jewish diaspora on the philanthropic front by ANPA. This thrust has a lot in common with the ANPA vision of leadership based on charitable networking. According to ANPA, shared attitudes of charitable network have permitted the Jews under law to benefit from donor grants while in the diaspora, as well as to access needed assistances in developing their American communities and the homelands.³

ANPA also recognizes that—like their Jewish and Asiatic counterparts in the diaspora—the provision in the U.S. tax code offers to its adherents the required access to philanthropic support. Further, it provides them with stock sales that can strengthen its missions and associations within and without. In addition to such gains, charitable giving or offered endowment can enable ANPA to reduce tax burden as well as enhance access to the U.S. legal status on tax-exempt shelters and donor access to available fund. So, with the economic stability of its membership along, with a more viable social accord, the ANPA leadership occupies a favorable

¹ANPA (2000), p. xv.

²Ibid., p. xv.

³Ibid., p. xiv.

orbit in exploiting the noble insignia of the profession toward the realization of its aim of industrial redemption of the homeland.¹

Hence, collectively, the lessons drawn from the benefits of American Jewish Charitable Organizations and the by-laws of charitable tax-exempt statuses would seem to have had enormous impact on the mission of ANPA leadership toward the homeland.² Viewed then within the inter-Nigerian professional context in the U.S., adherents of the SANDA and ANPA associations, appear to have accepted the fact that they were eminently qualified and indeed well placed in the diaspora to lobby American governmental agencies to support their medical missions to the Nigerian homeland. Referring to the Jewish socio-political clout, ANPA argues that their lobbying power while in the diaspora has won them admiration everywhere.³

Corresponding with the preceding emphases, ANPA poses its philanthropic gesture as neither “a political” nor “apolitical” organization. What does this mean? What the ANPA ideology represents, therefore, can best be viewed as corresponding with neither a clear political nor “apolitical” interests over the torn and degraded images of the Nigerian or the entire African homelands. On the basis of its official statement, ANPA is simply an organization seeking to bring out the varied strengths of the Nigerian physicians, in the hope that, “our host communities and our motherland will avail themselves of the resources that our organization represents.”⁴

Along the same course as the Jewish vision, ANPA exhorts the example of “one departed colleague and compatriot, Dr. Daniel Nwankewo,” who reportedly

¹Ibid., pp. xiv-xv, 468.

²Ibid., p. xiv.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 391.

gave to the association a memorial trust fund that put its membership into investment in the capital gains. The future of this “trust fund,” particularly its “financial capacity to do charitable work that would last generations after generations,” not only recognizes “such opportunity at the young age,” but would enable its adherents to set “up a long-term philanthropic goal.” ANPA has identified this process as the key to success in the future.¹

The preceding background, as we have already hinted, undoubtedly explains the admiration of Nigerian physicians in philanthropic activities. Probably it also explains the course of their persistence to embark on projects designed to usher in Nigeria, along with the rest of Africa, into the fullest cycle of an industrial age.² But, as we shall see slightly further down, it is also at the intersection between adapting the Jewish and Asiatic vision toward the regeneration of the homelands that ANPA reveals its weaknesses.

Despite, of course, what appears to be its commitment to the mission of medical and industrial regeneration of the homeland, the ANPA thrust is also driven by the crisis of the racial “otherness” that seriously begun to confront a majority of this most skilled class of Nigerians in the diaspora from the 1980s onward.³ But ANPA appears to have been more optimistic throughout the remaining part of the

¹Ibid., p. xv.

²Ibid., pp. iv-xv.

³For example, my examination of the Nigerian/African profiles was supportive that the birth of ANPA around the mid-1990s in the Americas was also in response to changes that came to the fore during the Reagan era. This background was later to receive an additional transformation with the publication of *The Bell Curve* in 1994. Although most of the emphases by scholars in *The Bell Curve* have been questioned in both the public media and academic discourse, the subtle effects of their emphases have resonated in areas of the new technologies, in which African scientists are presumed to be one of the most vulnerable racial ramparts in America.

1990s that it could find collaborative partners that would support its initiative of developing the homeland. By that time, ANPA believed that its success in this venture would depend on its own commitment. Drawing from both the Jewish and Asiatic experiences, ANPA envisioned giving of itself and of its tremendous skills back to the future course of recovery of the homeland. To succeed in this endeavor ANPA argued that Nigeria's national character required more substantive changes from its current context of economic and political indiscipline.

ANPA thus shares in the wisdom that good healthcare services in the Nigerian homeland would be conditioned by improved socioeconomic and politico-cultural milieu within the larger nation-state. During its Third Annual Convention at Chicago in 1997, Professor Chukwuedu Nwokolo, the guest speaker, observed that: "In addition to the problems specific to health care, there are several very serious national impediments which greatly inhibit and undermine development activities everywhere."¹ Further, Nwokolo observed that the national impediments to sound healthcare services included, the "failure of Nigeria to industrialize its handicaps in modern communication, failure of financial institutions, destitution of the Nigerian school system, and breakdown of the infrastructure of the health institutions everywhere." But, according to Professor Nwokolo, these crises were heightened by "societal indiscipline that reached a peak within the last ten years." These crises, as he further observed, must be addressed and corrected to enhance the prospect of sustained development in Nigeria.²

¹ANPA (2000), pp. xii, 461.

²Ibid., pp. xiii-xix.

Nwokolo therefore seemed right in urging Nigerians to strive “to follow the well defined footsteps of former third world nations of the Asian Pacific region who have now moved on to the other worlds.”¹ He called upon Nigeria to “tackle the fundamental cankerworm of indiscipline and corruption while planning and implementing all other programmes.”² To Nwokolo, the conditions that enabled Korea and Malaysia to sell “motor vehicles and computers equipment to us,” as well as to send “experts to find out in the spirit of South-South cooperation what happened to us along the way,” have its root in “a failure of leadership.”³

The preceding could very well explain—why, during the inauguration of ANPA in 1995—the presiding leadership emphasized making the Nigerian-African background more respectable in the eyes of the world. ANPA even argued in its 2000 editorial that the peculiar problem confronting Africans in the continent, or in sub-Saharan Africa, where the evidences are about the most retarded, was neither due to colonial dispossession nor one to be resolved nor corrected by blaming outsiders. Japan, it argued, which was once handicapped was later able to prove that it could surmount its obstacles, thus making its people respected in the world over. Japan has since shown the world that the best providence can endow a nation is not always material resources. With the respect earned in a little over thirty years after raising themselves from the ashes of 1945, ANPA felt justified in arguing that, “the entire world must now pronounce Japanese names.”⁴ This meant then that, “If the

¹Ibid., pp. xiii, 462.

²Ibid., p. 463.

³Ibid., p. 462. Also, see Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (London and Nairobi: Heinemann, 1983), p. 1.

⁴ANPA (2000), p. xix.

leaders of Nigeria create a milieu that truly encourages creativity, excellence, hard work and ingenuity, it could be a nation someday that would be respected all over the world.”¹

ANPA Redemption Missions to the Homeland: A Brief Assessment

There is therefore no doubt that the ANPA leadership represents the birth of a more pliable body of Nigerian-African professionals in the Americas. Within a short time, its professional aptitude has offered the most reliable data for gauging the direction of the class of high skilled Nigerian personnel likely to succeed within the American capitalist system. Indeed, where both the ANPA leadership and its related human membership stands in the historic effort of leading either Nigeria or the entire of Africa into an industrial transformation must be seen as commendable necessary first steps from the diaspora. Such also is its credit in helping to found SANPA—a supplementary back-up umbrella organization tied to its historic efforts. Besides, of course, its willingness to borrow from the Jewish and Asiatic models represents a meaningful response to the pressing crisis of underdevelopment in the Nigerian or the African homelands. By envisioning the unity of its enormous talents with the emerging generation of SANPA, these two closely knit branches of the Nigerian physician-type leadership have indicated a willingness to “strengthen and established trans-Atlantic bridge between North America and Nigeria.”²

ANPA, in fact, appears to be very conscious of its historic mission within the renewed Afro-Atlantic triangle of exchanges in the twenty-first century. This fact is

¹Ibid.

²ANPA (2000), p. xii.

exactly what comes across in its editorial in 2000: “When the history of the twenty-first century is written, we hope ANPA would be remembered maybe not for any heroism but hopefully as a generation of patriotic Nigerians in the Diaspora who made some modest contributions to the rebuilding of the father land. Or still, as a group of Nigerians who attempted to lay a strong foundation for the future both here in North America and also in their homeland-Nigeria.”¹

But perhaps because ANPA is dominated by medical scientists, some of its noble objectives toward the regeneration of the homeland reveal signs of serious misunderstanding over deep-seated facts of its peculiar historical background. With such misunderstanding, some of its emphases are at best, historically misconstrued, or even false. For example, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of the Jewish and Asiatic diaspora, in advancing the pace of human development in their respective homelands, is probably due more to their favorable historical settings than any other factor. One explanation is that they have been least susceptible to the enduring crisis of socio-cultural “otherness” on the basis of their race since the opening of the modern era than African descent people. To be sure, the ANPA dogma expresses itself within a socio-cultural orbit which calls for a much closer look. The more serious omission in its claims of redemptive missions to the Nigerian-African homeland lies in its misunderstanding of the related role played by the descendants of slaves.² We hope to show slightly below that this is an important basis for a critical review of the ideological platform of ANPA.

¹Ibid., pp. xvii-xix.

²See, for example, Chapter 1 of this dissertation on “mission of African Redemption” and “Pan-Africanism.”

Since its early formative years, ANPA has seemed imbedded in the nature of crises that were traceable to its inexperience in meddling with the complex historiography of the Afro-Atlantic triangle of the black struggle. First, ANPA was not very explicit as to whether the major concerns leading to its founding in 1995 were driven by the nature of the socio-cultural experiences operative in the racial orbit of its American interaction. Second, it did not explain what its reference on how the lot of Nigerian physicians had confronted the new changes within the U.S. healthcare system meant. The emphasis here is that, this critical position should have been explained before moving to emphasize its medical objectives for Nigeria, as well as the related desire to combat its deteriorating healthcare system.

Yet, the failure to explain the above context still deflected some evidences that suggested that the ANPA dogma co-existed with socio-cultural stress.¹ Significantly, the high population of Nigerian physicians in the U.S. trained at Nigerian/African medical schools pointed strongly toward a probability that both the founding of ANPA as well as its current vision had their take off in unfavorable workplace settings.² By early years of the 2000s, both the ANPA leadership as well as its larger memberships comprised mostly of Nigerians trained at the Nigerian medical schools; others were trained within Africa or outside Africa. These were those whose re-adaptive cultural skills were readily pronounced, and who comprised the most vulnerable wing of physicians currently practicing in America. The general workplace apathy which has impinged on this body of skilled professionals can be

¹ANPA, 2000, p. 391. This is based on examination of the ANPA profiles from 1994 to 2000, including interviews.

²Ibid. Also, see Figures 7.1-7.4; Table 16.2.

explained by complex intra-cultural adjustments, which might have been unfavorable. There is a strong likelihood that the effect of sudden changes within the medical establishment during the mid-1990s was particularly stronger for physicians trained within Africa than elsewhere.

For example, as we indicated earlier, about 21,000 Nigerian physicians were reportedly in the U.S. probably between 1993 and 1995.¹ But between 1994 and 1996, for example, the officially certified and published number of Nigerian physicians in the U.S. was about 4,000.² This might suggest that a majority of them were not practicing physicians for reasons that could very well be associated with cultural constraints. Thus, as the largest base of African scientific establishment in the diaspora, Nigerian physicians are undoubtedly among the most affected professional groups within the ongoing economic integration of American professionals. Both globalization and integration are occurring simultaneously with socio-cultural indifference as well as hierarchic stratification of racial groups. The enduring effects of the “skin color,” which historian Lincoln examined about forty years ago,³ is even a more relevant for explaining the current socio-cultural context of the skilled class of the black African labor migrants in America.⁴

For, as Lincoln argued, “the fundamental problem of color and group identity derives in large measure from the desire of the established white hegemony . . . to

¹See, for example, earlier notes especially in Chapters 1 and 3; Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 236.

²See ANPA published data 1994-1996.

³Eric Lincoln, “Color and Group Identity in the United States,” in Color and Race, ed., John Hope Franklin (Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company, 1968), p. 249.

⁴*Ibid.*; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9, 19, 110; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

distinguish itself by all means available from the blacks.”¹ While, on the other hand, color is an unreliable basis for determining human qualities, it is with race that the question of color is ultimately concerned. Lincoln further observed that: “In the social relations in the United States, color is often read as a signal to denigrate, to discriminate, to segregate.”² Anthropologist Ogbu, on the other hand, argued that the experience of historically marginalized racial minorities in American society correlated with their state of underdevelopment.³ Based then on the Ogbu thesis, there is a basis that African-Americans and hence Nigerian immigrants, are likely to be among the most susceptible groups to racism and discrimination.⁴

Not surprisingly, Nigerian physicians in America fall into the racial category of those with supposedly low “Ethnic Differences in Cognitive Ability.” Their socio-cultural features, moreover, are presumed to have unmistakable correlation with low “psychometric properties of the standardized test” noted against blacks in Africa and America.⁵ These facts are perhaps rendered more correctly in corroboration with the black experience than with class differences in the U.S.⁶ The fact that the

¹Lincoln, Color and Race, p. 251.

²Ibid.; Linda Vigilant, “Race and Biology,” in Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century, ed., Winston A. Van Horne (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 49-56; Martin Bernal, “Race and History,” in Global Convulsions, pp. 75-6.

³Ogbu, “The Consequences of American Caste System,” pp. 19-56.

⁴Ibid.; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-5; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 58-81, 90-2, 94-7; Landry, America at Century’s End, pp. 202-3; Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variant,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530 (November, 1993), p. 84.

⁵The Bell Curve, pp. 288-289.

⁶Ibid. Also, see, Chapter 1; Cindy Rodriguez, “Study Shows Blacks Trailing Immigrants from Africa, Caribbean,” The Boston Globe (February 17, 2003); Lapham, 1990-3, “Census Reports Among Immigrant Groups,” Public Opinion Office, September 1993); Trotter Review, p. 31.

“predictive validity of tests for academic and job performance seems to be about the same” for Africans and African-Americans further suggests that the experience of the ANPA professionals will be arduous. Yet, a majority of its members, particularly those trained in America and Europe, attended some of the finest medical schools.¹

The preceding background perhaps best explains why Winston Horne sees the emphases by scholars in The Bell Curve as an attempt to insist upon the notion of an inherent inequality of American races. This development, as he further argues, was first evident in the degradation of African-Americans on the basis of their color within the racist traditions of colonial America, and later of the U.S.² There is no doubt that the racist traditions which Lincoln and Horne have emphasized for African-Americans have now extended to the Nigerian or to the black African skilled professionals in America.³

The shift therefore from managed healthcare system to computerize medicine, as we saw earlier, marked the first fateful development leading to the call on the Nigerian medical professionals to rally around a common interest. This call, which was intended to “showcase the talents and expertise that exist within the Nigerian community,”⁴ may have been a necessary response to an emergent socio-cultural workplace changes. These occurrences can even be viewed in light of the

¹For example, this is supported by information on the ANPA Directories, 1994-2000.

² Winston A. Van Horne, “A Cross-Century Tradition Concerning Race and Intellect,” in Global Convulsions: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth-Century, ed., W.A.V. Horne (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 63-73.

³Ibid. Also, see earlier notes on historian Lincoln, and related emphases in Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9, 19, 110; and Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

⁴ANPA (2000), p. 391

emerging compartmentalization of the medical profession by the medical establishment. Probably some identifiable changes in computerized medicine began to work against racial minorities during the 1980s. By around mid-1990s, especially with the publication of The Bell Curve, some of the crises associated with the latter emphases had begun to transform workplace relations and attitudes among varying high-skilled professions in America.¹

If the above is correct, chances then are that the changes alluded to earlier by Dr. Emeruwa, probably had much in common with events that were traceable to the 1980s. This development, which reached its heights during the Reagan era, had strong impact on foreign-born settlers in America. Along with this background, the renewed racial climate from the early to mid-1990s, for example, was least favorable to Nigerian physicians or to their related counterparts elsewhere in this country.²

Dr. Emeruwa's insistence on raising the American-born offspring of Nigerian physicians with due consideration to the values of the homeland was perhaps another way of responding to an existing socio-cultural conflict: "how do we raise our children in the best traditions of Nigeria? How do we transmit our culture and values to these children?" Still, within this context, he observed that, "other issues we face include professional ones such as the change in the health care environment in the USA—from managed care to the issue of computers in medicine."³ This last emphasis seems to depend on control over professional access within the medical

¹Ibid. Also see, Jennings' emphases in "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," pp. 144-154. The Jennings emphases were probably transformed between early 1980s and 1990s.

²Ibid. Also, see Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110.

³ANPA (2000), p. 391.

establishment, which most Nigerian physicians did not have.¹ This strongly suggests that things were not going well with Nigerian physicians in America, as indeed such evidences were common place in American electronic news media in the late 1990s.²

Thus, given the preceding emphases, there is a strong likelihood that, the adjustment made by Nigerian physicians in the U.S. to some changes in their profession, especially during the mid-1990s, was either due to the new technologies or growing manifestation of cultural stress. This seems to have influenced the founding of ANPA in 1995. The development marked as well the genesis of its mission of medical redemption to the homeland from the diaspora.

Viewed within this context, the birth of ANPA may very well have marked an historic first-step toward sustained consolidation of Nigerian medical scientists within the Western Hemisphere.³ Accordingly, in a situation where workplace attitudes were least likely to favor Nigerian physicians, the ultimate founding of ANPA corresponded with the ways that historically marginalized groups have often attempted to re-adapt themselves as well as their skills in eras of crises. For example, with freedom from slavery, African-Americans responded to racial resentment and discrimination by developing black-owned institutions. This had the effects of releasing most of them from direct forms of racial oppression. The founding of the first black Church in America corresponded with the response to the

¹Ibid. On the other hand, this emphasis is supported by the ANPA data and interviews.

²“Foreign-born Doctors in America,” 60 Minutes (November 6, 1999).

³Ibid. This development followed a similar pattern identified earlier in my evaluation of Nigerian/African transformation in America—particularly from late 1970s to 1980s. Also, in my opinion, the adjustment undertaken by the ANPA toward the Nigerian homeland was [is] no less different from the one which influenced the transformation of Nigerian immigrants during the Reagan era.... and thereafter; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 25-38.

racism and discrimination which confronted the descendants of slaves who attended predominantly white congregation.¹ Coincidentally after about four centuries, a similar attitude of socio-cultural constraints accounted for the founding of Nigerian/African immigrant churches in America. Earlier, as well, this same background had influenced the missions of African redemption from the diaspora to the homeland among some the descendants of American slaves. The ANPA missions of medical redemption from the diaspora to the Nigerian homeland during the 1990s were no less different.²

Aside then from the inherent problem of workplace stress, ANPA is as yet to evolve a disciplined professional interaction among the varying establishments of Nigerian immigrants or African immigrants in America. This negligence appears to presage future crises in its mission from the diaspora. As a young organization, the ANPA leadership, along with its membership, depends on philanthropic support to contest its homebound programs. ANPA can, of course, claim to be a Nigerian organization with a far lesser degree of tribal/ethnic pandering among its membership. But such a fact is not an adequate basis for what appears to be a calculated distancing from other American-based organizations of Nigerians while claiming to represent Nigeria in the diaspora.³ Only sustained interactions within the Nigerian/African immigrant communities can fully legitimize its representation as well as status as an effective medium of developing the homeland.

¹Horton and Horton, *In Hope of Liberty*, pp. 137-8. Also, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation. These socio-cultural crises are almost similar to those identifiable among ordinary Nigerian immigrants during the Reagan era. See, for example, Chapters 4-6.

²Ibid.

³This position is based on fieldwork and interviews.

Probably the most identifiable weakness of ANPA is in its uncritical admiration of the Jewish and Asian models. This attitude appears to blur an effective grasp of the varied complexities surrounding the current status of human underdevelopment in Africa. This weakness is perhaps more revealing in ANPA's overemphasis rather than in the soundness of the Jewish-Asiatic models. For example, ANPA's admiration of the progress of post-Second World War Japan showed no grasp of an earlier one among the descendants of slaves. But, coincidentally, despite dissimilarities in historical eras, their admiration for Japan was almost similar. As Marc Gallicchio has demonstrated, the admirable status of Japan in the world scene was first exhorted by the black diaspora of enslavement. Like ANPA, moreover, the descendants of slaves admired and even celebrated the rise and triumph of the Japanese people.¹ They—like ANPA—saw in the Japanese progress the necessary example in their struggle for a better future through self determination. "The wonderful progress of Japan and their sudden rise to a position of one of the great nations of the world," even Booker T. Washington once admitted to a Japanese editor, "has nowhere been studied with greater interest or enthusiasm than by the Negroes of America."² Nevertheless, while both the Jewish and Asiatic footing is plausible, the ANPA tended to misunderstand where and how its inherent historical setting contrasted with theirs. This is a serious weakness; for it reveals a loose grasp of its peculiar historical orbit.

If, as we pointed out, the ordeal of the black experience also affected ANPA, it does appear that a much clearer grasp of its often conflicting Afro-Atlantic context,

¹Gallicchio, Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945, p. 14.

²Ibid.

is likely to enhance the success of its medical missions to the homeland. Certainly the ANPA views about the Japanese experience, in particular, can be queried. The comparison of the Japanese experience with the Nigerian-African experience under colonialism is commendable but imprecisely linked. For example, there was a marked difference between the internal fracture of Japanese and Nigerian societies under colonialism, which was later mirrored in terms of the advantages of one nation over the continuing handicap of the other. This is not, however, to accept some of the shameful evidences of the political indiscipline in post-colonial Africa, along with the related problem of corruption, misrule, and of undue human hardships.

Rather, it is to understand that the Japanese experience within the European context, for example, was markedly dissimilar from that of black Africa. Historian Davidson has argued that the political sociology of Africa” under colonial dispossession was “peculiar to itself.”¹ Japan, according to Davidson, had a dissimilar experience with Europe compared to Africa. Davidson further argues that the dissimilarity between Japan and black Africa lies in the peculiar fact that Africans had suffered more deeply than did the Japanese under colonialism.² As Davidson concludes: “One may reasonably reply that in this case the modernizing revolution of Japan could not have been carried through” had its peoples been “made a target of . . . colonial dispossession in the second half of the nineteenth century.”³ Nor, moreover, could the Japanese revolution “have succeeded,” had the Western

¹Davidson, Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, pp. 63.

²Ibid., pp. 64-6.

³Ibid., p. 65.

enclosure and dispossession and its agencies “taken from the Japanese all scope for their own initiative and enterprise.”¹

Therefore, in a sense, the ANPA ideological exhortation toward the homelands exhibits almost a similar weakness as that identified by Harold Cruse for the Negro intellectual. This is a weakness of spurious extraction of ideas from outsiders’ views despite the more peculiar historical facts surrounding the black experience both in America and Africa.² For, admittedly, where ANPA does not understand the extent to which the peculiar history of the black experience contrasts sharply with that of other races—while still suffering from its effects—its lanes of collaborative exchanges with the homelands are likely to be susceptible to incrimination. This seems to be the kind of oversight that is likely to blur its future direction in an otherwise well-founded mission.

It is worth again emphasizing at this juncture that, what defines the effectiveness of the Jewish and Asiatic models, which ANPA seems to misunderstand, is traceable to their more sustainable context within the European global network. The ANPA prospect of a lasting success may very well depend on the extent to which the major cultural forces of advanced world capitalism determine the varying collaborative contexts which influence its efforts to incorporate the homeland into high skilled industrial sector. This may require an understanding of

¹Ibid.

²Ernest J. Wilson, 111, “Foreword,” in Harold Cruse’s Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. i-vi, especially the Chapter VI entitled, “Role of the Negro Intellectual—Survey of the Dialogue Deferred.” One can sometimes see this pattern of the “Crisis of the Negro intellectual” evolving among adherents of U.S.-based organizations of Nigerians/Africans. This is particularly evident in their striving to bring their countries or the continent line with the trend of development in the Western world. On the other hand, very few of Africans have pondered over the complex horizon surrounding their craze for the outsiders’ models.

its competitive margins within existing unequal hierarchic classifications of European and Asian dominated global networks.¹

ANPA's emphases regarding the philanthropic gains of the American by-law² also suggest some misunderstanding of some context and facts. For, while these anticipations seem valid, they are likely to be constrained by the absence of a viable institutional support within the American mosaic. The general overemphasis regarding the gains of the American philanthropic by-law does suggest that the ANPA leadership has as yet to understand the socio-cultural and political intricacies surrounding organizations with its kind of public agenda. For, to be sure, the historical context in which the Jews and Asians have succeeded in philanthropic projects in America, and hence in the benefits of tax-exempt status, is somewhat dissimilar with that of ANPA. While ANPA has every right to tap into the standing benefits of the American by-laws to facilitate its medical mission to the Nigerian homeland, its lasting success in the venture appears to require a more thorough grasp of the process. Even with the best of intentions, an overwhelming reliance on philanthropic platform via the tax-exempt claims seems to underestimate the powerful groundswell of institutional forces likely to be touched off by some of its unsolicited public overtures. Because the ANPA-American public overtures are not as yet based on actively sustained institutional support, some of its aspirations toward the homeland from the diaspora are mere presumptions.³ Indeed, its admiration for the ingenuity of the Jewish and Asiatic models ought then to be based

¹Research Report, pp. 42-3.

²ANPA (2000), pp. xiv-xv.

³In my opinion, some of the emphasis found in Ruben and Rumbaut's *Immigrant America*, p. 112, can also explain the ANPA context.

on some understanding of the events that have shaped the descendants of forced migration and post-colonial African migration in America.

Surprisingly, ANPA places the economic and industrial imperatives of its vision too assuredly outside the Pan-Africanist framework. Yet, as we have shown thus far, the redemptive missions of the black diaspora of enslavement were foremost in heralding the notion of African regeneration.¹

By all the available criteria, the ANPA and SANPA visions of a Nigerian-African world development are nothing more than a recreation of earlier redemptive missions of the black diaspora. Shepperson and Uya and Geshoni have credited the generation of the Middle Passage for heralding organized mission of African redemption.² This redemptive medium was among the earliest channels of attempting to bridge the vast lag in human development deflected against sub-Saharan Africa largely by the transatlantic slave trade.³

Legum also observed that from the early 20th century to the Second World War, the birth of formal Pan-Africanism served as a new bridge in the commerce of ideas via the Atlantic triangle.⁴ ANPA's redemptive medical missions to Nigeria/Africa were also basic the re-creation of the Pan-Africanist summons to African-descended peoples everywhere to work collectively toward the development of the homeland.⁵ For example, its official summons on cultural differences,

¹For example, see chapter 3.

²Shepperson, "Notes," pp. 301-312; Uya, The Black Brotherhood; Uya, "Afro-American/African Relations," in Global Dimensions of the Black Diaspora, pp. 70-4; Gershoni, Africans on African Americans, especially Chapters 1-3.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.; Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 14.

⁵Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. 2-3.

multiculturalism, integration and interaction of cultures are Pan-Africanist. Similarly, its emphases on the pains and gains of assimilation are inherently Pan-Africanist.¹

Essentially, while leaning on the Jewish-Asian models, the ANPA hopes of Nigerian/African regeneration for its mission as well as for the succeeding generations of American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants are rooted in the earlier conjectures of Negro-American Pan-Africanist aspiration.² This historical coincidence is rather interesting, given its somewhat calculated isolation from an open intra-Pan-Africanist partnerships.

Nor, moreover, did the philanthropic history of Nigerians or of Africans abroad originate with ANPA. Although ANPA and SANPA are neither a political nor apolitical organizations, nevertheless, their foundation and missions are basic modifications of earlier patterns of African students' associations in the Americas and Europe.³

Both the West African Students Union (WASU) and African Students Association in the Americas (ASAA) were founded in the early decades of the twentieth century out of the noble desire to chart the course of self-determination and development back in the homelands.⁴ The founding in 1924 of WASU in London was shaped by the aim of developing a generation of African leaders who were later to lead Africans to liberation from colonial yoke. This later formed the basis of

¹ANPA (1996), pp. 165-168.

²For example, see earlier notes on chapter 3.

³ANPA (2000), pp. xi-xx.

⁴Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. 95-100.

African liberation movements from colonialism.¹ Like ANPA, those earlier associations of African students abroad were founded by a few dedicated members before becoming the medium of collective liberation for the many back in the homelands.² Similarly, they correctly shared in the soundness of the cultural as well as moral and political responsibilities of helping to redeem the homeland from alien exploitation, human degradation, and racism. Historian King tells us that these Africans looked “forward to a day when representatives from various parts of Africa can meet in a general convention to discuss the problems of common interest which bear on African people.”³

Perhaps the missions of WASU/ASAA and ANPA/SANPA were only dissimilar in terms of their historical eras. If so, an understanding of the historical orientation of the black struggle in America as well as its African rampart is an important intersection in explaining the varying eras of the black sojourn in the Western Hemisphere.⁴

To begin with, evidences are supportive that adherents of WASU/ASAA and ANPA/SANPA⁵ were willing to sacrifice their time, their skills, and their professional prospects in developing a network of inter-regional and continental liberation and development. Similarly, the success of their missions also depended

¹Ibid.; pp. 215-17; ANPA (2000), pp. xi-xx.; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 202-4..

²Ibid.

³Ibid.; King, Pan-African Education, p. 218.

⁴Landry, America at Century's End, pp. 202-3; Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 239-245; Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, pp. 95-100.

⁵Ibid., pp. 181-5, 192-3; Geiss, Pan-African Movement, pp. 295-304; Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp. 26-36; Shepperson, “Notes,” pp. 301-312; and ANPA (2000), pp. xii-xviii.

on the support of both the white and black institutions of the Western world.¹ However, unlike ANPA/SANPA, members of WASU/ASAA were not a settler community of Africans in the diaspora: they were mostly students. Until the late 1950s, a majority of Africans south of the Sahara were not under political freedom. Consequently, their immigration to the U.S was not a product of the disruption of post-colonial institutions—as was the case, for example, during a greater part of the late 1980s and early 1990s—for a majority of the ANPA adherents. This strongly suggests that the difference between earlier and current redemptive missions of Nigerians [Africans] from the diaspora to the homelands lies more in generational changes within varied historical eras rather than in ideologies.

Conclusively, nearly all the important aspects of ANPA's missions to the homeland from America corroborated those earlier undertaken by the black diaspora of enslavement. The ANPA/SANPA visions are therefore no new creations in the Atlantic triangle of Euro-African and Afro-Atlantic connections. From the mid-1940s onward, when Africans began to take formal frontline leadership from the New World blacks, the generations of WASU/ASAA were mostly those at the helm of the liberation movements.

By 1960s, moreover, when a majority of Africans were free from alien rule, these men represented the dominant base of the new leaders of independent Africa. The new status of Africa that began to emerge as from the late 1950s was the

¹Ibid. This is based on analyses of ANPA's activities and goals as well as Pan-African orientations in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. Particularly important are the obvious reversed relationships within a continuum of the frameworks, that is, between the current patterns and earlier ones. For example, see Osedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement; Geiss, Pan-African Movement; and in Shepperson, "Notes."

consummation of the union between the descendants of slaves and Western-educated Africans abroad.¹

Given these antecedents, it is instructive to place the redemptive missions of ANPA to the Nigerian homelands within the historiography of Pan-Africanism. That its leadership leans more favorably toward the Jewish and Asian models should not negate where the true historical essence emanated. Even where ANPA rarely refers to earlier Pan-Africanist antecedents, its similarities are irrefutable.²

Of far greater significance is that differences in historical cycles, as evident in the renewed Euro-African contacts, strongly suggest that ANPA and other Nigerian representative organizations in the diaspora—have finally entered into an era of sustainable interaction within the Western world. This might even represent one of the strongest bridges of controllable exchanges and development linking the diaspora of colonialism and the homeland in the twenty-first century.

Summary

The Nigerian immigrant community in America began largely with students' immigrants between the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This background later formed the core of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism. Between mid-1980s and 1990s, Nigerians further consolidated their American build-up through successive waves of chain immigrations. This represented the first sustained historic concentration of voluntary waves of Nigerians since the demise of slavery and colonialism. This development was influenced by the historical and political cycles of black America,

¹Ibid.; Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp. 24-32.

²Ibid.

as well as by the policies of two American presidencies: Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.

The Nigerian immigrant community is more operative within the African-American context, both as a natural impulse of its ancestral relationship as well as an imperative of racial identity. The African-American context provided the strongest arm in the contextual development of Nigerian immigrant community as well as in the general transformation of Nigerians. Within this context, the Nigerian churches and American-born offspring of Nigerians are the most identifiable arms of ancestral relationships with African-Americans. In adjusting into the American mosaic, Nigerians almost unconsciously recreated patterns of socioeconomic and cultural survival identifiable among African-Americans after freedom from slavery.

The five major leadership models widely in use among Nigerian immigrants within the U.S. and toward the development of the homeland are: (1) Ethnic Conscious-type Leadership (2) Elected-type Leadership (3) Women-type Leadership (4) Nigerian-American Youth-type Leadership, and (5) Representative Professional-Type Leadership. The strongest components of Representative Professional-Type Leadership of Nigerian immigrants are the Attorney-Type Leadership and the Physician-Type Leadership. The major ideological outlines of the Physician-Type Leadership of Nigerian immigrants are basic recreations of earlier redemptive platforms of black America toward ancestral Africa.

CHAPTER 5

THE EXTENT OF INCORPORATION OF NIGERIANS: A NEW SOCIO-CULTURAL MILIEU IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter explains how Nigerian immigrants are being incorporated into American society. It also contains some explanation of their socio-cultural context and experience. The chapter emphasizes that the incorporation of Nigerian immigrants into society is more favorable to their offspring; that their socio-cultural experience is similar to that of the descendants of slaves; and that their impressive educational status is more favorable to economic incorporation. Additionally, it explains the effects of American institutions on indigenous Nigerian marriages, along with the struggles between tradition and changes, the emerging inter-generational crises of the Nigerian offspring—their relationships with black America and the Nigerian homeland—as well as with mainstream America, etc.

Part 1: Re-creative Patterns of Inter-Ethnic and Intra-Racial Class Conflict

The enormous achievements and crises that resulted from the successful adjustment of Nigerian immigrants into the American mosaic, which we saw in Chapter 4, have then to be explained in relation to the changes that began to affect both their African and American foundations. This implies understanding the extent to which the continuing crisis of American slavery and colonialism either facilitated or constrained the spirit of collective unison among the Nigerian settlers, as well as of relations with African-Americans. On the other hand, it implies seeking some

understanding of the basic commonalities and differences in the historical relationships between African-Americans and the Nigerian settlers in America.

The preceding emphasis can be explained in terms of the differing but somewhat closely related histories of America's immigrants since the birth of the new republic. This requires as an understanding of the bittersweet experiences of some branches of ethnic America. Every generation of its settlers has experienced as well as shared in the bittersweet struggle of crossing the waters of the Atlantic to find a new home. Mostly economic and political as well as religious compulsions have combined to embolden the human or racial varieties associated with crossing the Atlantic to this land of freedom and opportunity. Within this context lies the notion of an American dream. The aspiration to be an American and to benefit from its enormous bounties, historian Countryman tells us, has been as related as markedly dissimilar for the White, Red, and Black races who were enjoined at the core of the "Collision of Histories."¹

What then constitutes the concept of historical collision in A Country of Strangers² has an added bearing on the character of post-emancipation settlers from Europe, Asia, and Africa in America. Of course, in similar albeit varying degrees, their strivings for the American dream have often varied both in historical periods as well as in the available opportunities for those who came and continue to come. This is the case because each definitive historical era of American immigration has always been influenced by the attitude of its earlier and much newer generations of

¹Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories, pp. xi-xii, 4-9, 83.

²David K. Shieler, A Country of Strangers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).

settlers. The general politico-cultural milieu shaping their diverse characteristics has also always played an important role in their strivings for success.

On the other hand, of course, what has continued to be an exceptional fact of human prospects among the newer breed of foreign-born settlers in America since the Civil War—even for descendants of slaves—is not that the possibility of the American dream is not accessible, nor that the chances for its material opulence are no more available. For example, given the current status of West Africa, where a majority of the descendants of slaves came from, it would perhaps be wrong to argue that they have not fared much better in America. For, indeed they have, despite the continuing crisis.¹

So, the sometimes gruesome struggle among America's immigrants for its "dream" is not only exceptional to the peculiar complexities surrounding the experience of the descendants of slaves. But there is a difference: the latter were forced into America against their will. The same emphasis, however the revolving crisis of racial indifference in America, would seem inappropriate for the new generation of mostly voluntary immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, accordingly, Americans of varying cultural backgrounds have confronted almost a similar problem. With time and sustained support, as well as experience, they were able to adopt or to re-adopt the values of the Old World to sooth themselves in the new settings.

But, as historian Countryman points out, because the peculiar traits of the black experience bore the deeper bruises resulting from the collision of histories,

¹This position is fully supported by current status of Black America compared to West Africa. It is also supported by the literature in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

some enduring negative effects have persisted against the descendants of slaves.¹ This development has strong bearing on the expressed lanes of some development currently shaping the relationship between two historic generations of African settlers in America. Due to the peculiar character of the black experience during and after slavery, Nigerian immigrants are susceptible to almost the same pattern of crisis within the mosaic that has historically affected their ancestral kin. This is the crisis of “racial otherness” based on the effects of both the earlier and continuing conflict of historical collision. This is a problem that might escape most other non-European immigrants who are not African descended.

Consequently, raising the particular concern regarding the inordinate-subordinate status of American blacks as political scientist Jennings has done, for example,² suggests that assimilating or incorporating Nigerians into American society is likely to be problematic. The Nigerian context may offer insights that could defy earlier theories of inter-group assimilation of ethnic America.

First, as noted earlier, the inter-generational attribute of American slavery explains the socio-cultural context of Nigerian immigrants. Second, it also explains the nature of the tenuous relationships that often find expression in some of the attitudes of Nigerians and African-Americans. Third, and perhaps of far greater significance, it offers a basis for explaining the extensions of historical crises involving two generations of Africans in America, along with the attitudes

¹See earlier notes on Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories. Also, see Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4.

²Jennings, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America, pp. 144-154. Also, see earlier notes on the socio-cultural context of ANPA professionals in America.

influencing their social crises.¹ That Nigerians succeeded in adjusting into the American mosaic, must then be viewed as a remarkable historical feat. For, their success, as we also saw earlier, was shaped by the generational experience of the descendants of slaves.²

By early 1990s, the Nigerian phenomenon had its most direct bearing by how some Nigerian immigrants sought to employ the moral foundations of the American republic to advance their collective interest. These Nigerians, seeking to identify and redirect their diverse interests within the mosaic—just as their forebears had done after slavery—enshrined their faith in the possibilities of American dreams. Their faith offered some insight into the fact that, unless the moral foundation of America was re-summoned, their collective stability would very likely be indeterminate.

To these Nigerians, moreover, the enormous gains of being a part of the American dream were immeasurable. This is the understanding that gets across in a book written by a Nigerian entitled, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time: A Step by Step Program for the Radical Transformation of America.³ In this book, Dr. Azuonye goes as far as pointing out the virtues of America, calling for an understanding of the underlying wisdom of its Founding Fathers. He argues that America must confront and resolve some of its internal problems in order to secure the well-being of its varied albeit beloved peoples within the existing republican principles.

¹Ibid. Also, see Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Sanford J. Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 258-9. Also, see Chapters 1-4 of this dissertation.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. vii, 117-118; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 26, 40-1. Also, see Chapter 4 and 6 of this dissertation.

³Ikechukwu O. Azuonye, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time: A Step by Step Program for the Radical Transformation of America (New York: Vantage Press, 1992).

Clearly, the process proposed by Azuonye seems designed to ease the existing historical tensions among the American races, particularly for Nigerians. He argues that America's truest greatness requires finding a realistic solution to the ongoing cycles of racial crises, moral decadence, and involvements in foreign wars.¹

According to Azuonye, America must abandon the unhealthy program of global intervention, thus retrieving itself from the role of a world policeman. Overextensions, he argues, have drifted America from realizing its historic destiny of being the truest evidence of human nobility and beauty.² So Azuonye documents that,

I suspect that part of the answer we seek will come by way of another shot at the melting pot. Whether this will result from the expansion of cross-racial marriages or from some other factor operating in the environment, I am unable to predict, but the overall effect of possible future changes could be a new, unifying, and distinct American identity—not European, African, “Native American,” or Asian—but an *entirely new aspect of consciousness* of a people.³

As, for example, the legacy of the Founding Fathers of American nation, Azuonye believes that,

If the people of the United States should at this time rededicate themselves to the expression in everyday life of the full potential of the Great Documents of their nation and apply themselves to the exploration and development of their mental and physical potentialities, society will certainly develop in wonderful directions which we are at present unable to predict... We can certainly envision a people whose character will be most exemplary, whose technology will grow to exceed the wildest imaginings of science fiction writers, whose government will be just and balanced, a people noble and cultured beyond all others on earth, a society serving as a model for the crest of the world to follow.⁴

¹Azuonye, America the Beautiful in Our Life Time, pp. vii-29.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 85.

⁴Azuonye, America the Beautiful, p. 85.

Even unconsciously, the Azuonye position, to be sure, is a basic recreation of the ideological summons of the descendants of American slaves. At nearly all the crucial intersections of their struggle for an equal place, they have called upon their former enslavers and the larger nation-state to honor the noble credo of the Declaration of Independence. In other words, the Azuonye parlance is another expression of the existence of conflict at the core of sustained incorporation of Nigerians into American society. For, admittedly, unless the conditions alluded to by this Nigerian physician turned activist are removed, an equal place within the American mosaic for such a handicapped immigrant group like Nigerians is, as we hinted earlier, uncertain.

Answers to the concerns raised by Dr. Azuonye can then be explained by understanding of how Nigerians are being incorporated into American society. Like native-born blacks, Nigerians who succeeded in adjusting into American mosaic, recognized that the “physical and permanent fact of color,” was and is still a strong barrier against favorable contextual incorporation.¹

So, in America, observes Igboanugo, discrimination is “generally undercarpet, but mostly evident.” Citing a typical dramatic example at Utah, he points to how a “white woman got up and changed seats after realizing she was sitting next to “a woman of color.”² This further confirms the extent to which the general socio-cultural context of Nigerians is being shaped by the generational attributes of the descendants of American slaves.

¹Ibid.; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, pp. 357-9; Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, pp. 14-15; Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, pp. 19, 110.

²Ibid., Igboanugo, p. 16.

Sometimes, however, these attributes are more pronounced toward Nigerians who have been able to acquire an American niche. At other times, however, even their American success reinforces their instability within the brethren's communities. Alternately, it is this same background that encourages some of the magnanimous accounts of success stories among the few more fortunate Nigerians over the masses of their less fortunate brethren.¹ Sometimes accounts of the success stories of Nigerian immigrants against a growing tide of racial resentment follows almost a similar pattern of make-beliefs identified among African-Americans by sociologist Franklin Frazier in the decades after their emancipation from chattel slavery.²

For, indeed, in nearly all aspects of their American evolution, one finds such features as exaggerated sense of Nigerian success stories that bear strong resemblance to the earlier experience of their ancestral kin, as well as to their general state of powerlessness and contextual insecurity. Except however in one area, and that is: Nigerian immigrants have more intimate certainty about their native and national roots than their ancestral kin.³ Otherwise their social context exudes with exaggerated myth of success driven almost by the same socio-cultural denigration and ostracism that once confronted the descendants of slaves.⁴

There is a basis then for surmising that the socio-cultural attributes of most Nigerians have merged with those of the descendants of slaves. These are capable of

¹Udofia, Research Report, pp. 38-40.

²E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (New York and London: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997), pp. 174-238; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait, pp. 81, 90-2, 94-7; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 19; Ogbaa, Nigerian Americans, pp. 138-167.

³Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. 433-5.

⁴Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie, pp. 174-238.

sustaining the bond between the two related and affected groups, depending, though, on the attitudes of the mainstream agenda. On the other hand, these attitudes can sometimes be helpful to further understanding of the peculiar similarities and dissimilarities between the black experience in Africa and America.¹

Among Nigerian immigrants, as for their African-American kin, the problem of make-beliefs—which we noted earlier, along with its exaggerated sense of success—is further exacerbated by inter-ethnic class struggle. The extension of this problem lies in the fact that, despite their good education and hence huge gains in median income, as also in the general placement of the black African skilled immigrants, they still occupy an unequal status among America's newcomers.²

Whether for Nigerian immigrants, as a specific group or for the entire black African immigrants, the problem of inter-ethnic class struggle is closely tied to their unequal racial status in the diaspora, and back in the homeland. This background, which was first ordained during the historical cycle of racial slavery, has followed a similar trend during and after colonial dispossession. Since then, it has continued to retain its arduous effects on Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans despite the

¹For example, in 1994, scholars in The Bell Curve took a position that confirmed the existence of "Ethnic Difference in Cognitive Ability" as well as "How . . . African Americans compare with Blacks in Africa on Cognitive Tests" (pp. 288-9). Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, pp. 90-7; Landry, America at Century's End, pp. 202-3; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Judy Pamphile, "Education in America: African Americans vs.: African and Caribbean Immigrants," in Scholars of the Twenty-first Century: End of Year Research Reports, Spring 2005 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, August 30, 2005), pp. 1-3; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 2-4.

²Ibid. Author, Invisible Sojourners, 45-8; Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional Community Profile (Atlanta, Georgia: The Atlanta Regional Commission, 1994), pp. 1-2; Cindy Rodriguez, "Study Shows U.S. Blacks Trailing Immigrants from Africa, Caribbean," The Boston Globe (February 17, 2003).

huge gains of freedom.¹ The stringent measure of identity crises as well as of complex inter-and-intra-cultural adjustments identified by sociologist Ira Reid more than fifty years ago among the early waves of Negro immigrants in America remains unchanged.² For Nigerian immigrants, with the largest sub-Saharan African population base, this problem of inter-class conflict has further exacerbated their inherent fragile unity. With racial ambivalence, Nigerian immigrants—like their related sub-Saharan counterparts—maintain one of the most detached associations within the mosaic with American institutions.

Perhaps the above explains why most Nigerian immigrants often see themselves as “outsiders” in America. Similarly, it explains why economic gains remain the strongest emblem of their American sojourn. Authur tells us that, as outsiders, Africans identify themselves as “foreigner.” For, in their view, “even if they achieve the highest social mobility in the United States, they will continue to experience problems with integration... because of their skin color.”³

As Authur further argues, the educational advantages of the black African migrants are not explicable to a favorable degree of assimilation. The inherent crisis of their racial background, he points out, explains why most of them engage in the host society selectively as well as confine “their activities to carefully constructed zones, mainly educational and economic..... for survival in this country.”⁴ This probably best explains why a majority of sub-Saharan immigrants sometimes defined

¹For example, Robin Blackburn in his New World Slavery (pp. 3-5) has an excellent observation on the negative impact of chattel slavery on African-descended races.

²Reid, The Negro Immigrant, p. Research Report, pp. 25, 29-30.

³Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 73-4.

⁴Ibid.

their relations with black America either as separate or as approximate as both the internal and external fractures of the black base allow.¹ The type of identification indicated here strongly suggests that the enduring socio-cultural attributes of racial slavery have some defining effects on how Nigerians—as the largest black African base in America—perceived their contextual crisis and attempted to re-construct their relationships with the descendants of slaves.²

Woldemikael and Authur have both pointed out that the problem of differentiated histories of the black experience corresponded with the cultural ironies of their varied regions under alien influences.³ For example, in reference to black Africa, Authur argues that a majority of its immigrants in America came from countries where they controlled almost all aspects of their social organizations. While in America, however, their approach to the black-white racial divide has to be extremely cautious.⁴

This background perhaps best explains why they were more likely to censure their relationship toward African-Americans. Also, it might explain why their attachment to the American mosaic is mostly defined by the quest for economic survival.⁵ These emphases are important for understanding some of the claims about

¹Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4; Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, pp. 19, 110; Jennings, *Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America*, pp. 144-154; Milton Vickerman, "West Indian Adaptation: The Role of Cross Pressures," in *Trotter Review: Immigration, Ethnicity, and the Black Community in the United States*, ed., James Jennings (Boston: William Monroe Trotter Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston, Summer 1996), pp. 6-8.

²Ibid.

³Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4; Woldemikael, *Becoming Black American*, pp. 1-5, 38-42.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

the effectiveness of some racial traits.¹ For, ultimately, the fact that most immigrants do better in America than while in their country of birth may not always be based on their solid educational status or effective racial and cultural traits. Sometimes there seems to be a natural inclination among humans to re-adopt more effectively for success in far removed regions; sometimes this happens more favorably among distant cultural groups than necessarily the case within well-known environments. This development is perhaps most likely to occur where the socio-cultural unities among varying groups are as internally and externally volatile, as are evident in the loose and obviously detached racial amalgam of the American races.

Perhaps we can safely conclude at this point that the rigid feature of intra-racial tenacity surrounding the struggle of American races has also an equal effect on the inter-class conflict of the black African immigrants. That the Nigerian or the black African labor migrants have high expectations for economic survival via education is, therefore, unsurprising—as Judy Pamphile argues.² The dividend here has some bearing to their Old background in Africa. Compared to native-born blacks, where education is sometimes susceptible to the adversarial policies of institutions, the resulting dividends are also likely to be less favorable.³

The evidences then are supportive that Nigerians who benefited from good education are susceptible to very little sustained incorporation into American society. This might suggest some over-emphasis in the effectiveness of the middlemen

¹For example, earlier notes on Sowell and D' Souza in Chapter 1.

²Judy Pamphile, "Education in America: African Americans vs. African and Caribbean Immigrants," pp. 1-3.

³Ibid.

minorities,¹ where neither the high median income nor excellent educational status of Nigerians, for example, guarantees acceptance or favorable degree of institutional assistance.²

Overall, however, the preceding might mean much for understanding the effectiveness of the middlemen minorities. For example, it is quite likely that their cross-cultural effectiveness over native-born black Americans or the black African migrants was sometimes based on exploiting the inordinate-subordinate status of both the former and latter racial groups. Thus, the success or failure of some groups is neither always clearly inherent in their cultural vitality nor inaction but probably due more to the dominant politico-cultural forces shaping the collision of the varied histories of the American races.³ Surprisingly, the effectiveness of the middlemen minorities—as explored in the context of race and culture—is rarely viewed as also embedded in the bittersweet socio-cultural experiences of marginalized racial minorities.⁴ Authur and Woldemikael noted that the white-black historical tensions

¹See for instance Authur, Invisible Sojourner, p. 3; Cordell and Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants, pp. 4-5; Research Report, pp. 13-19; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, Chapter 3, especially, pp. 83-6; Pamphile, "Education in America: African Americans vs. African and Caribbean Immigrants," pp. 1-3; Cindy Rodriguez, "Study Shows U.S. Blacks Trailing immigrants from Africa, Caribbean." For effectiveness of ethnic middlemen minorities' racial/cultural traits, see Sowell, Race and Culture, Chapters 1-2, especially pp. 32-58; D'Souza, The End of Racism, pp. 472-3.

²Ibid. Also, see for example, earlier notes on the median income status of African immigrants, along with their educational classification, as well as related socio-cultural crises.

³See earlier notes on Countryman, A Collision of Histories. Also, based on Jennings' "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," pp. 144-154, it is unlikely that some of the emphases, for example, in Race and Culture: A World View, "Introduction" and Chapters 1-2—especially, pp. 46-58, 141-144—are tenable in all phases.

⁴Ibid.; Sowell, pp. 32-46; D' Souza, The End of Racism, pp. 410-421.

were capable of tilting even similarly related and affected black migrants against their collective interest and certainly against native-born blacks.¹

The above goes to say that, while the effectiveness of the middlemen minorities and their cultural and racial traits are obvious enough in America, the overwhelming emphases on their successes are sometimes over stretched. Jennings has noted the extent to which the social experience of black Americans is influenced by officially sanctioned acts of institutionalized racism and discrimination.² This seems to be the type of occurrence enhancing the effectiveness of ethnic minorities.

Part 2: The Extent of Incorporation of Nigerians in America

Admittedly, the crisis of America's incorporation of foreign-born groups can also be explained by understanding the extent to which each historical era has either positively or negatively shaped the pace in which its settlers were/are able to transform their identities. This background, to say the least, is generally unfavorable to the black migrants—especially those from Africa south of the Sahara. For, this region is where the residual effects of the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism still have the strongest opposition to modernization and human development. Except, however, for the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria,³ most Nigerians are not accredited as possessing the racial and cultural traits likely to result in a higher orbit of human

¹Tekle Mariam Woldemikael, Becoming Black American: Haitians and American Institutions in Evanston, Illinois (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1989), pp. 1-5, 35-42; Vickerman, "West Indian Adaptation: The Role of Cross Pressures," pp. 4-8; Gemima M. Remy, "Haitian Immigrants and African American Relations," in Trotter Review, pp. 14-16; ; Author, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

²Ibid.; Sowell, Race and Culture, pp. 32-46; D'Souza, End of Racism, pp. 420-421; Jennings, "Conclusion: Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Conflict in the United States," pp. 144-154.

³Sowell, Race and Culture, p. 239; Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, pp. 27-8, 228, 368; D'Souza, The End of Racism, p. 473

development in their current status of American sojourn. Such have been the obvious suggestions made in the massive examination of cultural and racial traits by some scholars.¹

Sowell and D'Souza have praised the effectiveness of the cultural traits of the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria. Accordingly, they argued that, through hard work and acceptance of the lures of Western education, the Ibos have been able to transform themselves to higher status of human development.² Substantially, however, there is validity that the Ibos—once backward to the Yorubas of Southwestern Nigeria, for instance, later embraced Western education more openly as to benefit from its accumulative blessings—both economically and politically. It cannot therefore be denied that, with colonial contact, the Ibos began to respond more positively to the values of Western education.

One of the finest explanations of the status of Ibos and of their striving for modern development during the colonial era is found in Professor Emmanuel Ayandele's Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society. This book offers some useful insight into the fact that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the first Ibo to have a university degree in the “thirties of the twentieth century,” studied in the United States.³

Yet, to be sure, by the 1870s, the Yorubas had already established evidences of highly sophisticated class of Western-educated elites in medicine, law, literature,

¹Ibid., Migrations and Cultures, pp. 1-49.

²Ibid.; Sowell, Race and Culture, p. 239; D'Souza, The End of Racism, p. 473; Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, p. 46.

³Ayandele, Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, p. 14; John Iliffe, Honour in African History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 316-317.

linguistics, mathematics, poetry, musicology—including the first modern black African Bishop—to mention but a few.¹ Elsewhere, however, this Ibo-Yoruba strand in the making of modern Nigeria was sharpened by the contrast between Western European education and American education. For example, the Yoruba educated elites were mostly of the British and Western European backgrounds. To a certain extent, it was the backwardness of Ibos at a certain historical juncture that made their choice of American education more meaningful. Therefore the education of “Azikiwe” in the U.S. represented a pioneering phase of post-Second World War, and later still, even of the post-1960s immigration of most Nigerians to this country.² Between 1930s and 1950s, the Ibos had successfully upset their regional handicaps, emerging as challengers to the Yoruba,³ and even surpassing them in some instances. This background corresponded with the successive waves of mostly Ibo-led immigration from Nigeria to the U.S., both before and after decolonization.⁴

And, again, both the colonial and post-colonial phases of Ibo-led immigration to the U.S. reflected features of those of their pre-colonial era under the slave trade. Their populations as forced migrants from the Niger Delta basins and the Cross river to the New World were the largest during the eighteenth and early decades of the nineteenth centuries. Nor, furthermore, should it be forgotten that Ibo slaves were among the largest ethnic groups in the Chesapeake region of mainland North America. At other times, however, they were among the most susceptible to slave

¹Ibid.

²Coleman, *Nigeria Background to Nationalism*, pp. 220-4, 264-7. See the demography of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. in Chapter 3.

³Ibid.; Achebe, *The Trouble with Nigeria*, p.46.

⁴For example, see the explanations in Chapter 3 of this dissertation; *Research Report*, pp. 12-29; “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 95-102.

revolts. Later still, moreover, Olaudah Equiano, the West African slave—the earliest embodiment of black abolitionist ferment—was an Ibo.¹

After about four centuries of American slavery, the Ibos again constituted the core ethnic group among the largely voluntary post-colonial settlers in America from Nigeria. From the First to the Second World War eras to the 1980s, for example, the pattern of the Ibo admiration for Western education, along with their attraction to American immigration, had not changed. Rather, since then, it has simply been strengthened and further transformed. As we observed earlier and also saw in Chapters 2 and 3, the general thrust of immigration from Southeastern region of modern Nigeria to the U.S. followed the pattern established during the forced migration. But during the colonial era, it was the pioneering influence of a Southeastern Nigerian, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe—an Ibo, that opened American immigration to Nigerians who sojourned for Western education.² As far as post-colonial (1960s-1990s) Nigerian immigration to the U.S. is concerned, the Ibo regional and cultural traits were among the most dynamic in the making of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism.³

Where then do the admirable Ibo-cultural traits stand in the context of American incorporation? Do their much praised cultural traits yield toward favorable or unfavorable patterns of American incorporation? First, to begin with, as

¹Ibid. Chapter 3, especially the explanations of the demography of Nigerian-West African background of mainland North American slaves. Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 6-10; Horton and Horton, Hard Road to Freedom, pp. 7, 12; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, p. 145.

²Ibid. Also, see Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, pp. 220-4, 247).

³This is supported by explanation of the waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Also, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation for some details on the earlier phase of Ibos during the forced migration.

we have shown so far, and, as we shall see again in related explanations in both chapters 6 and 7, post-colonial build-up of the Ibos in America—despite their hard work, adaptive and re-adaptive cultural skills—is still being affected by the inherent crisis of their racial otherness. Given the identifiable crisis of race in American civilization, this further suggests that the basis for incorporating the enormous talents of the Ibos into the American republic is problematic. For their good status on hard work is rarely the highway to sustained incorporation. Second, and perhaps due more to the peculiar crisis of racial indifference, the Ibos are likely to be foremost among Nigerians noted by the host country and related institutions, whether truly or falsely, among the major culprits in socially deviant behaviors.¹

From the foregoing, we can re-confirm our earlier conclusion: that is, for the core base of Nigerian or the black African migrants in America, economic and educational successes are more favorable to selective incorporation.² Aside from their inclination toward the American black base, Nigerians exhibit a form of segregated incorporation patterned after the experience of the descendants of slaves.

If the preceding emphases are correct, then, the fact that Nigerians are seeking American citizenship in far greater numbers than previously does not necessarily mean that their American foothold at this point is secure. Nigerian immigrants have one of the most constrained accesses to institutional support. As Portes and Rumbaut have observed, one of the key factors in effective development

¹This is based on an examination of the national profiles of deviant social behaviors in which Nigeria and Nigerians have become noted for in the U.S.

²Nigerian immigrants—as a specific group—have the largest share of the black African labor migrants mirrored, for example, by Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-5, 25, 46-8.

of an immigrant group is the extent to which a seating government and its related institutions are willing to support them.¹

The preceding position is reasonable largely because it is closely associated with the success of the newcomers in America. However, the trouble is that such an attitude is rarely associated with the official policies that most American institutions have toward Nigerians as a specific group. Nor is it associated with their attitude toward the broader base of the black African migrants' struggles for survival in America. The result then is that Nigerians are cognizant in "their heart of hearts that the odds are against them."² Like African-Americans, these Nigerians not only fall into the peculiar categories of the more "visible minorities," they are indeed among the racially defined minorities whose share of self-definition and identities are among the most affected.³ Nigerians are therefore cognizant that the hurdles are against them and that their more distinctive racial features would neither change over night nor encourage favorable incorporation into the host society. Unlike other non-European people of color, "their skin color, accent, natural orientation," are some of the features that affect respectable participation in American society.⁴

Consequently, in the absence institutional support, Nigerian immigrants suffer from pluralistic and socio-cultural biases associated with their vulnerable and

¹Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, Chapter 3, especially, pp. 83-6.

²Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 14-15; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 73-5.

³Probably, the general background employed by Mary Waters in her illuminating essay had its strongest applicability to Nigerian/African immigrants. See, for example, her essay entitled, "Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?" in Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in America, eds., Silvia Pedraza and Ruben G. Rumbaut (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1996), p. 447.

⁴Ibid.; also, Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 14-15; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 73-5.

powerless racial status. Just as this vulnerable status reinforces their exploitation of the black base its alternate effect exposes them to exploitation among the more fortunate hierarchies of the American races.¹ This suggests again that deep-seated socio-cultural stress could explain why Nigerians are least likely to have respectable collaboration with American institutions, or even with the less fortunate branches of the races of color. This does not even include the more fortunate races of color or the more distinctive and subtle ramparts of mainstream America.

As we saw earlier, the same crisis as above influenced how Nigerians made some key decisions on race matters. It also corresponded with their scare to fully Americanize, or to openly embrace ancestral bond with African-Americans. Like their counterparts from the Caribbean, while generally sympathetic toward native-born black Americans, they are willing to exploit their vulnerability purely for contextual survival. At other times, however, this could result in their willingness to detach their distances from their ancestral kin. That they don't want to be like their kin is not because they feel anything different; rather it is because of the desire to insulate their consciousness from the stress of an unchanging inter-generational experience.² This crisis has a lot to do with which model is viable for an effective incorporation of ethnic America into the mosaic. For, none of the three models of

¹Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, pp. 7-10; Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America, especially Chapter 3, pp. 83-6; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Jennings, "Racial Hierarchies;" Percy C. Hintzen and Jean M. Rahier, eds., Problematizing Blackness Self-Ethnographies by Black Immigrants to the United States (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 26-30.

²Ibid. Remy, "Haitian Immigrants and African American Relations: Ethnic Dilemmas in Racially Stratified Society," in Trotter Review, pp. 14-15. Also, see for example: Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, pp. 3-4; Alejandro Portes and A. Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

generic pluralist inter-group relations identified by James Davis, for example—as cultural, structural, and political—is clearly favorable either to Nigerian or to the larger base of the black Africans in America.¹

Therefore, the notion of American assimilation for some skilled class of Nigerian immigrants—as identified by April Gordon is uncertain—if as he also tells us, their relationship within the brethren’s communities is marked by subtle forms of detached relations or distancing.² The prospect of an American assimilation is more likely to be shaped by favorable historical settings, sustained and shared communal institutions among related groups, and the support of mainstream institutions. These factors, as we noted earlier, were/are least favorable to either the Nigerian or the entire bloc of the black African migrants. Gordon’s position appears then to have misunderstood the vital requirement of the relationship between assimilation and collective communal solidarity.³

The incorporation of Nigerian indices into American society should then be measured against the inter-generational constraints confronting the descendants of slaves after freedom.⁴ The status of black Americans, as once perceived by Haitian immigrants, is almost similar to that of Nigerians.⁵ As Igboanugo documents, although “African Americans have been here for centuries,” and have made

¹Ibid. F. James Davis, Minority-Dominant Relations: A Sociological Analysis (Arlington Heights, Illinois: A H M Publishing, 1979), pp. 152-4.

²Gordon, Nigeria’s Diverse Peoples, p. 237.

³Ibid.

⁴Woldemikael, Becoming Black American, pp. 1-5, 35-42; Landry, America at Century’s End, pp. 202-3; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 39-43; 211-219, 303-4. Vickerman, “West Indian Adaptation,” p. 7; Remy, “Haitian Immigrants and African American Relations,” p. 15.

⁵Ibid.

enormous progress during their long period of inculcation into Western mores, “not much difference” has occurred in the attitude of most whites toward them.¹

Among Nigerians in the diaspora, it is obvious that the experience of racial otherness has further sharpened their unequal status as well as their built-in pattern of socio-cultural stratification. Igboanugo argues that back in Nigeria, there is class discrimination, ethnic preferential treatment, and religious fundamentalism, but the consciousness of race is taboo.² “Racial prejudice in the U.S. is in a class by itself.” This is where “one is loathed, hated, and put down, and sometimes killed for his or her race.” While “racial discrimination has been outlawed,” racial prejudice has not.³ So the volatile incorporation of Nigerian immigrants into the American society is undeniable. As we pointed out earlier, this phenomenon corresponded with rigorous class conflict, resulting as well, in their distorted displays of make-beliefs about American successes. Ironically, while some have achieved an American niche, such does not necessarily correspond with a desire to want to live and die in America.⁴

On the other hand, however, the example of American support for Ethiopian immigrants during the early stages of their American sojourn contrasted sharply with similar effort toward other groups. This attitude appears to be more pronounced toward African immigrants from regions where a majority of the forced migrants were taken.⁵

¹Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 14; Sowell, Preferential Policies, pp. 69-76.

³Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 15; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 73-5.

⁴This is based on summary of the field work undertaken in this dissertation.

⁵Ungar, Fresh Blood: The New American Immigrants, p. 259.

The preceding development seems to have some effects on the sometimes tenuous relationships between Ethiopians and their West African counterparts. This is also linked to some of the indifferences one finds between them and native-born black Americans. Given the sustained hierarchical inequalities surrounding the black base, Ethiopian immigrants have sometimes claimed that they were neither Africans nor required to publicly identify with African-Americans.¹ Undoubtedly, the Ethiopian attitude is further supportive of the volatile socio-cultural context of an American world incorporation of the black African migrants.

Africans tend then to be incorporated into the American mosaic from a north to east to south to west thrust of the races of continental Africa. This appears to correspond with the reversed pattern from the south-north thrust to a north-south downward contraction of ancient lanes of exchanges along Afro-Asian, which we illuminated much earlier.²

For example, in the U.S., Africans from Northern Africa, particularly those favored by physical Mediterranean bloodline—are more likely to be accorded favorable incorporation. The Ethiopians of East Africa appear to be next in line. Generally, the greater the inclination toward Afro-Asiatic bloodstream and cultures the more secure seems to be the American foothold of the black African migrants.

South African blacks are likely to trail their counterparts from both Northern and Eastern Africa despite sustained contacts with Western Europeans. Black South Africa's most favorable point of an American incorporation lies squarely in black

¹Ibid., pp. 263-6; Jennings, Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America, pp. 144-154; Remy, "Haitian Immigrants," pp. 14-15.

²For example, see earlier references in Chapters 2 and Chapter 3.

America. The weakest lanes of Africa's incorporation into the American mosaic comprised West and Central Africans. They are mostly from the cultural regions where the transatlantic slave trade had its most devastating effects. But ironically, these comprised the most educated base of the black African migrants, and certainly one of the most educated of American foreign-born settlers.

The above thus imposes a certain difficulty in gauging what kind of American assimilation the Nigerian offspring are likely to have in the succeeding generation of their American transformation. Other evidences, however, suggest that some positive prospects in the U.S.-Nigerian relations are currently being poised via the Nigerian-African offspring. This is largely due to the fact that the chances of their incorporation into American society are much better than that of their parents.¹

We hope to show again slightly down this chapter that, if properly harnessed, the inter-generational molecules of the Nigerian offspring can be of enormous benefits to both black America and black Africa, as well as to Euro-America. Their socio-cultural features could very well serve as one of the most sustainable bridges of interactive and intra-active exchanges and partnerships within the American as well as the larger global context in the twenty-first century.

Part 3: A New Socio-cultural Milieu for Nigerian Immigrants in America

Aside from the problem of incorporating Nigerians into American society, there was also the related one of changing cycles of cultural impact during the 1980s and 1990s. The underlying emphases all along suggest that success in assembling

¹"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 266-270.

and transforming Nigerian indices within the American mosaic was either favorable or unfavorable depending on how the new climate of intra-socio-cultural interactions affected the newcomers from Nigeria. The problem then emanated from the extent to which the cultural features of the American free institutions affected the traditional beliefs of Nigerian immigrants, as the newest of America's newcomers. From the mid-1980s onward, both in their marital and inter-generational circuits, Nigerian immigrants confronted problems that were inherently American.¹

For, indeed, prior to the late 1970s, Nigerian female spouses did not have to be long in America before realizing that they owed it both to themselves as well as to the traditional values of the homeland to stand faithfully behind their husbands in the struggle to acquire education. This was when both the female and male spouses owed it to each other and to their collective future in America to work as a close unit toward a meaningful future back in Nigeria after their studies. During this period, it was not therefore unusual for most Nigerian students desiring to be well connected back in the homeland to bring their wives to America for further education. This option was even more rewarding both economically and socially in a status infested climate of modern Nigeria. Even the few, who desired to settle down in America after studies, also depended on the marital traditions of the homeland. However, for those with children, the cultural values of the homeland were equally influential in the orientation of their offspring.²

¹Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, pp. 25-6.

²This is based on interviews along with my examination of the patterns of Nigerian immigration to America

Probably the first two decades of settlement of Nigerians in America were favorably linked to, as well as, supported by the marital values and traditions of the homeland. During those early decades, the union of Nigerian female-spouses with their male counterparts was often a sort of compromise: married female spouses became the economic, cultural, and moral foundations upon which the success of their student-husbands rested. Aside from other family pressures on the Nigerian female spouses—especially those pertaining to the welfare of their offspring—the traditions of the homeland required them to be fully supportive of their husbands.¹

Very few Nigerian students' marriages would have succeeded between the 1960s and 1970s without the strong marital traditions of the homeland tying both the female and male spouses in their respective family households into a cohesive union.² Those who succeeded without the support of their female spouses were very few. Just as the husbands had to work from dawn to dusk as full-time students to bring their wives/fiancés to America, these wives often reciprocated those efforts while safely in America.³

By mid-1980s, however, things had begun to change. First, with the corresponding influences of American institutions, Nigerian marriages were beginning to reveal vigorous signs of contextual stress. Second, with this problem began the erosion of traditional loyalty between husbands and wives. The effects

¹For example, John Authur, in his *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 117-120, made some observations which, in a very general sense, revealed the working attitude and re-adaptive skills of the Nigerian homeland among some female spouses. I believe those features were of enormous advantage to their male spouses during the early decades of their American sojourn.

²Ibid. "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 147-152.

³Ibid. p. 151.

were such that some Nigerians seeking longer-term economic survival began to look away from their home-bred pairs as spouses.

By early 1990s some Nigerians had entered into marriages with Americans, rather than accepting indigenous choices that were least likely to be of immediate socioeconomic and cultural value in the hazardous strivings for an American footage and its ultimate dreams.¹ In fact, since the mid-1980s, the Nigerians marital crises reflected the extent to which the influences of the American free institutions had impinged on the once dominant status of the male spouses. This development was to hasten the liberation of their female spouses. Although during the later part of the 1980s, indigenous paired marriages were still the preference for a majority of Nigerian immigrants, it could not be denied as well that most of them had begun to come under intense revulsion almost along similar lines with American marriages.²

Coincidentally, almost the same degree of unfavorable socioeconomic status identifiable among native-born black American males³ was also reflected in the bittersweet experience of most Nigerian male migrants. Similarly, the somewhat more favorable socioeconomic status found among black American females corroborated with that of most Nigerian females. Almost in a similar degree, African women were in general noted for having stronger contextual partnership with African-American women than their men vis-à-vis African-American males.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 147-152; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 55-65; Author, Invisible Sojourners, p. 46

²Ibid.; Author, pp. 119-123; Jermaine Nkrumah, "Is African Societal Influence Too Evident in Today's Intra-African Relationships," African Business Source Magazine (Houston-Texas, November, 1992), pp. 35-6.

³Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal, pp. 94-7.

⁴Ibid.; Author, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 46, 120-121.

The degree, therefore, to which the impact of the American free institutions affected Nigerian traditional marriages in the early decades of settlement, was due largely to their general state of socioeconomic and cultural instability. This then meant that, as Nigerians settled within the American mosaic both socioeconomic and cultural factors had far stronger effects on how their marriages and romantic relationships were re-envisioned. It also meant that, coupled with some of the exaggerated values of American material civilization, some of the traditional values of the Nigerian homeland were being overthrown by the influences of American cultures. Some of these problems were the deflection of the changes brought about by the Reagan era. We noted earlier that the socioeconomic and politico-cultural effects of his policies toward African-Americans corresponded with the beginning of crisis for the black African immigrants.¹ Unsurprisingly, his era was also when the earlier unities of African marriages began to fracture. This was equally the period when the socio-cultural circuits of the American republic, was least unfavorable to the black American and African males. This was especially the case with regard to the male-spouse relations among Nigerian immigrants.

The crises surrounding most Nigerian marriages were such that, in taking over the social circumstances of an independent survival, most Nigerian women were generally more flexible than their male counterparts in re-adopting into the economic settings of the host society. Due also to the inherent feminine attributes,

¹Alejandro Portes and A. Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans in the United States," pp. 107-120; Research Report, pp.; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.

they were sometimes more accessible to some support than their male counterparts.¹ Significantly enough, during this period, some of the inherent survival skills of the homelands that these Nigerian female spouses re-adopted and exploited proved advantageous to their American transformation. Such re-adoptive attributes of the homelands such as active inter-women collective fellowship further complemented their intra-American cultural pull and socioeconomic flexibility. For some reasons as yet not clearly known, the White-Black racial divide, which indeed affected the black African male immigrants more directly, sometimes appeared to have been more flexible and even soft-handed toward their female counterparts.

Elsewhere, it so turned out that, in successfully adjusting into the American mosaic, Nigerian females seemed to have had some advantages over their male counterparts. During the arduous adjustment of the Reagan era, they tended to have adapted both themselves and their skills more readily into some professions than their males. When married women with college degrees adapted themselves to such economically high demand work as nursing profession and nursing maids, their male spouses had some difficulty seeing themselves and their interests along such lines.²

Nigerian males who adapted their professional endeavors along similar lines as nursing and nursing aids, for example, could make just as much money. But within the social class structure of Nigerian immigrants, male nurses and male nursing aids are least likely to be accorded high ovation within the community. Even among Americans, some high-demand professional features have strong marital relationships between female and male spouses: male lawyers and women nurses;

¹ Author's *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 118-120.

² Ibid. This is based on evidences obtained during the fieldwork for this dissertation.

female teachers and male professors; male scientists and female lawyers; male engineers/business/accountants and nurse vis-à-vis.¹

Given the well known status of male dominance in most Nigerian traditional marriages, the changes ushered in by the new socio-cultural milieu of American society from the mid-1980s onward were to place the Nigerian male spouses in a most unusual position in the diaspora. For, as a story entitled, “All in the Name of Love,” published in the African Newbreed Magazine reveals, both the contemporary American socioeconomic compulsion ushered in by the Reagan dynamic, as well as its inherent socio-cultural constraints on Nigerians, ultimately proved crucial to the making of their marital/romantic crises in the U.S.

Indeed, in the particular story of “All in the name of Love,” a representative Nigerian [African] named, “Musa” finds solace in exploiting the economic stamina of his “sweetheart” to advance his progress as a medical student.² Musa, as the story goes, later abandons his sweet heart on completion of his medical studies. This story reveals how Musa's ploy, through “mesmerizing kisses” and promises, ultimately seduces the affection of a homeland’s “sweetheart,” who identifies with the tradition

¹Ibid.

²African Newbreed Magazine (Chicago, July, 1991), p. 22. This author employed two fictional stories based on true occurrences during the early 1990s to explain the socio-cultural context of the Nigerian marital/romantic relations in America. The first story involved a deviant attitude of a male spouse toward the female partner; the second involved a similar attitude by a female spouse toward the male counterpart. These stories, in sum, although fictive were based on true some Nigerian/African romances/marriages: “Marriage by Arrangement” (MBA) and “Lay Away Marriages” (LAM). Dr. Bedford Umez, as will be seen slightly down the pages, has employed the term “Marriage by Arrangement” (MBA); similarly, Igboanugo and this author have employed the term “Lay Away Marriages” in explaining the painful emotions involved in long-distant marriages among Nigerians both in the diaspora and back in the homeland. See, Bedford N. Umez, “High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston: A Rejoinder,” <http://www.umez.com/divorce.html> (Accessed 10/25/2005); Udofia, “Status of the Relationship with African Immigrants,” pp. 147-152; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 58-62.

of loyalty to her future husband as well as to her status as Nigerian/African in a foreign land.

Babe we need to plan our future. I can quit medical school and work, or you can be the bread winner until I finish school . . . I think the best thing is for us to live together until we can afford the wedding you desire. When I marry you, I want the whole world to know . . .¹

Ultimately, Musa's astute mastery over his sweetheart yields expected dividends. As Ndelia states, "Not too long after this incident Musa moved in with me. I quit my own school and took a full-time job to pay the rent and the bills." Moreover, as Musa "could not even keep a part-time job because of the demanding medical studies" (he was on probation), and the sweetheart's (Ndelia) job "couldn't cover school expenses," he again "suggested that we make a decision about the future." To help in securing this future, Ndelia

took another full-time job so he could concentrate on school. I also became Musa's housewife without a ring. I did all the cleaning, laundry, cooking and attended to all of Musa's personal demands. . . As a medical student, Musa's lifestyle was very demanding. He was in school all day and spent most of the night studying . . . The schedule was hectic, but I didn't mind, for as Musa said, "We need to alter our lifestyles for a better future" . . . The household chores and Musa's demands turned me into a robot, but I didn't mind. I chose to make the sacrifice because I loved Musa, and he said, "we are working for a better future . . . after . . . medical school."²

Two months after Musa "got into the residency program," and after buying himself a Corvette as a graduation gift, which only increased his sweetheart's regularity at two jobs, a letter directed to "Dear Ndelia" comes stating:

Let me begin by inquiring about your health and jobs. I hope everything is well at the end. Things are going well for me. I've passed my course with flying colors, and I've also met somebody who

¹African Newbreed Magazine, p. 22.

²Ibid.

has changed my life forever. Ndelia, I hate to hurt you, but I am now experiencing real love. I've fallen in love with one of the students here. The two of you are alike in so many ways, yet different in many aspects. I cannot explain it, but she's brought a totally different dimension to my life. I'm sorry. For all it means, I will never forget you.¹

Given the economic crunches of mid-1980s, the Musa-Ndelia scenario further confirms that most unstable Nigerian or African marriages could not have been faithful for too long in the remaining part of the decade and during the 1990s. The Musa-Ndelia story thus confirms the passing of an historical era. This was when the male chauvinism in some Nigerian marriages began to be resisted by female spouses, who sought greater independence from the rigid tradition of the homeland. This development also corresponded with a period when both the individual's and collective demeanor of Nigerians had begun to question the extent to which the marital traditions of the homeland were useful to their strivings for survival.²

As most married Nigerian women became effective economic partners with their husbands, they sought financial and social independence.³ This perhaps explains why one Nigerian woman in Washington, DC, observed that she "only married that fool because I wanted to satisfy my parents."⁴ To another in Houston, it was the compulsive pressures of the capitalist system that reinforced both her marital grievances as well as the ultimate decision in seeking an alternative choice in an American marital partnership:

¹African Newbreed Magazine, p. 22.

²This reference is based on fieldwork, interviews, exploratory survey, and examination of the community profiles of Nigerian marriages in America, 1990s-2005. Author, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 117-119.

³Ibid., Author, p. 120.

⁴Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 60-2.

I was so frustrated with my Nigerian fiancé who controlled everything including my bank account that I left him. I am now dating a fine man. He is an American, and we will be married this summer.¹

Accordingly, Nigerian married females such as professional nurses, lawyers, and independent entrepreneurs have become more self-aware of their needs. As this happens, as we indicated earlier, their inherent feminine attributes have further acceded to them some advantages over their men. Besides, their transformation by America's egalitarian cultures far exceeded anything their male spouses would have anticipated prior to the early 1980s. The result has so far been evident enough in the number of divorces and voluntary separations occurring among Nigerian spouses, especially in such cities as Houston, Chicago, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, and New York.² By mid-1990s, some Nigerian marriages entered an era of re-negotiations between female and male spouses. Just as in the experience of most American marriages, Nigerian marriages began to serve the dual functions of not allowing marital differences to hurt the future of the children within the family households. For those who could afford the exorbitant child care bills designed by law, found acceptance of such an alternative more useful than leaving their children blank in the diaspora.³

The general result was that some Nigerians reconsidered their homeland marriages. Others, however, regretted having left "a good American woman" in preference for a Nigerian.⁴ Nigerian males—just as their women—are therefore

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 112-113; Bedford Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston," pp. 1-2.

³This is based data gathered from field work.

⁴Igboanugu, *Nigerians in America*, pp. 60-2.

more likely to accept American marriages, particularly with African-Americans. Being more operative within the African-American context also meant that, where marriages with their national and continental pairs were not readily negotiable, the racial factor has made access to African-Americans the most likely alternative to fill the void. Also, because Nigerians comprise the largest sub-Saharan African base in the U.S., chances are that they are even more likely to consider cross-cultural marriages for longer term survival with African-American than previously.¹

Marriages by Arrangements vs. Lay Away Marriages of Nigerian Immigrants²

Going by a more specific statistics, by mid-1990, "There were over 100 cases of divorce involving Nigerians in Houston, Texas alone."³ As a city where Nigerian immigrants have one of the strongest communal structures in America, the Houston evidence reveals the scope of an ongoing marital conflict among Nigerian immigrants since the 1990s. Political scientist Bedford Umez has described the high divorce rate of Nigerian marriages in Houston as resulting from negative effects of "marriage by arrangement" (MBA). By this development, Professor Umez argues that MBA "may not work for every body because the person who is arranging the marriage (between the two individuals separated by thousands of miles) is only working on his or her perceptions of the two people."⁴

"MBA," as Umez further explains, "is a blind date" because the individuals involved "are mostly blind to each other's preferences." Nor is it any surprising that

¹Ibid.; Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 147-152, Author, *Invisible Sojourners*, p. 46.

²This is partly a reworking of post-colonial African context of its pre-colonial traditions.

³See, for example, the *Houston Punch* (Houston, Texas, February 1995).

⁴Bedford Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston," pp. 1-2.

“blind dates are often a disaster.” Umez points to the three cardinal factors associated with its crises as: distance, dishonesty, and the poor state of the Nigerian economy. Umez then argues that these problems are compounded by the harsh “Life” which confronts Nigerians in America.¹

But, in Umez’s view, it so turns out that the cases of “dishonesty” by “our men,” are the most identifiable causes of the high rate of divorces among Nigerian immigrants. For, according to him, most of the Nigerian males who visited home to meet their MBA displayed ostentatious claims, which projected to their female spouses evidences of an American success that were simply false. Lured either by the well-known cycle of socioeconomic hardship of post-colonial Nigeria to succumb to the expectations of greater security with an American sweet heart, or by the sincere albeit uncertain nostalgia for the “American dream,” some female spouses had sometimes to go the extra mileage of abandoning a more faithful and approximate home-groomed sweet-heart for an American MBA. The dilemma of MBA therefore lies in the particular closet of an American experience unbeknownst before. Umez mirrors the American phase of MBA in the following manner:

upon arrival in the U.S., hypnotic reality sets in—truths start pouring out, one by one. Worse still, these men start telling new lies to cover the old ones. Now, the poor ladies find themselves in the horns of dilemma—to stay or to leave? If they decide to stay, they spend the rest of their lives in misery; if they decide to leave, we call it divorce. But, who created the divorce? The men or the ladies? I say, don’t blame the ladies.²

If, as indicated above, the Nigerian male spouses are more likely to blame for the increased cases of divorces than their female counterparts, the flirtation among

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

the MBA adherents suggests that during the 2000s, some Nigerian males were still being allured and fascinated by the traditions of marrying from the homeland. Returning to the homeland to bring down a home-groomed sweet-heart that met the expectations of the lost good-old days of the 1960s and 1970s, must then be seen as part of an ongoing struggle between vanishing traditions and emerging changes among Nigerians in the diaspora.

For, in retrospect, the decades when Nigerian female spouses were willing to withstand the rigor of American life solidly behind their student-husbands were gone. By mid-1990s, very few Nigerian wives were willing to accept the rigorous alternatives of the earlier decades purely for the sake of being married. These crises were not wholly American: some aspects, still traceable to the extent of the American cultural influences back in the Nigerian homeland, included exposures to such popular day-time soap programs as “General Hospital,” “All My Children,” and “As the World Turns.” These exposures, along with the Nigeria’s-own phases of socioeconomic crises, were likely to have some irretrievable effects on the traditional ethics of marital relationships and romance among Nigerians.

If the proceedings were/are true—even on a partial basis—then, what Umez attempted to explain was/is mostly the result of socio-cultural contacts between Nigerian traditions and American free institutions. This is, similarly, the result of the retrospective cross-cultural carry-overs to America of some of the crises of the Nigerian homeland. That, according to Professor Umez, the Nigerian male-spouses were more to blame than their female counterparts, therefore, suggests a poor grasp of the marital crises of Nigerians in Houston, or elsewhere in America. Seemingly

blaming all the cases of Nigerian marital problems in Houston on the negative attitudes of the male spouses, strongly suggests that the problem of distance, dishonesty, poor national economy, and the related hardship of “Life in America,”¹ only affected Nigerian males.²

Again, if the preceding emphases were correct, Umez then would have denied that some marital conflict of the MBA tradition was also identifiable among some Nigerian females striving to use foul means in entering into America. Clearly, this failure to have an overarching picture of the crises as reflecting the negative attitudes of both gender appears to be a serious although an unusual oversight.³ For example, the fieldwork done in this dissertation confirmed that, in some instances, Nigerian male-spouses were more likely to be leveled headed than their female counterparts. This was especially in situations where their economic status enabled them to function as the leaders within the family households.⁴ Therefore, the general socioeconomic insecurity of Nigerian males, along with increased family demands, which sometimes propelled their women to a more pro-active economic role—was not always helpful to marital security. This is perhaps due more to inexperience as well as the implicit socio-cultural advantages of feminine attributes.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Umez’s chronicle of Nigeria/African experience in America is one of the most thorough and foresighted found by this author over more than fifteen years of assembling and analyzing the data on this field. His views are therefore accorded one of the highest respects in examining Nigerians/Africans. The benefits of his insight into the weaknesses Nigerians, in particular, have helped this author to fashion a clearer context of the crisis surrounding the Nigerian/African development in the diaspora and back in the homelands.

⁴This is based on the field work undertaken in the course of this study. Generally, my examination of Nigerian/African indices over the past fifteen years was rather conclusive that some divorces among Nigerian immigrants were increasingly being determined by the attitude of females, which, in some instances, were negative.

With inexperience, coupled with the unchecked appeals of American egalitarianism, sometimes the women—more than their male counterparts—were those taking conflicting positions. As they become powerful family household leaders on the basis of their economic status, these required shared responsibilities with the husbands, and without a working moral and cultural bonding, the inevitable result was increased divorce rates.¹

Also, some Nigerian female spouses in America have played foul under the marital tradition of MBA. These were female spouses whose marital attitudes were contemptuous and whose behaviors encouraged increased divorces.² If Nigerian female spouses are part of the American material cultures, there seems to be no sound basis for exonerating them while blaming their males. No sooner after the MBA male-spouses had labored to bring their female partners to America did the latter abandon them for the much greener pastures of American dreams. Often such conflicts were likely to occur where the female MBAs had some hidden motives for coming. Like their male counterparts, such an attitude by MBA female-spouses, as we hope to show a little further down the pages, sometimes revealed a willing to exploit the “honesty” of the former, as a passage to America.³

The Umez version of MBA, as thus examined, was first expressed in the character of the “Lay Away Marriages” (LAM) of Nigerian immigrants. Later on, however, the two traditions become closely related, albeit with a slight variant. LAM means exactly what the name implies; its character amplifies perhaps a

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

stronger commitment to the lost traditions of Nigerian marriages during the early decades of mostly students' immigrants. The LAM traditions had its strongest context when Nigerians did not develop a firm communal foothold in urban America. But while MBA also means what the name implies, it involves greater networks of people: sometimes these are bound to act on inclinations which are not necessarily defined by respectable marital traditions of the homeland.

The author of this dissertation argues that between 1960s and 1970s, a higher proportion of the student marriages of Nigerian immigrants in America fell under what might safely be regarded as the LAM traditions; that, accordingly, the MBA traditions might have begun to have its strongest impact on Nigerians from the mid-1980s to the 1990s. As in the case of MBA, its genesis had closer affinity with an era when the old traditions of the homelands among Nigerians/Africans in the diaspora had come under greater contextual stress. This was also an era when the cross-cultural diffusion of Nigerians between America and the homeland was as economically and culturally volatile as to have allowed for the mitigation of a complex array of internal and external misconducts which Nigeria/Nigerians later became noted for throughout the 1990s.¹ Thus, a slight variant in historical eras explains the commonalities and distinctiveness between the MBA and LAM models.

Yet, both the strong commonalities between MBA and LAM are predicated by their inherent uncertainties: emotional drain, internal and external fraud in the attitudes of the beloved. For their features were, and are still the functional channels the subscribers have accepted to honor the traditions of marrying from the land of

¹See, for example, Winer, Nigerian Crime: 1996 Congressional Subcommittee Hearing.

their birth while in the diaspora. So, admittedly, the pre-eminence of MBA could only have led to the erosion of the earlier status of the LAM—particularly from the mid-1980s onward.

At this point, however, the LAM model of Nigerian marriages requires greater clarification. By “lay away marriages,” some Nigerians were either married before coming to the U.S. or likely to have gone back home to do so after establishing themselves in “the land of opportunity.”¹ Prior to the 1980s, when the communal settlement of Nigerians or even of the larger African immigrant community, was not deep-seated in America, most Nigerian students looked back to the homeland for their marriages. The expectations then were high back in the homeland or in America among “these lay away husbands and wives/fiancés,” seeking to bridge their long distant emotions. Those who succeeded in bringing their “lay way spouses” to America were even more fortunate.²

But, as Nigerian immigrants became deep-seated settlers within the American mosaic, the “lay away marriages” became an exercise in futility. This was because, for both the male and female spouses involved in the venture, both its cultural and socioeconomic burden was enormous. These adherents worked tirelessly to pay immigration attorneys to process the necessary papers for their fiancé, wives, or husbands—sometimes with no results.³ Back in the Nigerian homeland, of course, these “lay away” spouses often demanded every bit of support, which drained the

¹See, for example, Coral Ekeruche, “Nigerian Bachelors Who Go Home to Marry,” Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, North Carolina, January 3, 1992), pp. 14 and 21.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 151; Amie Joof’s Column “Heart-to-Heart: A Stranger in the Midst,” in African Newbreed (Chicago, May 1991), p. 22.

³Ibid., Joof, “Heart –to-Heart: Stranger in the Midst.”

financial stamina of the long distance “sweethearts.” By mid-thirties, most Nigerians became aware that both the stamina and zest which some successful marriages required might be lost. This may explain why one Nigerian lady “will not stay here waiting for all these square heads . . . who don't even know what is good for them.”¹

Knowing “what is good for them” implies that the “layaway” victims had rationalized their circumstances in light of the available options in a foreign land. They were willing to substitute for their “layaway” husbands or wives back in Nigeria a more approximate cultural “sweethearts” in America. Prior to the 1980s, it would have been difficult to accept such choices. Besides, during this period, it would have required serious devaluation of traditional values to make the swift changes into a new direction of intra-cultural marital choices.²

As we hinted earlier, there was a phase of the crisis of “lay away marriages” of Nigerian immigrants which could further explain how even the attitudes of their female-spouses were equally faulty. Again Amie Joof—the insightful chronicler of Nigerian-African Heart-to-Heart column in the African Newsbreed—uses fictional story-news flash based on true occurrences to illuminate the Nigerian marital/romantic crises. The problem which Amie Joof captures in this phase revolves around how the ethnic parochialism of Nigeria influences the choices of marital spouses and hence raises the scepters of the confusion and crisis involving

¹Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 61.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 152. Cross-ethnic marriages among Nigerians are not new; but the pattern, in my opinion, is not deeply rooted among them. What seems really new is that the current pattern that shapes them in America seems compelled by socio-cultural circumstances, and they are also making the necessary adjustments. Also, see Author, Invisible Sojourners, p. 46.

female-male spouse relations in the diaspora.¹ Raising the particular crisis of Nigerian marriages from the mid-1980s mirrors its continuing transformation during the early 2000s. This touches on an earlier position by Umez. For, to begin with, while Joof's story is built around an episodic intensity of "lay away marriages," the premise of its crisis is similar to the cultural features of "marriage by arrangements." Besides, it is one in which the female-spouse is the culprit. So, the underlying experience supports an earlier dissent from the position emphasized by Umez.²

Writing of the experience of a Nigerian from Iboland, named "Mba," Joof narrates how he falls in love with "Yata." In retrospect, however, "Yata" who is not Nigerian, confronts the problem of ethnic parochialism. Being from Cameroon, a country which has an approximate regional human contact with Nigeria, yet her honesty and love for Mba are not the traditional criteria for marital support. The opposition is serious.³ Joof, the chronicler, makes "Mba" to tell us that,

Yata was the woman of my dreams. She offered all the qualities I wanted. She valued her African traditions, and she supported me at every level of my struggle to survive in America. But my family wouldn't accept her because she wasn't from Nigeria. After years of dealing with my family and friends who always treated her like a stranger in their midst, Yata began to feel like a stranger. At the same time, I couldn't deal with the stress of having a fiancée that wasn't accepted by my family. I eventually left Yata, losing my true love.⁴

As Mba ultimately loses Yata, a faithful and loving sweetheart, in her place enters a "lay away fiancé" back in Iboland. Joof mirrors Mba's dissent in the following manner:

¹Amie Joof, *African Newbreed*, May 1991, p. 22.

²Umez, "High Divorce Rate Among Nigerians in Houston," p. 1.

³Joof, *African Newbreed*, p. 22.

⁴*Ibid.*

Shortly after the breakup, I went home to Nigeria to meet the woman my family had selected for me. I came back to America after taking care of the necessary traditional arrangements that would lead to our marriage. I paid over \$10,000 in cash and material goods to win her hand in marriage. I drained all my savings to pay for Ify's bridal price and to give her the lavish wedding she wanted. London was her choice for honey moon. One month in London cost me a lot of money, granted we had much fun.... I incurred huge debts in legal fees to fly "Ify" here.¹

The final phase of LAM for Mba and "Ify," just as in MBA, is in America.

Here, Joof concludes that:

Shortly after "Ify" came to this country, problems develop in our marriage. She was very materialistic. She wanted to live up to her fantasies of America—in her actions, manner of dressing and speech. Our communication suffered. She eventually started an affair with another man. She told her friend that she wouldn't file for a divorce because she wanted alimony from me. She accused me of being too possessive and provoked me into granting her divorce. ... My ordeal with "Ify" turned to be a very costly lesson in my life. In trying to marry a woman from Nigeria, I ignored an important factor in choosing a life-time partner—getting to know her well. All I knew was that "Ify" was Nigerian and was an Ibo.... In retrospect, should have prevented me from marrying Yata. She loved me for who I was, and she cherished her traditional values. She was always content with what we had.²

The "Mba" and "Ify" scenario symbolized the beginning of changes in traditional attitudes of Nigerian immigrants toward the soundness of the "lay away marriages." The fading shadow of Nigerians' "lay away marriages" as well as of their beginning to debunk that pattern of tradition in the 1980s was captured in film featuring Eddie Murphy, entitled "Coming to America." The film is probably most revealing for its focus on the crises of the "lay away marriages" of Nigerians than for

¹Ibid.

²Joof, African Newbreed, p. 22.

the general stereotype of “Akeem,” a representative of Nigerian/African student immigrants in the U.S.

Thus, the importance of “Coming to America” lies more in the shifting socio-cultural circuits in America that surrounded the Nigerian-African renewed contacts with their ancestral kin during the 1980s. For, this was a period when African immigrants began to settle down in urban America, and when their earlier traditions of returning to the homeland after studies also began to be reversed.¹ This was as well a period when African immigrants began to identify themselves with American images, especially with marriages with their black American kin.

But it is not clear whether Eddie Murphy or the Nigerian, who allegedly collaborated in the development of the script, had thought in terms of the explanation offered by the author of this dissertation. Nonetheless, the film gives further credence to a period when the “lay away marriages” began to lose their traditional vigor in America amidst varying competing cultural influences. It reflects and conforms to the whole trend of the disillusionment of Nigerians/Africans with some aspects of their traditional marriages; besides, it symbolizes a time most of them began to settle as a community in America and to make decisions regarding their future in ways that were independent of the traditions of the homelands.²

By itself, moreover, the film is equally important for depicting the reception accorded the new waves of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa in America. “Akeem” shows how a Nigerian student from a wealthy family was perceived by

¹For example, see the crisis surrounding the film “Coming to America,” featuring Eddie Murphy, in *Safari Link Magazine*, Vol. 1 No.3 (Los Angeles, California, 1991), p. 4. Also, see Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 111-112.

²Ibid.

most Americans, especially by their African-American kin and the extent to which the American system exploited him: it confirms the cultural crisis which confronted those who were less informed of the material gratification of American society.¹

“Akeem,” on the other hand, depicts a period when African-Americans began to wield substantial power, particularly in the entertainment industry. As they became a force to reckon with, due consideration began to be given to events around their ancestral setting.²

Taken as a whole, the Akeem-American gestures were equally suggestive of how some African-Americans exploited the Nigerian context during the early decades of their American concentration. This can be taken as a reversed pattern of the contextual exploitation of the black base by Nigerian immigrants. A majority of the early waves of Nigerian students attended predominantly black institutions of higher learning, where millions of dollars in Akeem-like collaborations took place.³

Beyond this point, the film reveals how some black Americans perceived and reacted to the early waves of Nigerian students in America. As shown thus far, their response was equally revealing of the extent to which they sought to ameliorate the image of modern Africa from the standpoint of their conflict of national identity. While Akeem typifies the excesses of some Nigerians during the early waves of their American concentration, its black diasporan-African context exhibits the extent of a continuing cultural conflict about both the African-American and African identities.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans.”

³Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, pp. 27-8.

⁴“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 111-112.

Nigerian Offspring: Emerging Inter-generational Crises

The cross-cultural erosion of the marital traditions of Nigerian immigrants was perhaps not the greatest problem confronting them during a greater part of the 1980s and 1990s. As we saw in Table 2, with increases in their ancestry group populations, by far the greatest crisis confronting the Nigerian migrant parents during the immediate decades of adjusting into the mosaic revolved around the inter-generational transformation of their offspring. Throughout the three decades preceding 2000, the size of the Nigerian ancestry group—representing American-born population of Nigerian ancestry—was the largest from sub-Saharan Africa.

For example, in 1980, the population of the Nigerian ancestry group in the U.S. was 47,857. By 1990, it rose to 91,688; and to 137,002 in 2000.¹ Accordingly, the growth of the population of the Nigerian offspring, coupled with increased divorce rates among Nigerian marriages, corresponded with a period of increased socio-cultural crises of the Nigerian offspring. In responding to this crisis, a majority of Nigerian-parents began to seek new ways in which to re-educate their offspring along more favorable lines of the homeland cultures.²

By the early 2000, there were no clear evidences that Nigerian parents had been able to upset the perceived societal problems confronting their offspring in the diaspora. Based on the data examined in this study, Nigerian/African parents were not winning the war against their American-born offspring, for they were losing their

¹For example, this is supported by the data on Tables 1, 2, 13.1. Also see the related information in Chapters 1 and 3.

²Houston Chronicle (Houston-Texas, February 9, 1992); Fidelis Nwazuzu, "Toward Another Breed of Black Africans," The African Herald (Dallas-Texas, 1998), p. 25.

umbilical cords.¹ The seriousness surrounding the emerging inter-generational crisis of the Nigerian offspring was due more to the fact that, as these core parent-migrants became deep-seated within the American mosaic, their offspring also increasingly become more Americanized.² This development, as we observed earlier, was due more to changes in historical eras. When Nigerian immigrants were not deep-seated as settlers in America, their offspring had a far lesser degree of undue exposures to its cultural influences. But with a stronger communal foothold within the American mosaic, coupled with increased exposures to its cultural and institutional influences, the Nigerian offspring became more susceptible to such deviant social behaviors as crimes and drugs.³ Prior to the 1970s, the early return to the homelands after studies had enabled these American-born offspring of Nigerian ancestry to re-adjust into the native cultures of their parents' homelands.

The 1980s and 1990s therefore marked the heights of the concentration of Nigerian populations in America. Also, it marked the beginning of their strong orientations under the cultural influences of American free institutions. This meant newer orbit of socio-cultural crises for the Nigerian offspring and their migrant parents. It represented as well the beginning of a shift from the traditional values of the homeland.⁴ This crisis (See Chapters 3 and 4) was made further complicated by the continuing political and economic instability back in the Nigerian homeland.⁵ Apraku and Authur emphasized the socio-cultural crises of the African offspring in

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²Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 240-1.

³Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 24-5; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 25-6, 70-71.

⁴Ibid., Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 113-117.

⁵Ibid.

the diaspora. They argued that it was at least one explanation why the core base of the black African parent-migrants desired to return to their respective countries in the future.¹ Yet, due to the continuing political and economic instability back in the homeland, most of these parent-migrants were unable to establish a firmer hold on their American-born offspring. This further confirms the extent of their collective vulnerability, even after successfully adjusting into the American mosaic.

Given the variant between the traditions of the Nigerian homeland and that of the U.S., one of the fundamental crises confronting Nigerian parents since the 1990s was evident in their child-rearing traditions.² First, as more Nigerians began to settle down as a community, situation where their American siblings began to think along markedly differing lines became characteristic of their collective experience in the diaspora. Second, and perhaps of far greater significance, and due mostly to the more evident impact of American cultures, Nigerian parents lacked the much-needed and familiar child-rearing orbits found back in the homeland. Igboanugo presents an excellent insight to the variant between the child-rearing traditions of the Nigerian homeland and one operative in the diaspora. According to him, children born of Nigerian parents in America,

are mostly “baby-sitter bred.” Because they were born when their parents were either students and still going to school, or working and could not afford to take along time off to cater to the children and bond with them. There are numerous cases where a child is born and

¹African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 13-16, 19-28.

²Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, pp. 25-6, 67-71. Apraku, *African Émigrés in the U.S.*, p. 26, has captured this phase of African problem in his emphasis in the return decisions of Africans to their respective countries. On the other hand, however, Authur’s *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 121-3, argues that African women have emerged as the transmitters of African traditional values to their offspring. Authur sees this development as a carry-over of traditional African women child-rearing values from Africa to America (Ibid).

the mother goes right back to school and /or work the same week. This may not sound strange to an American. It is a common place here, but to a Nigerian, it is not.¹

As Igboanugo further documents:

Nigerians who have children in America know that their children are experiencing a different type of freedom from what they (parents) were used to in Nigeria. They worry about charges of child abuse, neglect, and the like. In Nigeria, paddling of children, is an instrument accepted for child rearing, but it could easily be turned into a case of child abuse . . . Nigerians who have . . . kids in America do not have the freedom their parents had in child rearing and nurturing. Children have the liberty to call their parents by first name—a no, no in Nigeria. They may even call the law on them for any strict disciplinary measures deemed “abused.” Certain disciplinary measures are common place in Nigeria, but forbidden here. Siblings could be left to take care of each other allowing the parents the freedom to do other things necessary to benefit the family . . . that is in Nigeria, not in America.²

As Igboanugo’s emphases suggest, between the 1980s and early 1990s, the problem confronting most Nigerian parents was influenced by the extent to which the power of traditional discipline over their offspring had eroded. This was made further complicated by the recognition that, with an American birth rights, their offspring had the power of flexibility to participate in the larger society in ways that far exceeded their expectations, selective preferences, and choices.

The phase of the above conflict appears to be greater as the Nigerian offspring begin to enter into the rigorous transition from one generation of settlers to the other. This might have been why Chinua Achebe urged his Ibo community brethren, as well as other Nigerians earlier in New Jersey to “stick to their roots” and

¹Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 25.

²Ibid., pp. 25-6.

to “learn about the customs and traditions of our people.”¹ “Professor Achebe,” as Chuks Nwaka reported,

Lamented about the fact that children born in the U.S. are not taught and do not know how to speak Igbo. He illustrated this unfortunate irony by reminding his audience that most children listening to him did not understand what he was saying.²

Yet, the inter-generational conflict surrounding the American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants is not exceptional. For, indeed, this is the type of crisis that all the racial branches of American civilization have almost an even share throughout most of their varied transitional phases. However, the real conflict surrounding the Nigerian-African parents in the diaspora appears to have been reinforced by their more peculiar cultural fracture under alien influences. Too, their strong orientation under colonialism, along with the continuing influence of American cultures, weakens an effective parental control over their siblings. American cultural values, on the other hand, compel an alternate pattern of child rearing development markedly dissimilar and in most cases, directly oppositional.³

Author has emphasized some of the re-adoptive values of the African homelands by African parents in the effort to re-orient their offspring. This development, according to Author, has perhaps influenced the role of the black African female immigrants in the diaspora than that of their male.⁴ But, it is this

¹Bon Uzzi, “Chinua Achebe at a Nigerian Gala,” The Good Hope News, The Nigerian Perspective (Dallas-Texas, July, 1991), pp. 1, 17.

²Chuks Nwaka, “A Call for Cultural Rejuvenation,” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, July 26, 1991), p. 17.

³Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 25-6, 67-70. Also, see Author, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 117-124.

⁴Ibid.

author's opinion that Author's emphasis here may not be correct in every aspect, although generally valid in some clearly definable socio-cultural context.

Elsewhere, however, Fidelis Nwaozuzu—almost similar to Igboanugo and Achebe—argues that the dilemma surrounding the child-rearing traditions of the Nigerian offspring in the diaspora depends on what type of efforts their parents have made toward their acceptance of the cultures of their parents' homelands:

There are certain practices otherwise known as culture with which people are known and unless one starts early in life to assimilate the said culture, one will remain an alien to the culture. Most, if not all children of Africans born beyond their continent do not speak their African language, and since language is the vehicle for cultural transmission, how then can those children understand the customs, traditions, mores and values of their true origin.¹

To Nwazuzu, moreover, mere exposure of the Nigerian offspring to the Nigerian cultures without a follow-up may not guarantee acceptance of the cultural traditions of their African ancestry. Nwazuzu writes that parents should strive to involve their offspring in early contacts with the cultures of the homelands.

This writer is of the opinion that children of native Africans residing abroad should be sent home early in life so that they grow up at home, identify with their age mates, understand where they belong, know what belongs to their family and what does not, instead of losing touch with their roots...We need our children to be nurtured by the finest tradition of African culture and this cannot be achieved by bringing them up in the American lifestyle. In the American society, people are highly individualistic and do not help one another. What happens to another man is no one's business.... But in Africa people work for one another, retain family ties for a long time and it is their cherished culture to do so.²

Of course, it can be concluded at this point that none of the preceding emphases clearly implied that Nigerian parents were clearly successful in keeping

¹Nwazuzu, "Toward Another Breed of Black Americans," The African Herald, p. 25.

²Ibid.

their offspring away from some of the deviant influences of American cultures. Rather, it is clear that they were more likely to seek the balance against some conflicting cultural influences on them. The simple fact, as we indicated earlier, is that, as the Nigerian parents and their offspring become entrenched within the mosaic, their grip on each other loosens most naturally. This partly explains why most Nigerian parents were unable to upset the pace in which their offspring were being influenced by American cultures. They realized that the Nigerian-child-rearing traditions were difficult to fit into the American experience.¹

There is evidence that effective rearing of the Nigerian offspring in the diaspora is further complicated by the attitudes of their parents. For example, one Nigerian parent (father) stated that his “daughter protested” because “she holds it religiously that it is insulting to call people blacks.”² In the opinion of this “Nigerian American,” black “isn’t a fancy color like pink or red or yellow.” Beside, “it takes a color blind person to think people are black.”³

Thus, it is clear that the revealed weakness of the Nigerian offspring in faulting the “black color” is mirrored in the shared attitudinal predisposition of the father. Since the father did not explain the cultural orientation of his daughter before employing her childish views to back up his viewpoint in a “Black History Month,”⁴ the reader can only ponder over the type of influences some African parents

¹Ibid. Author’s position in *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 113-117, is predictive of the experience of Nigerian immigrants as the largest black African base in America. This was supported by an exploratory interview July 23, 2005, with Mfon Ufot of Nigerian Women Association of Georgia (NWAG) and Radio Talk-Show personnel at Radio Free Georgia.

²*The Good Hope News; African Perspective* (Dallas: Good Hope Publishers, Dallas-Texas, February, 1991), pp. 12, 14.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

encourage in their American-born offspring.¹ Given this background, it was perhaps unsurprising that during the greater part of the 1990s, the traditions of the Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa-Fulani, Efik-Ibibio, Edo, Itsekiri, and Ijo—were values that the Nigerian offspring either knew very little about—or seriously cherished in their cultural strivings and professional aspirations as Americans.

At best, however, in order to succeed as citizens, these offspring needed stronger attachments to American mores than to the cultures of their migrant-parents. This shift in trend was even taking place with the overwhelming approval of their parents: most of them sought and helped their offspring to identify with American interests in order to secure their future birth rights as Americans.²

We hinted earlier that some of the child-rearing re-orientation of Nigerians, along with their emerging generational conflict, was first predicated by changes from one historical era to another. These changes had a lot in common with the survival schemes adopted by Nigerian parents from one decade to the other. Altogether, this requires an understanding of how each experientially derived effort of an era had transformed Nigerians in the diaspora, as well as influenced their choices of the tools of child-rearing development. For example, by the early 1990, some Nigerian parents had begun to re-adopt their indigenous child-rearing mechanisms within the mosaic in combating their problems. This attitude differed from earlier approach.³

This trend of re-adopting indigenous child-rearing concept of the homeland in the diaspora in rearing American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants seems to

¹Ibid.

²This is based on interview with Mfon Ufot.

³Ibid.

have corroborated an earlier emphasis by Authur.¹ He depicted the stamina of some African family households in re-adopting their indigenous skills, values, and acumen in rearing their American offspring. This also strongly corroborates the trend operative among Nigerian parents.² However, Authur's important emphasis did not explain the nature of changes taking place from one historical era to the other.³ If this had been so, perhaps the revolving patterns of adjustments undertaken by African immigrants from 1960s to 1990s would have been explained. This could have made some of their inherent differences much clearer.⁴

The position, then, is that the recurrent cycles of chain-migrations from Nigeria (Africa) to the U.S.—particularly during the 1990s—had brought along some observable changes in their general attitude toward the tradition of child-rearing in the diaspora. Despite the somewhat decade-by-decade relationships in the pattern of child-rearing crises among the black African family households, some changes separated earlier attitudes from the much later ones. For example, as we saw earlier, the characteristics of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. were not all uniform or similar.⁵ Dissimilarities within a continuum thus meant that some re-adoptive socio-cultural changes had taken place in the subsequent orientations of the

¹Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 113-124.

²Ibid. This evidence is further supported by this author's research on the Nigerian profile.

³Ibid.

⁴See Chapter 3, for example, for elaboration of the many waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S. from 1960s to 1990s. Each phase of this development revolved with some changes from the earlier waves. Thus, it may be futile to explain the socio-cultural context of Nigerian/African immigrants without also explaining the underlying changes and characteristics associated with their American build-up. This depends on understanding the nature of the changes that resulted from their adjustment into the American mosaic and the efforts made to secure their contextual visibility and stability.

⁵Ibid.

Nigerian settlers. So, accordingly, we can now return to an earlier position: that is, going by historical eras, the student-parents' part of the problem of child-rearing identified earlier by Igboanugo among Nigerians in the U.S.¹ was perhaps stronger during the 1970s and early 1980s than during the 1990s. These were eras when the bulk of them, particularly those with the expectations of returning to the homeland after their studies, did not bother as much about the hazardous drain involved in the child-rearing stress. The expectation of returning to Nigeria immediately after studies seems to have been an underlying factor in understanding the hazards that Igboanugo's important reference has to be taken.²

Of far greater significance is also the fact that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the crises surrounding the students' child-bearers of Nigerian immigrants were becoming internally self-tolerant due to an expectation of future recovery back in the homeland. For, admittedly, most of the early hazards were undertaken faithfully and in keeping with the future welfare of their American-born offspring. During this period, children born in America under any kind of socio-cultural hazards still benefited when their parents finally returned to Nigeria to socialize them in the traditions of the homeland. When these children subsequently re-entered the U.S. as their parents had anticipated for further studies in the future, they often did so with a somewhat more balanced and educated understanding of their Nigerian background and cultural heritage.³

¹Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 25.

²Ibid.

³This explanation is based on my evaluation of the first four waves of Nigerian immigration to the U.S.: Chapter 3; Research Report, pp. 12-17; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, p. 119.

Actually, the preceding observations can also be seen in light of the cycle of changes that began to unfold among African immigrants from the 1960s to the 1970s in the U.S., reaching its clearest historical peak particularly for Nigerians in early 1980s.¹ The result of this trend of changes was later re-adopted into the improvement of the child-rearing pattern of some Nigerians from mid-1980s to 1990s. During this period, the demographic composition of Nigerian immigrants was slightly different from the earlier one. Nigerians entering America directly as students from mid-1980s were much smaller in number compared to the previous decades. “During this period, the allotment accorded to African immigrants compared, for example, to the Asians and Europeans also became smaller.”² Again between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Nigerians admitted to the U.S. were those in high skilled professions as the medical and technical sciences, academia, and administrative positions.³

To be sure, while the crisis surrounding Nigerian students who were parents was an accurate history, a greater part of the 1990s did not seem to have mirrored its effects among Nigerians as evenly all across. Its strongest claim was closely

¹Ibid. The emphasis here is based on an understanding of the varied waves of African immigration to the U.S. For example, in the case of Nigerian immigrants, there is no clarification of the major phases of their post-colonial immigration to the U.S. (Kalu Ogbaa, especially Chapter 1-2). However, as we saw earlier, by the early 1980s, an historic development of a Nigerian immigrant community, which took place, was mostly of the early students' waves of the 1970s. The clarification in Chapter 3 of this dissertation can serve as faithful basis in which to explain the earlier as well as the subsequent changes in the pattern of Nigerian/African immigration to the U.S. By itself, however, some of the explanation of Nigerian immigrants, as mirrored in Ogbaa's Nigerian Americans, for example, does not quite fit with this author's understanding of the Nigerian context. The approach adopted here is receptive to a more definitive explanation of the Nigerian immigrants, or even of the broader context of black African immigrants in America.

²Research Report, p. 15.

³Ibid.

associated with the era of largely student waves of immigrants.¹ From early to the mid-1990s, when Nigerian immigrants had accomplished most of their adjustments into the American mosaic, other patterns of inter-cultural re-adaptations had also begun to evolve among them. With maturity during the remaining part of the 1990s, Nigerian immigrants had to re-adopt their indigenous child-rearing features into the American environment. They succeeded in transforming what in Igboanugo's terms were some of the identifiable features of the child-rearing crises of Nigerians.²

Author's important emphases on adopting the cultural values of the homeland by African women to influence their offspring in the diaspora are more closely linked to the preceding background as well as to events during and after the 1990s.³ This further supports the variant in historical eras. During this period, most Nigerians were able to re-adopt their indigenous cultures within their functioning communal settings in ways that the much earlier waves could not have been able to do. Especially for those Nigerian parents with American citizenship, this was done by financing the entries of their parents or relatives back in the homeland into the U.S. to assist with the rigorous requirements of child-rearing in the diaspora. This is another reason for understanding the varied cycles of changes that shaped post-colonial African immigration to the U.S., as well as the likely re-adoptive socio-cultural context operative within the Nigerian/African immigrant communities.⁴

Author's position on the increased presence of aged parents among African-born family-households in America due to economic hardships and medical care

¹Ibid.

²See the earlier notes on Igboanugo, Nigerians in America.

³Author, The Invisible Sojourners, pp. 113-124.

⁴Ibid. This is based on information gathered during the fieldwork for this dissertation.

problem is a true fact.¹ It is also a fact that aged parents brought all the way from Africa have added financial strains on their struggling sons and daughters in the diaspora.²

Yet, Authur's underlying emphases corresponded more correctly with an era when Nigerian/African immigrants were bringing aged parents into the U.S. to assist as domestic helpers within their family households.³ If so, the emphasis here lies more in what appears to have been a misunderstanding of the underlying role played by those aged African parents while in America. For some of them were brought as rear-guards of traditional values as well as maids for their daughters and sons.⁴ While some came for medical assistance, however, often the medical care received and the expenses incurred in bringing them into America, occurred as part of the negotiation to help the American-born offspring of their sons/daughters to secure a more stable socio-cultural cohesion.⁵

This form of parent-relative child-rearing negotiations undertaken by Nigerians in the diaspora was quite capable of freeing most of them during a greater part of the 1990s and early 2000s either to attend colleges/universities or to take on other lines of career re-training. At other times, however, they served as the basis upon which some Nigerians were able to re-orient their career schedules with as many jobs as were needed to meet the financial expenses of their struggling family

¹Authur, Invisible Sojourners, p. 119.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. For example, see my explanation on fieldwork and examination of African indices. However, the accounts here also included contacts with African family households with grand parents from the homeland, where the problem discussed by Authur was often closely examined.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid. Also, see earlier notes on Authur, p. 119.

households. While either attending classes or working, the parent-relative-maid helpers became the most natural home-bred rearguards within the American family households in charge of the offspring.¹

Some parent-relative-maid helpers of Nigerians in the diaspora were sometimes on contractual arrangements. This is another indication of the negotiation schemes for the claim of bringing aged African parents into the U.S. for medical services. Essentially, the difference between “negotiation” and “contractual arrangements” lies in the nature of the rewards reasonably agreed upon between Nigerians and their parent-relative maid helpers before entering America. The idea of “negotiation” often involved reward for domestic services as helpers for being taken away from the hardships of the Nigerian/African hunger, problem of absence of proper medical attention, and general instability. On the other hand, however, in “contractual” arrangement there is often the direct agreement and an understanding about the nature of benefits to be derived between the Nigerians in the diaspora in the coming over the parent-relative-maid helpers.

Accordingly, therefore, what Authur sees mostly as burdensome financial pressures on Africans who brought their aged parents to America has to be viewed as the working out of contractual compromises. This is no less different from the attitude of some white families who brought in Mexican maids, who sometimes spoke very little or no English, but who were willing to learn and later able to answer to the demanding role of domestic services under illegal contractual financial arrangements. By such compromises, the Nigerian parent-migrants in the diaspora

¹Authur, Invisible Sojourner, p. 119.

agreed to reward the parent-relative-maid helpers either while in America or back in the homeland with some form of financial support. Given the harsh economic and political uncertainties in Nigeria, some parent-relative-maid helpers were willing to remain in America for as long as their assistance was needed. Usually, they agreed to remain until the American-born offspring of their sons/daughters were in a position to assert their independence without undue cultural influences.¹

Interestingly enough, to a certain extent, the parent-relative-maid helpers of Nigerians were also the carriers of the homeland traditions as well as deciphers of ancient folklores to the offspring of their sons and daughters. They were as well their story-tellers and singers of indigenous songs. In situations where the Nigerian offspring are to be seen speaking fluently in the native tongues of their parents, as sometimes found among some Yoruba and Ibo ethnic groups,² for example, the skills may very well have been influenced through the medium of the parent-relative-maid helpers living within the American family households of their sons and daughters.³

Therefore, as indicated above, the process of influencing the Nigerian offspring to speak in the native tongues of their parents depended in the domestication of the cultural values of the homeland within the American family households. Otherwise, very few Nigerian parents have succeeded in influencing their offspring to use their native tongues in the diaspora. This is due mostly to the enormous underlying contradictions between workplace attitudes and the medium of domestic interactions influencing of Nigerians in America. So, however loosely in

¹Ibid.

²“Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 275-6.

³Ibid. This was confirmed by fieldwork. Also, see earlier related notes.

degree, the medium of the parent-relative-maid within the Nigerian immigrant family households appears to have appended an important outline of cultural void for their sons and daughters in the diaspora.

The preceding then calls for a more specific understanding of how some Nigerian parents especially mothers, have recorded their views regarding the emerging inter-generational crisis confronting them and their offspring. This is because, as mothers, they sometimes stand a better chance of understanding, and indeed of carrying the deeper burden of child-rearing. This peculiar experience has further transformed the role of the Nigerian/African women in the diaspora.

The extent then to which Nigerian female parents, who are mothers, are coping with the emerging inter-American cultural transformation of their female offspring is perhaps the most worrisome feature of their sojourn in the diaspora. The question often asked is: "Can our female daughters who are American-born maintain a balance with the traditional values of the Nigerian homeland?" This question is often particular when it relates to choices of their future marital spouses: "Who will they marry, anyway?" "Will they marry according to our tradition, and will they ever return to Nigeria?"¹ Some of the questions posed here were based on experience of a Nigerian mother of Ibo ethnic background "torn between teaching my daughter to be an Ibo woman and giving her the independence she craves."²

¹These questions have been raised by Nigerian/African parents in the many community forums I attended from 1990 to 2005. I noticed that most of these parents were fully cognizant of their crisis but often had generally less agreeable formula to reconstruct their dilemma.

²Dympna Ugwu-Oju, "should My Tribal Past Shape Delia's Future," Newsweek (December 4, 2000), p. 14. See further elaboration on "Dympna Ugwu-Oju" in Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, pp. 240-1.

The above was the general dilemma of Ugwu-Oju, a Nigerian woman and mother of a 18-year old American-born offspring of Ibo ethnic background. For this mother, the concern was mostly about the extent to which her Ibo tradition would be relevant to her American-born and bred daughter. "I'm a member of the Ibo tribe of Nigeria, and although I've lived in the United States most of my life, my consciousness remains fixed on the time and place of my upbringing."¹ Ugwu-Oju's experience reveals the nature of the double consciousness operative between two contesting influences on her daughter. If, as a parent, she could separate herself from American influences into her Ibo tradition, in her reasoned viewpoint, such an exercise would be difficult for her daughter. "I see these American and Ibo aspect of my life as distinct; I separate them perfectly, and these are no blurring."²

Ugwu-Oju who entered America in 1974, argues that she knew and still knows the rules governing the traditional values of her people and of the Ibo tribal bond. She also admits that, in entering America, she brought along with her the expectations of her parents. Her education, as a woman fell within the accepted tradition of faithfulness to her husband. All she knew and was taught to cherish most by her parents was loyalty to the marital traditions of her people, and crave for male children to please the husband.³ But, at age 18, her daughter—Delia, a future Princeton University graduate—knew very little or nothing about the traditions of Iboland. What Ugwu fears most is the extent to which her "tribal past" should influence her expectation of her daughter's future. Like most Nigerian parents, she

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

is “torn between teaching my daughter to be an Ibo woman and giving her the independence she craves.”¹

Particularly for the Nigerian female offspring, the Ugwu-Oju crisis thus confirms the general dilemma confronting Nigerian parents with regard to the shifting crisis of inter-generational transformation of their American-born offspring. For these offspring will “most likely not consider” their feelings and their values in choosing their American spouses. They are not as selfishly loyal as the parents were back in the homeland. “Should we limit their opportunities to keep them loyal to our beliefs and our past, or should we encourage our daughters to avail themselves of all experiences, even at the risk of rejecting who and what we are?”² The answer to this question requires an understanding of the prospects of their American incorporation.

**American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants:
Their Relationships with Black America
and the Nigerian-African Homelands, etc.**

Admittedly, the worrisome concerns raised above by Ugwu-Oju had to be sought and explained within the context of an American world incorporation of the Nigerian offspring. And, as we have hinted earlier, this explanation lies in the fact that, the longer Nigerian immigrants remain in the diaspora, the greater the chances that their offspring will look more favorably toward sustained interactions with American cultures than those of their ancestral homelands. Perhaps, due also to the racial circumference of American cultures, both their relations as well as the corresponding values of effective socioeconomic mobility will also gravitate more

¹Ibid.

²Ugwu-Oju, “Should My Tribal Past Shape Delia’s Future,” p. 14.

favorably toward black America, and in varying degrees, toward those of mainstream America.

Most revealing, though, for the Nigerian offspring, has been the fact that their sense of cultural identity—perhaps depending more on the degree of parental influences—also corresponds with a double consciousness either toward ancestral Africa and black America or toward Euro-America. While there are Nigerians who have lured their offspring toward the cultural values of mainstream America, however, the emphasis here is that the general trend is more favorably skewed toward black America. Either way, however, African parents are neither able to control the rising tide of the generational transformation of their American offspring nor of the opposing lures of American cultures against those of their homelands.¹

Thus, the historico-cultural orbit of the Nigerian offspring requires a more careful explanation. This is because their more distinctive generational orbit from both the experiences of the forced and voluntary migrants places them in a certain level of advantage. This tends to make them one of the most adjustable human features from black Africa currently in America since the demise of chattel slavery and colonialism. Yet, sometimes, their socio-cultural identification mirrors the earlier and continuing attitudes of “passing” identifiable among the descendants of forced migration with mixed white-black ancestries.²

¹This is based on summaries drawn from several children day care interaction conferences (including African-Nigerian, African-American and White) I have attended.

²For example, for some historical context of “passing,” see Jean Toomer, Cane (New York: Liveright, 1993), especially the “Introduction” by Darwin T. Turner, pp. ix-xxv; Nella Larsen, Quicksand and Passing (New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. ix-xxxii; and Houston A. Baker, Jr., Afro-American Poetics: Revisions of Harlem and the Black Aesthetic (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 33-44.

Nigerian offspring who “pass” outwardly as American rather than as Americans of Nigerian ancestry are also able to “pass” back as the offspring of “Nigerian ancestry.” Generally, this development is dictated by the racial character of American civilization. Ironically, however, it offers the Nigerian offspring the dual choices of the consciousness of urban survival. It is either favorable or unfavorable depending on the institutional features influencing their strivings for, as well as, access to the goal of American dreams.¹ Overall, however, the inner tensions leading some Nigerian offspring to “pass out” as African-Americans with no links to Africa are rare. In the research and fieldwork done in this dissertation, it was found that the Nigerian offspring only attempted to “pass out” as the “other American” where they perceived their ancestry at a disadvantage. The attitude was mostly in response to a drive to achieve the desired goals.²

Thus, there are currently in America certain institutional features that influence some choices at the inter-generational circuit of the Nigerian or the African offspring of sub-Saharan settlers. These are either advantageous or disadvantageous to their American and Nigerian-African relations depending on the medium chosen in their search for survival. Generally, within a specific context, it would appear that Nigerian offspring enjoy a huge advantage in accessing some institutional support with their ancestral origins fairly intact, rather than losing them.

As we see from the preceding development, the socio-cultural plateau of the Nigerian offspring offers a much clearer basis than that of their core parents for understanding their incorporation into American society. The social feature of

¹Ibid. This is also supported by the fieldwork and interviews undertaken in this study.

²Ibid.

“passing” adopted by some Nigerian offspring as a mechanism of urban survival is therefore less obvious compared to the highly constrained patterns of incorporation associated with their parents. The Nigerian offspring thus represent the most favored basis for incorporating or integrating Nigerian indices into American society.

Similarly, both the historical and cultural orbit of the Nigerian offspring, are more natural to sustained intra-racial incorporation than those of their parents. Their future possibilities are assuring enough. One of the strongest demographic achievements of their core migrant parents, which also hold for these offspring, has been their excellent educational status.¹ The relationship of this advantageous background seems poised to enhance greater chances of incorporating the Nigerian offspring into the American mosaic. A majority of them are already achieving the American niche in far greater numbers than their parents were able to do. Their strong visibility within the major Ivy League universities and colleges is impressive.

The Nigerian offspring do also have a smoother access to the American dream as well as greater commitment to its ideals. Thus, they are more likely than their core parents to stake their rights as Americans and hence to achieve a greater degree of incorporation. Besides, as our evidences have demonstrated, they seem well placed to be able to re-adopt their American gains toward the Nigerian/African world development than were their parents and the descendants of slaves.

Yet, it is also worth noting here that, the extent to which the current thrust of the Nigerian offspring represents an effort toward sustained incorporation into American society may not be based solely on their effective education. Nor are the

¹Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, pp. 3-9; *Research Report*, pp. 14-19; Author, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4.

strong efforts by their parents to identify them with mainstream values very convincing future predictors of favorable incorporation. Perhaps, arguably, due to the continuing crisis of racial indifference, good education is also likely to be more predictive of a higher level of economic stability than of sustained incorporation.

As we saw earlier, the extent of an inter-American success in incorporating ethnic groups into society had much in common with the support extended to them by the host society and American institutions. This support in turn is closely linked to the strengths of co-existing ethnic communities of these groups in America.¹ Given the evidences illuminated so far, this important emphasis is undoubtedly least favorable to Nigerians or to the larger base of the black African migrants. As Portes and Zhou found, incorporation of the children of Mexican immigrants and the Caribbean immigrants was at the least favorable orbit of either assimilation or integration, largely due to some social constraints.² This strongly suggests that a similar pattern for Nigerians/Africans is likely to be much weaker and harder in America. For example, when considering that the Latinos and Asians in America often view their conflict in terms of cultural rather than racial terms, it would likely be seen that sustained incorporation of the Nigerian offspring falls into the dissenting pattern of the historical crisis characteristic of African-descended groups.

There is even a basis that, despite their poor status in education, the inter-generational features of Mexican-American offspring have more favorable

¹Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science #530 (November 1993), p. 84.

²Ibid. The relationship can be viewed within the broader context of the socio-cultural crises that affect Mexican-American and African-American communities.

demographic orbit than those of the offspring of Caribbean immigrants. While conflict in assimilating the children of Caribbean immigrants, is due more to race, that of the Mexicans is due to low level of education.¹

Therefore, unlike Nigerian and Caribbean immigrants, Mexican immigrants can admit of discrimination but probably with little or no strong emphasis on race. The inherent strength deflected by the broader assimilation of the Hispanic cultures has the power of favorable reception by the mainstream races than for Nigerian/Caribbean immigrants.² Moreover, the socio-cultural context of the Nigerian offspring is much closer to the experience of the black Caribbean immigrants as well as to that of the native-born black Americans.

The extent then to which Nigerian offspring will be able to overcome a full cycle of the socio-cultural crises that have historically confronted the descendants of slaves is as yet uncertain. Their options, to a certain extent, are likely to be influenced by the contesting political and cultural forces that will shape the American republican agenda. Almost most of them are cognizant that their racial attributes both in America as well as back in Africa, are concealed in the background of the black experience.³ A majority of them have a strong consciousness about the effects of race on their American strivings. They have witnessed through some experiences and sometimes learnt from their parents, as well as from the bittersweet relationships between White America and Black America, that race is a determinant feature of American civilization. When they “pass” as pure Americans with no

¹Ibid.; Cordell and y Griego, Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Americans in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, especially pp. 3-11, 19-20.

²Ibid.

³Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

attachment to a Nigerian-African ancestry, this is mostly in recognition of the inherent conflict of race in their consciousness.

But, as we noted earlier, the degree in which the above problem is characteristic of America's newest migrants and offspring varies significantly from one historical era to the other. Nevertheless, while the succeeding generations of the Nigerian-African offspring are likely to fare better, perhaps their ultimate success would depend more on the modification of the indelible attitude of racial indifference toward their ancestral background.¹

For the Nigerian offspring, a point can then be made: that is, they are more susceptible to favorable incorporation into American society than their parents. Yet, as we have argued, such a fact or historical fortune need not conceal their unknown footholds as Americans in the future.

The author of this dissertation argues that, unless there are concerted efforts to modify the racial ambivalence of American civilization, the Nigerian offspring are likely to achieve only a more favorable degree of an American incorporation than did their migrant parents. One can speculate that such crises as racism and discrimination, where they will continue to impinge on them—whether in a similar or a near-similar degree as those of the descendants of forced migration—might lead to the refocusing of their future direction as Americans. Such refocusing, as can be further speculated, might enhance their choices of self-redirection either toward greater partnerships within the American black base or toward the Nigerian/African homelands. Clearly, the basis of an overall shift in historical dynamics is inevitable.

¹Ibid.

Should the preceding scenario take place, it would certainly represent another phase of re-creative patterns of inter-generational similarities which involves the descendants of slaves and voluntary migrations in America.¹ This inevitable dynamic might be determined by how Americans of Nigerian ancestry, for example, seek to control both their political and cultural agenda. At this point, however, the prospect of this development is a mere conjecture. Yet, current evidences point strongly to the fact that the general thrust of this development appears to be headed in the direction of offering newer patterns of Pan-African features in the greater part of the twenty-first century.²

We are likely to see again in Chapters 6 some evidences of how the Nigerian offspring are being positioned to achieve the real gem of Pan-African solidarity with the black diaspora of enslavement. Their relationships with Euro-Americans and even beyond the larger concerts of the European and Asian world connections are equally suggestive of emerging medium of changes in race relations. This is largely because, as we noted earlier, they are more likely to overcome some of the cultural and historical constraints that often affected relations between continental Africans and African-Americans. A similar degree of favorable relations between the Nigerian offspring and Euro-Americans is therefore inevitable.

Summary

The successful adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic was accompanied by newer patterns of socio-cultural crises—which, in turn—affected

¹For example, see the major socio-cultural emphases in Chapters 6 and 7.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 265-270.

their inherent values. Currently, the basis of an American incorporation of Nigerians/Africans is largely economic, and this is supported mostly by good educational status.

Nigerian marital traditions, which have come under the influences American institutions, are currently being affected by divorces and separations. Nigerian marriages are also beginning to live and to act like most American marriages. Among some Nigerians, as with African-Americans, the pageant for individuals' successes follows the same pattern of make-beliefs in the efforts to define their new found identities.

The Nigerian offspring have the best socio-cultural orbit of favorable incorporation into American society. They are currently more African-American than Nigerian as well as more favorably predisposed toward American values than those of the homeland of their core parents. They are in a position to have more favorable contacts with the ancestral homelands than the descendants of slaves, and in some instances, they represent the best medium of exchanges involving Black America, Euro-America, and Nigeria/Black Africa.

CHAPTER 6

THE SOUTHERN BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN IMMIGRANTS: AN EXAMPLE OF THEIR SOUTHERN PULL ALONG AFRICAN-AMERICAN LANES

This chapter explains the Southern identification of Nigerian immigrants in the United States and the extent to which the presence of African-American institutions influenced their build-up. It argues that geography, the high density of African-American and Nigerian populations, socioeconomic and socio-cultural issues, and the presence of predominantly black institutions of higher education—were some of the major factors influencing the strong Southern pull of Nigerian immigrants. The chapter also shows some evidences of the strong Southern pull of Nigerians in Atlanta and Dallas, focusing on Houston as a case study. Next, it explains the Southern interactions of Nigerian-owned churches and the pattern of ancestral relationships with African-Americans.

Part 1: A General Review of Southern Background

By mid-1750, the build-up and regional distribution of African slaves within the Southern slave societies had both a distinctive as well as sizeable lead over its counterparts in Northern societies with slaves. This was because the Southern colonies, later to become the United States, had a far denser concentration of both the cultural and demographic varieties of the African slave populations than did their Northern counterparts.¹ Consequently, even before the legal abolition of slavery by the U.S. Congress in 1808, Southern states had emerged as the most natural locales of African-American communities and institutions. That the freest Black-owned

¹This is supported by evidences in Chapter 2. See especially the statistical data on the Southern and Northern colonies.

institutions began in the North, as historian Leon Litwack has observed, is a fact of the black experience in America.¹ But it was in the Southern region that the main action of the early free Northern black communities both converged and transformed itself after the Civil War.

With the coming of Reconstruction, the South had numerous black colleges/universities, more viable black institutions, and an active population base that facilitated its advantages in seedling the forces that were later to transform the state of white-black inequalities in America.² This Southern heritage of black America is perhaps best illustrated by its peculiar experience and history during the era of freedom. For example, from 1877 to mid-twentieth century, the public institutions in the South expressed themselves toward the descendants of slaves in accordance with the old features of racial slavery. This took place through segregation of public institutions by race, an unequal school system for blacks and whites, rigid state miscegenation law, and exclusion of blacks from the juries.³

The South then is where African-descended Americans began their entry as late citizens into the American republic despite being one of the earliest frontier settlers in the nation. This is also, where, following Reconstruction, racial

¹Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 39-40; Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 130-47, 203-213.

²Martin Luther King, Jr., Strive Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 100-3; Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham Jail, 1963," The Annals of America, Vol. 18 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1961-1968), p. 147.

³Davidson, Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 15-16; August Meier, Negro Thought in America 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 19-25.

opposition and increased repugnance toward black equality resulted in organized violence by white supremacist groups against established black institutions. Thus, apart from being noted for increased black ghettos and urban black underclass, it is where racism and discrimination has been on record high since the enactments of the civil rights and voting rights laws in the 1960s. This region is as well where the status of black freedom continues to confront the strongest opposition by the advocates of states' rights legislations.¹

Southern Background of Houston, Texas

Unsurprisingly, the South is where the black struggle won its national and international debut both in the ethical and political appeals for equal status. Yet, although a pathway to the emergence of a New South under law began probably between mid-1950s and mid 1960s, it still retains some of the indelible facts of the Old South. Sociologist Chandler Davidson has observed that the cultural milieu of the Southern mores is still influenced by the character of the peculiar institution.² These features of the Old South are still evolving in the large size of internal black population movements and established cultural institutions.³

Robert Bullard has argued that the "South is more than a statistical entity," and hence cannot be classified as "comprising sixteenth states and the District of

¹For example, see: Gates, Jr., America Behind the Color Line, pp. 179-189; Sitoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, pp. 3-36; Desmond King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 3-30; Kenneth O'Reilly, "Racial Matters:" The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 (New York and London: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 1-77.

²Davidson, Biracial Politics, pp. 10-17.

³Daniel M. Johnson and Rex R. Campbell, Black Migration in America: A social demographic history (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1981), pp. 5-6, 9-16, 32-56.

Columbia.”¹ The South, Bullard observes, has its own distinctive history, culture, and development patterns, comprising the “twelve states” of the so-called New South. Like Davidson, Bullard concludes that the so-called New South is not completely dissimilar from the Old South.²

Figure 9 shows that the twelve states of the New South, comprising of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas—are all embedded in the regional and cultural zones of former slave societies (See Tables 6.1-6.3). Despite the persistence of the character Old South, these states are where—particularly between 1970 and 2000—some important demographic changes have occurred in the white-black relations. Some of these changes have been of significant political gains as well as losses to the descendants of slaves. For example, some major gains have been recorded in the size of black middle-class and in their political representation despite continuing strong disparities compared to whites.³

Therefore, in the so-called New South, the peculiar circumstances which make for the Southern typology of African-Americans and of the new generation of largely voluntary African immigrants are perhaps more favorable in the major urban cities of the black belt. Within these cities, their potential for collective groupings is maximized by the large size of urban population of African-Americans. This strong black visibility in turn is formed around more favorable socio-cultural and

¹Robert D. Bullard, “Lure of the New South,” in Search of the New South: The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s, ed., R. D. Bullard (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 3-4; Davidson, Biracial Politics, p. 10.


²Davidson, Biracial Politics, p. 10; Bullard, In Search of the New South, pp. 3-4.

³Ibid., Bullard, pp. 5-15

politico-economic interactions, geographic spread, along with sheer size of pliable black institutions. These factors are either advantageous or disadvantageous to African immigrants depending on the varying evolutionary statuses of the descendants of slaves.

Figure 9

Map Showing the Twelve States of the South



Source: Robert D. Bullard, In Search of the New South, The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1989), p. 4.

Aside from Atlanta and Dallas, perhaps nowhere else in the major Southern cities are the possibilities of larger political and economic transformation of the collective strengths of African-Americans and of the black African immigrants as obvious as in Houston, Texas. As Bullard writes, “Blacks in Heavenly Houston,” particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, represented the macrocosm of some of the

changes in the Old South.¹ This same trend, which continued favorably throughout the 1990s toward African-Americans, also embraced African immigrants.

As Table 18 confirms, the patterns of growth of blacks in Houston have been steady since 1900. Such factors as sheer size, general demographic growth, internal and external migrations, along with the numerous effects of rapid urbanization, have added to the rapid rise of the city of Houston and transformation. For example, in 1970, Houston, a city of 1.2 million people, was within the country's thirteenth largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).² In 1980, when Houston's census population was 1, 595,138, it ranked fifth among the nation's major SMSAs.³ When in 1990 Houston's census population figure was 1,630,553, its national SMSA status moved to the fourth position.⁴ As of 2000, the city had a total population of 1.9 million people. By July 1, 2004, more than 2 million people were recorded in its population.⁵

Demographically and culturally, part of the region where Houston is currently located falls into the "peripheral South or the Rim South rather than to the heart of Dixie."⁶ Founded in 1836, Houston located in Harris County, was once included in a region known as East Texas. A. R. Mangus once defined East Texas and Houston including part of Arkansas and Louisiana, as falling within the region known as "Western Old South."⁷

¹Bullard, In Search of the New South, pp. 16-34.

²Davidson, Biracial Politics, p. 17.

³Atlas Year Book, 1993, p. 801.

⁴Ibid.

⁵See U.S. Bureau of the Census Report for 2000, and the supplementary Report, July 2004.

⁶Ibid.; Davidson, Biracial Politics, pp. 11-12.

⁷Ibid.; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 200-2.

Table 18
The Growth of African-American Populations
in Houston, Texas, 1900-2000

Year	Total Population	Black American Population	Percent (%) Black American
1900	44,633	14,608	32.7
1910	78,800	23,929	30.4
1920	138,276	33,960	24.6
1930	292,352	63,337	21.7
1940	384,514	86,302	22.4
1950	596,163	125,400	21.0
1960	938,219	215,037	22.9
1970	1,232,802	316,992	25.7
1980	1,595,138	440,257	27.6
1990	1,630,553	457,990	28.1
2000	1,900,000	494,496	25.31

Sources: Chandler Davidson, Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 18; The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1983 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1983), pp. 212-213; The Information Please Almanac, Atlas Year Book 1993, 46th Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), p. 801.

The Negro concentrations in the above areas were principally along the Brazos, Trinity, Neches, Sabine, Colorado, and Red River bottom, where cotton was first grown in large quantity, and where plantation agriculture was densely concentrated.¹ These areas included counties stretching from Lamar County along the Red River down the Texas-Louisiana boundary to Harris County (Houston), Galveston, Refugio, and Fort-Bent. Stretching further up the Neches and Trinity River bottoms, the region embraced Dallas and Ft. Worth, and from there Austin and Waco. According to Frazier and Davidson, East Texas and Houston along with the Eastern Old South and the Mississippi Delta once embraced the Cotton Belt.²

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.; Davidson, pp. 11-13.

Houston is thus steeped in the political and social mores of the Southern Black Belt. From the pre-Civil War to the current era, it exhibited both the image of the Old and the so-called New South. The image of the Old South in the city is still being retained as a place where slavery flourished in large quantity once it was introduced in the early nineteenth century, and “which till today bears witness to the nature of the peculiar institution.”¹ Frederick Law Olmsted, who visited the city in 1854, noted that: “There is a prominent slave mart in town, which held a large lot of likely-looking Negroes, waiting purchasers.”² Olmsted’s record reveals that the social features of the “peculiar institution,” as posted on the “windows of shops and on the doors and columns of the hotel,” included many advertisements for sales of “A likely Negro girl,” “Two Negroes” and “Twenty Negro boys.”³

Although the image of the New South in Houston is to be seen in some of the active involvement of blacks in city-politics, evidences of its conservative traditions persist. The peculiar Southern identification of Houston during the previous century was indicated by its name, “Magnolia City.”⁴ David McComb observed that Houston's modern civic and social history reflected a pervasive conservatism in politics, public schools, and reactions to urban problems. The roots of this conservatism, he argued, lie in the Southern heritage of the town, the expansive, the opportunistic nature of the areas, and the strong business orientation of the economy.⁵

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., pp. 13-14.

³Ibid. Quoted in Davidson, pp. 13-14.

⁴Ibid., p. 17.

⁵David G. McComb, Houston: A History (Austin: University of Texas, 1981), p. 145.

Indeed, until the abolition of the “White Primary” in 1944, African-Americans—as the largest minority group in Houston—were not involved in city politics. Prior to this date, they were excluded from voting in the democratic primaries in the state. They began to participate in Houston politics by way of forging alliances with the liberal factions. By 1953, however, they had formed an organization with the dual aims of fostering a relationship with the National Democratic Party and providing support for liberal candidates at the state and local levels.¹

The entry of blacks in Houston into the electorate in a relatively short time challenged the status quo. This trend has in recent times come to be evident by the growing shift in the organization of City-Hall politics from conservative to racial moderates to liberal political dominance.² Significantly, the Houston city politics has been dominated by numerous run-off elections. The evolving demographic patterns of black coalition-based political activism, along with other ethnic minority political interest groups, have often made Houston’s well-known and intense political campaigns to depend on the cooperation of black voters. This trend peaked in 1981, and in 1983, following the elections of the city’s first female Mayor, Kathryn Whitmire.³

Prior to 1981, however, Houston's politics was not well known for its civil rights actions. With the election of Whitmire, the reliance on minorities’ support to run the City Hall (Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, women, Asian Americans

¹Davidson, *Biracial Politics*, pp. 11, 84-5.

²Paul Udofia, “Television Use by Two Mayoral Candidates: A Comparative Assessment” (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Texas Southern University, 1985), pp. 41-2.

³*Ibid.*, pp.1-2, 39, 41-46, 72-5, 94-5, 109-110.

and gays) marked the beginning of a gradual shift toward liberal policies in city. This trend was further transformed by the appointment of Lee Brown, an African-American, as Houston's Police Chief by Whitmire. Together, her election as the first city's female mayor represented the clearest historic shift in the organization of City Hall's policies.¹

Since the 1980s, therefore, blacks have been recording some gains in Houston politics. For example, in 1997, Houston elected Lee Brown, as its first African-American mayor. The current Mayor of the city is Bill White. Crime has been closely linked to Houston's Southern identification. Houston maintained a top-ranking murder rate and a relatively small police force throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. While Houston ranked fourth in the nation in crime rates in 1967 and 1979, its crime statistics were comparable to New York and Los Angeles, although not as bad as Dallas and Atlanta.²

Consequently, the mayoral election of 1983, for example, focused upon crime as an important issue.³ Earlier, Henry Allen Bullock, a Professor at Texas Southern University, who studied Houston's crime problem in 1961, noted that there was a close relationship between homicide and geography and stated: "generally, murder is a southern problem and Houston's murder rate helps keep this southern tradition alive." Bullock concluded that murder encouraged general lawlessness in the city,

¹Ibid.

²McComb, *Houston, A History*, pp. 153-154.

³*Houston Chronicle*, (May 24, 1983), Section 4, p. 8.

and affected a communal lack of control over the criminal behavior.¹ Houston's troubling crime identification has recently been tempered by favorable policing, which began in the 1980s. The efforts to reduce crime in Houston increased between the 1990 and 2000, and the city appears to be experiencing lower crime rates and homicide cases. With expanding infrastructures of its varying ethnic minorities, the city has truly become a staging-center for Texans, Houstonians, Americans, and foreigners.

This evolving demographic outlines of Houston, which we highlighted earlier, is supported by an array of expansive social, intellectual, industrial, and cultural facilities catering to its diverse public interests. In sports are the Houston Rockets and the Houston Astros. In higher education for blacks and whites are the University of Houston (predominately white), Texas Southern University (predominately black), and Rice University (a predominately white private school), St. Thomas University (Catholic), and Houston Baptist University). In informational sources, Houston has many network-affiliated television stations: KTRK-TV, KHOU-TV, and KXLN-TV; and other independent TV stations. The major mainstream daily newspapers are the Houston Chronicle and Houston Post and a variety of related Black-owned newspapers such as the Houston Defender.

Further strengthening Houston's economic and social entertainment listings are: NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Astrodome complex, Sam Houston Coliseum and Music Hall, and The Texas Medical Center. Besides, being the nerve

¹Henry Allen Bullock, Houston Murder Problem: Its Nature, Apparent Causes and Probably Cures: Report of the Mayor's Negro Law Enforcement Committee (Houston, Texas, 1961), pp. 7-8.

center of the American oil businesses, its enormous medical center facilities and NASA projects provide Houstonians—native and foreign—the necessary backdrop for complex economic and social experiences. This background has far-reaching implications for emerging biracial coalition activism and conflict among racial minority groups in the city.¹

Undoubtedly, Houston's image as a "space city" has brought an additional strength to the growth of local, national, and international industries within its counties. Collectively, these factors perhaps best explain why Houston is an economic powerhouse of the New South and home to diverse nationalities. Also, with a major U.S. port-city and an international airport, the city attracts large concentrations of immigrants from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. This fact has further transformed its complex ethnic milieu, making the city a place where all sorts of peoples are to be seen struggling to define their American identities. Houston therefore compares more favorably than Atlanta and Dallas in Southern United States as a city with dense populations of native-born black Americans and new generation of largely voluntary settlers from black Africa.

Part 2: Nigerian Immigrants in Major U.S. Southern Cities

Accordingly, from the 1970s onward, Houston emerged as a major enclave of demographic changes in the so-called New South. This trend, as we pointed out earlier, was accompanied by corresponding proliferation of the populations of "the new Americans." This development was later to place Houston in a position to offer mixed outlines of inter-and-intra-racial distribution patterns which have sometimes

¹Udofia, "Television Use by Two Mayoral Candidates," pp. 1, 41-6.

touched off sensitive socio-cultural nerves in areas previously dominated by either mainstream Americans or African-Americans, or the Latinos.

The dynamics of the “new Americans” from Africa have their strongest establishments in Houston. This is particularly the case in relation to cultural exchanges and proximity to areas of dense concentrations of African-Americans. This is where some visible evidences of post-1960s black African immigrant communities are mostly likely to be found in the metropolitan South. This context is also where the Nigerian immigrant community, with perhaps its most developed Southern base, is to be found. Because of their sheer size, Nigerians control the largest share of the general population of the black African immigrants in Houston, or elsewhere in the South.¹

Overall, however, the Southern concentrations of Nigerians are denser in Texas and Georgia. Within these regions, Nigerians are almost evenly distributed in their cross-cultural diffusion along African-American lines. From a Southern perspective, therefore, the successful adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic, which we discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was more clearly expressed by their interactions within the two regions.

¹This conclusion is based on exploratory survey of the black African immigrant communities in Southern United States between early 1990 and early 2000, along with information published on the Nigerian/African community media; U.S. Bureau of the Census data; African Business Directories in the United States, 2000; African Business Directories for Houston, Dallas, Atlanta; Saraviv Directory of African Businesses in America & American Companies that do Business in Africa (Newark, New Jersey, 1999 & 2000); Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional community Profiles (Atlanta, Georgia: Atlanta Regional Commission, 1994), pp. 1-4; Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 90.

Such cities as Atlanta and Dallas and Houston have not only dense concentrations of highly educated Africans, in fact they have been noted as the major enclaves of Nigerian immigrants. Thus, it can be safely asserted that, in these cities, Nigerians have one of their most established communal institutions in the metropolitan South.¹ For Nigerian immigrants, as for the entire black African immigrants, the crisis of racial otherness, determines the socio-cultural context of their affiliation with African-Americans. Despite their advanced degrees, Nigerians often work two or three jobs in order to make good living standards due to the misunderstanding associated with their educational abilities and racial background. The demographic diffusion of their professional establishments includes: “teachers, college professors, doctors, doctors nurses, pharmacist, lawyers, psychologists, counselors, and artists.”² Their Southern presence in the major Southern cities is also revealed in the strong visibility of their emerging institutions, the most prominent which are their churches and media.³

Regrettably, however, determining the actual population of the black African settlers in the metropolitan South often shows some contradictory data. The controversy surrounding the official count of Nigerians in Houston, a major Southern city, during the early 2000, revealed the extent to which the incorporation of Nigerians indices into American society was as yet to be accorded a respectable

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.; also, see Chapter I, especially the explanation of the methodology adopted in this study; Eyobong Ita, “Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia,” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, North Carolina, December 27, 1991), pp. 1, 21; Cyril D. Lurlay, African Business Directory (Atlanta, Georgia, 1996); African Business Directories for Houston, Dallas, Atlanta ; Cordell and y Griego, Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas, Forth Worth, Texas, pp. 18-19,20-4; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 37-40, 100.

³Ibid.

examination.¹ The problem of undercounting Nigerians/Africans by the U.S. Census appears not to be exceptional to Southern U.S. alone, although one reflecting a general national trend. According to one report in 1991, Nigerians in Dallas were estimated at 10,000. As, for example, in 2000, the U.S. Bureau of the Census recorded 7,300 of Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth-Worth Metropolitan area. This figure contrasted sharply with the estimates of the Nigerian embassies.²

Again, with Atlanta estimated below 12,000 Nigerians in 2000, Houston reportedly had about 100,000.³ Between mid-1990 and 2000, Nigerian/African embassies differed in the head counts of their nationals/immigrants in Southern cities from those presented by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This meant that Nigerian populations as known by Nigerians in Southern cities or elsewhere, are much higher in number than those reported via the U.S. Census Bureau. For instance, in Atlanta, Georgia, with an estimated population of 200,000 Africans in 2003, the proportion of only 3,500 Nigerians in 1994,⁴ suggests a strong underestimation of their overall potential population base.

¹This was found in my examination of demographic information of Nigerians in Houston.

²See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census Population, 2000; Cordell and y Griego, "The Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas," pp. 3, 13; Wikipedia, The Free encyclopedia: "<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houston>; <http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwhxjan03g.htm>; Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia," pp. 1, 21. Also, see estimated of the population of Nigerians in Houston by the "Embassy of the United States of America in Nigeria [Crossroads], Reaching Out to the African Diaspora: The Need for Vision: US. Embassy," Public Affairs Section, Information Section (Abuja, Nigeria, November 26, 2002), p. 2.

³Ibid. My exploratory survey of Nigerian indices in early 2000s in the some Southern cities leaned more toward a higher population than estimated by the U.S. Census. For example, an unofficial estimate said that there were between 9,000-10,000 Nigerians in Atlanta in 2004.

⁴Richie Bodie, in an article entitled "Entrepreneurial Spirit Brings Africans Here: Growth points to Bright Future," The Atlanta Journal Constitution (May 9, 2003); Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Community Profiles, p. 2.

So the rise of the Nigerian population in Houston from about 10,000 in 1990¹ to 100,000 in 2000 may be extraneous, where their overall total, as reported by the U.S. Census, was 134,000.² This controversy suggests that most black Africans were either not being counted by the U.S. Census Bureau or were being underestimated in the count, or were on their own not cooperating with the effort. Perhaps the controversy surrounding African census tabulation in some Southern cities, as is elsewhere in the U.S., lies in both the approach as well as in the attitude toward a cultural region that has historically been the least respected by American institutions.³ Nonetheless, the controversy seems to have had no effects on the well-known patterns of dense concentration of Nigerians/Africans in Southern cities.⁴

This Southern build-up of Nigerians, first begun with the largely students' waves of immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s, formed the nucleus of the Nigerian community.⁵ We saw earlier in Chapters 3 and 4 that the educational inclinations of Nigerians—coupled with favorable socioeconomic, geographic settings and the presence of viable black institutions—were the major considerations in their vast concentration in the region. Such cities like Atlanta, Dallas and Houston were the major urban centers of economic, cultural, and educational diffusions of Nigerians across African-American lanes during the 1970s and 1980s. These were as well,

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 165.

²Cordell and y Griego, "The Integration of Nigerians and Mexican Immigrants," p.4; Census of the Population of the United States, 2000.

³Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 261-2, 271; Skinner, In Defense of Black Nationality, p. 7-9. Holt, "Africans," in Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, p. 5. Also, see some emphases in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

⁴For example, this is supported by the demographic composition of Nigerian immigrants in Chapter 3. See especially the Tables on regional distribution.

⁵Ibid. For example, see discussions in Chapters 3 and 4.

enclaves where Nigerians were densely concentrated during the 1990s and early 2000s.

This Southern concentration of Nigerians was due mostly to the historical as well as cultural factors that had tied African descended peoples to the black belt.¹ Probably such factors as economic, geographic, and low cost of higher education, which accounted for the strong concentration of Nigerians in Southern cities were also more closely linked to socio-cultural considerations. This might suggest that racial ‘otherness’ had a far stronger basis in their Southern distribution than any other factor. If so, surprisingly, such an explicit fact rarely corresponded with their pattern of favorable residential settlement side by side with African-Americans.²

Why then are Nigerians in Southern cities, or elsewhere in the U.S., less inclined toward closer pattern of residential cleavage with African-Americans? Are there other reasons that can further explain their loose affinity with black America, the seedbed of their Southern and indeed of their American germination? To begin with, it is worth noting here that, although the extent to which the class factor of Nigerian immigrants influences the pattern of their residential distribution is undeniable, it clearly requires some explanation. For example, as we saw earlier in our examination of the issue of class forces in the internal structure of Nigerian

¹This is the general feature of the Southern Background of the black base, which we saw in Chapters 2-3. For example, W E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of the Black Folk (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), pp. 88-103; Davidson, Biracial Politics, pp. 3-8; Frazier, The Negro in the United States, pp. 200-2; and Bullard, In Search of the New South, pp. 5-15, classified this region within the Black Belt. For Geographic and demographic distribution of black ancestries populations, see: Black Allen and Turner, We the People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity, pp. 151; “Nigerians in the Atlanta Region,” in Ethnic Regional Community Profiles, p. 1; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

²Ibid.

immigrants,¹ it was apparent that this development had much in common with the extent to which the unfavorable socio-cultural orbit of the descendants of slaves was being impinged by the attitudes of the more fortunate racial hierarchies in the U.S. This was further supported by the fact that, for Nigerians—in particular, the problem of an unfavorable racial background—often engendered inter-ethnic divide and hence rivalries. This in turn generated impulses that further transformed their responses within the mosaic. The result was then evident in the kind of inter-ethnic class conflict that was probably strongest among them in such Southern cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. As Cordell and Griego found in their study, a majority of Nigerians were unconcerned in their affiliations with Nigerian ethnic organizations.² This position points strongly toward ethnic/tribal conflict that borders on class struggle, particularly in the regional settlement patterns of Nigerians.³

First, it may be well to keep in mind that the socio-cultural crises of some Southern cities are sometimes expressed within the larger historical confluence of the black experience. It cannot be denied that this development influenced the pattern of neighborhood distribution of Nigerian or the larger black African immigrants, and hence accounted for the absence of a strong desire to settle side by side with their ancestral kin. Second, this attitude, which we shall touch on again slightly below, can be traced to the entrenched inordinate-subordinate socio-cultural milieu of the black experience and its effects on sustained Pan-African solidarity.⁴

¹See, for example, Chapters 3-5.

²Ibid. See Chapters 3, 4, and 5, and Cordell and Griego in "Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in the Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas," pp. 3, 18.

³Ibid.

⁴Research Report, p. 25; Trotter Review, p. 32. Also see Chapter 5.

For, indeed, unlike the Latinos and Asians, for example, who have identifiable pattern of residential distribution, Nigerians were the least likely groups during the 1980s and some part of the 1990s to identify themselves with ethnic enclaves in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, or elsewhere in the U.S.¹ A majority of the 28,000 Africans recorded in the Dallas-Forth Worth area in 2000, including the 7,300 for Nigerians, lived in four counties: Collin, Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant.² These are mostly mixed neighborhoods, with some demographic variant into upper white and mixed white-black-Asian-Latino residential areas.³

For example, in Atlanta, Nigerians were once believed to “have formed no ethnic enclave” because of “intent on assimilation.” Their distribution in this enclave stretches throughout the Atlanta region: from Fulton to Dekalb, Clayton to Cobb to Gwinnett, with the largest concentration spreading from Stone Mountain to College Park, to south of 1-20 to Riverdale.⁴ Proud of their heritage and presumed to be intent on assimilation, a majority of these Nigerians in Atlanta live in what might safely be described as predominantly mixed neighborhoods, with a few spreading into predominantly white neighborhoods. Only a few live in predominantly black

¹The pattern of Nigerians’ distribution in Atlanta, as mirrored in Atlanta Ethnic Regional Community Profiles, p. 2, is almost similar to their diverse pattern of residential concentration in Dallas and Houston depicted by Cordell and y Griego in “Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in the Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas,” pp. 3, 18.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴For example, the 1994 background of Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional Community Profiles, p.2, still serves as a basis for evaluating the pattern of their neighborhood cleavage. My follow-up examination of Nigerian indices in Atlanta (2005) confirmed that the enclaves cited here were still areas of dense concentrations of Nigerians. Where there were some shifts into other areas, such did not invalidate their demographic composition and the general pattern of neighborhood cleavage as reported by the Atlanta Regional Community Profiles in 1994.

neighborhoods.¹ In Houston, however, most well educated middleclass Nigerians who are white-collar professionals live in West, Southwest and South Houston.² These Nigerians have their largest residential diffusion in mixed neighborhoods. Others lived in predominantly white and middle-class black neighborhoods, with a few still scattered here and there across predominantly troubled black neighborhoods.

One strong Southern attribute found among Nigerian immigrants is in the manner that an earlier feature of historical crisis has converged in favor of their current relationship within the black base. For example, a majority of Nigerians in Southern cities are from the regions where the forced migration to mainland North America took its greatest human toll. Such ethnic groups as Ibo, Yoruba, Efik/Efik/Ibibio, Ijo, Hausa-Fulani, and Edo, who comprised the majority of slaves from the Bights of Bonny and Benin, also comprised the dominant base of the current post-colonial voluntary settlers from Nigeria in Southern cities of the U.S. The only marked differences are perhaps clearly discernible around areas of ethno-regional redistribution of these groups under new political identities during and after the demise of colonialism in Nigeria.³

Further significant are the related socio-cultural attributes between the Judeo-Christian attitudes of the descendants of the forced migration and voluntary Nigerian

¹Ibid.

²Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).

³This reference is supported by information in Chapters 2 and 3, which examined the ethnographic settings of the races of the Niger Delta basins/Niger-Benue during the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The Southern front of their build-up and socio-cultural identification in America since the demise of colonialism has the boldest ethnographic similarities between the generations of forced and voluntary migrations from the Bights of Bonny and Benin and hence the current location of modern Nigeria.

migration in Southern cities. This revolved around the extent of the Judeo-Christian indoctrination of African slaves by their masters in Southern slave societies and the almost similar experiences among Southern Nigerians under colonialism. Both in the Southern U.S. and Southern Nigeria, it was this experience that accounted and continues to account for the extensive proliferation of Christian churches before and after freedom. Among Nigerians in the diaspora, this historic dynamic has become the most identifiable feature of their relations with black America, and alternately with Euro-America. Also, its tenet has served both as a cultural and spiritual bridge in linking the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism to the black diaspora of enslavement.¹

So, within the Southern cities of the U.S., Nigerians from Southern Nigeria are the most dominant post-colonial base of Judeo-Christian representation in the current build-up of the black African labor migrants. They are mostly from Southeastern and Southwestern regions of Nigeria. Coincidentally, the Ibos, a dominant source of supply in the human cargoes shipped to Virginia during the era of racial slavery are also the dominant Judeo-Christ base of the Nigerians in Southern U.S. from Southeastern Nigeria—and across the American landscape.

Together, therefore, with some proportion of others from the Middle-Belt enclaves of Northern Nigeria, the overall Judeo-Christian configuration of Southern Nigerian immigrants in Southern U.S. cities represented the strongest arm of intra-cultural contacts with the descendants of slaves: also, this Judeo-Christian thrust has its strongest contextual diffusion with African-American settings. Where the concentrations of both African-Americans and Africans are much stronger, such as

¹Research report, pp. 22-4.

found in Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, this Judeo-Christian thrust of Nigerians embraced non-African people of color as well as mainstream Americans.¹

Using the Dallas-Forth Worth evidences of the Judeo-Christian confluence of Nigerians, Cordell and y Griego noted that:

Nigerians attend a vast array of churches of all denominations, reflecting the great variety of missions that fostered Christianity in Nigeria itself. Some attend services in mainstream Catholic and protestant churches whose congregations are largely white, or are mixed—white and African American and Hispanic. Other frequent mainstream services populated largely by African Americans and other Africans. Still, others attend small, Nigerian-dominated independent churches with Nigerian ministers. Church and Mosques attendance exposes Nigerians to virtually all immigrant and native-born communities in north Texas.²

Of course, to be sure, what Cordell and y Griego saw as amounting to “small Nigerian-dominated independent churches,” represented the unfolding of their most dynamic institution in Southern U.S. Demographically and culturally, the Nigerian-owned church in the American South represents the most visible emblem of a Nigerian institution in the diaspora. Within the Southern black belt, or elsewhere in America, its socio-cultural features appear to have the strongest potentials for sustained transformation of Nigerian immigrants in the foreseeable decades.

Ultimately, at this point the explanation has to be that, apart from their strong Judeo-Christian bridge within the black base, Nigerians in Southern cities generally have loose patterns of neighborhood/residential attachment with African-Americans. As hinted earlier, perhaps due mostly to the crisis of racial indifference, their patterns

¹For this background, see Chapter 4; and “What are Nigerian Customs and Culture,” in Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional Community Profiles (1994), p. 3.

²Cordell and y Griego, The Integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas, p. 18.

of neighborhood distribution have corresponded with a strong curve toward their ancestral kin than one found among other enclaves of America's new settlers.

There seems now to be a basis for some re-appraisal over the other known reasons surrounding the detachment in the residential attitude of Nigerian/African immigrants toward African-Americans. First, choices of some urban residential settings such as New York, Dallas, Atlanta, and Houston, for example, were equally noted for the violent deaths of Nigerians.¹ These were as well where black American deaths, along with those of other Americans, were often record high. Second, Nigerians take their safety and general contextual security seriously since a majority of them operated without personal health insurances. Third, with increases in both their population and corresponding tragic deaths during the early 1990s emerged some newer patterns of neighborhood clusters among Nigerian settlers in Southern cities.

The above development later corresponded with the desire to secure their safety throughout the remaining part of the 1990s. This development was further supported by the fact that most Nigerians—like their related African counterparts—have strong views about the tragic passage of loved ones in a foreign land. For those with independent businesses, the risks involved were often too high when tragedies that should have been checked were allowed to occur. Due to these factors, the

¹“Missing Nigerian Lady Was Murdered,” Nigerian News Digest ((Ashville, North Carolina, June 26, 1992), pp. 1, 16; Richard Nwachukwu, “A Nigerian, Alphonsus Iwuagwu, laid to rest,” The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, September, 1990), p. 1, 14; _____”The Tragic death of an Ethiopian,” pp. 1, 17; Richard Nwachukwu, “Two Nigerian Cab Drivers Killed Two Weeks Apart in U.S.,” The African Herald (Dallas Texas, June 1997), pp. 1, 29;

general socio-cultural pattern of residential/neighborhood clusters of most Nigerians was least likely to result in a favorable bonding with African-Americans.¹

Elsewhere, the detachment of Nigerians from African-Americans had the added negative effects of transforming their internal class conflict among varied ethno-regional clusters into greater contextual rift in America.² Nor is it to be denied that the historical rift between some Nigerians and American-born blacks still persists, and can be further transformed under an atmosphere such as shown here. Indeed, the painful and continuing attributes of the Atlantic slave trade accounted for the suspicions as well as undue influences on certain patterns of their residential distribution.³

Thus, as shown here, the distancing of most Nigerians from African-Americans—particularly in their patterns of residential clusters—appears to be shaped more by socio-cultural forces than other factors. This then raises the ultimate question as to whether the more definable “racial otherness” currently affecting the Nigerian or the black African immigrants in America is poised to reveal further insights which can help in re-explaining the earlier models of inter-groups incorporation into American society via assimilation, integration, amalgamation, and cultural pluralism.⁴

¹Ibid. This author has been an eye witness in some occurrences taking place in the Nigerian/African communities in the diaspora. Drawing from these accounts, along with the data on exploratory survey in Southern U.S., it was possible to conclude that the residential diffusions of Nigerians/Africans were influenced by factors that transcended inter-ethnic differences and class conflict. See major emphases on this background in Chapters 1, 3-7.

²Ibid.; Research Report, pp. 25, 33-5, 38-40.

³Ibid.

⁴Newman, American Pluralism, pp. 51-78.

For, admittedly, none of the earlier models had any cogent explanation of the extent to which either the dominant white assimilationist model, or the ethnic minorities' amalgamation model, was pliable to the black share of an equal status, not to mention equal access to available national resources. The sufferance of some white ethnic minorities under these models, as found in the experience of the Irish Catholics, for example, had noted implications for the more peculiar encounter among African descended groups.¹ Whether in the Southern cities, or elsewhere in America, there is the problem of which models can fully incorporate the black African indices into society.²

Author's contention that the economic successes of African labor migrants corresponded with neither a desire to integrate nor to assimilate into American society,³ suggests that their patterns of neighborhood distribution are more likely to be oppositional than closely linked to African-Americans. Further, it suggests that the socio-cultural commonalities, which defined their contextual diffusion in Southern cities or elsewhere in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, were internally less supportive of intra-neighborhood cluster with African-Americans, as often found, for example, among the Latinos, Asians, and Europeans. Also, Author's later hints that African women were more likely to have stronger relationships with African-American females than their men vis-à-vis African-Americans⁴ is further suggestive of an overall pattern of a loose residential cleavage between Nigerians

¹Ibid. For example, see some evidences relating to the black experience in chapters 1, 3-7 of this dissertation.

²For example, see Chapter 5 for our discussion on the crises of racial "otherness" of the black experience and the effects on African immigrants in America.

³Author, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4.

⁴Ibid., p. 46.

and African-Americans in the metropolitan South. In other words, as we saw earlier in Chapters 4 and 5, it can be concluded that the implicit socio-cultural stress of the black experience has reinforced contextual dissonance among racially related groups. Generally, a far stronger revelation of this development can even be associate the detached patterns of neighborhood clusters of Nigerian immigrants from African-Americans with the residual effects of intra-racial indifferences.¹

Perhaps the detached neighborhood bonding between African immigrants and African-Americans is also the deflection of the enduring effects of American apartheid.² Massey and Denton have argued that the accumulated socioeconomic and politico-cultural effects of the policies of racial indifferences compounded the rigid attitudes of white residential segregation from blacks. If so, it cannot be denied that this same attitude has found expression in the pattern of neighborhood cluster of the black African immigrants. For native-born black Americans, particularly since the 1960s, the oppositional attitude of white residential segregation has been closely linked to their underclass status in society.³ As of the black African immigrant experience, however, this same crisis imposes a reactive pattern of both inter-ethnic and-intra racial conflicts, which are oppositional to sustained residential partnership.

A clearer basis then for explaining the pattern of class conflict among Nigerians in their residential distribution in Southern cities, or elsewhere in the U.S., requires an understanding of the implication of the preceding emphases. For, while class conflict cannot be denied, yet, it cannot be denied either that it emanates from

¹"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 190-2.

²Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1-9.

³Ibid.

the nature of sustained inequalities that are closely associated with socio-cultural indifferences. This might be the juncture in which to clarify some nuances by some scholars who seek to explain the current attributes of the black African immigrants.

For example, in rephrasing an earlier position by Kristin Butcher, Author observes that, “they [African migrants] are more likely than native-born blacks to be employed and live in multiple income households even though they earn less than native-born Americans overall.”¹ This statement is neither fully wrong nor fully correct, but certainly one requiring some further explanation. If Author and Butcher were correct, however, it would appear that the greater aptitude for a safety net, which we discussed earlier, and which the black African immigrant sought to secure, can also explain his/her choices of the sizes of family households. For, indeed, some choices of the sizes of family household by the black African migrant can be viewed against the conflicting socio-cultural milieu that defines his/her experiences as the newest of the “new American.” That, as noted earlier, this development does fit into the existing class conflict of the black migrant is a fact worth upholding.²

By all the available criteria, the analogy by Butcher, as referenced by Author,³ seems to reveal a misunderstanding that we can now explain. This is because the position, which Author referenced somewhat approvingly, is perhaps not an adequate explanation as to why some Africans have “multiple households.”⁴

¹Kristin Butcher, “Black Immigrants in the United States: A Comparison With Native Blacks and Other Immigrants,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47 [2] (1994), pp. 264-284; Author, Invisible Sojourners, p. 3.

²Research Report, pp. 25, 33-5, 38-40.

³Author, Invisible Sojourners, p. 3. Also, for full elaboration on the text, see Butcher, “Black Immigrants in the United States,” pp. 264-284.

⁴Author, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

First, as the most recent of America's newcomers, the black labor migrant is more susceptible to choices that reflect a strong desire to shape the future of an American world heritage. The Nigerian or African is therefore least likely to begin the foundation of an American heritage by being petty, if there are possibilities for choosing some of the best. Until recently, he/she had the least accessible medium to an American dream. Second, unlike native-born Americans, he is least likely to succumb to the exorbitant social habits, which affect their income, and which often results in blatant declaration of bankruptcies among the most wealthy of them. Third, and perhaps the most important, one of the results of selective pattern of contextual incorporation into the host society is that his/her choices often tends to favor investment in acquiring good homes. As Authur tells us, both his racial background and socio-cultural constraints have compelled a more selective pattern of American orientation markedly dissimilar from those of other immigrants.¹

Of course, with good education and hence corresponding better income status, one would expect the choices and sizes of the black African immigrant family household to be much better and larger. Nor, moreover, should it be forgotten that, even before immigrating to America, some black Africans—especially those from Nigeria—had already been exposed to a relatively assured sense of individualism, coupled with a “highly developed acquisitive culture.”²

Conclusively, therefore, in Houston, Texas, where the post-colonial build-up of African immigrants has one of its strongest concentrations in the metropolitan South, Nigerians occupy the center-stage in the cross-cultural re-distribution of their

¹Ibid.

² Mazrui, “The World Economy and the African/Afro-American Connection,” p. 51.

indices to Atlanta and Dallas, as well as into other related enclaves.¹ Beyond Houston, these Nigerians have their strongest consolidation in the Dallas-Forth Worth metropolitan areas. Houston and Dallas are not only two related sister-cities, indeed they are also two related and aggressively competing industrial enclaves in the metropolitan South. Often the speed of economic and cultural exchanges flowing from the two cities affected Nigerians in as fast a speed of inter-active exchanges as to influence the patterns of their resettlements and movements between them.

As a sister city to Houston, Nigerian residents in Dallas-Forth Worth areas may be said to be almost similar in their patterns of economic, cultural, and social class structures. Recurrent influxes of Nigerian immigrants from smaller Texas cities like Marshall, Longview, Texacana, Tyler, for example, are mostly likely to converge either, in Houston or Dallas; and, depending on the socio-economic circumstances and change, they fluctuate betwixt and between the two cities.²

The strong Southern pull of Nigerians in Houston offers a specific basis for a more concise case study. Houston then can serve as basis for further understanding of the scope of their Southern pull. It can also help in explaining the often worrisome cycles of white-black relations discussed thus far. Within this context, we are likely to perhaps fully understand the nature of the socio-cultural exchanges that have shaped the relationships between African-Americans and Nigerians. Similarly, the Houston background offers a faithful background for re-evaluating the

¹Based on analyses of African Business Directories in the United States, 2000; African Business Directories in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta; Saravic Directory of African Businesses in America & American Companies that do Business in Africa; and Nigerians in the Atlanta Region: Ethnic Regional community Profiles, pp. 1-4.

²"Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 176-7.

corresponding socio-cultural crises confronting the two related and historically affected racial groups in a metropolitan Southern U.S. city.¹

Part 3: Houston-Texas: A Case Study of a Nigerian Immigrant Community, 1970-1990

Certainly, Houston, Texas, with one of the largest population bases of Nigerians in the United States, is also where their most established communal features in the metropolitan South are to be found. Aside from the favorable tropical climate, Nigerian immigrants were first attracted to Houston by its healthy economy.² As immigrants from an oil-producing nation, the Houston oil-based economy was seemingly favorable in kind toward Nigerians.³ By the 1970s, Nigerian Houstonians comprised the largest base of African immigrants. Definitely by the early 1980s, the process of establishing an American identity of a Nigerian immigrant community in Houston was fairly complete. Seeded in the heartland of the "Space City," the success of Nigerians in adjusting into the Houston metropolis was closely linked to the black base: their high concentration was mostly due to the existence African-American institutions.⁴

Ultimately, one of the strongest arms of the black institutions that influenced the influxes of Nigerians into Houston was Texas Southern University (TSU). This historical institution of higher education controlled hundreds of students from Nigeria during the 1970s and 1980s. By 1985, the nearly 2000 Nigerian students

¹Eyobong Ita, "Dallas Boils Over Nigerian Mafia," Nigerian News Digest (December 27, 1991), pp. 1, 21; Onyia's "The Making of the Scape-Goat," The Good Hope News, pp. 26, 40.

²Bullard, In Search of the New South, pp. 27-34.

³"Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1993); KHOU TV Profile Let Me Tell You About Africa (1993).

⁴*Ibid.* This is also based on my examination of TSU-Nigerian relations from 1970 to 1980.

who enrolled at TSU represented about one-fourth of the total enrollment.¹ A few still attended the predominantly White University of Houston, Rice University, St. Thomas University, with others commuting from Houston to Prairieview A& M and Sam Houston University. The low tuition fees in the South at the time, which was much lower in the Texas region, made Houston attractive for Nigerians.²

While a majority of Nigerians during the much earlier waves had returned to the homeland after studies, this was not the case during a greater part of the late 1970s and 1980s. After the 1970s, of course, the relationships between Nigerian students and TSU entered a new phase. Due mostly to its large size of Nigerian students along with increased political and economic uncertainties back in the homeland, chances of returning to face an uncertain future after studies formed an important basis in the development of a Nigerian immigrant community in Houston.³

TSU, which benefited enormously from the financial resources that came with the Nigerian oil boom in the 1970s, was in most instances unwilling to abandon its large flock of Nigerians when the going got tougher. By mid-1980, when the Reagan interlude affected Nigerians in Houston, the black base was involved in their recovery. Ironically, the beginning of the Reagan era marked the demise of the somewhat more favorable policies of accommodation operative during the Carter era

¹"Nigerian Image," Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1993); Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 27.

²Ibid.; KHOU TV Profile, Let Me Tell You About Africa (1993).

³For example, the Nigerian background in Houston perhaps captures the clearest evidence of the pattern of their American evolution and transformation. As discussed earlier, TSU served as a patron in the build-up of Nigerian immigrants during the early decades of their immigration from Nigeria.

toward black America and black Africa.¹ This Reagan era coincided with a period when Nigerian Houstonians had developed their cultural and national outlook within the city. By this period, the socio-cultural seedlings of the instruments of the Nigerian immigrant communities within both the city and the African-American context were irreversible.²

Generally, it is doubtful whether the Nigerian immigrant community would have evolved within such a short span of time in Houston without the political turbulence and uncertainties back in the Nigerian homeland. It is also doubtful whether the dynamics of the Nigerian immigrant community in Houston would have taken such a speedy interaction without the American social crises of the 1980s.

Significantly, these occurrences were inextricably linked to the alternate shift from President Carter to Reagan. For, they had the chief effect of luring some Nigerians into negative choices.³

By the late 1980s, it was obvious enough that population of Nigerians in Houston, along with their socioeconomic status, as well as the role of TSU within the local and international contexts, was linked to the development of Nigerian Houstonians.⁴ The effort of Nigerian Houstonians therefore summed up the result of the brainstorming and search for means of self-rediscovery adopted by most of them

¹Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p 110

²Susan Warren, "Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here," Houston Chronicle (March 17, 1989), pp. 1A, 19A; "Let Me Tell You About Africa," KHOU TV Documentary; "Africans Attracted to Houston's Environment," Houston Chronicle (September 1, 1982); Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

during the early years of upheaval in America.¹ This represented a critical intersection in the transformation of Nigerian Houstonians, when Nigerians sought to find their niche as the newest of the “new Americans” within the mosaic.² This background undoubtedly explains why Houston has one of the most established infrastructures of Nigerians in Southern United States. Nigerian Houstonians are as visible as are their socioeconomic and cultural establishments. Evidences of their presence in the city are seen in the sizes of established ethnic-minority owned businesses throughout the entire Harris County. With about a population of 10,000 in 1992, and about 100,000 by 2000, Nigerians in Houston owned and controlled the bulk of the African fashion ware as well as media.³

The extensive population of Nigerians in Houston is largely Judeo-Christian based. This further confirms why the growing numbers Nigerian-owned churches constitute the strongest arm of the Nigerian community. For example, in 1992, the Nigerian-owned churches in Houston rose to about a dozen.⁴ By the time the data for some part of this study were compiled in April 1993, the 1992 figure of the Nigerian churches had doubled.⁵ By the early 2000s, the 1990s figures had risen to about one hundred churches.⁶

Table 19.1 shows the sample profiles of the major branches of Nigerian-owned churches in Houston. This evidence is important for estimating the Judeo-

¹For example, see explanations on this background in Chapters 4 and 5.

²Ibid.; “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 165.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 167.

⁶This is based on Exploratory Survey as well as examination of Nigerian/African Business Directories; International Guardian; The Christian Herald Newspaper; The Christian Mirror Newspaper; Saravac African Business Directory, 1996-2005.

Christian configuration of Nigerians in a major Southern city in the U.S. These churches are as well where new patterns of ancestral relationships with black Americans are unfolding. Most impressive has been the way African-Americans have participated and indeed interacted with the Judeo-Christian diffusion of their ancestral kin across the city of Houston and its counties. The Houston pattern is almost similar to one found in Dallas and Atlanta.¹

Table 19.1

Sample Profiles of Major Nigerian/African-Owned
Community Churches in Houston, Texas, 1990-2005

Chapel of Praise Church	Chapel of Restoration Church
Christian Fellowship Center	Amazing Grace Church
First Square Gospel Church	Celestial Church
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star	United Church of Christ
Christ Apostolic Church	Masters Vessels Church
Believers Bible Church	Jesus Women Prayer Band
Living Faith Christian Ministries	Word Alive Fellowship
Word of Hope Bible Church	Friendship Bible Church
Later Reign Assembly	The House of Payer for All Nations
Reunion Church	Height of Zion Assembly
Foundation of Peace	Miracle Church
Akwa-Ibom Church	Redeemed Chr. Church of God
Bethel Evan. Church	Miracle Christian fellowship
Apostolic Word of Faith Church Int.	Divine Empowerment Zion House
The Apostolic Church Int.	Restoration Christian academy

Source: Exploratory Survey of Nigerian churches in Houston, Texas, 1993-2005; Nigerian Business Directory, August 1995-December 2005.

Some African-Americans adherents of the Nigerian/African churches in Houston are married to Nigerians. Most of these couples live either within or outside the immediate vicinity of the city of Houston. Along with the related Africans as well as their white membership, the faithful adherents of the Nigerian churches are in a position to forge a union of mutual Christian fellowship as never before. This

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 168.

emerging biracial/intra-cultural unison is much stronger via the medium of the Nigerian/African offspring. Since most of them are American-born, the interactions via the churches have further strengthened the pace of the intra communal bonding between African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants.

Generally, through the medium of the churches, varying forms of interactions involving the Nigerian offspring and the black communities as well as the larger communities of color and the mainstream communities, have taken place within Houston and its related vicinities. Together, these offspring have become important interlocutors in the public outreach of Nigerian churches across the Houston counties and beyond. Because they have more natural traits as well as favorable socio-cultural orbits of interactions and assimilation into American society than their parents, they are in a better position to facilitate success as agents of new direction within the Nigerian churches in Houston.¹

The Nigerian immigrant churches in Houston are also where to gauge the emerging trend of economic and cultural attitudes among the faithful adherents. For example, in 1993, an examination of the interaction of a Nigerian congregation at the Chapel of Praise Church, Houston, revealed that some Nigerians used its podium as members to “thank God” and to announce to the congregation the progress achieved in both their old and new business ventures as well as to request for continued support from the community brethren.²

¹Research Report, pp. 22-4.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 281-282. This feature seems to have become further strengthened during a greater part of the 1990s and early 2000s, with the growing numbers of Nigerian churches in Houston.

Also, to be sure, the Nigerian immigrants examined at the Chapel of Praise Church showed strong orientation toward the messages of the Christian God: their Christian fellowship coexisted with a strong sense of economic and cultural solidarity among community brethren. The churches then become where the faithful adherents are admonished either daily or weekly to be good representatives of their country while in the diaspora.¹

Nor do the preceding emphases imply that Nigerian churches in Houston were or are free from the well-known crises of ethnic conflict characteristic of Nigerians in the homeland and the diaspora. Far from it, for the very fact of increasing proliferation of smaller “cell churches” in the homes of former and later members of the major branches across Houston, strongly suggests that things have not been too well.² On the other hand, however, the fact of an existing racial indifference which confront the faithful, also suggests that the proliferation of Nigerian churches in Houston is in response to socio-cultural crises. Probably their response to this problem so far is no less different from the much earlier one by their ancestral kin.³

¹Ibid. This conclusion is supported by findings in “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 167-170; Research Report, pp. 20-24; and the exploratory study of Nigerian/African-American relationships and churches in the Metropolitan South, 1990-2005.

²For example, there is a growing problem of separation between older and newer Christian memberships among the more established branches of the Judeo-Christian ministries of Nigerians/Africans in Houston. This problem has been growing steadily since the mid-1990s. By the early 2000s, some Nigerians who did not have the financial resources to build a church or rent a building for services were willing to convert their apartments or homes into church services. The proliferation of Nigerian churches in Houston, Texas, as is the pattern elsewhere, was also being unraveled by organizational crises, intense rivalries, and internal division among the faithful.

³Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, pp. 136-9.

The Nigerian churches in Houston, as elsewhere in America, co-exist with diverse visions and characteristics among their memberships, which are the signs of future crises. These crises are perhaps not as closely linked to the ethnic differences of the faithful adherents as are in their leadership and organizational structures.¹ Since the ethnic differences of Nigerians are well known, it may be well to give a brief attention here to the nature of the problem emanating from their Judeo-Christian leadership structures. For example, during the early 1990s, an evaluation of some Nigerian churches in the South revealed occasional rift among the faithful members due to the save-keeping of fund-raising accounts and appointments of members by the pastors to the upper benches of the Christian ministries. However, on closer examination, it was found that such an occurrence did not show that some members had very good grasp of what was involved in establishing new Christian ministries on a foreign land, where money and sustained patronage counted.²

Most of the Judeo-Christian institutions serving as the functional bases of Nigerian Houstonians are still struggling to achieve stability. Their pastors have the enormous task of working from morning till dawn to raise the money needed to keep their young foundations intact. Worse still, most Nigerian churchgoers were as yet to understand that securing the foundation of their Christian ministries during their formative years in the diaspora required sustained financial support. Nor do they quite understand that support for programs at their churches had some bearing on how some appointments were to be made to the higher benches in the House of God.

¹This is based on evidences of internal conflict among some Nigerian churches in the South. See earlier notes.

²Ibid.

Misunderstanding at this intersection can only lead to break away: this is where trouble often set in, and such factors have been decisive in some congregational conflicts found among Nigerian churches in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta.¹

To a far greater extent, of course, the degree to which the Judeo-Christian outreach of Nigerian immigrants influenced its faithful adherents in Houston was found to depend on the effective use of their informational network. Table 19.2 shows that Nigerians have varieties of community-owned media sources that cater to their needs in Houston. These media outlets are often used to rally the support on the vital issues that affected them in the diaspora.

Table 19.2

Sample Profiles of Major Nigerian-African Community
Media in Houston, Texas, 1990-2005

Name
Africa Today Newspaper
African Business Source
African News Digest
Root Newspaper
Houston Punch
U.S. Africa Digital Network
Int. Guardian: A Journal of Africa & America
The Christian Herald
Eno Style

Source: Exploratory Survey of Nigerians in Houston, 1996-2005; African Business Directory in Houston, 1996-2005, Saraviv Directory of African business in America and American Companies that do Businesses in Africa (P. O. Box 8386, Newark, New Jersey, 07108, 1999-2000), p. 6.

Such Nigerian-owned newspaper as U.S. Africa Digital Network, for example, has vast influences within and outside the Houston metropolises, and as far

¹Ibid. "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 168-9.

as the Nigerian homeland. Thus, while the mainstream media may often exclude the viewpoints of highly educated and mediocre Nigerian, the same option is much different when it comes to publishing their concerns in their community-owned media.

Access to informational sources by Nigerian Houstonians suggests that some form of the inter-city cross-cultural exchanges have been taking place between them and other Houstonians particularly since the 1980s. Further, it suggests the nature of an emerging socioeconomic power of Nigerians as well as the pattern of their incorporation into the affairs of the City-Hall. Indeed, as Nigerian Houstonians become deep-seated settlers, their economic and cultural contributions to the life of the city have received recognition. This fact was acknowledged by Mayor Kathy Whitmire during a dinner organized by the Nigerian Foundation in 1991: "The city of Houston commends the members of the Nigerian Foundation and Akeem Olawujon for their contribution to the economic and cultural life of the city."¹ After some nine years, Mayor Lee P. Brown acknowledged the enriching contribution of Nigerians, the Akwa-Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., both for hosting its Annual Convention in Houston, Texas, as well as for positive contribution toward the cultural, economic, and spiritual life of Houston. "The City of Houston is pleased to congratulate and commend the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria,

¹See "Akeem's Day of Glory," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-February 15, 1990), pp. 26-7.

USA, Inc., on this auspicious occasion, and extends best wishes to all for a successful and rewarding event.”¹

Accordingly, in recognition of the fact that “Houston is a rich city of rich cultural diversity, and the many ethnic groups that share their heritage with Houstonians enhance the quality of our lives, “I, Lee Brown, Mayor of the City of Houston, hereby proclaim Saturday, August 5, 2000, as Akwa Ibom State Day.”² During a greater part of the 1980s and 1990s, Houstonians accepted the Nigerian community as encompassing the strongest representation of the “new Americans” from Africa in their “Space City.”³

Throughout the evolving phases of the 1980s and 1990s, Nigerian Houstonians walked side by side with the emerging economic power of racial minorities in the “Space City.” According to one 1992 official report, profits from African/Nigerian owned restaurants, grocery stores, arts and crafts businesses, and import and export trading, yielded a net gain of \$100 million.⁴ Another official report in 1992, estimated major Nigerian-owned businesses in Houston to be 750.⁵ When their economic indices were re-examined in 1993, the 1992 figure had risen to

¹“Proclamation of Akwa Ibom State Association, USA, Inc., in Houston, Texas, by Lee P. Brown, Mayor of Houston,” in Akwa Ibom State association of Nigeria (USA), Inc.: 13th Annual National Convention & Cultural Extravaganza (Houston, Texas: 8686 Kirby Drive, August 5, 2000), p. 8.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. For example, Nigerian-owned businesses and personages have received public recognition within the City-Hall. Since the mid-1980s onward, the larger metropolitan enclaves of Houston have also recognized the economic power along with the rising cultural visibilities of Nigerians.

⁴Peter Undue, “Prospects of African Business Looks Bright in 1991,” African Business Source Magazine (January 15, 1991), p. 10.

⁵See “Nigerian Image,” Houston Chronicle (February, 1992).

1,054 (including the smaller businesses), thus recording a growth rate of 40.5 percent.¹ By 2000, the figures had all but doubled.²

Nigerians Houstonians not only have evolved an economic network aimed controlling nearly all the major African businesses, they have also developed a visible urban community features within the city. Measured in terms of cultural, political and income indices, the Nigerian communal structures during both the 1980s and 1990s were far stronger than those of the other black African foreign-born groups.³

Houston is therefore a good example of a Southern city where Nigerians have displayed their determination to control the direction of their traditional cultures. Over the decades, Houstonians have witnessed the numerous phases of the cultural celebrations of Nigerian immigrants within the city. This may be one of the cities with the strongest organizational emblem of the Nigerian women association in the South, or elsewhere in the entire U.S. During a greater part of the 1990s, Nigerian Houstonians exhibited their cultural strengths through such associations as the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria, Akwa-Ibom Youth and Christian Fellow/Women Fellowship Group, the Nigerian Women Fellowship, the Nigerian Foundation, Nimo Brotherhood/Umuada, Enugu State Women Cultural Group, and the Ugor-Okpala

¹This conclusion is based on an interview with Titus Oniya, owner and publisher, African Business Source Magazine, in April, 1993.

²This is supported by an Exploratory Survey and examination of the Nigerian Business Directories and Media archives in Houston.

³For example, to a certain extent, the size of the population of Nigerian immigrants in Houston also determines their influence in controlling the bulk of African businesses. They are the most identifiable Africans in nearly all important spheres of political, cultural, and economic matters, etc. Also, see earlier notes on African Business Directories in Houston, Dallas, and Atlanta, including Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992), as well as the KHOU documentary, "Let Me Tell You About Africa."

Women Cultural Group. Through their annual celebrations and exhibitions, these cultural extravaganzas have served as the medium for sustaining their consciousness with the traditions of the homelands while in the diaspora.¹

Houston is also where Nigerians have taken steps in developing some institutional structures that could enhance the prosperity of their young community. This is evident, for instance, in the efforts undertaken by Nigerian/African Chambers of Commerce and Nigerian Foundation since the 1990s to stabilize the cultural and economic networks among varying business and cultural groups within the city and across the state of Texas. There is a strong likelihood that, given the highly developed infrastructures of Nigerian Houstonians, along with the large size of highly educated Nigerian middle-class, the efforts to strengthen both the inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic communal ties across all gender, class, and racial backgrounds would probably enhance greater economic collaboration and investments within and outside the city.²

With the housing of The Nigerian Foundation in Houston, the role between its Community House and the related communal centers of Nigerian Houstonians might have greater visibility in facilitating creative arts and economic clientele. For example, as of 1990, The Nigerian Foundation conducted a fund raising drive in Houston aimed at building a Nigerian "Community House." This endeavor was supported by its first dinner organized to raise \$150,000 for the Nigerian "Community House." In a follow-up examination of this background between 1995

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 167.

²Chido Nwangwu, "African Chambers of Commerce: Strategy for the 1990s," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, April, 1991), pp. 30-1, 35.

and 2004, it was disclosed that, despite some problems, The Nigerian Foundation succeeded in putting into place some of the central goals of its mission: to establish a collaborative cultural partnership for Nigerians as well as for the related Africans in Houston city. Since then, The Nigerian Foundation has been serving as a forum for promoting a variety of Nigerian/African commercial and cultural ventures.¹

Nigerian-Houstonians and the American Dream

So, accordingly, Nigerian Houstonians have come very close to being more successful than one would perhaps say of their counterparts in other Southern cities. Evidences of their success stories as recorded in their personal and collective professional profiles form an important basis for evaluating their strengths within the city and the capitalist system. Between the 1980s and 1990s, Houston had some of the most visible evidences of successes in individuals' as well as in the collective professional settings of Nigerians in Southern U.S. Such evidences were often to be found among Nigerian working in the legal profession, drafting construction, sports, academia, and cultural institutions. The reverse was unmistakable as well in the character of socio-cultural crises confronting them.² If the success of these Nigerians were examined as part of the "American myth of the common man,"³ who according to American traditions, succeeded against all odds, it might have some comparison

¹For example, see "Akeem's Day of Glory," African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-February 15, 1990), pp. 26-7.

²See Tom Kennedy, "Nigerians," Houston Post (June 22, 1985); Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 137-159.

³For example, see Lemisch, Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography and Other Writings, pp. vii-xiii; arid, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age, pp. 1-46; Hofstadter, "Abraham Lincoln and the Self-Made Myth," American Political Tradition, pp. 18-32, 118-126; Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln. New York: A Mentor Book, 1977.

with that of early American heroes. The success of Nigerian Houstonians may even warrant greater pathos in that it reveals how they have risen above social ostracism and denigration to become effective participants in the American free enterprise system.

It is no hidden fact that most Americans admitted that Nigerian Houstonians, as elsewhere in the U.S., have mastered their system far better than they. This is further confirmed by the fact that, nearly all the documentaries on Nigerian immigrants from “60 Minutes” to local TV Talk-Shows to the “media write-ups,” admitted that Nigerians had mastered the American system. Although such inferences were often linked to a deviant trend, yet, they bore out the fact that, as highly educated base of immigrants, Nigerians understood the American institutions and their related structures.

Certainly, instances where Nigerians have done the extraordinary in sports, academia, legal profession, and scientific inventions, for example, far outweighed the deviant behaviors of the few.¹ For example, in 1994, a case study of one Nigerian, Noble M. Uchendu, revealed that² most Nigerians succeeded during the 1980s despite the crises of the Reagan era.³ This background, as we saw much earlier, especially in Chapter 4, resulted in establishing the basis of an economic self-sufficiency in America by most Nigerians. In Houston, evidences resulting from the

¹“The Status of the relationship with African Americans,” pp. 170-4. Also, see Tom Kennedy, “Nigerians,” Houston Post (June 22, 1985); Ogbaa, The Nigerian Americans, pp. 137-159.

²“Dorik Noble Casting a Niche,” African Business Source Magazine (December/January, 1992), pp. 6, 12, 24, 32.

³Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 2-9; “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 170.

latter development were even more remarkable in that the Reagan dynamic was a deciding factor in their contextual redirection throughout the Houston counties during the 1980s.¹

The success story of Noble M. Uchendu, founder of Dorik Noble Construction and Drafting Company, which can be traced to the backgrounds of mid- and late 1980, came to the fore during the early years of 1990s.² This was a period when the batches of Nigerians who first immigrated as students to Houston had almost completed the arduous task of successfully adjusting into the American society, and thus becoming active participants in the American dream.³

Mr. Noble Uchendu's success therefore fits into the spirit as well as the criteria of an era that explains when Nigerian Houstonians began to add their niche to the American dream. Although Mr. Uchendu was not selected in the "1991 30 Most Outstanding Africans in U.S.,"⁴ his recorded success at about a similar⁵ period represented how some Nigerians succeeded within the American capitalist system.⁶

The African Business Source Magazine, recorded in its "personality" profile column that, "Smart Noble Construction and Drafting has blossomed from its initial \$5,000 capital outlay into a six figure annual turn-over . . ."⁷ Dorik Construction, in 1991, reportedly landed

¹Ibid., Apraku, p. 110.

²"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."

³For example, most of the emphases on Nigerians by the Atlanta Ethnic Regional Community Profiles, pp. 1-2, are similar to those found among Nigerian Houstonians.

⁴Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 171.

⁵"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."

⁶"Nigerians in the Atlanta Region," pp. 1-2.

⁷"Dorik Noble Casting a Niche."

Contracts worth over \$250,000; these include among others the \$75,000 just completed Ceco building in Houston. Among its many clientele are the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Harris County Housing Authority, the City of Houston and the Houston Independent School District (HISD)....In addition to his construction firm, Dorik Noble has other subsidiaries, these include: the Dorik Import and Export and the Dorik Ink currently doing business with the Nigerian Police and other . . . manufacturing companies in Nigeria and . . . Uganda.¹

Perhaps Hakeem Olajuwon, the dream, was Nigeria's greatest symbol in Houston city during the above era. Born in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 21, 1963, his memorable history in Houston sports entertainment during the early 1980s was reminiscent of the beginning of a Nigerian immigrant community. And, it so happens that, since the late 1970s, Houston was being poised by its favorable location to attract a large size of Nigerians. By early 1980s Nigerian Houstonians were certain that they would not be returning to Nigeria after their studies. Thus, it was in Houston that the decision to settle down as a community after studies received one of the strongest impulse among Nigerian immigrants in the South, and perhaps across the whole U.S.

Hakeem's early history in Houston therefore fits into the period comprising largely of the student waves of Nigerian settlers in the U.S. This was during the early years of the Reagan era, which formed the clearest basis of the transformation of a Nigerian immigrant community. Hakeem himself was introduced to President Reagan as an ambassador of peace and new understanding between Nigeria and the U.S. during a visit to the city in 1980. Flanked to the left and right by security guards and American media gurus, Hakeem's introduction to President Reagan

¹Ibid.

almost symbolized a shift from the arduous cycle of negative media blitz that had affected a majority of Nigerian Houstonians. Ironically, however, this historic enactment in Houston after the replacement of President Carter¹ did not cast the negative effects of the Reagan policies on both Nigeria and its immigrants in America.

Among those Nigerian Houstonians seated in limbo, the sight of Hakeem's handshake with President Reagan probably had some relieving effect on their American dilemma. This was because some of their deviant attitudes had the boldest manifestations in Houston. As a part of the deflection of the transition from Carter to Reagan, the general thrust of the new era of Nigerians' visibility in urban America was perhaps most pronounced in this particular drama within the Southern enclave.²

Writing in the early 1990s as a Nigerian Houstonian, Igboanugo observes that under Reagan things began to change for Nigerians. Most Nigerian, he further observed, saw "The land of opportunity turned into what has been termed land of opportunibust."³ The Reagan policies, which were unfavorable to the Southern black

¹This is based on analyses of Nigerian community profiles from 1980s to 1990s in Houston, Texas.

²For transition from President Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, see earlier notes in Chapter 4 on James Blackwell in The Black Community: Diversity and Unity, pp. 76-7, 270. For corresponding socio-cultural crises of Nigerian/African immigrants, see Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19,110; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-9, 40, 75-6; Trotter Review, p. 32. On the other hand, Victor Umuabor, in an article entitled, "The Americans Again! George Shultz's visit drama re-enacted," African Concord (Ikeja, Lagos, September 1987, p. 9), raised the suspicion of a likely conflicting responses as well as negative perceptions back in Nigeria toward the Nigerian-American relations.

³Ibid.

base, and which corresponded with the opposition toward African states, also affected African immigrants.¹

The Hakeem-Reagan meeting also coincided with a period when the Nigerian dynamic began to experience sustained contextual diffusion within the city of Houston, and across the entire Texas landscape.² It represented as well a period when the Nigerian image in Houston began to be popularized for things other than incessant negative media portrayal.

Of course, as we saw earlier, the general irony was that Reagan's policies were largely accountable for the socio-cultural crises that confronted most Nigerians in America. Back in the Nigerian homeland, his dynamic was also blamed for the hardships of the 1980s.³ For example, one of the strongest effects of the Reagan era was the devaluation of African international monetary system in scale unseen prior to his era. This problem was closely tied to Nigeria's status as "an oil exporting giant"⁴ and later to its internal and external socioeconomic crisis.

Therefore, within the U.S., Houston mattered in the suffocation of this oil glut that was also closely tied to the devaluation of the international monetary system. Both its oil-driven industrial base as well as the Nigerian oil-based economy presaged some of the reception accorded Nigerian students within the "space city" during the early decades of their settlement. Nigeria—along with other OPEC

¹Ibid. This explanation is a specific background of the development elaborated in Chapter 4.

²Ibid. Also, this development was mostly based on the scope of the Nigerian national crisis and the dense build-up of its immigrants in Houston between the late 1970 and mid-1980.

³Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Eskor Toyo, "SAP can only Sap Nigeria: It is simply a neo-classical drug store," African Concord (Ikeja, Lagos, September 1987), p. 31.

⁴Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 28.

countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—were respected just as “Other considerations made them to be loathed.”¹

Admittedly:

Oil money made students from OPEC countries get special treatment, and feel important. But don’t forget the indiscriminate hiking of oil prices which hurt American economy so badly. The roller coaster oil prices were also blamed for the failure of President Carter’s administration. The land of opportunity was looking for a chance to gather itself from economic disarray, political quagmire and fallouts of the social turmoil of the late 1960’s.²

The preceding meant that, with the coming of “all American” Ronald Reagan in 1981, some of the changes ushered in by his policies, had begun to affect Nigeria and its immigrants in America.³ We have already noted that these changes were most radical in the devaluation of Nigeria’s monetary value. For example, by late “1984, one Naira was equivalent to \$1.40 or more.” As of 1992, one Naira was “said to be equivalent to ten cents.”⁴ By February 2006, however, one American Dollar was equivalent to \$125.00 Naira or more—depending on the medium of exchanges.

By the beginning of the Reagan second term, Hakeem Olawujon who began his transition in Houston as an ordinary Nigerian, had begun to dream of his professional career in seven figures. His Basketball career was remarkable, starting as a student with the Cougars at the University of Houston. There he was selected as the Southwest Conference Player of the decade in 1980 by a panel of media and

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 29.

⁴Ibid., p. 27.

coaches.¹ At that same time, moreover, the magnificent promises of an American career in Basketball and related status as a Nigerian Houstonian contrasted sharply with nearly every aspect of life back in his Nigerian homeland. By the time he was drafted by the Houston Rockets in 1984, his country had sunk deeply into the recession produced by the oil glut, as well as the changes proposed and supported by Reagan policies.²

Hakeem was one of the eight centers to lead his team to the NCAA Final four in three straight consecutive seasons. As a result, Houston city not only honored him but had a whole day declared by its Mayor, "Friday, 30th, 1990 as Hakeem Olawujon's day."³ On the other hand, in another record dated "November 20, 1999, Hakeem became the first player in NBA history to accumulate 20,000 blocked shots in a career."⁴

As the first overall pick by Rockets in the 1984 NBA draft, he led his team to back-to-back titles between 1994 and 1995. During the 1994 and 1995, he was a regular season MVP and a second-time Finals MVP, with seventeenth glorious seasons with the Rockets before being traded in the waning years of his career to Toronto.⁵

Also, as a Muslim, Hakeem sought to reveal the ethical mantle of his stardom. Throughout his time with the Rockets, his religious principles received the

¹This is based on analyses of Hakeem-Nigerian community profiles during the 1980s in Houston, Texas.

²Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, p. 110; Toyo, "SAP can only Sap Nigeria," p. 31.

³"Akeem's Day of Glory," *African Business Source Magazine*, pp. 26-7.

⁴"Hakeem Olajuwon, Nigeria." <http://www.interbasket.net/players/olajuwon.htm>

⁵Ibid.

ovation of both his team and coaches: “the Rockets made special arrangements for his meals, built him a prayer room at the summit Arena... and allowed him to take time out of the practice schedule to attend mosque on Fridays.”¹

At a time when most adherents of the Muslim faith were being faulted within the mainstream, his religious attitude endeared him as an ambassador of peace to representatives of all denominations. “Being in the limelight,” according to one observer, “has meant increased attention on his religion.” Olajuwon believed that one of the duties of his faith “is to express it so people in the non-Muslim population can learn about it.”²

The Nigeria sports star did not hide his faith but fervently embraced the tenet of live and let live for both Muslims and Christians—and all other religious bodies alike. This marked a departure from the attitudes of some who preceded his claim.³ But not all Nigerian Houstonians viewed Hakeem’s religious faith as an important emblem of cultural links within the Nigerian immigrant community in Houston. For example, Chido Nwangwu, publisher of US Africa, the largest Nigerian newspaper in the U.S., observed that while he was viewed as “a very good man and a credit to our community, he was not a center for the African community.” The Nigerian-born Yoruba basketball star “could have used his star power to bring the Nigerian community into the mainstream the way he did with Islam.”⁴

¹Kris Artman, “Houston Muslims lose a Leader, on and off the court,” The Christian Science Monitor (Houston, Texas, September 6, 2001).

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Nevertheless, it may not be quite true that, as a Muslim, Mr. Olajuwon had done nothing to advance the course of Nigerian communities in Houston, or elsewhere in America. The fact that his contributions were more visible in areas of dense Muslim populations may not negate his other public outreach. Perhaps he neither saw nor understood the Judeo-Christian incorporation of Nigerian/African immigrants “into the mainstream” in the same manner as did Mr. Nwangwu. His retirement and ultimate return to Nigeria appears to support the findings in this study: Some successful Nigerians were more likely to resist the contemporary notion of American integration perhaps due to its racial ambivalence than any other factors.¹

Also, the success stories of Nigerian Houstonians comprised their attorneys. According to the survey of African Business Directories, Houston alone had more than one hundred practicing attorneys during the early 2000s. Their general concentration appears to be stronger in the South and particularly in such cities as Atlanta and Dallas, and Houston.² By early 1990s, Nigerian attorneys in Houston comprised one of the most visible professional representatives of the Nigerian immigrant community. They represented one of the most visible evidences of the contextual adjustments made by some Nigerians, as discussed in Chapter 4. The pre-eminence of Nigerian attorneys can be traced to an era when most Nigerians sought to redefine themselves and their professional independence, mostly in response to the

¹Ibid. Also, see Chapters 4-5 of this dissertation; and Authur, *Invisible Sojourners*, pp. 3-4.

²Estimate of Nigerian Attorney at between 7,000 and 8,000 in the U.S. is based on Exploratory Survey and Examination of Nigerian Businesses Directories in America and The Saravic African Business Directory, 2000. Survey of these records revealed that Nigerian attorneys were densely populated in Southern cities, specifically in Dallas, Atlanta, and Houston. Some who emigrated to the U.S. from Nigeria as lawyers were not registered and hence not in professional practice.

socioeconomic and racial constraints propelled by the Reagan agenda. Among them were attorneys who won cases in the thousands and millions. Others have won legal battles for their brethren within and outside the city in such areas as immigration law, divorce cases, criminal cases, and auto accident cases.¹

However, the success stories of Nigerian attorneys may be explained in terms other than their general state of income or professional security.² The reason could be that, especially between the 1990s and mid-2000, Houston was where Nigerian attorneys had greater relevance in terms of their representative role within the brethren's communities than necessarily the case in terms of their median income status.

While their socioeconomic status was not in serious question, yet they might not be as professionally secure as whites or even as African-Americans. Their strong build-up in Houston had a socio-cultural angle, supported by a desire to secure professional independence against workplace stress.³ Therefore, in the particular case of Houston, what determined the success and direction of Nigerians during the 1980s and 1990s was the extent to which they controlled their professional destinies.

The result then was the proliferation of applicants into some fields that enhanced professional independence.⁴ Generally, in the making of Nigerian attorneys in Houston, it is this particular background that later came to have some

¹Analyses of Nigerian community records and the professional records of Nigerian attorneys confirmed this fact. See earlier citation on Nigerian attorneys under "Nigerian Community Leaders" in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

²Ibid., including Udofo, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 131-5

³For example, see again, Apraku. African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 28, 33, 40, 75-6.

⁴"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 118. Also, see Chapter 4.

defining effects on their professional representation as leaders within the Nigerian immigrant communities. It is also this background which later accorded to them the image of public success both as a measure of the American dream as well as a symbol of recognizable representation of their brethren. To a far greater extent, therefore, the degree to which Nigerians fared in the Houston and beyond defended on their role as the vanguard of the Nigerian immigrant communities.¹ Nigerian Houstonians are widely praised and recognized in their academic feat. For example, in the late-1980s, a Nigerian professor at Texas Southern University received wide publicity and recognition for the discovery of a sickle cell treatment, which utilized Yoruba roots from Western Nigeria to test and develop some medication for patients. Other Nigerians were known to be involved in important research projects at the Houston-based NASA.²

Nigerian-Houstonians and Image Crisis

Probably, as noted earlier, the origin of the Nigerians image crisis in Dallas, as in Houston, lies more at the intersection of changes in both the national and international political guards from the 1980s onward. This development was closely linked to the unstable political turbulence back in the Nigerian homeland, as well as to the alternating policies of two American presidencies: Carter and Reagan.³

¹Ibid., pp. 132-5, 172-3. This background is based on the growing numerical strengths of Nigerian professionals in Houston, Texas.

²This background relates to Professor Sunday Fadulu, the Nigerian microbiologist at Texas Southern University (Igboanugo, *Nigerians in America*, p. 83).

³For general context of the Carter-Reagan transition, see Chapter 4, including Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, p. 110. For the Nigerian image crisis, see earlier notes in Chapter 3 on Winer, *Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa*, pp. 1-5, including the emotions surrounding the Nigerian-American relations as mirrored by Umuabor, "The Americans Again!," p. 9.

Given the above proceedings, how then does one evaluate the origin of the Nigerian image crises in Houston and Dallas, or even across the United States? Were their noted criminal records a development of an American environment or of the Nigerian homeland? To begin with, it might be fair to see the background of this conflict as closely associated with Nigerians who first entered this country mostly as students. This calls then for some understanding of the extent to which their American orientation had an earlier beginning in the attitude to acquire knowledge of Western education. Prior to the 1970s, it would have been difficult to determine the vastness of the criminal behaviors among the varied student-waves of Nigerian immigrants in America.

Again, prior to the 1980s, it would have been difficult to count the number of Nigerian immigrants shown via the electronic network and print media who were involved in extensive fraudulent scams and narcotics in American society. As we have shown all along, the magnitude in which this culture later became expressed in both the national and international characteristics of Nigerians can be more clearly linked to changes during the 1980s.

The above development, as we also alluded to earlier, had a lot in common with the dynamic that came to the fore during the Reagan era.¹ Some of his policies on the devaluation of the international monetary system, which did not favor the Third World countries, had brought enormous socioeconomic changes and crises.

¹Umuabor, "The Americans Again!," p. 9; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, p. 110; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, pp. 27-8, 40, 75-6; Winer, 1996 U.S. Congressional Subcommittee Hearings on Africa, pp. 1-5.

This later background probably explains why some of the responses to the Reagan policies both in the U.S. and back in the Nigerian homeland, were oppositional.¹

Nor should it be forgotten that the inherent political misrule and instability in Nigeria was also an equal factor in the making of the image crisis of Nigerian immigrants in America. This background, by itself, had a lot to do with the official attitudes of Nigerian leaders on both the national and international levels. Similar to the effects of the Reagan officials on Americans, the negative impact of the varied cycles of Nigerian leadership since the 1960s, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, tended to encourage involvement of the citizenry in fraudulent scams and international narcotics.²

That some of official responses by the Nigerian governments may even have been designed toward the Reagan policies, could very well explain the vulnerability of Nigerian immigrants. Not surprisingly, the Reagan background which represented an important transitional from the Carter doctrine, also formed a critical intersection in the adjustment of Nigerians into the American mosaic.³ The Nigerian problem as mirrored during this period was probably more American.

If the fraudulent involvements of Nigerians during the 1980s, for example, were compared to those of white Americans, Asian Americans, Latino Americans—

¹Ibid.; also see Chapter 4 for further understanding of this context.

²See, for example, Chapter 3 for this background.

³Ibid. Also, see Chapter 4, along with "Nigeria: An African giant regains its strength," Africa Today (October 2000), pp. 37-40; Matthew Hassan Kukah, "The beauty and the beast," Africa Today, pp. 15-20; Adebayo Williams, "First closure, then the new beginnings," Africa Today, pp. 16-23; Winer, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, pp. 1-5; Umuabor, "The Americans Again!," p. 9.

including African-Americans—they would be one of the lowest.¹ Charles Harrison, Houston's Chief of Customs, even argued that “many drug couriers traveling from Lagos (Nigeria),” were white women.² This further explains the extent to which the Nigerian infestation during the 1980s and 1990s was indeed part of an American syndrome. District Attorney John B. Homes, another Houstonian, argued that the link between a particular crime and a particular nationality was unjust. “If you took all the credit card cases and stacked them end on end, percentage wise . . . Nigerians would be very small.”³

Perhaps the extensive media coverage accorded the Nigerian scammers in both Houston and Dallas during much of the mid-1990s and early 2000s, were part of the deflections of the 1980s. Nigerians were not the only ethnic minorities involved in the healthcare scam. Indeed, as the newest of the newcomers, they were latecomers into the act.⁴ Nor were some of the deviant attitudes of Nigerians without the compulsions of the American material gratification. An understanding of the American capitalist set-up, its exploitation, and intense materialistic inclinations—especially within its racially sensitive base—suggests that what the minority class of Nigerians involved in fraudulent scams were doing fit within the psyche of the American nation and social cultures. Sometimes such deviant attitudes were

¹For example, see the criminal activities among Americans in the “Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC (1988-2000).

²“Nigerian Image,” Houston Chronicle (February 9, 1992).

³Not all Americans identify a majority of Nigerian immigrants as criminals. See, for example, earlier notes on Warren (1989), pp. 1A and 19A.

⁴This is based on discussions with Nigerians in Dallas and Houston.

attempts to reconstruct a basic line of socioeconomic survival in the midst of conflicting socio-cultural milieu in which they found things.¹

The preceding might then suggest that, since the 1980s, an American and Nigerian epidemic evolving out of the attitude of a few Nigerians—probably in response to some of negative policies of the Reagan era—had the negative effects of being attached to the general characterization of innocent Nigerians.² Between the 1990s and early 2000, the involvement of some Nigerians in the healthcare scams further affected the image of Nigerian Houstonians. The negative publicity given a few sometimes tended to undermine the overwhelming positive contributions of most Nigerians to Houston's economic, cultural, and intellectual development. A majority of Nigerians surveyed during the healthcare scam admitted that the extensive media blitz accorded the deviant behavior of a few was an affront to those striving very hard to succeed daily through honest means. As a community with highly educated class, the perception that most Nigerians achieved their American niche by foul means had devastating effects.³ Consequently, an overwhelming majority of Nigerian Houstonians abhorred the shame of criminal indictment and were absolved after intense investigations. Yet, they could not escape its negative socio-cultural stigma.⁴ For the few Nigerians involved in criminal scams,⁵ their notion of the "American Dream" sometimes differed operationally with one shared

¹Ibid. Also, see Chapter 4 for explanation on how the policies of the Reagan years influenced the development of Nigerians in positive as well as in deviant ways.

²Ibid.

³This reference is summarized from an exploratory survey of Nigerians.

⁴For instance, see Onyia, "The Making of Scape Goat: Nigerians and Image Problem," The Good Hope News: African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, November, 1992), pp. 26, 40. This report mirrors the successes and ironies of most Nigerians.

⁵Ibid.

by the majority striving through hard work to attain genuine success. But in recent time, these few culprits were hunted as far back as Nigeria; and with the cooperation of the Federal Government, were often required to refund their illegal wealth. The damage, however, lies on the already blurred image of the Nigerian nation and of its mostly innocent and struggling immigrants and peoples.

Innocent Nigerians affected by generalized negative media blitz on their personal and national images blamed the American media for making very little or no effort to contrast the danger against the overwhelming positive attributes that were often unreported either in Houston or in Dallas. Apart from the publicity of news worthy events about Nigerians in their community media, it is doubtful that the mainstream media have very careful records on the positive contributions of Nigerian Houstonians. Some occasional recognition of the achievements of Nigerian Houstonians by City-Hall politicians often seems plausible. Such recognitions were memorable and indeed historic. Yet, its basis also seems designed to facilitate electorate support than sustained contextual incorporation of Nigerian indices.¹ Based on the exploratory Surveys—interviews and evaluation of the Nigerian community in Houston from 1995 to 2004—most of the mayoral attributes noted for Nigerian Houstonians, for example, were not clearly directed toward an acceptance of their rising political and economic strengths. They were not viewed as quite representative of sustained incorporation of either Nigerians or the larger base of the black African labor migrants into the city. Some Nigerians believed that their

¹For example, Mayor Whitmire declared August 30, 1991, as Hakeem Olajuwon's Day in Houston. This was later followed by Mayor Lee Brown's declaration of August 5, 2005, as Akwa Ibom State Association Day in Houston.

economic strengths were much stronger, and hence warranted a far greater degree of consultation than accorded them at the current level.¹

Consequently, in some sectors among Nigerian Houstonians, the notion of an American “success stories” and the “American dream” implies understanding the context of their image crisis within the city and across America. Since the mid-1980s onwards, in particular, when some Houstonians began to associate Nigerians with fraudulent scams, their general attitude toward a majority of Nigerians also began to blur.²

Because Nigerians in Houston comprise the city's “largest African immigrant group,” and because the city has both a major port of shipment as well as an international airport, Nigerians who entered Houston particularly during the 1990s from other countries were subjected to considerable scrutiny. Sometimes this scrutiny bordered on outright racial slurs and death.³ In 1992, such a noble American basketball star as Hakeem Olajuwon lamented the deplorable condition confronting his brethren:

They [the public] know what I do . . . but they still won't believe the doctors, lawyers and other professionals [who are Nigerian immigrants] when they introduce themselves, even if they have a business card, and that's not fair. Most people think Africans are uncivilized and that's a big mistake.⁴

¹Ibid. This is a summarized portion of the data, exploratory research, and interviews employed in this study. See Chapters 1 for the explanations of “Methodology” and Chapter 7 for content analyses of Nigerian-African community media.

²Tom Kennedy, “Nigerians Working to Improve Image,” The Houston Post (Houston, June 24, 1985).

³Warren, “Nigerian Ambassador to try to ease tensions in visit here,” pp. 1A and 19A.

⁴“Nigerian Image,” (February 9, 1992).

During the 1980s and 1990s, this image crisis of Nigerian Houstonians was such that they were “unable to get jobs when potential employers find out they're from Nigeria.” The corresponding social consequence of this negative image was such that the number of Nigerian immigrants admitted into the U.S. on student visas during the period “appears to be reduced.”¹ Perhaps it was this same background that compelled Jeff Ohanaja, President of the Nigerian Foundation at the time to lament that the 99.9 percent of the Nigerian immigrants who were not criminals had been put in the same camp with the 0.1 percent that were:

We're not proud of that 0.1% who are hurting our image, but the 99.9% of us are hard-working, productive and law abiding people who are just trying to live our lives.²

Sometimes, however, the outright racial slurs confronting the Nigerian communities in Houston provided their leaders the basis in which to explore the loopholes in America's libertarian ideal. In 1989, when KPRC-TV (Channel 2), broadcast a series on Nigerian criminals (February 12-15), the Nigerian community promptly summoned their Ambassador to Houston to meet with the city's “news organizations” and its mayor, to exonerate themselves under the American Fairness Doctrine. This response perhaps corresponded with the American Fairness Doctrine, which allows an equal time for an opponent or accused person to defend or respond to an attack in much the same time frame allowed the first party.³ As a representative spokesman, Emeka Ozurumba, attorney and head of the Nigerian Foundation observed that:

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Also see Warren's article on Nigerians, Houston Chronicle (March, 17, 1989).

The Nigerian community has decided enough is enough, and they don't want to take it anymore. They just want to live peacefully. They just want what is fair for them.¹

Nigerians in Dallas—a sister-city to Houston—shared almost a similar fate of image crisis as that of their brethren in Houston. Nigerian immigrants, especially those living in the Dallas-Forth Worth area, comprised a majority of those involved in drug scandals from the 1980s to early 1990s.²

During much of the 1990s and early 2000s, Dallas experienced almost a similar level of healthcare scams involving Nigerians, and almost with an equal degree of socio-cultural impact. Just as in Houston, while the crisis involved a few Nigerians, the media coverage tended to blur the image of a majority of reputable Nigerians. Locally, nationally, and internationally, the socio-cultural orientation of the coverage depicted most Nigerians as criminals. To be sure, from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, most Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth Worth area were grounded by the pre-conceived negative judgment of the white media. A majority of Nigerians opposed fraudulent criminal activities, and felt that some of their negative depiction in the media was due to racial indifference. The period between the mid-1990s and early 2000 was remarkable for the often generalized fraudulent scams of “The Nigerians” in the healthcare services in Houston and Dallas.³

As in the case of Houston in 1989, when Nigerian rallied against the KPRC TV documentary, Nigerians in the Dallas-Forth Worth reacted fiercely in 1991 to a

¹Ibid.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 176-8.

³Richard Nwachukwu, *The Good Hope News* (Dallas, Texas, November-December, 1991), pp. 1, 11. Also, this conclusion was supported by data derived from exploratory survey.

KXAS Dallas-Fort Worth-TV documentary entitled “The Nigerian Mafia.”¹ Responding to the documentary through the auspices of the African Chambers of Commerce, the “Nigerian community” faxed a letter to that “recalcitrant” station, cautioning that:

We want the station to be mindful of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. It will be discriminatory of you and/or your station to single out Nigerians on the issue of credit card fraud and/or abuse. If you are fair and not witch-hunting or not trying to damage the image of well meaning Nigerians in the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolis, you should do a similar documentary on credit-card fraud and/or abuse across the board, irrespective of color, creed, and national origin.²

On the other hand, the basis for this image crisis of Nigerians in Houston and Dallas might have been linked to the changing demographic composition of urban America. This might mean that the size of population, educated class, and of emerging infrastructures, have serious implications for tilting the balance and direction of urban policies. Therefore, with the reactive nature of multicultural dynamics in metropolitan Southern cities, Nigerians were capable of adding further inflammation to the sensitive climate of socio-cultural crises through the few involved in deviant behaviors. This development is often attendant with crises among varying groups. While the racial feature of the Nigerian background might conceal this type of crisis, the experience is probably inherent in urban changes.³ Yet, the racial indifference of the Southern enclaves appears to have correlated with

¹Ibid. Richard Nwachukwu, The Good Hope News (Dallas, Texas, November-December, 1991), pp. 1, 11.

²Ibid.

³Cordell and y Griego, “The integration of Nigerian and Mexican Immigrants in Dallas/Forth Worth, Texas,” pp. 3-6; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9, Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-5, 46-8.

how Nigerians were depicted in the white media. Also, it compounded the general attitude of the media against Nigerians, which really began in the 1980s.¹

That most of the policies of the Reagan presidency had attempted to heighten racial indifference meant that those Nigerians entrapped either in Dallas or Houston without much financial resources, were susceptible to some scandalous activities. That some of their deviant attributes corresponded with those of some Reagan officials, further confirmed the extent to which American influences were an underlying factor of the crisis. These Nigerians knew that the Reagan policies were unfriendly toward their country as well as toward their contextual stability. Like Americans, some found it much easier to re-invent new means of socioeconomic survival, which were sometimes deviant.² If, as Tom Kennedy observed in 1992, “Many of the Nigerians who come here are well-educated and know the banking and credit card systems better than American experts,”³ then the implication was that the majority of them were more likely to be arrested, harassed, suspected of criminal activities and searched without justification.⁴

Thus, as shown thus far, the socioeconomic and politico-cultural orbits of Nigerians in Houston and Dallas, or elsewhere in America, during the early decades of settlement, were more clearly explained within the historical context of black America.⁵ This further confirms that within their Southern confluence, the crises of

¹Ibid. See, for example, Chapter 4; Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110; Onyia, “The Making of Scape Goat,” pp. 26, 40.

²Kennedy, “Nigerians Working to Improve Image,” The Houston Post (Houston, June 24, 1985).

³Ibid.

⁴Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 174.

⁵Ibid., pp. vii, 117-118, 285. Also, see Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp. 14-21.

racial otherness, which affected Nigerians, were more similar than dissimilar to the experience of the descendants of slaves. This same phenomenon probably also explains why a majority of Nigerians with excellent education were susceptible to underemployment or even unemployment.¹

The view then that African-Americans trailed African immigrants in median income status is perhaps a plausible development² but certainly one requiring a more careful explanation. First, on the basis of an overall population of African-Americans and African immigrants in the U.S., such an observation is misleading. Second, where the overall population of Africans in America is much smaller compared to that of native-born blacks—which is much larger—such comparison only serves the longer-term purpose of influencing further contextual dissonance between the two related and almost similarly affected racial groups.³

Part 4: Nigerian Houstonians: The Extent of Ancestral Solidarity with African-Americans, 1970-1990

We saw in Chapters 4 and 5 as well as in the previous pages of the extent to which the strong visibility of African-American institutions influenced the concentrations of Nigerian immigrants in Southern cities. We also saw that this was particularly the case in Houston, Texas. In addition, we emphasized that, because the early waves of Nigerians in Houston were mostly students, the presence of a historically Black institution of higher learning accounted for their influx into the

¹Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9, 19, 110; Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4, 46-8.

²Ibid.

³Trotter Review, p. 32.

city. This fact was especially the case during the 1970s and 1980s. We undertake to show in this section that, this intersection represented the most appropriate locale in which to explain the early build-up of Nigerian Houstonians. This historic relationship between Nigerian Houstonians and the “Space City,” as we argued earlier was closely tied to Texas Southern University (TSU), a historically black institution of higher learning.

TSU, based in Houston, Texas, was an institution founded for the descendants of slaves. Its criteria for instructional services were/are as similar to those of predominantly white universities as they often differed due to the peculiar crisis of the black experience. But over the long period of the black-white political struggle in Texas, this latter background was influenced by the extent to which the winning political and cultural leaders of the American republic had sought to define the status of blacks in higher education. Therefore, within the framework of the black struggle in the South, the origin of TSU can be traced to 1927 and to the creation of Houston Colored Junior College under Houston’s school board. This later became a four-year Houston College for Negroes in 1934.¹

From 1934 to 1947, Houston College for Negroes became a state-supported institution, taking on the new name of Texas State University for Negroes (TSUN). The creation of TSUN was in reaction to the threat of lawsuit by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) against an attempt to keep Herman Sweat out of the University of Texas law school.² However, in 1951

¹Bullard, In Search of the New South, p. 35.

²Ibid.

TSUN was changed to Texas Southern University.¹ By all the available criteria, the link between Nigerian Houstonians and TSU lies in the renewed contacts of two related albeit dissimilar historical eras involving the descendants of forced migration and voluntary Nigerian migration. Viewed within this context, it seems well to keep in mind, as already hinted, that the development of Nigerian Houstonians would probably have been longest delayed or much more arduous a task—without TSU. Admittedly, the large students' waves of Nigerians in the 1970s and 1980s, who enrolled at TSU, formed the core of the Nigerian immigrant community.

Just as TSU had one of the strongest statistics on the development of black professionals in the state of Texas during the said decades, this same trend was equally representative of African immigrants, especially of the Nigerian background. Prior to the 1990s, probably no other historically black institution of higher learning in the “peripheral South or the Rim South,”² had educated more Nigerians than TSU. It would not be an overstatement to surmise that a majority of Nigerian attorneys and pharmacists currently practicing in Texas and beyond its borders were educated at TSU. And TSU, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, benefited immensely from the financial power of its Nigerian students during the heydays of the oil boom.³

The financial crunches that often sunk most predominantly state-funded black institutions of higher learning were some of the developments that sometimes made the relationship between Nigerians and TSU a faithful marriage. Even during times of conflicting perceptions, it was at TSU that Nigerians or Africans who sought

¹Ibid.

²Davidson, *Biracial Politics*, p. 12.

³“Let Me Tell You About Africa,” *Houston Chronicle* (September 1, 1982); *Houston Chronicle* (February 9, 1992).

employment in academia were most likely to be offered a job after certification from the surrounding white universities.¹

Beyond the preceding emphases, however, TSU sometimes played the role of an ancestral patron for Nigerians who attended there: its institutional premises were the staging centers for the Nigerian voice in Houston. Most Nigerian cultural groups used its playgrounds to host their annual festivities; others used its facilities for hosting their monthly, quarterly, and annual deliberations. These venues also served them in covering a variety of community issues like professional, national, and ethnic organizational matters. Conferences between visiting dignitaries from the Nigerian Consulate General in Washington, D.C., and the homeland and Nigerian Houstonians often found receptions at TSU.² During the 1980s, the KTSU on-campus radio station provided Houstonians some informational outlet on the traditional cultures of Nigerian/African immigrants. The KTSU forum enabled Nigerians both individually and collectively to rally around matters of cultural and national commonalities.³

The KTSU-Nigerian connection served as a bridge toward greater cooperation and understanding in areas relating to the Nigerian (African) music. Through its weekend programming, a variety of Nigerian homeland music, folklore,

¹This is based on an examination of TSU profiles on Africans, faculty and administrative structures, as well as overall system.

²For example, most of the Nigerian/African conferences from the late 1970s to the early 1980s—and thereafter—were held at TSU. During this period, moreover, TSU was often chosen as a host center for most of the Nigerian national/ethnic celebrations which took place in Houston—particularly from early 1980s to mid-1980s. Additionally, during the mid and late 1980s, several representative bodies of the Nigerian consular officers from Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, and the Nigerian homeland met at TSU to see Nigerians as well as to answer to their concerns before the public media.

³“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 182.

and free counseling on how to prepare Nigerian traditional foodstuffs reached a broad spectrum of Africans, African-Americans, and mainstream Houstonians. If the KTSU made it possible for Nigerians to rally around the campus air-circuit on Saturdays,¹ African-Americans who listened to the Nigerian/African musical programs reportedly requested replays of some of the music of their ancestral homeland.² And throughout the first three decades of concentration in Houston, it was at TSU that the numerical and cultural potentialities of Nigerians were more effectively transformed than at any other institution of higher learning in the Texas.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the incessantly dented images of Nigerian Houstonians were sometimes mirrored against TSU. During the 1980s, the Houston media along with some Nigerians even referred to TSU in ways that threatened both the public image of Nigerians as well as the institution. The fact that more Nigerians attended TSU, as a predominantly black institution of higher learning than the UH, then, served as a problematic contrast. At other times, however, they were simply perceived as less academically connected compared to Nigerians who attended the predominantly white University of Houston (UH). However, the irony is that, between the 1970s and 1980s, in some important professional degrees, such as pharmacy and law, for example, TSU fared ahead in educating more successful Nigerians across Houston than UH. While the population of successful Africans educated at TSU was far ahead of UH, yet the much smaller minority of those who

¹An examination of the KTSU on-campus radio station and Nigerians/African immigrants in Houston substantiated this fact. Also, interviews in Houston with some Nigerians who kept a close watch over the KTSU weekend programs were supportive of the highlights indicated here.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 182-3.

attended either UH or Rice believed they were better educated with acceptable status of recognition by the mainstream.¹ Evidences taken from examination of Nigerian data in Houston revealed that the small percentage of Nigerians who attended the UH system during the 1970s and 1980s, for example, rarely seemed a justifiable basis for determining attitudinal variances—either as more academically connected or socially deviant—unless one applied a cultural variable.²

But, ironically, the statistics of successful Nigerian professionals who attended TSU during the period was impressive. More importantly, most of the graduate research by Nigerians who attended TSU revealed an understanding of events in the African-American social settings, African world, and the Nigerian/African homelands.³

The TSU relationship with Nigerian Houstonians can be placed on an international setting. For example, a 1993 KHOU TV Documentary entitled, “Let Me Tell You about Africa” revealed how some African-Americans were involved in the write-up and production of a program that showed a more positive image of modern Africa. It also showed the continuing relationship between former students of TSU from Nigeria and other African countries back in their respective homelands. This program, in addition, showed the extent of an ongoing understanding between former TSU students in Nigeria/Africa and African-Americans. According to the

¹This would be the general view among Houstonians and even the Nigerians who attended UH, as evident, for example, by the article entitled, “UH, TSU May Be Locked in Accreditation Dispute,” Houston Chronicle (April, 1983).

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 183.

³This conclusion is based on an examination of graduate research at TSU relating to black America, the African continent and Nigeria. See, for example, TSU Graduate School, Graduate Research Abstracts of Doctoral Degree Dissertations and Masters Degree Theses, 1983-2000.

TV Documentary, the TSU influences embraced other parts of Africa.¹ Beyond this point, however, the TSU-Nigerian connection embraced other spheres of ancestral relationship with Nigeria: in 1979, President Sawyer of TSU visited Nigeria and was bestowed on him a “Yoruba chieftain's title.”²

Despite this trend, however, it might be misleading to surmise that extensive population of Nigerians educated at TSU during the 1970s and 1980s meant much in terms of sustained pan-African relationships. The TSU-Nigerian connection, insofar as training of Nigerians was concerned, was stronger in its economic orientation than on other cultural or pan-African issues. This was perhaps because, being a state-owned institution, TSU would perhaps have had some constraints in overstretching a pan-Africanist outreach. Clearly, the image crisis that began to affect Nigerian Houstonians more directly since mid-1980s, and which continued into the early 1990s, might suggest that the underlying pan-Africanist operatives which were the premises for their overwhelming relationship with TSU, had not resulted in any platform of ancestral cooperation.

Whether, and in what sense, the TSU influences on Nigerians during the said period reflected sustained understanding and cooperation may not be determined on the basis of the numerical statistics of the successful Nigerians who attended this historic institution. The emphasis here is that, while the connection with Nigerian Houstonians was plausible, such efforts did not necessarily lead to well-coordinated mechanisms of ancestral relationship. The TSU case is most revealing because,

¹“Let Me Tell You about Africa.”

²Ibid. “TSU - Nigerian Connection: Africans Give Granville Sawyer Princely Responsibility,” Houston Post (February 11, 1979).

during the early decades of settlement in Houston, its Nigerians' connection did not have as strong a pan-Africanist network.¹

The underlying conflict of the preceding background appears to have corresponded with some evidences coming out of the death of the late U.S. Congressman, Mickey Leland of Texas. This tragic incident was marked by distancing between the two kindred communities. If Africans in Houston were not openly invited to the funeral service of the late Texan U.S. Congressman,² who died in a plane crash in East Africa, it was not clear what other efforts they had made subsequent to that development or thereafter, to calm the emotions of that tragic event. It could be that some conflicting signals had preceded the perception that Africans would not be welcomed if they attended the funeral service.³

The preceding background perhaps best explains why both the Houston and Dallas wings of the Nigerian image crisis had a somewhat silencing effect on the African-American operatives. During the 1980s, what was absent in the organization of ancestral relationship in Houston or elsewhere in the South, were sustained mechanisms linking African immigrants and Africa-Americans together as a unit actively seeking to go beyond the euphoria of pan-Africanism.

Houston, however, could not have had such established pan-Africanist mechanisms when African institutions were not as yet firmly seated into its soil. By

¹Ibid.

²For example, my interviews in Houston in March of 1993 revealed that, at most, a very limited number or perhaps no African community members attended Congressman Mickey Leland's funeral service. It was difficult to ascertain what channels were used to invite the people who attended the funeral. After examining the information and context, it became clear that Africans did not attend largely because they felt uninvited.

³Ibid.

the 1990s, when the emergent Nigerian institutions such as the churches and media began to have more active interactions within the black base, it became possible to estimate what a united front of black solidarity could do, as once suggested by two black American U.S. Congressmen: Mickey Leland and Craig Washington.¹

Continuing Stamina of Ancestral Relationship in Houston

Despite the above constraints, the Nigerian churches which we saw earlier in Houston, represented the clearest medium of ancestral relationships with African-Americans. Within this context, their Judeo-Christian feature has served as a new bridge for fostering intra-cultural exchanges and other collaborations involving the two groups in Houston, Texas. This emerging unison between the Nigerian immigrant churches in Houston and African-Americans is being strengthened by the Nigerian offspring.² For example, between 1998 and early 2005, an examination of the major branches of Nigerian-owned churches in Southern United States revealed that the Nigerian offspring were one of the most important lanes of inter-cultural exchanges. Their Judeo-Christian outreach and cultural extravaganzas were known to embrace Houstonians of all gender, class, and racial backgrounds.

¹African Business Source Magazine (December/January, 1990), p. 32; Igboanugo, Nigerians in America, p. 105.

²During Nigerian cultural festivals, such as those presented under the auspices of the Nigerian Foundation, Cross River State Akwa Ibom State Associations, Ogor Okpala Women Cultural Group, Nigerian Women Fellowship, etc., African-Americans and African offspring often formed a sizeable block of the invitees. In Houston, as elsewhere, the bulk of the Nigerian churches and Youth Associations, economic clienteles, cultural associations, and Afrocentric fashion designers, are more effective within the African-American context. See "Akeem's Day of Glory," pp. 20, 26; Photo Files, African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, January, 1991), p. 20; "Black Expo USA," African Business Source Magazine, (Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992), p. 23. Also, see the appendices of this dissertation for samples of cultural profiles, etc.

Further examination of the Judeo-Christian profiles of Nigerian offspring revealed that their role as agents of cultural contacts would likely become one of the strongest lanes of transforming the Nigerian immigrant churches in the diaspora. This is due mostly to the fact that, on the basis of cultural expression and historical grievances, their relationships to African-Americans and whites as well as to other non-African descent peoples, are more solid and convincing. These offspring were even emerging as the interpreters of the subtle habitat of American cultures to their migrant-parents. Where they so chose to become the medium of exchanges for the Judeo-Christian ministries, this would in turn explain why they were more likely to be believed and accepted by both the descendants of slaves and others.

Generally, some African-Americans see the Nigerian offspring as representing a more faithful alternative to sustained contacts with their ancestral homelands than necessarily the case with their parents. Their connection with ancestral Africa through these offspring is stronger than one occurring through their Nigerian-parent migrants.¹

As of 1993, for example, when a case study of “Akwa Ibom Youth Christian and Cultural Group” in Houston was undertaken, it was possible to conclude that the emerging bond between a Nigerian church and the black church had greater chances of being applauded by African-Americans. This further confirmed the emerging relationships between Nigerian offspring and African-Americans in the South. Besides, this development offered strong evidence that Nigerian-owned churches in Houston were the most reliable outposts to gauge the ongoing course of intra-cultural

¹Ibid. Fieldwork.

collaboration with African-Americans. There cannot be any doubt that these collaborative partnerships were made more obvious and indeed stronger by the Nigerian offspring. In Houston, as in Dallas and Atlanta, their roles as mediators in bridging some intra-cultural rift between African-Americans and Nigerian/African immigrants, were noted with admiration.

We can then safely return to the emphasis on the “Akwa Ibom Youth Christian and Cultural Group.” For, during the 1993 “Black History Month Celebration” held at African-American Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church, the Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State of Nigeria in Houston impressed their desire for collective solidarity and sustained unity with the black communities in a song upon the black congregation. Their song assured the black congregation that they “are African-Americans” as well as “Nigerians from Akwa Ibom State.” Moreover, their song stressed the need for understanding the historical relationships between the generations of forced migration and voluntary post-colonial Nigerian migration. Additionally, it called for the renewal of ancestral solidarity between the descendants of the two migrations:

Our people became captives in a foreign land and were tortured, burnt and killed, but thank God for his love, strength and faith . . . they survived.¹

Further, the song by the offspring of Nigerian immigrants from Akwa-Ibom stressed that, “Blacks must not fail to remember how our fathers and mothers worked

¹This reference was extracted from a “Song” by the Akwa Ibom Youth and Cultural Group at Wheeler Avenue Black Church (Houston, Texas, February 1993) Also, see Appendix D; Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 189.

the land.” African descended peoples were also to remember how their predecessors sacrificed “to bring us to where we are today.”

We thank them for their love and strength, we thank them for their sacrifices, we will never, never forget their struggle. Dr. Booker T. Washington, Dr. Nkwame Nkurumah, Dr. Martin Luther King . . . Malcolm-X, Mickey Leland, we love you all.¹

To carry on the historical struggle of all the previous black leaders and regain past glory, the song by the Nigerian offspring stressed that,

We must be well educated, we must have self confidence, we must love one another, most of all, we must be God's children . . . We must stop selling and taking drugs. Drugs destroy the mind, the brain . . . Our future is in our hands, our destiny as a people is ours to shape. God has sustained us through the difficult years, He must have a purpose for us on earth . . . So let us stay together, work together, love one another . . .²

African-American Response: “Let Me Tell You about Africa”³

Aside from the Nigerian churches, which began to collaborate with African-Americans perhaps more openly from the late-1980s,⁴ the idea of sustained pan-African exchanges, as we observed earlier, had no deeper roots in Houston during most of the 1980s. This seems to have been the background mirrored by the Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State Association in Houston in their song to the black Congregation at the Wheeler Baptist Church.⁵ And African-Americans had

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³This is based on the KHOU TV Documentary, “Let Me Tell You about Africa.” Written, directed, and produced largely by African-Americans, this documentary had about one week run in Houston, Texas, during the 1993 Black History Month.

⁴This evidence is based on examination of the Nigerian profiles, as evident by the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church-profiles with African-Americans from the mid-1970s onward. See, for example, the excerpts on Bishop Ellerbe obtained during my initial fieldwork in the Appendix.

⁵This is based on earlier notes as well as excerpts of the Akwa-Ibom State of Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc.

sometimes responded in public defense of the image of their ancestral homelands in Africa, particularly when the issues involved tended to cut across racial boundaries to affect African-descended people. This then would mean that TSU could have defended the sagging images of Nigerians in Houston in the 1980s not because it had a pan-Africanist orientation, but because the integrity of its local, regional, and international image warranted such a public posture.¹

If, therefore, African-Americans had some working relationships with Nigerians/Africans in Houston between the early and mid-1980s, such an occurrence derived more from their implicit grasp of the socio-cultural consequences of extensive negative media portrayal of their ancestral kin. Certainly by mid-1980s, it was undeniable that the new generations of African Houstonians were being identified as one of the great arms of urban clusters among the city's newcomers. African-Americans were familiar with the cycles of such crises on the basis of their experience. The extent to which the Nigerian-African image crises affected or attracted their attention cannot be doubted.² Houston thus had good evidence perhaps more than in Dallas at about the same time of the extent to which African-Americans attempted to employ their presence in mainstream media to reconstruct the negative image of their ancestral kin.

¹This based on my early fieldwork in Houston Texas, in 1993. Also, in numerous instances, TSU played the role of an ancestral patron due to the large size of Nigerian students in its midst. Some Nigerian students were sometimes involved in activities that were not in keeping with the educational objectives of the host institution. These were issues that the institutions took seriously and had sometimes developed some quiet strategies to contain, as well as to correct such recurrent problems. In such situations, consultations with the Nigerian authorities either in Washington or the nearby regions were often recommended via former TSU-Nigerian attorneys in Houston.

²These accounts were noted in my evaluation of the context of the Black experience in Houston, and across the Southland. See earlier notes, especially in Chapter 1.

That is, some African-Americans were in a position to reciprocate the impressive display of solidarity by Nigerian offspring of Akwa-Ibom State at the Wheeler Baptist Church during a Black History Month. The KHOU-TV Documentary entitled, "Let Me Tell You about Africa,"¹ almost coincided with the plea by the offspring of Akwa-Ibom State that the descendants of slaves and voluntary Nigerian/African migration should "stay together, work together, [and] love one another."² First, the KHOU-TV Documentary represented a most direct attempt by African-American operatives to reconstruct the negative public image attached to African immigrants, especially Nigerians in Houston and beyond its enclaves. For, the documentary not only mirrored a more favorable side of the "African world image," it provided a marked departure from the incessant negative media blitz directed at Nigerians. Second, since the documentary was aired during the "Black History Month," it was probably designed as part of a cultural solidarity between African immigrants and African-American constituents in Houston.³

Accordingly, the contents of "Let Me Tell You about Africa" showed as well as credited the successes of the former students of Nigerian/African Houstonians who attended TSU from early 1970s to 1980s. Also, it depicted the centrality of TSU to the African-world development of African immigrants. Additionally, it showed former Nigerian/African Houstonians in important professional positions within the emerging modern infrastructures of black Africa. These were things that mainstream Houstonians were not used to seeing other than the incessant hungers of

¹See earlier note on "Let Me Tell You about Africa."

²This is based on "The Song by Akwa-Ibom Youth and Cultural Group" before a Black Congregation at the Wheeler Avenue Baptist Church, Houston.

³This is based on "Let Me Tell You about Africa."

Africa, human destitution, institutional and environmental crisis. But “Let Me Tell You about Africa” captured and projected the other more positive evidences of an African world development to Houstonians and beyond. In this undertaking, the descendants of slaves were consciously doing for their kin what their much earlier generations had done to bring Africans and their ancestral homelands to the status of cultural and political respectability.¹

The socio-cultural blend which Nigerians or the larger black African block falls into in Houston is closely linked to black America. This meant that the recurring social crises which confronted them from the 1970s to 1990s, were those American blacks had long experienced, known much about, and probably mastered. Whether, and in what clear manner, this background had given some insight and strength to the title “Let Me Tell You about Africa,” is still a conjecture. But neither African-Americans nor Nigerians could show unconcern over the image deformation of the other kindred folk without being severely affected by the larger socio-cultural effects. When Nigerians deployed their “racial otherness” in Houston, arguing that African-Americans have been unable to escape its negative claws since freedom from slavery, they were affirming their commonality with them even within some existing historico-cultural distinctions.²

African-Americans involved in the KHOU-TV production were aware of the image crisis of modern Africa and perhaps also of its relationships with the socio-cultural crises confronting the black African immigrants in Southern U.S. cities,

¹For example, the general emphasis on the ideology of the mission of African redemption led by the Black diaspora of enslavement is supportive. See Chapter 1.

²For example, Igboanugo, The Nigerians in America, pp. 15-16, has made reference to this crisis.

especially in Houston. Indeed while “Let Me Tell You about Africa” was funded by KHOU-TV, this author was informed during an earlier fieldwork that TSU and some African-Americans were also insightful behind its production. Some blacks involved in its production occupied important positions within the KHOU TV structure; others had affiliations either as former students or in working relationships with TSU.¹

“Let Me Tell You about Africa,” which took a week of the public airtime reportedly contributed to a more positive understanding of Nigerian/Africans by some Houstonians.² On the other hand, however, this documentary almost coincided with the emergence of the spirit of the “New South.”³ As Bullard has argued, the ethos of the “New South” began in a period when the South “desperately attempted to rid itself of the image of a socially and economically backward region.” Accordingly, this meant correcting the enduring developmental and racial problems of the Old South.⁴ Viewed then in relation to the emergent black political power, the KHOU-TV documentary represented the spirit of “New South,” in its efforts to identify, broaden, and poise the socio-cultural context of the black African immigrants in a major Southern metropolitan Southern city. This phenomenon cannot now be fully explained without appreciating the particular image of the “Space City” as well as of the alternate shift in the direction of historical dynamics—the rise of African-American political influences in Southern cities.

¹“The Status of the Relationship with African-Americans,” pp. 190-1.

²This was based on interviews in Houston during the initial fieldwork in this study in 1993. It was confirmed that the KHOU Documentary, running on the air for sometime, had somewhat ushered in some shift among Houstonians from the incessant negative media blitz on Nigerian/African immigrants in local and national networks.

³Bullard, *In Search of the New South*, p. 2.

⁴Ibid.

**The Nigerian Church in the South: The Extent of Community Influence
and Ancestral Relationship with African-Americans, 1970-1990**

Therefore, to a great extent, the Houston evidences of the Nigerian immigrant churches can explain their general Southern characteristics. This, again, is especially evident in their peculiar linkages within the African-American context. However, the difference between the Nigerian churches in Houston and their broader Southern thrust lies more in their demographic variant. That is, within the broader Southern base, the complicated characteristics of some of the “cell churches” of Nigerians may not be too easy to gauge because, as we saw earlier, a majority of them were housed in the homes of the faithful. Others, with orientations in segmented pockets of make-shift Christian ministries, and comprising the shared values of the beloved, also assembled wherever and whenever the financial and collective interest of the faithful converged.

Although the Southern pattern of the Nigerian immigrant churches is somewhat peculiar, it is not exceptional. It is peculiar because it seems propelled by a certain homeland-bred moral frenzy, which is not as yet driven by a clear vision of collective unity. This pattern of religious assemblage or corresponding moral services is neither exceptional to the experience of Nigerian Christian adherents nor to the larger context of the black African churches in Southern cities—nor elsewhere in America. There were as well instances when White/African-American congregations assembled in the homes of the faithful for religious services, or in hotels or high schools facilities.¹ This is a most likely scenario during the early

¹This author has personally been a part of a mixed White/Black Christian congregation that met for months in Worcester, Mass., first in school building and later in Hotel facilities.

phases of struggling to establish a religious congregation for adherents who were/are financially handicapped to build or rent large-sized buildings for their Christian fellowships.

Yet, interestingly enough, the peculiar Southern feature of Nigerian churches from the 1980 to mid-2000, for example, was that human attitude as well as the implicit response to the zeal to serve the divine was often shared with smiles and hardships among the faithful adherents. This feature of the Nigerian Christians is more visible during their early years of responding to the call to serve the faithful in the diaspora. While the financial resources of the Nigerian ministries are often insufficient, yet they are committed to the interest of the brethren and the lost sheep in America.

But, whether these churches are held in individuals' homes, or under a make-shift rotation, or under well-established Christian settings, Nigerian-owned churches in the South are the most dynamic feature of the Nigerian immigrant communities currently operative within the African-American context. If the total number of African churches in the U.S. were tabulated, the Nigerian owned churches would certainly be the largest. Going by the roughest estimates, Houston alone had about 100 Nigerian-owned churches in 2005, Dallas and Atlanta about twenty each.¹

That the Nigerian owned churches represented the strongest arm of the Nigerian immigrant communities in Southern United States is due mostly to the

Often during the early years of community outreach, when the ministries did not have a place, we rotated from one school/community building to another until we were strong enough to rent or finance or to refurbish old buildings into a new church, etc.

¹This is based on my Southern survey of Nigerian newspapers, community archives, and Business Directories.

enormous influences of their emerging institutions. Historically, the Judeo-Christian rampart of American civilization has exercised one of the strongest influences on the character of its republic. This same feature appears to be similar for Nigerian immigrants. Again, as we saw earlier, this fact also corresponded with the experiences of African-Americans and Nigerians during both the eras of the slave trade and colonialism. After freedom, this same phenomenon has reconvened in the U.S. as the strongest medium of cultural solidarity and self-expression between the two related groups.

Given the inherent crises of ethno-regional tensions among Nigerians in the Southern U.S., there cannot be any doubt that the moral imperatives within their Judeo-Christian wing are possible bases both stronger and broader unity in the diaspora. It can thus be speculated that substantial powers of collective unity and ultimately of sustained development, are more apparent within their American-based churches than their influential media outlets.¹ More significantly, the Nigerian churches in Southern U.S. have already developed a commendable territorial power within the mosaic. This seems to be something that most Nigerians are as yet to fully grasp and exploit.²

Unlike Nigerian community media, the Nigerian-owned churches are operative as non-profit organizations. This suggests that the orientations toward their faithful adherents are somewhat different: these churches are geared toward the collective moral well being of their adherents; moreover, their focus appears to be geared toward the economic welfare of the faithful. The Christian messages of a

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 273-264.

²Ibid. Also, see the background of this development in Chapter 4.

loving God, even if more operative on the psychological recesses of some church followers, are capable of bonding a communal body when tailored against their social crises. While in the diaspora, these churches represent Nigerian territories. These are where Nigerians act in their own terms, are freer to one another as a unit. This is as well where they often responded in accordance with the revealed will of the Christian God.¹ Thus, the Nigerian churches in the South are more able to console the pains and sorrows of the community brethren in the cross-road of their American sojourn. The preachers' messages, which thrive on the ever-merciful love of God, and in the possibility of the future redemption, cannot be underestimated for directing the faithful and the repentant sinners who yearn for hope and recovery.

Since moral diligence and discipline are characteristic of church teaching, the Nigerian zealots not only are expected to be good representatives of their country but also are enjoined from the pulpit to stay clear from negative behaviors. This moral diligence perhaps determines why some Nigerians are more likely to see their churches as the likely locations in which to identify with their marital "sweethearts."²

The Judeo-Christian feature of Nigerians in the diaspora can even be explained in relation to the phenomenon of the African background as a culture rooted in religious traditions.³ This fact is revealed by the names given to their churches. These names bear direct relevance to their deep beliefs in God, as well as to their associations with the Christian ministries. On the other hand, however,

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 279.

²"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 280.

³Holloway, Africanisms in American Culture, pp. 69-91, 83-113, 119-142; Herskovits, Myth of the Negro Past; Bolaji Idowu, African Traditional Religion: A Definition (New York: Orbis Book, 1973), pp. 175-8; G.G. Parrinder, African Traditional Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 1958), pp. 17-28, 31-65.

within their African-American context, Nigerian churches appear to be replaying both the mid-and late-nineteenth century patterns of the Negro Christian missionary crusade to convert so-called heathen Africans to Christianity. This trend found some expression during the 1980s between African and African-American churches across international waters.¹

Some African American adherents of Nigerian-owned churches have collaborated with their kin in visiting Nigeria for missionary activities. Within the Southern U.S., this resultant collaboration has been known to strengthen their collective solidarity. African Americans, through the medium of the Nigerian offspring—which we saw earlier—have played frontline roles in the Nigerian owned churches in the South in a manner that reflected increased understanding and solidarity with their ancestral kin.²

There is thus a clear basis that within the Southern confluence, Nigerian-owned churches are one the most effective nerves of ancestral rejuvenation with African-Americans.³ Unsurprisingly, it has been observed that the

Nigerian churches have approximated the African-American base with a certain degree of success, and may even become the nerve center for the spiritual rejuvenation of Afrocentricism linking African Americans and Nigerians as the larger carrier of Pan African renewal.⁴

African Americans who attend these Nigerian-owned churches see some of

¹For example, the link by Dr. Frederick K.C. Price's large and mostly African-American middle-class church in Los Angeles, USA, to a Nigerian church, "All Nation for Christ: Redemption Faith Magazine (Benin City, Nigeria, 1992), pp. 9-13, testifies to the pattern of this emerging trend.

²"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 274; Research Report, p. 22

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.; "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 139-141, 282.

them as emanating from Africa, and as representing some recovery from centuries of their lost cohesion with the homelands. There are other reasons for the latter development, however. First, and by far the most important, Nigerian churches, as we explained earlier, operated more under the auspices of the larger Judeo-Christian setting of American republic. In the second place, these churches use English as the official language of worship, so African Americans who attend the services have an easier time assimilating. Third, some African-Americans who attend these churches are married to Nigerians; hence, along with their American-born offspring, they represent an effective medium of re-direction. This is a two-way flow of ancestral exchange because some Nigerians are also regular supporters of the black church.¹

African Americans who attend Nigerian-owned churches are harnessed into a simple but instructive instrument of ancestral solidarity. In this particular development, Nigerian church owners may have been fortunate. As confidence in traditional American-patterned churches erodes, due perhaps to excessive displays of materialism, African Americans who lean toward sustained collaboration with their ancestral kin are more spontaneous in their response to, and relationship with, the churches of their ancestral kin.²

Given the swift pattern of intra-cultural efficacy of the Nigerian immigrant churches within the black base, another criterion was employed in evaluating some emerging relationships with African-Americans. This was a case study undertaken during the early 1990s in Southern U.S. This study revealed some interesting facts about Nigerian churches that claimed “Messianic Mission” to convert American

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

blacks. This study looked at two churches because of their peculiar socio-cultural features within the Southern base: they were Universal Cherubim and Seraphim Church and The Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church.¹

Finally, The Brotherhood Church was selected and examined because, with about “2 million members worldwide,” its underlying ideology depicted an ongoing trend of relationship between a Nigerian-owned church in America and African-Americans. Moreover, its messianic imperatives, which identified African-Americans with messages of regeneration, provided a more solid basis to compute the course of ancestral relationship for the remaining part of this chapter.²

Table 20 shows the major enclaves of the Brotherhood Church within and outside the Southern states in the U.S. If their newer Bethels in other smaller Southern cities and elsewhere in America were included, the number of The Brotherhood and Star churches would be much higher.

Unlike other Nigerian churches, the “Messianic” imperatives of the Brotherhood Church appear to be a basic reconstruction of the notion of Christian deification of Jesus Christ. Within its Christian rituals, an African essence of the origin of its “Holy Father Olumba Olumba Obu” and a Nigerian incarnation of the “Word” sometimes overtakes the established canons of the Judeo-Christian notion of

¹For example, see Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 238, for another variant of our earlier conclusion as well as “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p., which supports choice of the two churches.

²Based on the official newspaper of the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, The Herald of the New Kingdom, U.S. Special Edition (May, 1988). Follow-up interviews on the activities of the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Church during the 1990s were supportive of its continuing activities within the Southern black base. Also, see Appendix of this dissertation and “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 142-3.

“Christ.”¹ But both in Nigeria and in the U.S., despite the fact that the Brotherhood attracts people from all racial and class backgrounds, and has a worldwide representation, Nigerians are likely to view its aspirations with mixed feelings.²

Table 20

Selected Samples of Major Stations of the
Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Churches
in the United States, 1970-2006.

Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Atlanta
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, San Francisco
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Dallas
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Bay Area (L.A.)
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Wichita, KS
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, New Jersey
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Maryland
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Houston
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Chicago
Brotherhood of Cross and Star, Washington, DC

Source: Exploratory Survey of the Major Enclaves of the Brotherhood and Star Churches via African Community Media; African Business Directories in Southern Cities and across the United States, 1993-2005.

Founded by Leader Olumba Olumba Obu, and headquartered in Calabar, Nigeria, this church has been in the United States since 1971.³ The particular dynamic of the ancestral relationship between some African-Americans and Nigerian members of Brotherhood was vividly revealing in some of the public gestures made

¹Bishop James C. Ellerbe, The Stone the Builders Rejected:” Being lecture delivered by Bishop C. Ellerbe at the Morehouse College, Atlanta University Center in April in the U.S. Special Edition, Herald of the New Kingdom, Brotherhood of the Cross and Star (Calabar, Nigeria, May 1988), 3-4; “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 143; Research Report, p. 23

²Ibid.; Sir Eddie C.O. Osuagwu, “Brotherhood of the Cross and Star Holds Anniversary,” The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, November-December, 1991), p. 4.

³Bishop Ellerbe, The Herald of the Kingdom, p. 16.

in the Southern base in the late 1980s. As the “Official U.S. Edition” of the Brotherhood in The Herald of the New Kingdom noted:

Members of Brother of the Cross and Star, United States branch and Association Of Students and citizens of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria in the America Inc. recently organized what they called 'reception into Africa' in honor of Bishop James C. Ellerbe, an African-American who has declared his intention to become an indigent of Africa.¹

So, in retrospect, Bishop Ellerbe, both as an African-American as well as “our international and Field Bishop,” became a big factor in helping to organize the “Pan-African Christian Conference” in Atlanta, Georgia, between July 17 and 23, 1988. He also helped to lay the foundation for rallying the faithful, through practical Christian ethics, and the “studying and strengthening of unity, and liberation through the spirit of Christ.”² Ellerbe himself felt justified in presenting the missionary aspect of the church to some Christian congregation of blacks in Atlanta, and even reportedly sought and had an audience with Mrs. Coretta Scott King. His lecture on the essence of the Brotherhood church at Morehouse College and Atlanta University Center, sought to convince the student audience that the peculiar crisis of blacks in the world was an unfolding event from which a great hope had finally arrived. His messages to blacks in Atlanta and all across the U.S. rested on the prospect for recovery and hope.³

The Messianic rhetoric of The Brotherhood Church, as reflected in The Herald of the New Kingdom, has been compared to that of Dr. Martin Luther King

¹Ibid., p. 6.

²Ibid., pp. 3,4,16.

³Ellerbe, The Herald of the Kingdom, pp. 3,4,16.

who vigorously protested racist and discriminatory practices in the U.S. towards minority groups. Yet, more than three decades after the Civil Rights Movement,

.... the world still looks hamstrung; and the living can bear true testimony to Luther King that peaceful co-existence has eluded man after all. Thus, man appears powerless when faced with oddities: life now seems useless to him. Global economic recession, political instability and social inequality now experienced by man, is borne out of his desire to acquire for himself all the rich bounties of nature. The results . . . are violence [and] hunger. . . .¹

As Olumba further declared:

Do not preach division and segregation. Do not say that some people are not brethren or that some are not children of God, but rather preach that all human beings are brethren whether they are Moslems or Christians, Buddhist, or Hinduism, or Bahal, or Necromancer. . . . Do not base your assignment on the color of your body or on name, or place but know that we are all one through the spirit, and brethren, who should love one another.²

Since the historical crisis of the black diaspora of enslavement is often explained within a Biblical context,³ the notion of “The Stone the Builders Rejected,” formed the core of the rejuvenation of blacks, and implied an understanding of the fulfillment time of “history” and the coming of “God to the rescue.” Bishop Ellerbe argued that this trend bore directly on the emergent strong consciousness among African-Americans about their ancestral homeland in Africa as evidenced, for example, by changes of their names.⁴

It was, then, the historical crisis of blacks which compelled the “Messianic” mission of leader Olumba Olumba Obu. Whether realistically, or even fanatically,

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³In Chapter 1, for example, additional emphases to this background are found in the orations of Absalom Jones, (1808); Williams (1808); Sipkins (1809); Russell Parrott (1812 and 1814); John Gloucester (1830).

⁴Ellerbe, Herald of the New Kingdom, pp. 3-4.

some black Americans have been led back to Africa, while others have been elected as carriers of the prophetic horn. The development of "Black America" which began from the church was reinforced by Bishop Ellerbe's messages to his audience that the Holy Spirit had descended to earth in person:

The Holy Spirit has now descended on this earthly plane in human form, bearing the resemblance of one whose hairs are like wool, eyes like flames of fire and feet like brass. Leader Olumba Olumba Obu having fulfilled that entity is now telling the world to embrace the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star which is the new Kingdom of God; now on earth. The Holy Father also fulfills the text of Isaiah 63:1-2.¹

When the Brotherhood Church reached African-American students at the Atlanta University Center, one admirer stated:

Prior to mid-April, this year (1988), neither I nor anyone I know in Atlanta University Center had heard of Olumba Olumba Obu, Biahapan, Nigeria, 'Kingdom of God on Earth,' Brotherhood of the Cross and Star. Then, on a rainy afternoon, many students of my faculty heard about the Afrocentric Christianity that contains ideas, aspirations, and traditions that are strange and wonderful to our ears as well as give solace to our hearts. . . . Now, those numerous students, the department's friends, parents, faculty, student's friends, . . . other teachers have heard about Olumba Olumba Obu and I know that virtually everyone wants to hear more!²

By early 2000s, the status of the Brotherhood Church within the American black base had not changed significantly from what it was in the 1980s. This was also the case with its African-American adherents. Admittedly, we can speculate that, as the Judeo-Christian features of the messianic churches of Nigerians become deep-seated within the Southern confluence, African-Americans will likely re-

¹Ibid., p. 3..

²Ibid., p. 12. At the time the case study of the Brotherhood Church was undertaken between 1990 and 1993, Bishop Ellerbe was reportedly residing in the motherland, in the historic city of Calabar. This is where the Headquarter of the church, in Cross River State, Southeastern Nigeria, is located.

negotiate the recurrent values of whatever best complement their attachment to the churches of their ancestral kin. There seems here—along with the succeeding complementation of inter-cultural exchanges by the Nigerian offspring—to be a bigger quest toward a more resolute definition of the bonding between the descendants of slaves and voluntary passage across the Southland. The Southern trend thus points toward a renewed pattern of an emerging trend in Afro-Atlantic relations and an inevitable transformation through two historic migrations from Africa south of the Sahara to the U.S.

Summary

Nigerians in Southern cities are densely concentrated along African-American lines—with their most developed professional establishments found in such cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Texas, where Houston is located, has one of the most established infrastructures of the Nigerian diaspora of colonialism in the U.S. Ironically, their pattern of neighborhood distribution along African-American lanes is oppositional. This development seems to be influenced by socio-cultural crisis.

The Nigerian-owned church in the South represents the strongest arm of an American world institution of Nigerians. It also represents the strongest medium for sustained development of Nigerian indices, as well as ancestral relationship with the descendants of slaves. Within the same Judeo-Christian medium, American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants represent the strongest arm of cross-cultural partnerships. Similarly, their inter-cultural features are more conciliatory toward African-Americans and Euro-Americans than those of their core parents.

CHAPTER 7

NIGERIAN COMMUNITY MEDIA AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN SOUTHERN CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2000

This Chapter contains the content analyses of the published opinions of African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans in the Nigerian community media in Southern United States and the extent of their understanding or misunderstanding of each other. Part 1 of the content analyses (1990-1992), involving three Nigerian media, and based mostly on Nigerian/African published views, examines attitude and perception toward African-Americans. Phase 2 (1993-2000), involving two Nigerian newspapers, based mostly on the published viewpoints of Nigerians and African-Americans, examines how the two related and historically affected groups understand or misunderstand each other. This section also explains the extent to which Nigerian/African immigrants and African-Americans have shared similarities or dissimilarities with regard to socio-cultural/race matters in Southern U.S.

Part 1: Content Analyses of Media Opinions About African-Americans Published in the Nigerian Community Media in Major Southern Cities, 1990-1992

Unlike interaction with African Americans via the churches, which we saw within a specific context in Houston, as well as across the broader Southern front in Chapter 6, interaction via published views via Nigerian-owned community media involving the two groups provided another basis for assessing the course of ancestral relationship. The difference between the Judeo-Christian features of the Nigerians/African-Americans and the Nigerian community media lies more in understanding the effectiveness of each medium of exchange, and how this in turn

relates with the issues involving the two kindred groups. To begin with, as we saw earlier, the major differences/similarities between the two groups were closely linked to the black experience in America and the Nigerian homeland.¹

As Table 21 shows, over a three-year period, a total of 68 articles (sixty-eight) were recorded on African-Americans by the three Nigerian community media. The heaviest media weight coverage on African-Americans was in 1991: the 36 articles recorded represented some 53 percent, compared to 1992 with 19 articles (28 percent), and 13 articles for 1990 (19 percent).

Table 21

Total Number of Articles on African-Americans
by Three Nigerian-African Community
Media in Southern United States, 1990-1992

Period	The Good Hope News	Nigerian News Digest	African Business Source Magazine	Total	Percentage
1990	10	0	3	13	19
1991	18	7	11	36	53
1992	9	5	5	19	28
Total	37	12	19	68	

Tables 22.1, 22.2, and 22.3 are the breakdown of articles on news kinds recorded on African-Americans, along with their distribution over a three-year period. As shown, variations in their coverage were most identifiable in the editorial news. For example, the Good Hope News (Table 22.1) had five editorials on African-Americans, representing some 83 percent; Nigerian News Digest (Table 22.2)—zero percent; and African Business Source Magazine—17 percent (Table 22.3).

¹See our earlier explanation on the Judeo-Christian features of the Nigerian/African immigrant churches and community media. Also, see the “Introduction” and Chapter 8 for the summation of the extent of their similarities and differences.

Table 22.1

Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage,
by The Good Hope News: African Perspective, 1990-1992

	1990	1991	1992	Total	Percentage
News	10	11	4	25	63
Feature	0	5	2	7	32
Editorial	1	3	1	5	83
Picture	2	9	3	14	20
Total	13	28	10	51	

Also, there were some variations in the coverage of African-Americans in news stories: The Good Hope News (Table 22.1), with the highest score (twenty-five news stories), represented 63 percent of its coverage on news stories over the three-year period compared to Nigerian News Digest—10 percent (Table 22.2), and African-Business Source 28 percent (Table 22.3). Very little variation occurred in the coverage of African-Americans in the feature news, where Nigerian News Digest was slightly ahead—eight feature news stories representing 36 percent compared to The Good Hope News—32 percent, and African Business Source—32 percent.

Table 22.2

Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage,
by Nigerian News Digest, 1990-1992

	1990	1991	1992	Total	Percentage
News	0	2	2	4	10
Feature	0	5	3	8	36
Editorial	0	0	0	0	0
Picture	0	10	6	16	23
Total	0	17	11	28	

In the picture news (photo file depiction of African-Americans), African Business Source Magazine (Table 22.3), with 57 percent was the highest compared to The Good Hope News (20 percent) and Nigerian News Digest (23 percent).

Overall, however, the coverage of African-Americans was more consistent in The Good Hope News. Besides, the frequency of its coverage and distribution of issues on African-Americans cut across all categories of news stories over the three-year period compared to its counterparts.¹

Table 22.3

Distribution of Kinds of Stories, by Percentage, by
African Business Source Magazine, 1990-1992

				Total	Percentage
News	2	9	0	11	28
Feature	1	2	4	7	32
Editorial	0	0	1	1	17
Picture	4	18	3	39	57
Total	7	29	8	58	

As regards the coverage of African-Americans under the five major issue-categories (Table 23.1), The Good Hope News recorded 92 percent of its combined total over the entire three-year period on Race Relations/Racism (RRR), compared to Nigerian News Digest (zero percent, Table 23.2); and African Business Source—8 percent (Table 23.3). Apart from the 38 percent recorded on Opinion and Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB) and 25 percent on Racial Solidarity/Pan-Africanism (RSP) in the Nigerian News Digest, and 55 percent on RSP in African Business Source, the coverage of African-Americans in The Good Hoper News was once again stronger and more evenly distributed: 30 percent on RSP; 75 percent SEBAP; 100 percent CRRP; and 33 percent OAAA (Table 23.1).

¹Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African-Americans," pp. 222-3.

Table 23.1

Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans
Covered by The Good Hope News, by Years, 1990-1992

	1990	1991	1992	Total	Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR)	4	5	2	11	92
Racial Solidarity / Pan-Africanism (RSP)	2	4	0	6	30
Special Events/Black American Personages (SEBAP)	2	2	2	6	75
Civil Rights/Race Politics (CRRP)	2	2	3	7	100
Opinion/Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB)	0	5	2	7	33

Table 23.2

Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans
Covered by The Nigerian News Digest, by Years, 1990-1992

	1990	1991	1992	Total	Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR)	0	0	0	0	0
Racial Solidarity / Pan-Africanism (RSP)	0	2	1	3	25
Special Events/Black American Personages (SEBAP)	0	0	1	1	5
Civil Rights/Race Politics (CRRP)	0	0	0	0	0
Opinion/Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB)	0	5	3	8	38

Table 23.3

Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans Covered
by the African Business Source Magazine, by Year, 1990-1992

	1990	1991	1992	Total	Percent
Race Relations/Racism (RRR)	0	0	1	1	8
Racial Solidarity / Pan-Africanism (RSP)	2	9	0	11	55
Special Events/Black American Personages (SEBAP)	0	0	1	1	13
Civil Rights/Race Politics (CRRP)	0	0	0	0	0
Opinion/Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB)	1	2	3	6	29

Table 24.1 shows how the major issue-categories under SEBAP were distributed in the media over a three-year period. The coronation of Debby Turner in 1990 as “Miss America” was seen and reported as an event that most Africans and African-Americans ought to have known more about and be very proud of: “Do you know that the beauty crown of Miss America and Miss USA are worn by African-Americans?” As the report added, “Miss Debby Turner is Miss America 1990 while Miss Carole Gist is Miss USA, 1990.”¹ Also, the tribute to the “Legacy” of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., received a positive ovation because his “Dream Lives On”² (Table 24.1).

Table 24.1

**Breakdown of Issues Covered Under the SEBAP
by the Nigerian/African Media, 1990-1992**

Period	Issues	The Good Hope News	Nigerian News Digest	African Business Source Magazine
7/90	Miss America Debby Turner	1		
	Black Catholic Archbishop Resigns	1		
2/91	Black History Month	1		
	Local Channels Mark Black History Month	1		
1/92	Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday Celebration	1		
3/92	Martin Luther King: His Dream and the Legacy Left Behind		1	
	Court Building Dedicated to an African-American Judge	1		
6(7)92	Magic Johnson: AIDS Book Controversy			1

On the other hand, other articles like “Hambee Festival Celebrated African Tradition,” “African/African-American Ties Wax Stronger,” “African Products

¹The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (July, 1990), p.15.

²Nigerian News Digest (February 7, 1992), p. 14.

Shine at Black Expos, USA,” and the Abidjan Summit” were examples of the shared optimism about African-Americans by opinion molders in the Nigerian community media. Such news story as “Nigerian Businessman gives \$100,000,000 to Atlanta Institute,” on the other hand, revealed the perception toward the active role being played by a Nigerian personage in support of the black struggle in America.¹

The elections of L.D. Wilder as Governor of Virginia, and of David Dinkins, as Mayor of New York (Table 24.2), were depicted as representing a turning point in the maturing of America.² Similar praise in an editorial in The Good Hope newspaper was given to the passage of the “Civil Rights Bill of 1990:” this was argued as representing fairness toward American minorities as well as a genuine effort toward civil rights for all (Table 24.2).³

Table 24.2

Breakdown of Issues Covered Under
CRRP by the Nigerian/African Media, 1990-1992

Period	Issues	The Good Hope News	Nigerian News Digest	African Business Source Magazine
1(2)/90	Election of L.D. Wilder and David Dinkins History in the Making in US	1		
8/90	The Civil Rights Bill and Its Importance	1		
8/91	Clarence Thomas Says: Civil Rights Movement Helped Me	1		
	Bush's Choice of Thomas Fills Quota	1		
1/92	New Minority Scholarship Policy Expected	1		

¹For detailed discussion, see African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, January. 15-Feb. 15, 1991), p. 9.

²The Good Hope News: African Perspective (January/ February, 1990), p.4.

³The Good Hope News (August - 1990), p.13.

**Further Content Analyses of Nigerian-African Community Media:
Understanding and Misunderstanding African-Americans by
Nigerians/Africans, 1990-1992¹**

Table 25.1 mirrors the nature of understanding or misunderstanding about African-Americans based on the published opinions of Nigerian/African writers. Included in their media opinion perception was the sporadic split of the black base in the wake of the “Anita Hill/Judge Thomas” nomination. On the other hand, in “The Problem Lies with Teachers,” the expressed socio-cultural attitude of racism toward African-Americans was viewed as responsible for the conflict in their education.² “The King Verdict,” in particular, represented the “Most Sensational Verdict of the Year.”³ It was argued that, the verdict showed how the “U.S. stood up for human rights abuses everywhere except when it concerned people of color”⁴ (Table 25.1).

As the breakdown of data confirms, from Tables 24 to 25.1, and throughout the three-year period, the coverage of African-Americans by the Nigerian community media was much stronger in the Good Hope News newspaper. The frequency of overall coverage on particular issues was also much stronger in The Good Hope News.

Table 25.1 illuminates the breadth of the articles showing either understanding or misunderstanding of African-Americans by Nigerian/African writers. This is revealed by distribution of news briefs and by the frequency of times

¹This explanation is an expansion/breakdown of analyses on issues covered mostly under the major category of RRR. However, as shown by the data on Table 25.1, this trend is mirrored in terms of understanding/misunderstanding of African-Americans by Nigerian/African immigrants.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 237.

³“The King Verdict,” African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, June/July, 1992), p.8.

⁴Ibid.

of coverage over a three-year period. Accordingly, the analyses revealed a broad range of understanding than misunderstanding on issues such as economic, cultural, and civil rights politics.

Table 25.1

**Understanding/Misunderstanding African-Americans
in Nigerian/African community Media, 1990-1992**

Media	Issues	Understanding	Misunderstanding
Good Hope News	The L.A. Shame	1	
	The Young Black Males	1	
*	Reverse Discrimination	1	
	Inmate's Cry from Jail	1	
*	The Plight of Black Males	1	
*	Blacks, Hispanics Denied Home Loans than Whites/Asians	1	
	African-Americans: A Journey Through "Niger River"		1
	Mike Tyson's Rape Case	1	
	Back to the Past	1	
*	Buchanan's Bigotry	1	
	Confirm Clarence Thomas	1	
Nigerian News Digest	Race: America's Quagmire		1
	Black America/Nigeria an International Perspective	1	
	Clarence Thomas' Mainstream Media Hype	1	
	The Problem Lies with Teachers	1	
	Clarence Thomas' Apple Chomping Eves	1	
	Race America's Quagmire A Rebuttal	1	
African Business Source Magazine	Employment Discrimination	1	
*	Magic Johnson: Is AIDS a Biological Disease?	1	
*	Obstacles Facing Blacks	1	
	The King Verdict	1	

Further, such issues as “An Inmate's Cry from Jail,” “Racial Slur Backfires in Houston,” and “Employment Discrimination,” for example, revealed how opinion molders in the Nigerian media perceived and depicted the agony of American racism that affected them and their ancestral kin. On issues like the “Young Black Males in the 1990s” and “Ronnie Reagan's,” the Nigerian media blamed the Reagan era and

his policies for the general state of the economic and socio-cultural crises that confronted African-American males (Table 25.1).¹

Based on the data on Table 25.2, the general trend of understanding African-Americans by Nigerian/African writers was stronger in The Good Hope News. Some 43 percent of its media weight showing an understanding contrasts sharply with 4 percent for misunderstanding. Nigerian News Digest recorded 22 percent against 13 percent, while African Business Source Magazine scored 13 percent against 4 percent.

Table 25.2

Levels of Understanding/Misunderstanding African-Americans,
by Percentages, 1990-1992

Media	Understanding	Misunderstanding
Good Hope News	43%	4%
Nigerian News Digest	22%	13%
African Business Source Magazine	13%	4%

Further content analyses of news kinds revealed a stronger expression of an understanding of the socio-cultural context of African-Americans in the editorial opinions of The Good Hope News. This was evident, for example, in its edition of March 1992. In this particular editorial, the opinion was that the same process of racial judgment, which freed Patrick Kennedy Smith from his rape trial, was markedly different in the trial of Mike Tyson.

¹The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (April, 1991), p. 13.

In Mr. Kennedy Smith's rape case trial, he was acquitted. On the one that looked much less like rape, Mike Tyson was convicted. Perhaps, the fact that Mr. Smith was a medical doctor and from a celebrity family and, of course, a white, helped to exonerate him. Mike Tyson, although a world boxing champion...was prejudged and convicted before the case even came up for trial.¹

Again, in the article entitled, "The Problem Lies with Teachers," the opinion was that success in American education should be determined by how the educational curriculum was structured and "how fair and firm teachers are with grading systems and other requirements." The columnist questioned the view that African-Americans "exhibit disproportionately high rates of illiteracy." He argued that they confronted an educational system that was ambivalent toward their identity. Further, he argued that, historically, the success of black education in America was compounded by racism and institutional opposition.²

In another article published in Nigerian News Digest (January 24, 1992), the writer argued that the black dilemma in America emanated from the entrenched racial structure of America. Entitled "Race: America's Quagmire-A Rebuttal," Bennet Akpa, Nigerian, pointed out that the socio-cultural crises of black America were linked to the irreconcilable mindset of white America. He urged the first writer of "Race: America's Quagmire" (Nigerian News Digest, December 27, 1991), and African immigrants in general, to open up to African-Americans.³

Akpa encouraged his Nigerian/African brethren to come to terms with the fact that "being born and growing up Black in America is not something.... Africans

¹The Good Hope News: The African-Perspective (Dallas, Texas, March, 1992) p. 13.

²Nigerian News Digest (February 14, 1992), p. 18.

³Bennet Akpa, "Race: World's Quagmire-A Rebuttal," Nigerian News Digest (January 24, 1992), pp. 4 and 20.

could understand.” Since Africans came to America fortified “with high esteem” and determination to return home “some day richer than before,” they were very likely to exhibit traits that were markedly dissimilar from those of African-Americans. African-Americans, he further argued, were deemed failures by most white people right from their birth and considered “incapable.” Considered failures and “incapable,” African-Americans, according to Akpa, must

learn to live with the fact that whenever such cliches as welfare, inner city, ghetto, murder, AIDS, credit card fraud, hunger and starvation are uttered on TV, the accompanying photograph is more likely than not to be that of a black person.¹

Additionally, Akpa observed that the racism that confronted African-Americans was so deeply embedded in the American psyche that “most whites could not differentiate between a black cat and Black person.” So, accordingly, he rejected the blame placed on some African-Americans by the first writer for reliance on “affirmative action.”² Without “affirmative action,” which his countryman criticized,³ “A Black Ph.D could earn less than a white high school graduate.”⁴ Akpa cautioned: “I don't know that any of us from Africa has the moral high ground to pontificate about the probable solution to the problems facing Black Americans.”⁵

“Remember,” Akpa reiterated, “that it was our ancestors who sold them (African-Americans) into slavery in exchange for such simple things as a bottle of gin or shiny pieces of jewelry.” Africans, he argued, “have a whole continent riddled

¹Ibid.

²“Race: America's Quagmire,” Nigerian News Digest (December 27, 1991).

³Ibid.

⁴Akpa, “Race: America's Quagmire-A Rebuttal,” pp. 4 and 20.

⁵Ibid.

with problems” which “many of us have not the vaguest idea how to solve,” in spite of “decades and centuries of self government.”¹

Akpa, then, pondered whether a Nigerian could have been the one who wanted to correct black Americans on grounds of inaction, as the first writer of “Race: America’s Quagmire” had done, when “there are many Nigerians in this country who, despite two or three degrees, drive cabs or work menial tasks”²

So before talking about the “African-American problem,”

... let’s make an attempt to understand the people, let’s join some of their associations and sit around the table with them and allow them to open up to us. If we do this, we would be surprised to find out that the majority of Black people work everyday, are not on welfare, do not push drugs, have close families, have good things to say about Africans . . . and contribute positively to the American society.³

To Akpa, therefore, a more realistic assessment of African-Americans would undoubtedly make Nigerians/Africans cognizant that their development after slavery represented “the greatest comeback ever attempted by any people in history.” Akpa concluded that Nigerians/Africans must accept “an additional requirement” in constructive collaboration with their ancestral kin.

We (Africans) must learn to count African-Americans as our allies, not enemies. Who knows what the outcome would have been if Black grassroots organizations had mobilized to support those Nigerians who were fighting defamation in Dallas, Texas?⁴

And, there was Dr. Ema Etuk, whose response to the Nigerian and African-American relations complemented some of the emphases we saw earlier in Akpa. Although Dr. Etuk's article entitled, “Election Year Politics: Black Power in an

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

International Perspective,” showed a slight variant from the former, it represented a conscious call for coordinated relationships between Nigerians and African-Americans.¹ As a student of world history, Etuk took a most familiar although slightly newer line of Pan-Africanist worldview.

First, he sought to grapple with the possibilities of relating Nigeria and Black America’s numerical potentialities to the pace of their development within and outside the U.S.² Second, he sought to explore the emergent tenet of political changes involving the two related and almost similarly affected racial groups, urging for collective unity. Seizing upon the election campaigns of two presidents—one in the United States and the other in Nigeria—involving Nigerians and African-Americans in the democratic process, Etuk posed the inevitable question of a new cycle of relations. He felt the trend represented a pathway toward greater empowerment and regeneration between the two black worlds.³

When, in 1992, it first seemed that Nigeria would have an orderly transfer of political power from a military dictatorship to a democratically elected leader, Etuk viewed the strength of Nigerians and African-Americans as a magnet for cooperative relationship as well as corresponding development. As his article speculated,

Most likely, experts in the field of current history will remember 1992 as the year of the two presidential elections on both sides of the Atlantic. Almost coincidentally, African-Americans, with a population of 88,254,501 (according to the 1991 census) will go to the

¹Ibid. Dr. Emma S. Etuk, “Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International Perspective,” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, N. Carolina, November 13, 1992), p. 4.

²Ibid. Dr. Emma Etuk's article seems to be a more specific reworking of a historically popular Pan-African worldview. See some emphases in Chapter I.

³Etuk, “Election Year Politics,” p. 4.

polls this fall. The American will elect a new president on November 3, and Nigerians, hopefully, on December 5.¹

Also, Etuk believed that success between Nigerians and African-Americans required them to work as people with shared interests and objectives:

African-Americans and Nigerians combined constitute the ninth largest population group in the world . . . after China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Japan and Pakistan. This combination produces a figure of 118,500,561.²

If Nigerians and African-Americans “are bound . . . by some historical and cultural ties that go deeper than geopolitical differences,” an election year in which their combined human forces were involved in electing two presidents, was so historic an event as to warrant the convening of “a national congress of Nigerian and African-American leaders of thought...for a declaration of purpose and action.”

There are many thousands of well-educated Nigerian professionals in the United States with resources that can be tapped in order to lay the foundation for this kind of congress. There are also many Nigerian organizations to be harnessed for this purpose. All that is needed is a commitment and dedication to work together.³

Etuk's “what would have happened” suppositions indicated an understanding of the mixed phases of post-modern Pan-African possibilities. Profoundly suspicious of the tenuous relationship between Nigerians and African-Americans, he wondered in the following manner:

What would have happened if African-American leaders of thought and Nigerians worked faithfully together to lobby the United States Congress and Senate, the mega-companies, and the military industrial complexes to pay closer attention to their sheer numbers as market consumers, and as an important demographic group of the Black race? What would have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

provided a united voice to the United Nations on some matters relating to their interests, such as war, pollution, health, immigration, resource exploitation, racism, trade, and world prices of commodities? (Including massive public demonstrations of mutual concern)... What would have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians collaborated and cooperated in the areas of oil exploration, space technology, space engineering, automobile manufacturing....?¹

The need for Nigerians and African-Americans “to work together,” implied a grasp of new possibilities. Signs of mistrust and misunderstanding in the relationship between the two groups represented a source of disempowerment:

.... among many African-Americans and Nigerians the age-old stereotypes, fears, suspicions, and misapprehensions still exist. These are the roots of our powerlessness. As long as these misapprehensions exist, we shall never be able to get united and wield the kind of power we should.²

“There is still an oral code of conspiracy of distrust” in the relationship between Nigerians and African-Americans. Accordingly, this “oral code of conspiracy of distrust” among African-Americans implied that Nigerians were often to blame as those who “sold our fathers.” Nigerians were also known to exhibit a similar attitude of unconcerned and arrogance toward African-Americans:

Some Nigerians . . . have been alleged to possess certain degrees of arrogance and airs of superiority. No one seems to honestly and frankly deal with these matters of distrust... There is a lot of hypocrisy and pretense while we claim that we are “brothers” and “sisters.” There seems to be more talks than actions.^{3*}

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. *The faith that Dr. Etuk placed on the possibility of a smooth democratic transition in the 1992 Nigerian Presidential election did not yield expected dividends due to the annulment of the democratic process which elected Chief M. K. O. Abiola as President by President Ibrahim Babangida. Dr. Etuk reconstructed his earlier emphases in Nigerian News Digest of November 13, 1992, based on Patrick Henry's libertarian exhortation “Give me liberty or give me death,” urging Nigerians not to accept an imposed leadership. See Dr. Emma S. Etuk, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death:” The Meaning and Significance of the Nigerian Independence, African News Weekly (October 1-8, 1993), pp. 8, 35.

Another substantial understanding of the historical context of black America by the Nigerian media was revealed in the coverage of the nomination of Clarence Thomas for Supreme Court Justice. Overall five articles were devoted to the Thomas nomination crises; this represented the highest coverage accorded a particular issue over the three-year period.¹

Unlike most black Americans, the opinions expressed in the Nigerian community media with regard to the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas were neutral although more accommodating. First, the editorial opinions revealed an understanding of Judge Thomas' own weaknesses as a black American in a white-dominated institution. But, unlike the NAACP,² which would have preferred a white liberal to Thomas, the editorial opinions argued that complete absence of a black Justice on the Supreme Court after Thurgood Marshall would be dangerous for black America in the long run. The Good Hope News cautioned African-Americans that, "the devil you know is better than the one you don't know."³ As for Judge Thomas,

His past utterances were starkly contrary to the legacy left behind by Justice Thurgood Marshall. But we have to hear what his mother said recently . . . "Black people" don't have to think alike, they don't have to look alike, they don't have to talk alike . . .⁴

Similarly, other related opinions in the Nigerian News Digest showed an understanding of the historical context of the Clarence Thomas

¹"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 252-3.

²The NAACP and its related associates were almost unanimous in opposing the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas. Besides, its official stance before and during the Supreme Court confirmation process tended to have been more favorable toward a white liberal than Judge Thomas.

³The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (August, 1991), p.11.

⁴*Ibid.*

nomination crisis.¹ Responding to the New York Times editorial entitled, “A Justice until 2030,” the “Fire Talk” columnist observed that: “The above mentioned editorial smacks of sheer racism.” After all, “The Times did not demand a similar high-handedness when bonafide White conservative Justice David Souter was nominated...”²

Overall, however, the content analyses revealed that articles reflecting a misunderstanding of African-Americans in the Nigerian media were mostly linked to historical differences. Generally, this development supported the assumptions of this study.³ The Thomas/Hill conflict revealed how some Nigerians/Africans misunderstood the profound historical grievances of their ancestral kin. The fact that Professor Anita Hill had a continuing relationship with Judge Thomas, her boss, might not have implied that her opposition to his nomination was triggered by an unrealized interest—even sarcastically—as the writer of one article attempted to portray.⁴

Moreover, the substance of the conflict with Judge Thomas may be found in black America's ideological split within itself rather than in the unrealized interest of Professor Hill. And Hill, who probably understood the philosophical orientation of her former boss, had recognized that his nomination did not represent the fullest interest of black people. This same crisis was not much different from that between

¹See “Clarence Thomas” Nigerian News Digest (Ashville, NC, August 30, 1991), p.18; “Clarence Thomas,” Nigerian News Digest (Charlotte, N. Carolina, October 18, 1992), p. 20.

²Ibid.

³See, for example, the major assumptions employed in this dissertation (Chapter I.)

⁴Udofia. “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 255-6.

Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, nor from the type of misunderstanding which occurred between Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, etc.¹

The article “Perverting the Afrocentric” was viewed as representing a misunderstanding of African-Americans by some Nigerians or Africans. The misunderstanding was found in the process employed in questioning the attitude of African-Americans who tried to adapt African marital wedding traditions in the U.S. This confirmed the extent to which differences in the cultural orbits shaped their misunderstanding of each other. That an African-American even tried to go through the rigorous routine of adapting a traditional pattern of African marital wedding after centuries of cultural exorcise might have been a pointed representation of ancestral maturity and solidarity with the homelands. This attitude was taking place in America when the bulk of African marriages were largely Judeo-Christian based.²

Another article entitled, “African-Americans: A Journey through the Niger River,” revealed some misunderstanding. Here the problem was with the semantic of the name “Niger,” which, according to the writer, bore closely to “Nigeria,” and somewhat to “Negro.” The writer, whose viewpoint was published in a “Black History Month,” argued that it required African-Americans to make a journey back

¹Ibid. See, for example, the pattern of the ideological conflict of black America, as mirrored by Harold Cruse, in his The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. 115-181,305-357,347-420.

²This observation is arguable, and perhaps there are Nigerians/Africans who will differ with interpretation given here. Nevertheless, as emphasized here, what constituted “Perverting the Afrocentric,” a feature news write-up by an African, revealed how some Africans tend to use their cultural lenses in evaluating their ancestral kin, and, as often the case, this attitude resulted in misunderstanding of some of the genuine efforts to link up with the relationships homeland. Remarkably, while some African-Americans are trying to return to African cultural base, most Africans are still struggling to get into the heights of Westernization; others, of course, are entrapped in the adventure. For details, see earlier citation in The Nigerian News Digest (July 1991), p. 17; and The Good Hope News, The African Perspective (July 1991), pp. 1 and 17.

to the “Niger River,” in Southern Nigeria, to learn about that.¹ Since black Americans have had contacts with Africa beyond the level of understanding indicated by the writer of “A Journey through the River Niger,” this emphasis did not show an understanding. If the writer of this article felt he knew more about Africans who came to America from the coastal region of the Niger Delta basins—and was also himself more informed about them while in the U.S.—the central thrust of his argument did not support that view.² Indeed, he did nothing to enhance proper understanding of his thesis based on clear exposition of the two sides of the relationships with the “River Niger.”

Equally significant, the content analyses found that there were some favorable and unfavorable opinions toward African-Americans in the Nigerian community media. Nearly all the articles on this issue were in The Good Hope News column, and pointedly more favorable (Table 26.1).

The preceding meant that there were some variations in how each newspaper or magazine targeted its audiences. The Good Hope News—with strong orientation toward socio-cultural issues—also showed some favorable disposition toward African-Americans.

As further analyses revealed, the overall media weigh level on favorable news coverage of African-Americans did not differ any significantly over a-three year period (Table 26.2). For example, The Good Hope News recorded 89 percent of its favorable coverage against 11 percent unfavorable; the Nigerian News Digest

¹The Good Hope News: The African Perspective (February, 1991), p.10.

²Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 257-8.

recorded 89 percent level of favorable against 11 percent unfavorable; and African Business New Source 50 percent favorable against 50 percent unfavorable.¹

Table 26.1
Most Favorable News About African-Americans
by Issues Over a Three Year Period, 1990-1992

	Issues	Favorable	Unfavorable
Good Hope News	History in the Making in the U.S. (Election of L.D. Wilder as Governor of Virginia and Mayor Dinkins of New York)	1	
	Civil Rights Bill	1	
	Debby Turner (Miss America)	1	
	Curtis King A Man of Vision	1	
	Man of Courage Ervin Magic Johnson	1	
	Black History Month	1	
	Court Building Dedicated To African-American Judge George Allen	1	
Nigerian Digest	The Legacy of Martin Luther King	1	
African Business Source Magazine	Africans Have High IQ		1
	Jerry Sonny Ugokwe an Opposite of Martin Luther King	1	
	Magic Johnson AIDS Book Controversy		1

Table 26.2
Most Favorable News About African Americans, by Percentage
Over a Three-Year Period, 1990-1992

	Favorable	Unfavorable
Good Hope News	89%	11%
Nigerian Digest	89%	11%
African Business Source Magazine	50%	50%

Such news stories as “Court Building Dedicated to an African-American Judge,” “The Black History Month,” and “Curtis King a Man of Vision,” for

¹Ibid., pp. 259-60.

example, were some of the highlights of favorable coverage about accomplishments of blacks reflected by the Nigerian media. The elections of L.D. Wilder, as the first African-American Governor of Virginia and of David Dinkins as the Mayor of New York—which we noted earlier—also corresponded with favorable disposition toward American blacks. To The Good Hope News, this development meant great changes for both blacks and whites in America. Particularly for blacks, it meant that,

Some color barriers were knocked down in the United States of America during the recent November 7, 1989, election of L. Douglas Wilder, an African-American Lawyer, and the Lt. Governor of the State.¹

On the other hand, an editorial in The Good Hope News took a public stance supportive of the passage of the “Civil Right Bill” against existing trend of “intentional discrimination.” The passage of the bill, it argued, was especially helpful in removing some constraints against the “people of African descent.”² Favorable coverage by the Nigerian News Digest was accorded to “Dr. Martin Luther King” and to the “Legacy He Left Behind.”

Almost a quarter of a century after an infamous assassin’s bullet snuffed the life out of him, the voice of this Black charismatic leader and champion of the human rights movement still echoes throughout America and around the world probing the conscience of man and calling for social justices, equality for all, and the right of man to be judged not by his color but by the contents of his character.³

Other opinions about African-Americans were unfavorable. For example, the news flash on “Magic Johnson’s” Aids Book Controversy was considered unfavorable. Although its accounts did not reflect a Nigerian or African point of

¹The Good Hope News; The African Perspective (Jan/Feb, 1990), p.4.

²The Good Hope News; The African Perspective (Dallas, Texas, August, 1990), p.13.

³Nigerian News Digest (Feb.7, 1992), p.14.

view, nevertheless, its contents raised some unfavorable ethical questions about the character of the Basketball star.¹

Another article entitled “Africans Have High IQ's” was considered unfavorable in relation to African-Americans. Published in African Business Magazine, the writer wanted to use the auspices of a white immigration attorney to refute an earlier view by “Charles Murray” that African-Americans had lower I.Q.'s.² By bringing in the viewpoint of this attorney, the anonymous reporter very nearly accomplished a great public relations feat. However, the viewpoint of the attorney probably succeeded most in splitting the Murray thesis without clarifying its relevance to the relationship between Africans and African-Americans:

Blacks who came to America 300 years ago did not remain pure and...Africans may be better off seeking to maintain racial purity.³

The anonymous writer seemed not to have understood the socio-cultural tenet implied by the statement of the white attorney. Regrettably, in attempting to interpret his thoughts for public readership, he got things further mixed up.

Mr. Yakaboski's reference to American Blacks is not correctly applicable to real Africans, to people who have not been diluted through intermarriage, and who have not shown any dip in their collective I.Q.⁴

Yet the unfavorable categorization of the Murray thesis on African-American I.Q. was not based on the imprecision of historical data alone. One can, of course, argue that blacks were more than 300 years in America from January 15, 1990, when

¹“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” p. 259.

²African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-January 15, 1990), p. 13.

³Ibid.

⁴African Business Source Magazine (Houston, Texas, December 15-January 15, 1990), p. 13.

the article was published to the first date of their public identification under servitude in colonial Americas or the British mainland North America.¹

Also, whether “African Americans” were completely “diluted through intermarriage,” or reflected a “dip in their collective I.Q.,” was not a basis for considering the article unfavorable. The real decision was due mostly to unsubstantiated clarification of facts. For, of significance was the fact that, neither the opinion of the white immigration attorney nor that of the anonymous writer was clearly explained. Besides, the Murray-I.Q. article was considered unfavorable because the so-called anonymous writer lacked a personal voice in reporting the views of the white attorney. As a story reported by a second party, its central theme should have been more thoughtfully researched before being printed. The anonymous context suggested an element of controversy which the writer should have checked.²

Part 2: Content Analyses of Published Views by Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in Nigerian Community Newspapers in Major Southern Cities in the United States, 1993-2000

Unlike Part 1 of the content analyses of African-Americans in the Nigerian community media, which evaluated opinions from a Nigerian/African point of view, Phase II—1993 to 2000—included those of African-Americans. Moreover, unlike Phase I, which evolved varied media—two Nigerian-owned community newspapers and one magazine published in the Southern U.S., Phase II involved two Nigerian-owned community newspapers. The decision to use two Nigerian newspapers was

¹Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census*, p. 268. Also, see Chapter 2.

²*Ibid.*; “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 261-3.

due to the fact they had a broad demographic reach on vital issues that affected Nigerians/Africans across both the Southern U.S. as well as across the entire U.S.

Table 27 shows that a total of 213 articles were recorded on African-Americans by the two Nigerian-owned community newspapers. On a yearly period, The African Herald (TAH) recorded a total of 172 articles on African-Americans; this represented about 66 percent (1996), and 100 percent (1997-2000), compared to African News Weekly (ANW)—with 41 articles—representing about 19 percent.

Some variant in the coverage of African-Americans over the seven-year period was revealed during the early 1990s, and this was mostly in ANW (Table 27). About 100% of its articles on African-Americans were used between 1993 and 1995. During the later part of 1990, the coverage on African-Americans was heavier in TAH.

On average, however, between 1993 and 2000, TAH accounted for more than 81 percent of the total number of articles on African-Americans compared to only 19 percent in ANW. Significantly, between 1993 and 2000 (Table 28), news stories and feature news were the most widely used medium in both ANW and TAH: the 12 articles on African-Americans accounted for 29 percent in ANW compared to 79 in TAH, representing 46 percent. On the other hand, however, the editorial news kind was the least used medium in the coverage of African-Americans: this accounted for only 8 percent in the ANW and 4 percent in TAH. On the particular issue of racism, ANW accounted for 29 percent compared to 33 percent in TAH.

Table 27

Total Number of Articles on African-Americans
Covered by African News Weekly and The African Herald, 1993-2000

	African News Weekly	Percentage of African news weekly by year	African Herald	Percentage of African Herald by year	Total
1993	7	100	---	---	7
1994	0		---	---	0
1995	15	100	---	---	15
1996	19	34	37	66	56
1997	---	0	55	100	55
1998	---	0	34	100	34
1999	---	0	33	100	33
2000	---	0	13	100	13
Total	41	19	172	81	213
Percentage (total from 1993 - 2000)	19		81		100

Table 29.1 and Table 29.2 show the overall distribution of story kinds relating to African-Americans in ANW and TAH. Table 29.1, for example, confirms some patterns of the coverage of African-Americans found earlier in Table 28—in the news stories, feature news, and racism—in 1995 and 1996. During the entire period, news accounted for the most widely used form of distributing story [1996] on African-Americans: its highest score recording 58 percent in 1996, with racism having a share of 42 percent in 1993 and 1996. Feature news dominated in 1995 with 57 percent and 43 percent in 1996, followed by editorial news 67 percent in 1995 and 33 percent in 1996.

A similar pattern in Table 29.1 goes for Table 29.2: that is, news was the major vehicle for distributing story kinds on African-Americans in TAH. Between 1996 and 2000, the 79 news items recorded on African-Americans were found to be consistent, especially in a year-by-year basis. Furthermore, the news medium was

widely in used in 1996, a fact corresponding with 51 percent; in 1998 it recorded 59 percent; and in 2000, it scored 70 percent. Racism, on the other hand, enjoyed some shares under the major news story kinds: with 36 percent in 1997 compared to 46 percent in 1999.

Table 28
Kinds of Stories on African-Americans [including Racism]
by Newspaper, by Number of Articles, by Percentage, 1993-2000

	African News Weekly	Percentage of African News Weekly by kinds of stories covered	The African Herald	Percentage of African Herald by kinds of stories covered
News	12	29	79	46
Feature	14	34	30	17
Editorial	3	8	6	4
*Racism	12	29	57	33
Total	41	100	172	100

*Note: "Racism" is not a category of news. However, due to the strong orientation of African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans on racial matters found in the study, this author decided to place "race" under a separate category in order to enhance further explanation of issues in the major categories.

Table 29.1
Distribution of Kinds of Stories by African News Weekly,
by Percentage, 1993-1996

	1993	1993 %	1994	1994 %	1995	1995 %	1996	1996 %	Total
News	2	17	0	0	3	25	7	58	12
Feature	0	0	0	0	8	57	6	43	14
Editorial	0	0	0	0	2	67	1	33	3
Racism	5	42	0	0	2	17	5	42	12
Total	7	17	0	0	15	37	19	46	41

Table 29.2 further confirms that the overall pattern of distributing news kinds on African-Americans was more consistent in TAH than ANW (See Table 29.1). Also, it lends support to the fact that the overall media weight concentration of issues on African-Americans was stronger in TAH than in ANW. One explanation for this

variant lies in the dense concentrations of Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in the cities where the two newspapers were stationed. The next bears closely to how they targeted issues designed to capture the broad concerns of varied audiences.

Table 29.2
Distribution of Kinds of Stories by The African Herald,
by Percentage, 1996-2000

	1996	1996 %	1997	1997 %	1998	1998 %	1999	1999 %	2000	2000 %	Total	% of total
News	19	51	17	31	20	59	14	43	9	70	79	46
Feature	5	14	16	29	5	15	4	12	0	0	30	17
Editorial	2	33	2	4	0	0	0	0	2	15	6	4
Racism	11	30	20	36	9	26	15	46	2	15	57	33
Total	37	100	55	100	34	100	33	100	13	100	172	100

Table 30.1 and Table 30.2 show the major issue-categories employed in examining African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans in ANW and TAH. Overall, the data on Table 30.1 and Table 30.2 confirm earlier patterns found in Table 29.1 and Table 29.2. According to Table 30.1, the 23 articles recorded by ANW on African-Americans from 1993 to 1996 were not evenly distributed across all the major issue-categories.

Further analyses revealed almost no action by ANW during a greater part of early 1990s. The exception was in 1993, when Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism (RSP) had five articles, representing 100 percent. From 1995 to 1996, RSP received 22 percent; Civil Rights Race Politics (CRRP), received 22 percent; and Opinion attitude About American Black (OAAAB) received some 56 percent. The general average of the coverage of African-Americans by ANW was stronger in RSP with 39 percent in 1993 and OAAAB—31 percent.

Table 30.1

Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans,
by African News Weekly, by Year, 1993-1996

	1993	1993 %	1994	1994 %	1995	1995 %	1996	1996 %	Total	%
Race Relations Racism (RRR)	0		0		0		0		0	0
Racial Solidarity Pan Africanism (RSP)	5	100	0	0	2	22	2	22	9	39
Opinion Feature Race Solidarity Pan Africanism *(OFRSP)	0	0	0	0	2	22	2	22*	4	17
Special Events/Black American Personages (SEBAP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	11	1	4
Civil Rights Race Politics (CRRP)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	22	2	9
Opinion/Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB)	0	0	0	0	5	56	2	22	7	31
Total	5		0		9		9		23	

*The indication means that, although the category of coverage was on Race Solidarity/Pan-Africanism (RSP), it was derived from what this author terms, opinion feature news. That is, while the articles counted did not specify “feature news,” yet they were based on individuals’ opinions. They could have been placed under the RSP issue-category, but might not have favored general analyses of conceivable patterns of relationships based on the strengths of some issue-positions. The feature news, as we explained in our definition of terms (see appendix), relates more to personal viewpoints of the writer(s). This distinction is important in that it establishes a basis for a more concise evaluation of opinion on racial solidarity across the board.

Table 30.2 confirms the frequency of issue-positions covered by either African-Americans or Nigerians/Africans. As shown, TAH had the highest score compared to ANW (Table 30.1). Moreover, its overall distribution of media weight was more consistent over the entire period across the major issue-categories.

As Table 30.2 further shows, with a total of 78 articles on the major issue-categories compared to 23 in ANW (Table 30.1), RRR averaged zero point in ANW, while TAH yielded a total of 18 articles, averaging some 23 percent from 1996 to 2000. African-Americans received their strongest coverage under CRRP in TAH,

totaling 21 articles, and averaging more than 26 percent, and representing the most consistent focus on a particular issue from 1996 to 2000.

Table 30.2
Major Categories of Issues on African-Americans,
by The African Herald, by Year, 1996-2000

	1996	1996 %	1997	1997 %	1998	1998 %	1999	1999 %	2000	2000 %	Total	% of total
Race Relations Racism (RRR)	3	21	8	26	3	23	4	22	0	0	18	23
Racial Solidarity Pan Africanism (RSP)	2	14	3	10	1	8	3	17	0	0	9	12
*Opinion Feature Race Solidarity Pan Africanism (OFRSP)	1	7	1	3	3	23	0	0	0	0	5	6
Special Events/Black American Personages (SEBAP)	2	14	2	6	2	15	2	11	1	50	9	12
Civil Rights Race Politics (CRRP)	4	29	7	23	3	23	6	33	1	50	21	27
Opinion Attitude About American Blacks (OAAAB)	2	13	10	32	1	71	3	17	0	0	16	21
Total	14		31		13		18		2		78	

Table 31.1 highlights the breakdown of issues covered under RRR, showing some strong sensitivity to white-black relations as well as to the attitude of American justice system toward African-Americans. This is supportive of the assumption in this dissertation that commonalities in historical experience would serve as a likely basis for understanding and of partnership between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary Nigerian migration in America.¹

Other evidences of ancestral collaborations between African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans were found in the content analyses of the Nigerian community

¹See Chapter I for the major assumptions of this dissertation.

newspaper (Table 31.2 and Table 31.3).¹ This embraced collaborative economic development and political support, and an understanding of the role played by some key black institutions in America. For example, in an article entitled “The Black Church,” it was clear that Nigerians/Africans were aware that the church “has made the greatest impact on the Black community.”² With origin in the caste history of American slavery, Dr. Leonard Madu, the writer argues that the Black Church fulfilled the spiritual needs of its adherents. Since freedom, the Black Church has served as a reservoir of struggle and survival. The Black Church remains the one institution that continues to mold the direction of African-Americans.³

The history-making appointment of an African-American in the state of Pennsylvania, where—prior to the time, African-Americans had never occupied such a status—received attention. “For the first time in its 100-year history, the Pennsylvania Colleges and Universities (PACU) has elected an African-American chair of the state-wide organization.”⁴

Similarly, with obvious pride, the Nigerian/African writer stated: “The lucky winner is Lincoln University President Niara Sudarkasa, author of more than 60 published pieces on women, immigration, African American families, [and] diversity.”⁵ John Hope Franklin was the other African-American to receive such a

¹For example, there was a strong correlation on ancestral relationships during both the first phase and second phase of the media coverage of African-Americans by Nigerians (Africans) and African-Americans who wrote in Nigerian community media from 1990 to 2000.

²Leonard Madu, “The Black Church: A Core Institution in the black Community,” The African Herald (Dallas Texas, February 19-25, 1996), p. 18.

³Ibid.

⁴“Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU,” African News Weekly, (November 11-17, 1996), p. 2.

⁵Ibid.

high degree of praise as a non-ostentatious and successful African-American scholar:
 “what an illustrious life of 80 useful years of worthy emulation.”¹

Table 31.1

Breakdown of Issues Covered Under RRR
 by the Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000

Period	Issues	The African Herald	African News Weekly
8/96	NIMH wastes millions on Psychiatric Racism	1	
	NAACP says Racial Problems of 1960s endure	1	
10/96	Black Employees sue Bell Atlantic	1	
6/97	Grocery Chain settles Discrimination case for \$4.3 million	1	
	Judge rules Beauty Shop Discrimination Suit can be Class Action	1	
	Lone Black student graduates from Gonzaga Law	1	
	Black Businessmen sue over Municipal purchasing and contracting	1	
7/97	Alabama executes Ex-Klansman for lynching of black teenager	1	
	Egyptian sues U.S. Govt. over his race classification	1	
	Lawsuit: Police Using Excessive Force Against Ethnic Minorities	1	
	Former Principal murdered in Nigerian Seminary	1	
12/98	Police Chief suspended, demoted	1	
	Slave’s descendants feel vindicated	1	
	Attorney accuses judge of being racist	1	
1/99	Pizza Hut settles Hate Crime Lawsuit	1	
	Denver Toughens its Affirmative Action Law	1	
2/99	UNT guilty of Bias against Black Professor	1	
3/99	A Lesson from Jasper, Texas	1	

The article “Summit Brings Trade Pact, Goodwill” shows the extent of racial solidarity in a meeting of “African-Nations-Southern States Accord, September 20-23,” hosted by former Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder. “Wilder urged cooperation between American and African parties... not only is Africa relatively

¹A. B. Assensoh, In Retrospect: Professor John Hope Franklin, What a Life!,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, May 12, 1995), pp.16-17.

untapped... but also African sectors could benefit from the experience of the American South.”¹ Further content analyses revealed a consciousness over the continuing trauma of the trans-Atlantic slave trade era. “Wilder the first elected African-American governor in the United States and the grandson of slaves, has led two trade missions to Africa and has announced plans to construct a museum in his state to acknowledge the beginning of the American slave trade in Jamestown, Virginia” (Table 31.3).²

The content analyses revealed how the opinion molders in the Nigerian community media perceived the identity crisis that affected their ancestral kin. This was found in the news flash on Tiger Woods, the African-American golfer. The news flash depicted Mr. Woods as “the first African American” to accomplish such a feat, pointing out that his achievement “came as a great relieve to many Black people...stereotyped as having no acumen to play golf.”³ The news flash then raises the concern as to whether Mr. Woods was black or not. “Even though Tiger Woods looks black to the naked eye, he says he is not Black. He says he is one-quarter Black, one-quarter Thai, one-quarter Chinese, one eighth American Indian and one-eighth White.”⁴ If, as the news flash mimics, the law enforcement officials were to look for him, they would be looking more for those mixed ancestries rather than his black skin (Table 31.5).⁵

¹African News Weekly, (October 6-8, 1993), p. 3.

²Ibid.

³“Who Am I?” African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, June 2, 1995), p. 2.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

On the other hand, however, in “A Rich African Culture”¹ (Table 31.3), the fascinating highlight of the relationships between Southern University Law School, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and the Faculty of Law University of Lagos, in Nigeria, revealed an ongoing dialogue between American blacks and Nigerians/Africans. The result of the content analyses revealed that two successful African-American professionals were crowned with honorary chieftaincy titles “by His Royal Highness Oba Adetju Adeyey II, Ado Oko of Ida Oko Ijesha in Ogun State of Nigeria.”² The recipients were Dr. Gloria J. Braxton, Director of International Programs at Southern University, and Co-Director of the USIA-Sponsored Democracy in Africa-Project, and Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr., of Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit.³

In “Center Honors African/African-American Children,” it was revealed that “several African and African-American school children were honored by members of the city’s center for African/African American Arts & Culture” in San-Francisco, California.⁴ The program, which involved indigenous Africans and African-Americans in the U.S., inspired Chief Akande to observe “that Africa will rise again,” especially “with your contributions” (Table 31.4).⁵ Articles like “Jumping the Broom,”⁶ “Reconnection to the Motherland,”⁷ and “Reflection on a Visit to

¹Yvette Alex-Assensoh and A. B. Assensoh, “A Rich African Culture,” African News Weekly, (Charlotte, NC, June 2, 1995), p. 6.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴“Center Honors African/African-American Children,” African News Weekly, (July 15-21, 1996), p. 18.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Hariette Cole, “Jumping the Broom,” African News Weekly, (Charlotte, NC, August 6, 1993), p. 18.

⁷“Reconnection to the Motherland,” African News Weekly, (Charlotte, NC, July 16, 1993), p. 18.

Ghana,”¹ written mostly by African-Americans or in collaboration with Nigerians/Africans, revealed an ongoing interactions with African cultures and continuing contacts with the ancestral homelands (Table 31.3 and Table 31.4). These articles demonstrated the extent to which both African-Americans and Nigerians shared as well as believed in incorporating available pieces of their ancestral heritage in remolding themselves while still in the diaspora.

But, interestingly enough, other articles like “Summit Brings Trade Pact, Goodwill,” “Nigerians support Randall Robinson,” and “Farrakhan’s world Tour: The Issue of Nigeria,” confirmed the existence of cooperative relationships between Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans. The TransAfrica democratic foray into Nigeria, along with the visits by Rev. Jessie Jackson to bring about constructive changes, also received some attention in the Nigerian newspapers.²

Madu’s article argues that Farrakhan’s understanding of Africa’s problem explains his ready welcome in the continent than in the U.S.³ For, accordingly, while in Nigeria, Farrakhan observed that

...it was time.... to understand African Americans have as much right to Africa as indigenes, bearing in mind that they have been forcibly sold into slavery. Moreover, he employed African leaders to get together and decide which area of land should be made available to African Americans for settlement so that their children should start returning to Africa to help develop it. In addition, Farrakhan emphasized a need for economic, cultural, educational and scientific cooperation between the two peoples.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Al -Zeta Khan, “TransAfrica vs. Abacha,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, May 12 1995), pp.1.and 29; African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, February 19-25, 1996), p. 24; Leonard Madu, “Farrakhan’s World Tour: The Issue of Nigeria,” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1996), p.23.

³Ibid.

⁴The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1996), p. 23; “Louis Farrakhan on African Tour,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, January 29-February 4, 1996), p. 1

Table 31.2

Breakdown of Issues Covered Under CRRP by Two
Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000

Period	Issues	African Herald	African News Weekly
1/96	NAACP to honor Harvey Gantt		1
5/96	California initiative to bar Racial Preferences qualifies	1	
7/96	First African-American Female Deputy Chief	1	
	Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson reacts to SC decision	1	
	Hope High for Mfume leadership at NAACP	1	
11/96	Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU		1
1/97	Nyon Carathers named Director of Outreach and Health Education	1	
7/97	Senator Ellis Praises Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock for service to Texas	1	
7/97	Administrator at Jail sues County for Discrimination	1	
7/97	Bernstine named as new PSU President some Faculty says.....	1	
	Jackson elects first Black Mayor	1	
	Bar Disciplines Scheck, Douglas, not Cochran	1	
	Florida's 'Little Haiti' honored for restoring houses	1	
5/98	Western Michigan University names first Black President	1	
12/98	Senator Royce West expresses concern over states report	1	
	MU receives \$2.4 M Grant to train Minority Professors	1	
1/99	Rep. Thompson to introduce legislation on Independent Counsels	1	
2/99	Calendar of the month	1	
	Dallas Urban League and UTD President to salute Youth	1	
	Texas Publishers Association holds seminar in Austin	1	
3/99	Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk kicks off Re-election campaign	1	
	Plans afoot for first N.C. Minority-owned bank in over 20 years	1	
2/00	Woman ordered to repay \$534,159 for stolen chips	1	

Table 31.3

**Breakdown of Issues Covered Under RSP by the
Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000**

Period	Issues	African Herald	African News Weekly
7/93	Pamusa Plans National Conference		1
	Reconnection with the Motherland		1
	Jesse Jackson on weekend visit		1
8/93	Jumping the Broom		1
10/93	Summit brings Trade Pact, Goodwill		1
6/95	A Rich African Cultural Excursion		1
	Most Nigerians support Randall Robinson		1
1-2/96	Symposium on Entrepreneurship in Chicago		1
5/96	Lawyer sentenced for Bank Robbery	1	
	Tyson Needs to Stay out of Trouble		1
8/96	Michael Jackson composes song for Mandela	1	
6/97	Apology	1	
6/97	Nation's Largest Black History Museum Opens in Detroit	1	
7/97	African Community honors retiring Human Rights Commissioner	1	
12/98	Jackson ends Africa Trip Heaping Praise on Ghana	1	
2/99	Ethiopian Trade Consul visits Dallas	1	
	African Americans monitor Gabon election	1	
3/99	Book Review – Book: Here and Now (Author – K.L. Roby)	1	

**Further Content Analyses of Nigerian-African Newspapers:
Understanding and Misunderstanding between Nigerians
and African-Americans, 1993-2000**

Since the overall pattern of intra-Pan-African misunderstanding mirrored in the two Southern newspapers associated more with cultural differences, this background was further content analyzed for clarification.¹ Based on the data, the result confirmed that the racial background of the black African migrants, especially of Nigerians, had some correlation with their socio-cultural crises. While using human

¹For example, see the earlier concussions in Chapters 4-6 for an elaboration of the emphases in this chapter.

perception to gauge social direction can at times be problematic (See related Tables), still some negative depiction of Nigerians and African-Americans derived almost from a similar historical crisis. Also, their understanding and misunderstanding of each other derived from shared socio-cultural commonalities and differences.¹

The above emphasis lies more in understanding how the inherent differences as well as the shared experiences between African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants under alien cultures have influenced how each party views the other. This attitude found expression in the response by Melvin Foote, an African-American writer, who published in the Nigerian community newspaper ((Table 31.4). In an article entitled, “Why Africa Matters: The Case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa,” Mr. Foote took a position against the attitude of Senator Mitch McConnell (R-NC) and Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) for proposing cuts in foreign aid packages to Africa. As Mr. Foote argued, the cuts were designed to favor countries in the former Soviet Union and the Camp David Countries (Israel and Egypt) while ignoring those in Africa south of the Sahara. “Both Helms and McConnell are on record opposing existing levels of foreign aid for Africa. Both have promised to scale back bilateral aid to Africa considerably, perhaps as much as 20%.”² Foote further argued that, “Scaling back American aid to Africa sends the wrong sign to African governments and economies struggling to recover from the effects of colonialism and the Cold War.”³

¹For example, see our explanations in A. B. Assensoh, “CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians,” African News Weekly, (February 19-25, 1996), p. 16; Ben Edokpayi, African News Weekly (Charlotte, North Carolina, July 29- August 14, 1996), p. 1.

²Melvin Foote, “Why Africa Matters: The Case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, May 12 1995), p. 6.

³*Ibid.*, p. 22.

Table 31.4
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under OFRSP by the Two Nigerian-African
Newspapers, 1993-2000

Period	Issues	African Herald	African News Weekly
5/95	Why Africa Matters: The Case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa		1
6/95	African American Heritage Awards		1
1/96	Reflections on a Visit to Ghana		1
7/96	Center Honors African/African-American Children		1
8/96	Immigration Issue as relates to Anti-terrorism Law	1	
7/97	"African" or "African-American" as a mere tag is not Enough	1	
5/98	Toward Another Breed of Black Americans	1	
7/98	Afrocentricity Thrives Despite Vicious Attacks.....Detractors	1	
12/98	The Persistence of Economic Inequality in Age of Globalization	1	

In another response directed at a legislation viewed to be unfair toward Africans, attorney Ollie Jefferson, African-American female lawyer in Dallas, Texas, showed some understanding of Africans' status. She argued that the anti-terrorism law, signed by President Clinton in 1994, to combat domestic and international terrorism, was unfavorable to African immigrants, especially to those entering the country as refugees.¹ This "hurried legislative effort" according to attorney Jefferson, was mostly unfavorable to refugees from Africa "than any other part of the world."² Jefferson further argued that, where the U.S. "already accepts a disproportionately low number of African refugees," the anti-terrorism legislative law would further impinge on African immigration into the U.S. than any other region of the world (Table 31.4).³

¹Ollie Jefferson, "Immigration Issue as relates to anti-terrorism," The African Herald, (Dallas, Texas, March, 1996), p. 26.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Table 31.5
Breakdown of Issues Covered Under OAAAB,
by the Two Nigerian-African Newspapers, 1993-2000

Period	Issues	African Herald	African News Weekly
5/95	Fight of the Century: Mandela vs. Tyson		1
6/95	Who Am I?		1
	Serving Two Masters		1
	Winning in Africa Makes it Special for New Miss Universe		1
10/95	Colin Powell: Nigerians are Scammers		1
5/96	Texas Publishers Association 10 th Annual Convention in Austin	1	
7/96	African-American Leaders head to Austin	1	
9/96	Senator Sees Abacha		1
	Fredericks challenged by Johnson; Big Purse at Stake		1
6/97	Nation's 100 Biggest Black-owned Companies	1	
6/97	Golf's New Math: How many can Tiger Win?	1	
	Senate Approves Proposal to Create Juvenile Crime Center	1	
	State Rep. Coleman helps TSU to Remain Independent	1	
	States with Fastest Growth of Black Buying Power listed	1	
	Historic Black School Appears on Verge of Shutdown	1	
7/97	Students "Reap" the Summer with Science and Technology	1	
	Haiti Seeks Loans for Electric Power, Agriculture	1	
	Former Barbadian Cabinet Minister ChargedDestroying Property	1	
	Immigration Sends Illegal Immigrants to Bahamas, Cuba	1	
12/98	Mosley-Braun loses tough Re-election Test	1	
2/99	Southwestern Bell Offers Hope to South Dallas Students	1	
3/99	The Making of Legendary Deal maker	1	
	North Texas Residents Urged to Open Their Eyes to the Risk of Diabetes.	1	

Furthermore, the content analyses revealed that Nigerians/Africans were aware of the emerging changes in their American identities in the diaspora. They

were also increasingly becoming aware of the implications of such changes in their particular relationships with the descendants of slaves. For example, such an article and public speech as “Toward Another Breed of Black Americans”¹ and “Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Series,”² revealed how the opinion molders in the Nigerian community newspapers sought to cast the changing phases of their relationships between America and the homelands as well as with their ancestral kin.

Moreover, the viewpoint expressed by Nigerian/African writers revealed that the relationship between the forced migration and largely voluntary postcolonial Nigerian/African migration to the U.S. was rooted in both the commonalities and differences of the black experience. The migration of Africans under compulsion and bondage, according to Nwaozulu, were “mercilessly labored, brutalized, dehumanized and tortured beyond human endurance.”³

As Nwaozulu further argues,

Today the descendants of those Africans think American and behave American both in lifestyles and character and hence they are called Black Americans...⁴ A person’s total mentality and attitude is largely dictated or conditioned by environment or circumstances of his upbringing. For some obvious reasons, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible for children brought up in American society to recognize another home outside the American society.⁵

How about the language crisis of the Nigerian/African offspring?

Most, if not all children of African born beyond their continent do not speak their African language, and language is the vehicle for cultural

¹Fidelis Nwaozulu, “Toward Another Breed of Black Americans,” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1998), p.25.

²Richard Nwachukwu, “Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Series,” The African Herald, March 1999, pp. 1, .8.

³Nwaozulu, “Toward Another Breed of Black Americans,” p.25.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

transmission, how can those children understand the customs, traditions, morals and values of their true origin.¹

So, what is the solution?

This writer is of the opinion that children of native Africans residing abroad should be sent home early in life so that they can grow up at home, identify with their age mates, understand where they belong, and know what belongs to their family and what does not; instead of losing touch with their roots.²

To Professor Mazrui, however, the problem that Nwaozulu painted above so vividly requires grasping the implications of the emergent inter/intra-Afro-atlantic convergence of Africans side by side with the descendants of forced migration in America. In a speech at “UTA African Series,” Dr. Mazrui placed the emerging African-build-up in America as representing the making of a new Afro-atlantic paradigm. He called for an understanding of the relationship between the old and new histories, which, as he further observed, were now to be explained in America within the context of the relations between the Diaspora of enslavement and the Diaspora of colonialism.³

Mazrui also argued that the human endeavors of Africans had shaped the early American frontiers as well as the evolution of American capitalism.⁴ While Euro-Americans, Mazrui continued, “like to think of themselves as heirs to Greece and Rome,” as well as to the sole spirit of taming the frontier, they often forget that “what was uniquely American was also the Black presence along the Frontier.”⁵

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Nwachukwu, “Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks UTA African Series,” pp 1 and 8.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

It was this Black presence, “Which nurtured American capitalism in its maturation.”¹

In its infancy, American capitalism needed Black labor. This is the link between America and the imperative of labour. In its maturation in the Twentieth century, American democracy needed the civil rights movement and deracialization to realize its original concept that “all men are created equal.” It was Black who helped American democracy account to its ultimate ideal. The echoes of ... the Afro-Atlantic paradigm ... fed into the feminist movement... The African presence in America has also deeply influenced music, literature, food, culture, sports and the performing arts.²

What then does the new Afro-atlantic paradigm mean to the descendants of slaves against the recurrent build-up of Africans in America since the 1970s? As Mazrui argued, the relationship between black America and Africa has entered into a new phase. Despite some distinctive Western Hemispheric differences, these complicated relationship survived, resulting now in the build-up side by side of the African diaspora of colonialism with the black diaspora of enslavement.

The distinction between the Diaspora of slavery and Diaspora of colonialism gets more complicated... The great majority of African Americans are a product of the Diaspora of Enslavement ... American Africans (or Americo-Africans) on the other hand are product of the Diaspora of colonialism. They are usually first or second generation immigrants from Africa to the Americas. They may be citizens or permanent residents of Western Hemisphere countries.³

So, as Nwaozulu observed, Mazrui agreed: the real difference between the diaspora of colonialism and diaspora of enslavement lies in the existence of more definitive lane of cultural exchange with the homelands. According to Mazrui, in reference to the diaspora of enslavement, their major cultural links as well as

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

language lanes toward the ancestral homelands are American. But in the case of “American Africans,” contacts with the homeland as well as language lanes are still more secure: “when American Africans become African Americans, it does not mean other ties with Africa are cut. Relatives in Africa still abound. Concern for Africa is often still intact.”¹

Mazrui concluded that with the ultimate incorporation of the diaspora of colonialism through the offspring “into an African American family,” begins a natural erosion of language ancestry where sustained acculturation does not exist with the African homeland.² Because language holds the umbilical chord together, the blurring of vital lanes of sustained cultural contacts with the homelands would likely influence adoption of an American identity by the Nigerian/African offspring. Others, however, would increasingly become African-Americans.³

The umbilical chord is language. The children of Professor Nkiru Nzegwu of Binghamton University are still American Africans (hemispherically) because the children still speak fluent Igbo. On the other hand, my children still speak African American-their linguistic umbilical chord has been cut.⁴

The extent then to which differences in historical cycles affected the descendants of forced migration and largely voluntary Nigerian/African migration has some bearing with their often tenuous relationships in America. For example, an

¹Ibid.

²This is fully supportive of our conclusion in Chapter 5: that is, the longer the stay in the diaspora by Nigerian immigrants, the greater the chances that their offspring would become more Americanized than acculturated toward the homeland cultures of their core parents. The lures of this Americanization by Nigerian offspring was found to be more favorable in their relationship with African-Americans, and alternately with the American mainstream than their migrant-parents.

³Nwachukwu, “Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks UTA African Series,” pp 1 and 8.

⁴Ibid.

article entitled “My Name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi—an African Living in a Black Community Gary, Indiana,” supported the extent to which difference in historical experience influenced the rift between Nigerians and African-Americans.¹ Mr. Nnandi’s article was influenced by a court decision involving many political interest groups within the Black community, in which he was on the losing side. As he, himself, wrote in The African Herald:

I moved to Gary Indiana in 1974, and worked for the city of Gary under the first black mayor Richard Gordon Hatcher... Then I worked under William A. Douglas during the Mayor Barnes Administration. I was caught in the political battles of two boards fighting to take control of the airport board.²

Undoubtedly, Mr. Nnandi, who lost by a court decision had also to suffer its corresponding socioeconomic and politico-cultural consequences. This is because the court decision had greater chances of affecting his economic status within the poverty-ridden Gary-Indiana black politics. “When I sued them to get my job back, the two boards united politically, and in court, the court gave them a political division, and they won; the first case that the city won in decades.”³

With the preceding backdrop, a series of instigated failure at the Gary Housing Project followed, which amounted to what Mr. Nnandi termed “My Ordeal.” As he further reported: “Ten unit apartments, in which I have spent over \$250,000 to renovate.... did not....work anymore.” Nnadi concluded that an

¹“My Name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi—an African Living in a Black Community Gary, Indiana: My Ordeal,” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1999), p. 23.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

“African [Nigerian] who wanted to live in a black community [was] practically run out of the neighborhood.”¹

More than three quarters (3/4) of a million dollars of investments in real estate has been lost.... I cannot even feed my family.... This is regrettable to those Americans who work hard to fulfill the American dream...a shame to all those who call themselves an African American, but an African is not allowed to live in their community.²

The preceding development received further impulse in another article entitled “African or African American as a mere tag is not enough” (Table 31.4).³ Although this article has some dissimilar emphasis with the one noted above, nevertheless, it was also rooted in the conflict of cultural misunderstanding. The writer of this particular article, Dominick Iyorlu, cautioned some African-Americans to resist the temptation of misunderstanding their ancestral homelands. This position was in response to the conflicting image of Africa, which, as Mr. Iyorlu recalled to his readers: “very few of us were prepared for the obscene anti-African diatribe that appeared in the shape of a very strange book “out of Africa, written by one African American Journalist, Keith B Richburg.”⁴ In responding to Keith Richburg, Iyorlu argued that publishing a book that failed to show an understanding of the internal crises of Africa was wrong. His position was similar to the position taken by William Finnergan in The New York Times Book Review against Mr. Richburg.⁵

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 24

³Dominick Iyorlu, “African or African American as a mere tag is not enough,” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, July 1997), p. 28.

⁴Keith B. Richburg, Out of Africa: A Black Man Confronts Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. xi-39.

⁵William Finnergan, “Black Like Me: An American journalist is posted to Africa and struggles with what he finds there,” The New York Times Book Review (March 30, 1997), p. 30 [9].

Mr. Richburg's problem, as Iyorlu argued, amounted to the continuing crisis of the Mis-education of the Negro:

Thus uncritically imbibed for so long the terrible images of Africa fed them by the Western media, so many African Americans disdain anything African. Some of us are already familiar with the anti-black people reactionary activities of such notorious African Americans like Walter Williams, Thomas Sowell, Allan Keyes, and Ward Connerly.¹

According to Iyorlu, Journalist Richburg's publication, along with the misunderstanding associated with his statements,

Confirms a long-held thought among serious-minded scholars around the globe that the extent to which aggressive oppression damages the psyche of certain individuals, has, for a long time, been underestimated and that serious study of this psychic problem might reveal a disease which, in a physical sense, might be as deadly as cancer or AIDS.²

Another published indifference in the content analyses was found in response to a statement made by General Colin Powell (Table 31.5). General Powell's public statement via the ANW (October, 1995), was quoted as saying: "Nigerians as a group, frankly, are marvelous scammers. I mean, it is their national culture."³ Responding to this public indictment of the Nigerian national image, representatives of the Nigerian immigrant communities argued that taking a public position, which generalized and insulted the image of most law-abiding and honest Nigerians, amounted to an "irresponsible tirade of a man who has abandoned his African heritage."⁴

¹Iyorlu, "African or African American as a mere tag is not enough," p. 28.

²Ibid.

³"Colin Powell: Nigerians Are Scammers," African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October 1995), p. 2.

⁴Ibid.

On the other hand, however, other Nigerians who responded to General Powell's comments observed that: "There is a particular irony in this statement as it comes from an African-American figure head."¹ Unsurprisingly, this background picked up in an article entitled, "CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians," which pointed to the negligent attitudes by American laws as well as the U.S. news agencies in dealing with Nigerians. Dr. Assensoh, the writer of this article, raised the query: "how can one stay completely out of trouble if one is made to be guilty by merely belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group, or even because of one's nationality: the guilt by association notion?"²

Other unfair public misrepresentation of the African background by agents of American institutions found during the Olympics corresponded with the ongoing socio-cultural crises confronting African-Americans and Nigerians. Responding to the perceived negative attitudes of NBC on African Olympians, one observer noted: "If you are searching for detailed stories about African athletes at the Atlantic Olympics, the wrong place to look would be NBC's daily coverage of the event."³

Most Africans did not perceive the NBC channel as an appropriate medium to watch for positive reports on the achievements of athletes from their continent,

.....if you are interested in details such as scores of Nigeria's two goals in the Group D victory against Japan, or the punching power displayed by Nigerian Light weight David Attah in his defeat of an opponent from Papua New Guinea or, better still, the reaction of 21 year old swimmer Penny Heyns after she won South Africa's first Olympic medal in 44 years.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Assensoh, "CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians," p. 16; Edokpayi, African News Weekly, p. 1

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

The scope of the preceding crises was further compounded by how the opinion molders in the Nigerian/African immigrant community responded in 1995 to an editorial entitled, “O.J. Puts America on Trial.”¹ What was most revealing in this editorial was that the published viewpoint did not suggest that the O.J. Simpson’s decision reflected his innocence. “This editorial will not engage in a futile attempt to refute or confirm the guilt or innocence O.J. Simpson.”²

The fact surrounding the O.J Simpson case lies in its historical context. Consequently, the editorial was an open invitation to America to re-examine the cancerous effects of white-black crisis, where the truth was to be found. “Long before the trial, about 70% of Blacks believed O.J. was innocent while 70% of Whites believed he killed Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman.”³ In other word, the racial divide separating a majority of whites and blacks, “remained unchanged after the jury had delivered its verdict.”⁴

No wonder the editorial saw the O.J. case as representing the “Mother of all trials,” as well as “the undertow of racial prejudice that threatens to drown all of us if not dealt with.”⁵ It moved backward to examine earlier antecedents in the trial cases of African-Americans within American justice system. Racial indifference toward African-Americans also explains why some judges were sometimes compelled to break the rules “to the dismay of experienced lawyers and legal analyst.”⁶

¹“O.J. Puts America on Trial,” African News Weekly (Charlotte, NC, October 13, 1995), pp. 1 and 7.

²Ibid

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

Theoretically, American law presumes a man innocent until proven guilty. It demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt before taking a man and stringing him by the neck. That is, if he is not a Black man we go by precedent. Truly, as revealed from the O.J. trial, attitudes have not changed since the days when it did not take much to hang any Blackman. In fact, 14-year old Emmert Till was brutally murdered in Mississippi in 1955 for allegedly whistling at a white woman. He was found with one eye missing the other eye dangling from its socket, nose bashed in, one ear missing and a bullet through his head.¹

Yet, all white jury acquitted the culprit, J. W. Milam and Roy Bryant for their brutal murder of Emmet Till. The same jurors later confessed that every single member of the panel believed without a shadow of doubt that the men were guilty.² Pointing to the “Talk of rage at justice” in the O.J. case, the editorial observed that answers were to be sought within the unequal distribution of white-black criminal justice system in America. Seeking to address newer attitudes without understanding the past, it pointed out, was premature.

Where was America when Myrlie Evers had to wait 30 years to get justice for the June 1963 murder of her husband an NAACP activist Medgar Evers? Twice, all-white juries failed to convict Byron de Beck with, a white supremacist who even bragged to an acquaintance about the killing. Beck, which later had the audacity to run for lieutenant governor of Mississippi using the unofficial campaign slogan “Elect Byron de Beckwith- He’s a straight shooter.”³

And the editorial pointed to the Rodney King crisis. As it further noted, “the Rodney King beating as recently as 1991 by Los Angeles police which fate mercifully had recorded on video,” and which was made of an all-white jury, found the culprits innocent: “the evil that the community condones always comes back to haunt it...Prejudice, whether Black or White, hurts both the perpetrators and the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

victims. All America must recognize this snake and kill it before it swallows us all.”¹

Consequently, in associating the O.J. trial to the agonizing climate of blacks under law, one writer argued that African-Americans were unfairly treated by the judicial system. “Driving While Black” (DWB) was depicted as a coded dictum that explained how “many African-American men are singled out by police for stops and searches.”² As this writer observed, “blacks are stopped more frequently than Whites.”³

Even such well known African-American as Christopher Darden, one of the prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson trial, admitted in his book, entitled The Contempt that, the “police stops him about 5 times a year, although he rarely gets tickets” because of being “suspicious of a black man driving a Mercedes.”⁴ This background might explain why, according to one police report, about one-third of black males between the ages of 20 and 29 are either in prison or under supervision, or are under frequent police targets.⁵

Based on our findings, Dr. Madu identified strong disparities in the racial make up of blacks in American prisons, arguing that, “America’s prison...is enough evidence...that the law is not being fairly applied.” Moreover, according to Dr. Madu, “The overwhelming allegations of police high handedness and judicial burgling tend to support solid charges of institutional racism and systematic

¹Ibid.

²Leonard Madu, “The Judicial System is Unfair Toward African-Americans,” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, July 1996), p. 22.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

discrimination against African Americans.”¹ The effects of this development were obvious in the ambivalent attitude of African-Americans toward the system. As Dr. Madu concluded,

There are very few African Americans who have faith in the U.S. judicial system. To the average African-American, fairness in the judicial system means for white people only. For all intents and purposes, the U.S. judicial system has failed African Americans. The confidence level among blacks is at its lowest since the emancipation proclamation and the Rodney King police brutality case and the O.J. Simpson double murder trial have obviously worsened matters.²

The published viewpoint of Dr. Madu found further support in a 2004 report, which stated that, nearly 1 million African-American men were in jail, with more than 2 million under the criminal justice system.³ That about 625,000 African-Americans were in college during a similar period might mean that more able young black men were in jail for crimes sometimes dominated by whites.⁴

Therefore, beyond the earlier emphases raised by Dr. Madu,⁵ there is even the evidence that the percentage of black women in American prisons rose by about 800 percent since 1986, compared to “a 400 percent increase in the number of all women in American prisons.”⁶ Hence the crisis of African-Americans in the criminal justice system is an issue that cuts across all aspects of their current socioeconomic and cultural features. For example, during the 1990s, when one in every seven Americans lived in poverty, African-American figure was almost one in three.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Jesse L. Jackson, “Restitution, Reinvestment,” in America Behind the Color Line, p. 354.

⁴Ibid.

⁵See earlier note, Madu, “The Judicial System is Unfair Toward African-Americans,” The African Herald, p. 22.

⁶Dr. R. Lawton Higgs, Sr., “Word of God,” in America Behind the Color Line, p. 185.

While some 13 percent of white children lived below well-known poverty line, black was 46 percent. Poverty and unemployment, coupled with alienation and despair, “were major factors in an internal hemorrhaging of black America.”¹

Indeed, when the number of black women in jail rose twice as fast as the number of women prisoners from the population as a whole, a third of their male counterparts were either in prison, or on parole, or probation.² This latter emphasis, like the above and much earlier ones, corresponded with the findings in our content analyses of the Nigerian media as well as with the explanation given by Attorney Obi Duruji on the attitude of “Proposition 209.” For, it also explains how the unfair judicial system, along with centuries of related injustices, continues to perpetuate “anti-black sentiment.”³

Further, Duruji argued that, “from colonial days to the Civil War” to post-modern America, the negative attitude of the judicial system has continued to influence the degradation of African-descended Americans. This made it rather unsurprising that California overturned a civil rights position on Affirmative Action at a time when “President Clinton was preaching opportunity for all Americans.”⁴

As further revealed in the content analyses, differentiated socio-cultural experiences of Nigerian immigrants and African-Americans had strong correlation in their expressed public viewpoints on the media. This perhaps makes it much easier to understand why some opinion molders in the Nigerian/African community media

¹Ibid. Also, see Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 260-1.

²Ibid.

³Obi Duruji, “Proposition 209 and Affirmative Action: Whiter America?” The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, January 1997), p. 28

⁴Ibid..

were least surprised that President Clinton's admirable status "as a friend of African Americans" was being reversed during his second term.¹

The uneven distribution of political gains among African-Americans and the corresponding increases in the number of Hispanic/Latino appointments might have been one reason why the loss of "U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown," in the plane crash in Dubrovnik, Croatia, raised some air of suspicion and concern in the Nigerian/African community. The publication by TAH newspaper reflected the general distress of most Africans following the news of the loss of "Ron Brown" in the plane crash.²

For example, as published in news flash via the Reuter Press release, Libya allegedly reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was behind the plane crash that resulted in the loss of "Ron Brown" in April 3, 1996. "News information shows that the U.S. Secretary was the victim of a plot because he was black and because of his well-known opposition to the economic measures which the U.S. administration is taking."³

The unsubstantiated allegation by Libya about the CIA in the loss of Ron Brown confirmed that, Nigerians—like most black immigrants, and certainly African-Americans—shared in the belief that their unequal status in American society has historically been associated with tragic ends for those striving to reach the pinnacle of American dream. The tragic death of "Ron Brown," similar to that of

¹"Black and the Clinton Cabinet Appointment," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, January 1997), p. 4.

²"Libya Suggests CIA May have Killed Ron Brown," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1996), pp. 1 and 27.

³"Libya Suggests CIA May have Killed Ron Brown," The African Herald (Dallas, Texas, May 1996), pp. 1 and 27.

the U.S. Congressman Mickey Leland of Texas in East Africa in 1993 (See Chapter 6), perhaps best explains the high risk surrounding the striving toward black-white equality in America.

Like Ralph Bunche who won the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize on his way to becoming the highest ranking black diplomat in the history of the United States, Brown was a man of great personal achievement in whom African-Americans placed much hope. He was the bridge builder. A problem solver, a mover and a shaker who helped black followers get prominent positions throughout the Clinton administration.¹

Summary

The media coverage of African-Americans supported the major research queries employed in evaluating the Southern interaction of Nigerians and African-Americans, that is: due to their racial background, both the descendants of the forced migration and voluntary migration from Nigeria/sub-Saharan Africa in America would share almost a similar degree of socio-cultural experience.

As found in this chapter, the Southern evidences of the content analyses of the media opinions of Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans revealed the existence of more positive than negative relationships between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration. On the other hand, their understanding and misunderstanding or favorable and unfavorable media attitudes were closely linked to the differences in their socio-cultural/historical circuits, both in Africa and America.

¹Ibid.

Generally, the content analyses of the Nigerian community media revealed that African-Americans and Nigerians/Africans complemented each other's strengths as well as weaknesses. This was particularly evident in the emerging medium of cultural interactions and exchanges—including political rapport, and socioeconomic partnerships—and in ways yielding toward greater understanding than misunderstanding, as well as favorable than unfavorable disposition.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This study was designed to address the consequences of two historic migrations of sub-Saharan Africans to the United States through the forced separation of black Africans during the foreign slave trade and voluntary post-colonial settlers from Nigeria. Throughout the chapters, the research questions along with the assumptions employed in assessing the major themes of this dissertation were closely corroborated. Given the nature of the issues involved in this study, this author browsed across the major ethnographic regions that were active in the Euro-African slave trade and slavery for further understanding of both the earlier as well as the current trend in the discipline. Considering my earlier preparations, the limitation of this approach was inevitable, yet immensely rewarding in understanding the general relationship between the two historic migrations of black sub-Saharan Africans to the U.S.

Retrospectively, of course, the exploratory study which preceded some parts of this dissertation¹ suggested the futility of attempting to examine post-colonial African migration to the U.S. in isolation of the historiography of the forced migration of black Africans. Authur, for example,² provided some hints on some of the current carry-overs of cultural traits via voluntary post-colonial African settlers in America which were helpful in understanding the varieties of their emerging communal characteristics within the mosaic.

¹See Chapter 1 for interpretation of methodology.

²For example, see Authur's Invisible Sojourners.

On the other hand, however, the variant between Authur and Apraku¹ was closely linked to how each attempted to explain the socio-cultural factors operative in varying historical eras. Whereas Apraku attempted to embrace the colonial and post-colonial backgrounds in explaining the crises surrounding emigration of the African skilled class, Authur's approach corroborated the much broader historical context, thus illuminating substantial continuities from Africa to America.² Yet for Apraku—as for Authur—the crucial racial crisis surrounding the black experience via the forced and voluntary post-colonial African migrations was closely linked.³

The preceding, in turn, suggested that post-colonial African build-up would, in the long run, broaden our general knowledge about race matters in America. Assuming this background, some further excursion had to be made into the Old World as well as across the major regions of racial capitalism in the New World to gauge the broader trend. This task was arduous considering the limited resources and resulting worrisome length of this dissertation.

Based on the general examination of the Nigerian Diaspora of Colonialism and Black Diaspora of Enslavement, some observations can now be made under seven rubrics regarding their relationships and context of American world development: (1)) The Historic Relationships between Forced and Voluntary Nigerian-African Migrations to the United States (2) American Slavery and Reactive

¹See, for example, Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, especially “Introduction” and “Chapter 1.”

²Ibid., Authur, especially his emphasis on the role of black African women, pp.; also see Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, especially “Introduction,” chapters 1-2..

³Ibid. For example, see Authur, pp. 3-4; Apraku, pp. 19, 110. For the development of this background in this dissertation, see “Assumption” and “Context of an Existing Problem” in Chapter 1.

Pattern of Global Migration (3) The Nigerian Immigrant Community within the African-American Context (4) The Black Diaspora of Enslavement and Nigeria Diaspora of Colonialism in the Crossroads of American Sojourn (5) The Birth of a Conciliatory Generation: American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants (6) The Nigerian-African Community Media vs. Nigerian Churches; and (7) Direction of Coverage by Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in Nigerian-African Community Media in Southern U.S. Cities.

1. The Historic Relationships between Forced and Voluntary Nigerian-African Migrations to the United States

One of the most interesting results of this study was the relationship between the forced migration and voluntary migration from Africa south of the Sahara to the United States. For example, Nigerians not only had their largest distribution in Southern U.S. but exhibited a similar pattern of socioeconomic and cultural development along African-American lines. Besides, they were also found to be replaying some of the earlier survival patterns of black America. This strongly re-confirms that African-Americans are their pathfinders in the U.S.¹

Based on the above result, one of the best ways in which to delineate the prospects of success among foreign-born people in the U.S. requires a clearer understanding of their varied historical backgrounds. This is especially the case when considering the experiences of immigrants of non-European backgrounds.

Figure 10.1 summarizes the above context. A greater portion of underdeveloped regions of non-European peoples in South America/Caribbean and black Africa were involved in the Atlantic slave trade and other forms of exploitation

¹This is molded in the old Pan-Africanist ideal; see especially Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

through colonization by the major European powers.¹ Going by the implications of the data on Figure 10.1, it is well-known that during and after slavery these regions experienced a corresponding cycle of development and underdevelopment, as well as racial differentiations mostly in the interests of the major European states. Despite the entrenched racial crisis, the pattern of human development in North America was more satisfactory than elsewhere in the Americas, thanks mostly to the colonial vision of sustained independent development of the English-European settlers. A majority of the labor migrants entering the U.S. after slavery and colonization as well as decolonization, were from regions where the negative effects of racial slavery, colonization, conquest, and exploitation were devastating and deep-rooted.

With the preceding emphases, our analyses revealed clearer patterns of post-emancipation immigration from Europe and the Americas into the U.S. followed by Asia, which differed markedly from sub-Saharan Africa.² This corresponded with the attitude of the major European powers toward non-Europeans, especially toward African descent people and regions.³

So, as found in this study, the Nigerian context which served as our major variable for explaining post-colonial African immigration to the U.S., was more directly shaped by the general climate of white-black relations.⁴ Too, our data showed that the crisis of this background, which corresponded with the inherent

¹For example, Winant's *The World is a Ghetto* has some keen insights in illuminating the complex phases of historical changes traceable to chattel slavery, the racialization of color through world colonization and later after decolonization. Especially interesting are his emphases in Chapters One-Five, which mirrored the corresponding relationships of regional and human changes from slavery to decolonization, etc.

²See, for example, Chapters 1 and 3, especially Tables 10.1, 10.2; and Table 32 in Chapter 8.


³We discussed this problem in Chapters 1-2 and 3.

⁴See, for example, earlier notes, especially Chapters 2 to 7.

commonalities and differences between Nigerians and African-Americans, was due more to their more peculiar historical experience. This supported an important premise of the research queries and assumptions employed in this dissertation.¹

Figure 10.1

Map Showing the Major Geographic Regions and Routes/Ports of the Atlantic Slave Trade in Africa, the Americas, and Europe



Source: Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade, The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 16-17.

The preceding emphases, which can perhaps be fully explained in relation to the residual effects of American slavery (Table 10.1) and colonial experience, represented the strongest historical links to the two migrations of sub-Saharan

¹For example, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation for the major assumptions. For conflicting historical context of the black experience, see Winant, The World is a Ghetto, pp. 81-98.

Africans to the U.S. With the black diaspora of enslavement, the exploitation of their labor was closely linked to the development of the early phases of American capitalism. With the Nigerian diaspora, the problem was mostly traceable to colonial dispossession, which in turn corresponded with the undermining of pre-colonial African institutions during and after colonial rule. This background was closely linked to the second largely voluntary historic settlement of Nigerians in the U.S.¹

Within the U.S., therefore, the leap from 399,000 imported slaves to 4,000,000 free citizens in the South alone following the Emancipation Proclamation after the Civil War, marked a turning point in their struggle for equal status.² Since the 1860s, this population has grown steadily through the varying phases of the black struggle to over 36,000 by 2000.³

The peculiar socio-cultural crisis confronting both the descendants of slaves and voluntary post-colonial Nigerian settlers in America can be linked to events beginning in the early 1440s along the West African coastal plains. But in the British mainland North America, this can more specifically be traced to 1619, witnessing its slow and rapid leaps and ultimate transformation between the 1660s and 1840s.⁴ This development marked both the beginning and maturing of a highly differentiated order of race relations on the world scene. Again, back in Nigeria or

¹This background was explained in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation.

²See, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, p. 3; Ira Berlin, et al., *Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. ix-x, 186.

³See Chapters 1 and 2 for earlier emphasis on the population of African-Americans in 2000, as well as distribution of African slaves in mainland North America. Also, see: Low and Cliff, *Encyclopedia of Black America*, p. 685.

⁴*Ibid.*

black Africa, this background stretched from the late 1440s to 1860s and again from 1880s to 1950s.

Not surprisingly, as a specific group, the development of Nigerian immigrants revealed that the status of African settlers in America was being shaped by both the positive and negative historical cycles of the descendants of slaves.¹ Going therefore by the peculiar ethno-regional historiography of the varied peoples of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Nigeria currently in this country, it can be safely concluded that, compared with Europeans and other non-Europeans, the probable socio-cultural experience of the second migration of Africans via the voluntary passage, is almost as peculiar as the first.

Furthermore, our data revealed that the almost irreconcilable socioeconomic and politico-cultural attitudes of the major European states both among themselves and toward non-Europeans—particularly between 1700 and 1800, had ushered in an appalling pattern of reactive relations—markedly dissimilar from those in the era when moral conscience was even less developed. This trend corresponded with the general pattern of human disruption that followed the opening of the modern era via the slave trade, possession of world colonies, and ultimately during decolonization.²

As Winant argues, the most important features of the preceding development were in the relationships between race/cultural determinants and economic exploitation, especially in their patterns of global exchanges with non-European peoples.³ The Winant position is especially important because of its strong rebuttal

¹Ibid.; including Chapters 3-7.

²See earlier note on Winant, The World is a Ghetto.

³Ibid.

to the historical context in which the author of Migrations and Cultures mirrored the relationship between cultural traits and the relative status of development among some immigrant groups within the Western Hemisphere.¹

This means that the crisis of slavery had come to compound a new context of reactive relations of non-European peoples to European world views and values. Besides, it later transformed their inherent cultural differences under the varied hierarchical orders of inequalities outlined by the ideological persuasions of the European conquest and colonization of the world.²

The development of reactive relations thus requires an understanding of the varying responses among the major European states to both their internal as well as external interests with non-European regions via world colonization. The emphasis here is that, from the opening of the modern era to the beginning of the European Cold War, the ideological contour of reactive relations, which walked hand in hand with the expansion-contraction of the world system,³ also corresponded with highly structured patterns of racial differentiations of the Europeans and non-Europeans.

Thus, accordingly, some part of Professor Immanuel Wallerstein's thesis on the expanding-contraction of the world system has its basic tenet in the current patterns of reactive responses to socioeconomic and politico-cultural forces shaping

¹Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, especially, pp. 70-137, 175, 213-233, 332-344, 371-391; Sowell, Race and Culture, especially pp. ix-xiv, 1-60.

²For example, Professor Winant's current views in The World is a Ghetto, especially the first five chapters, along with some emphases in Black Reconstruction and Democracy and Color, including some emphases in Chapters 1-3—were useful in evaluating the links between world colonization and reactive relations.

³For example, see I. Wallerstein, Africa and the Modern World, pp. 68-9, 101; Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. v-xvi [ix and xi]; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Foes as Friends?" Foreign Policy, Number 90 (Spring 1993), pp. 145-146.

the relations between the Northern and Southern poles. It does seem therefore that his emphasis on the transition from “a typical Kondratieff A-phase of expansion of the world-economy” to “a Kondratieff B-phase” are further deflections of reactive imbalances via reactive relations. This is particularly the case where the ultimate dynamic of changes corresponded with the reversal of earlier statuses among the major global powers.¹

Certainly the European dimension of reactive relations was first evident in the attitude of some European states against Portugal and Spain during the early centuries of Atlantic capitalism. Their replacement after more than a century of dominance had serious implications within the European theater of Atlantic capitalism. This development directly transformed the worldwide pattern of reactive relations. From this point, moreover, the internal circumference of European rivalries shifted toward a greater desire among the major winners to secure their international interests.² By the time Britain succeeded in replacing the Dutch and the French, particularly in the Americas and West Africa, a more mature outlines of intra-European reactive relations had developed, which involved non-Europeans under varying hierarchical orders.

Although these new traits of reactive relations were fashioned within a continuum of the Old World and New World strands, their inherent differences and similarities also united as well as separated both the winners and the losers around the world. This development was influenced more by their control over the medium of inter-European or intra-non-European exchanges around the world.

¹Ibid.

²See, for example, Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Undoubtedly, by the time Britain emerged as the greatest power in the new Atlantic system, it could not have been denied that the major regions of European states that participated in world colonization, along with their conquered over non-European regions, were being tied to differing levels of reactive relations: in the military, commercial, and later in industrial matters. Collectively, these reactive relations formed the basis of the exchanges between the new Atlantic capitalism and the varying regions of the Old Worlds that were later to respond to the imperatives of the New World: for example in the United States.¹

It would then be misleading to attempt to explain the pattern of global linkages and exchanges that occurred between varied regions and peoples within the new Atlantic capitalism without noting what type of medium of control each region had across the processes of inter-active and intra-reactive relations.² Again, considering the particular case of non-Europeans, our data revealed that the Atlantic slave trade was the one indelible socioeconomic and politico-cultural feature of an extreme form of intra-reactive stigma that later compounded all other reactive relations. The highest stage of this crisis evolved out of the degradation of black labor during slavery as well as after emancipation. Nearly all the phases of the black struggle in America were found to be closely linked to extreme reactive relations. This was evident in their struggle for equal status. The attitude of this background re-echoed in chain-reactive relations, which shaped and continue to shape other features of inter-American and intra European and non-European reactive unities.

¹Ibid. This would be the obvious conclusion based on some of the outlines we highlighted earlier.

²This term explains cross-cultural relations among groups with differing racial ancestries and regional and international interests they were involved in the new Atlantic capitalism.

Moreover, since then, the status of the most affected racial group in the Atlantic exchange has continued to define the historical contest of post-modernist relations, particularly as found in its more developed outlines in America. This same background continues to define the patterns of reactive relations within the expanding sphere of worldwide capitalism. Winant appears to have given one of the most thorough contemporary expositions of the consequences of this continuing crisis.¹

The above could not have failed to mean much for the Old World background of West Africa and Central Africa, where the Atlantic slave trade had one of the most indelible negative effects. Granted, this perhaps best explains why post-colonial build-up of Nigerian settlers in the U.S. represented one of the most unique phases of largely voluntary post-emancipation global migration.

The Nigerian variable therefore mirrors the bittersweet experience of migrants from one of the most disrupted regions of the world after the Euro-African slave trade and colonial rule. For example, the Ibo, who comprised the largest population of the human cargoes from the Bight of Bonny, also comprised one of the largest bases of post-colonial Nigerian settlers in the U.S. Next were the Yoruba, Ibibio/Efik, Edo, and the Ijo.

Thus, within a specific context of reactive relations, this trend further confirms the strong ethnographic similarities between the generations of forced settlers and voluntary post-colonial settlers. Besides, it probably makes it much

¹Winant, The World is a Ghetto: especially the first five chapters, including the conclusion.

easier to understand the continuing pattern of the conflict of racial capitalism.¹ Yet post-emancipation historiography of foreign-born settlers in the U.S. rarely suggests that African representation constitutes an effective orbit of cultural and economic exchanges.² While the Ibos of Southeastern Nigeria have been credited for possessing effective cultural traits based on Western values, the bulk of Nigerians/Africans with similar talents were often excluded.³

The problem with the Ibo traits might be due to how their cultural traits were defined. First, as we observed in Chapter 5, there was no basis in which to deny the admirable re-adoptive talents of the Ibo of Southeastern Nigeria.⁴ Second, as further supported by analyses, the effectiveness of cultural traits of some migrants was closely linked to how they exploited the hierarchical inequalities that existed side by side with racial indifference. This appalling problem, we also noted, was compounded by the nature of institutional assistances accorded some racial groups over others.⁵ Even for the Ibo, there were the likely problems of continuities, based on the background of racial slavery. Moreover, for the Ibo, as for other West Africans, their overall status as voluntary settlers, however their talents, determines their American world success and related contextual development.⁶ Often this type of crisis is closely linked to how both the dominant racial groups and the more

¹This is supported by the ethnographic features of the generation of sub-Saharans under forced/voluntary migrations to the United States. See Chapters 1-2 and 3 of this dissertation for the general outline on this emphasis.

²See earlier notes on Migrations and Cultures.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 27-8, 228; Race and Culture, pp. 54, 239

⁴This was explained in Chapters 4-6 of this dissertation.

⁵*Ibid.*, especially Chapter 5.

⁶*Ibid.*

fortunate ethnic minorities perceived their aspirations in relations to their less fortunate counterparts.

By all the available criteria, one of the most vulnerable ramparts of the newcomers in America was from West and Central Africa. This development cannot be separated from the earlier attitudes toward the descendants of slaves.¹ Yet, collectively, the black African migrants from these regions were among the most highly educated foreign-born settlers, and perhaps also those more rounded under varying Western European and Euro-American historical affinities.

The above can perhaps be further understood by how the low population of Africans admitted into the U.S. corresponded with the negative effects of slavery and colonialism (Tables 1-2, 10.1-10.2, 32). Until 1960s, the U.S. Bureau of the Census had no clear regional configuration on African immigration.² Nor were some of the later revisions any clearer with regard to officially recorded population from black Africa.³

Recorded population of Africans in the U.S. accounted for a far lower percentage of representation than evident in comparable demographic visibility. This population also varied as recorded by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and as known by African Embassies.⁴ The claim then that Houston alone had about 100,000 Nigerians in 2000 may be extraneous, where the U.S. Bureau of the Census

¹Ibid., especially Chapter 5.

²Ibid. See Chapters 1 and 3, where we discussed the historical context and patterns of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-African immigration to the U.S. Based on our analyses, the explanations associated with this development can be linked to effects of the Atlantic slave trade.

³For example, the fieldwork confirmed that more Africans were in the U.S. than reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. (See Chapter 6).

⁴Ibid. For example, see Chapter 6.

recorded about 134,000 for the entire Nigerian population during the same period. However, the fact that the total population of African immigrants was under 1,000,000 in 2000 raises some concerns, considering their strong build-up during the 1980s and 1990s.¹

One has then to understand the crisis of cultural indifference in America to effectively explain the relationship between African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants. This means that one can expect an intra-pan-Africanist fracture between African-Americans and Nigerians just as evident in inter-continental African fracture between Nigerians and other Africans—across closely related and unrelated lines. This is further sub-divided into Afro-Arab-Asian fracture within the African-American within the African base—all this within a continuum of the expressed hierarchical inequalities shaped mostly by the sociopolitical dynamic of the Atlantic slave trade and under the varying ex-colonial fragments of Europe.² Perhaps scholars in the Bell Curve had most succeeded in capturing the socioeconomic and politico-cultural implications of a much earlier circuit of historical crisis than explanation of its continuing context.³

Beyond the preceding emphasis, however, lies perhaps another understanding of the extent to which colonialism in Nigeria, for example, was of beneficial in both developing and incorporating the region into the modern world. Probably scholars who emphasized that “the imperial system stands out as one of the most powerful

¹Ibid.

²For example, see earlier notes on Winant, The World is a Ghetto, especially pp. 152-175, 289-312.

³Ibid., including Chapters 1-2 and 4, especially Countryman, Americans: A Collision of Histories.

engines of cultural diffusion in the history of Africa ...its credit balance by far outweighs its debit account,”¹ were not wrong in the general conception of the idea. However, if what they viewed as “its credit outweighs its debit”² constituted an enduring human crisis in Nigeria during or in sub-Saharan Africa after colonialism, and later corresponded with the inordinate-subordinate status of post-colonial settlers in America, the thesis may require further explanation. This calls for a more careful explanation of the proclaimed pattern of “cultural diffusion in Africa” within an existing state of unequal global exchanges.

There are therefore some worrisome concerns as well as optimism with regard to post-colonial migration of Nigerians to the U.S. Although this migration was also triggered by the blunders and inexperience of Nigeria’s leaders, it has provided a basic framework for sustained interaction between the diaspora and the homeland. The Nigerian equation is especially significant in that it has led directly to the historic merging within the U.S. of the black diaspora of enslavement with the black diaspora of colonialism.³

We can then return to the control over the medium of intra-active relations and exchanges which we touched earlier in brevity. This is because our data found strong support for an earlier thesis: that is, one of the major facilitators of global development and underdevelopment between 1600s and 1900s, for example, was the corresponding relationship between Atlantic slave trade and European colonization.

¹Philip D. Curtin, “Black Experience of Colonialism and Imperialism,” in Slavery, Colonialism and Racism, ed., Sidney W. Mintz (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1974), p. 26.

²Ibid.

³Ibid. Also, see chapters 4-7 for the emerging socioeconomic and politico-cultural thrust of this alternately circumstantial phase Afro-atlantic relations.

This development, as we also saw earlier, was closely tied to the economic exploitation and cultural degradation of non-Europeans, and later still, to the sizes and medium of worldwide exchanges with the major European powers.

So, in retrospect,¹ one has to take into consideration the kind of mutually beneficial medium of global exchanges that existed between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, as well as with mainland North America during and after slavery. Consequently, there seems to be a need for greater understanding of the medium of exchanges between sub-Saharan Africa and the modern world during and after colonialism. This is particularly the case with due consideration to its current pace of human development.

During and after the foreign slave trade, just like the colonial era, Africans had one of the most constrained lanes of human exchanges despite the earlier involvement in the development of Atlantic capitalism. For example, the small population of African migrants allowed into the U.S. before and after decolonization, compared to the much larger population of Europeans and other non-Europeans, can be seen in the general context of constrained medium of exchanges. The effects of this development were mostly unfavorable.² It seems unlikely that events could have taken such a course without the socio-cultural effects of racial slavery. From the standpoint of the historical experience of Africa south of the Sahara, there appears to be a strong probability that, within a specific context, the second dispersal of

¹For example, this can perhaps be a more adequate intersection in which to re-adapt an earlier response emphasis by Professors Gann and Duignan, The Burden of Empire. See our earlier reference by Curtin, in Slavery, Colonialism and Racism, pp. 26.

²See, for example, Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Also, see Sowell, Migrations and Cultures, pp. 1-49, 113-139, 175, 213-227, 332-344.

Nigerians to the U.S. (1960s-1990s), represents “the most powerful engines of cultural diffusion in the history of Africa.”¹

We can safely argue at this point that there is currently within the U.S., a far stronger basis than ever before for understanding the ultimate unity between historical eras and the patterns of regional as well as of the human development that emerged out of Atlantic capitalism. This is not to disavow of some of the benefits of modern development via the medium of slavery and colonialism. Rather, it is to further explain the extent of an uneven flow of global exchanges into black Africa, particularly since the same period, and collectively of its effects on the current status of the region and peoples.

We conclude, therefore that, with a more favorable historical tide, along with a clearer medium—the future of the U.S.-African relations at the current point is more likely to lead to sustainable exchanges. If this scenario goes well for Nigeria within a specific context, as its current evidences in the U.S.-African equation suggest, it might be surmised that the medium of voluntary post-colonial migration—more than the forced and colonial migrations—has positively influenced the course of human development. This will likely be seen in the foreseeable future as one important attribute of the positive effects of an historical era.

¹See our earlier notes as well as the response by Curtin, Slavery, Colonialism and Race to the emphasis in the Burden of Empire by Gann and Duignan.

2. American Slavery and Reactive Pattern of Global Migration

The bulk of the preceding emphases then meant that the socio-cultural crises of reactive relations in the modern world were more closely linked to chattel slavery. Thus, chattel slavery and international labor migration are to be seen as two closely related phenomena. This is because, with racial slavery came a more structured historical cycle of reactive relations. Indeed during and after emancipation of the slaves, this background expressed, and still continues to express its dynamic in relation to the character of international labor migration into the U.S.

Surprisingly, however, only but a few contemporary works have shown much interest in exploring the relationship between the Atlantic slave trade and international labor movements. Among the much earlier ones were Du Bois's Black Reconstruction and Williams' Capitalism and Slavery, for example, which explained the background leading to the degradation of the black and white laborers, as well as of the flow of the new waves of labor migrants following the emancipation of former slaves.¹

Probably one of the most contemporary works on the complexity of the cultural forces unleashed by racial slavery and world colonization in the Americas and later still, by decolonization—came to the fore with The World is a Ghetto.² Much of the recurrent waves of international labor migration into North America therefore had its clearest take-off during the opening of the Atlantic capitalism. This development, later closely supported by racial slavery, also influenced the flow of Europeans and non-

¹For example, see earlier notes on Du Bois's Black Reconstruction; and Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 28-9; and Winant's The World is a Ghetto, pp. 19-30, 152-6.

²Ibid.; Winant.

Europeans into the U.S. both before and after the Emancipation Proclamation.¹ Winant—like Du Bois and Williams—argues that the explosive relationships between racial slavery and colonization. Winant in fact goes farther, arguing that, the unequal status of non-Europeans as well as of their dispersal to the metropolises of their former masters after decolonization corresponded with the disruptions resulting from exploitation and conquest.²

Sowell, on the other hand, offers some useful insights into the economic and cultural capitals involving Europeans and non-Europeans, which corresponded with the positive attributes of labor migration to the Western Hemisphere. However, he did not go as far as Winant later did in exploring the complexities of the inter-related sociopolitical forces shaping the unequal relationships between Europeans and non-Europeans, as important links to the reversed flow of human dispersal.³

Yet, the socioeconomic and politico-cultural ironies implicit in a greater part of the Sowell conclusions—particularly in the negative attitudes of Europeans to non-Europeans—corresponded with most of the emphases expanded by Winant. Probably the problem in the Sowell position lies in the attempt to merge varying distinctive eras of reactive relations as well as of intra-cultural differences, as if they were all driven by a similar dynamic of migratory exchanges around the world.⁴

As we pointed out earlier, on the other hand, it would have been difficult not to see the medium of international labor migration of Europeans and non-Europeans

¹Ibid.

²Ibid; see earlier notes on Du Bois and Williams.

³Ibid., Winant; Sowell, Migrations and Cultures; and Race and Culture, pp. 204-225.

⁴Ibid. For example, it is quite likely that the major phases of economic and cultural exchanges from 1500s to 1900s around the world via migration were not all similar.

into the U.S. as a major channel of world exchanges in the immediate decades following the emancipation of slaves.¹ And, it would be difficult to ignore the fact that this same medium of entry peaked up again even after decolonization, especially during and after the Cold War. Collectively these waves of international labor exchanges were driven by what we term here as reactive migration.²

The preceding meant that there were corresponding reactive relations to the new order of international exchanges into the U.S., which resulted from the dominant role of the Europeans over non-Europeans around the world. Based on analyses, it is conceivable that Professor Weiner's delineation of "five distinctive waves" of international migration in the modern era³ belongs more to the socioeconomic and politico-cultural gravitation of patterns of reactive migration. The intersection marking the demise of racial capitalism seems to have been more closely linked to the accumulated transformation of this potential development.

Surprisingly, however, Professor Weiner only refers to the historical cycle of the Atlantic slave trade around "the second wave."⁴ Yet, with the opening of the modern era, the general pattern of global migration into mainland North America was linked to nearly all the major waves of international labor migration, as well as to the major landscapes of racial capitalism. The American patterns of these

¹Ibid. Also, see, for example, Chapter 3 of this dissertation, including Tables 10.1-10.2 and the U.S. Bureau of the Census on European and non-European foreign-born immigration, especially from 1800s-1950s.

²Ibid. For example, in the case of the U.S., most reactive patterns of international migrations came from other parts of the Americas, Asia and Africa. Most of them, particularly from emancipation of former slaves to decolonization, can be traced to the historical cycles of the Atlantic slave trade and the effects of colonization and later still—of decolonization. See Winant, The World is a Ghetto, pp. 151-8.

³Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis, p. 21.

⁴Ibid.

evidences were very strong, just as were those of human movements from Europe into other parts of the Americas.¹ Elsewhere, it does seem that what historian Kennedy saw more in terms of the socioeconomic and cultural implications of an expanding worldwide population movements² were at best events rooted in reactive responses to historical forces.³

Kennedy's earlier emphases in the Rise and Fall of the Great Power may even have been more useful for understanding some of the backgrounds that shaped the socio-political forces that Winant later explored. Similarly, they could help in re-thinking some of the trends that Kennedy later positioned on reversed patterns of global migration in his Preparing for the Twenty-First Century.⁴ Of far greater significance, however, is that both the Weiner and Kennedy observations corroborated the period marking the most visible shift of labor migration after decolonization from "technologically advanced societies to less advanced societies."⁵

If the above is correct, then, our understanding of what Weiner terms "the fifth Wave" of international migration requires a closer examination largely because of its close links to decolonization. For, as Weiner argues, the "fifth wave of international migration.... emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to the rising demand for imported labor in Western Europe, the United States, and the oil-

¹Ibid. 121-25. See earlier notes on Sowell, Migrations and Cultures. Also see, the demography of the forced and voluntary migrations of Europeans and non-Europeans in Chapters 2-3.

²Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 29-46.

³Ibid.; also, earlier notes by Winant.

⁴Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Power: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), especially "Introduction," and the first seven chapters; Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, especially, pp.42-3; Weiner in The Global Migration Crisis, especially pp. 21-24

⁵Ibid.

producing countries of the Middle East.”¹ Kennedy, almost similarly, concurs that: “contemporary migrations chiefly move from less developed societies toward Europe, North America, and Australia.”²

Admittedly, the “fifth wave” of international migration coincided with the period marking the beginning of the “reversed” pattern of international migration.³ Additionally, it corresponded with an era consistent with the increased flow of foreign labor movements into the U.S. The “fifth Wave,” therefore, formed the crucible of a succession of other related migratory build-up of international labor exchanges into the U.S., which was particularly stronger from the 1970s to the 1980s.

It is important to note at this point the more distinctive pattern of reactive migration from Africa and Asia (Table 32). Why the supposed benefits of decolonization occurred almost simultaneously at the intersection of the “fifth wave,” and with such extensive waves of reactive chain migrations, require a clearer explanation than the emphasis often associated with the economic benefits of advanced industrialized societies.⁴ For, decolonization was supposed to result in a somewhat more pliable context of human development and cohesion particularly in Africa and Asia.

So, the particular intersection in which the “fifth wave” of international migration occurred may not be explained solely on the basis of North-South socioeconomic variant: that is, answers may have to be sought beyond the benefits of

¹Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis, p. 24.

²Ibid. Also, see Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, p. 42.

³Ibid.; Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis, p. 24.

⁴Ibid.

advanced industrialized societies. Nor does this reasoning mean that the advanced status of industrialized societies was not closely associated with international labor migration into the U.S. The emphasis is that one should not rule out other factors.

First, within the context of this study, however, it is our view that the strongest feature of this reactive pattern of international labor migration occurred between the 1960s and 1980s, and relatedly during the 1990s. Second, most of these waves—especially those associated with non-Europeans—were the result of unequal development between the major European states and their ex-colonized subjects/regions (Figures 10.1).¹


Figure 10.2 summarizes the uneven status of the relationships between underdeveloped and developed regions in the immediate decades after decolonization. These regions embraced the bulk of the regions involved in the brink of the Cold War contest, especially between the 1960s a 1980s. During this period, the major regions of the underdeveloped worlds were in the Latin Americas, Asia, and Africa. From these zones originated a majority of the black, yellow, and brown labor migrants to the U.S.

Figure 10.2 can then explain some patterns of uneven reactive exchanges around the world which later merged with the Cold War. Also, it can explain those occurring between the more developed and less developed regions of the world, as well as among historically exploited regions during and after the slave trade and colonial imperialism (Figure 10.1).

¹Winant, The World is a Ghetto, pp. 140-158.

Figure 10.2

Map of the World Showing the Major Geographic Zones of the Developed and Less Developed Nations before and after the 1980s



What Winant terms “the “racial dimension of post-coloniality”¹ can then be seen in the context of the unequal relationships arising out of the Southern and Northern contest of post-Second World War status of reactive global differences and inequalities. Winant writes that, in the aftermath of the Second World War and during the decade-long Cold War came some changes which represented the releasing of accumulated global “sociopolitical forces.”² Accordingly, it was the unchecked dimension of this development which transcended the old world racial system into “the metropolises, colonies, and ex-colonies alike.”³ This same background provided the basis for what Richard Abrams later termed as the new

¹Winant, *The World is a Ghetto*, p. 141.

²Ibid., pp. 133-7, 141.

³Ibid.

order of “liberal internationalism,” which shaped American policies toward the Middle East, the Far East, Europe, and Africa.¹ Similarly, it further shaped the leap in the flow of reactive migration into the U.S.

At this juncture, however, it cannot be denied that the “fifth wave” of international migration,” or its links to the “reversed” pattern of international labor migration—from the less developed to the more developed countries—was nothing more than a corresponding transformation of reactive migration.² The Middle East and Australian ramparts of these migratory waves can be seen in the context of macro-micro patterns of reactive responses to the North-South imbalances within the world system.

Table 32 is directly supportive of the transformation of the reactive waves of international labor migration to the U.S.: that is, between 1960s and 1990s. During the bulk of the period, the pattern of international migration corresponded with the underlying foreign policy questions of the U.S. These were the strategic foundations of most post-Second World migrations, particularly of non-Europeans.³

Significantly, however, some waves of reactive migrations during this same period (Table 32) were tied to the unequal margins between the North and South poles. These were especially the case in the economic spheres, which were tied to educational and technological inequalities between the underdeveloped and developing, as well as developed regions.

¹See earlier notes especially on Kennedy; and Abrams, America Transformed, pp. 320-1.

²For example, see the explanations in Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, p. 632; Du Bois, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace, especially chapters 1-3; Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 38-46 [42]; Winant, The World is a Ghetto.

³Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis, pp. 31-2, 126-130.

Table 32

Foreign-born Immigration to the United States, by Region,
by Population, by Decade, 1960-2000

Year	Europe	Asia	Africa	Oceania	Latin America	Caribbean	North America
2000	133,362	255,860	40,969	5,962	118,100	85,875	397,201
1990	4,350,403	4,979,037	363,819	104,145	8,407,837	532,497	753,917
1980	5,149,572	2,539,777	199,723	77,577	4,372,487	872,051	853,427
1970	5,740,891	824,887	80,143	41,258	1,803,970	741,126	812,421
1960	7,256,311	490,996	35,355	34,730	908,309	470,213	952,5000

Source: The U.S Census Bureau, 1960-2000

Further significant has been the fact that, from the opening of Atlantic capitalism to decolonization and thereafter, most reactive migrations into the U.S. have corresponded with the general after-effects accompanying European rivalries and displacements of peoples from a dominant role either through conquest or colonization, or through foreign policy related considerations. Others were closely linked the old as well as emerging new alliances based on ancestral relationships and ancient rivalries, or the undue influences of the major powers on the global scene.

Thus, to a great extent, some of the socioeconomic features of the pull and push thesis of international migration—especially after decolonization—have a lot in common with the flow of reactive migration around the world. The European flow of this pattern of migration into the U.S. may have come mostly from those unstable regions whose relationships with the more established industrialized regions were/are less secure. Perhaps these are also mostly regions that were neither the big winners in the era of world colonization nor highly established with modern facilities catering for all their struggling peoples.

Table 32 is equally suggestive of some subsequent changes in the pattern of reactive migration of European into the U.S. The data show that migratory

exchanges were high and steady during the heights of the European Cold War, although not as extensive as in the earlier eras (Tables 10.1-10.2). Given the expectation of decolonization, Table 32 confirms nearly an all round pattern of reactive migrations from non-Europeans regions—Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa into the U.S. These, as we saw earlier, were determined by the effects of racial slavery and the corresponding attitudes of the host country.¹

Collectively, Table 32, Figures 10.1 and 10.2 are supportive of the links between underdevelopment and reactive migrations. After decolonization, these uneven relationships between the underdevelopment of mostly non-European races and the development of Europeans—as mirrored via labor exchanges—intersected with the “fifth wave” of international migration.

Granted, this particular phase of world migration represented the transformation of “a new industrial slavery of black and brown and yellow in Africa and Asia.”² For, both its offshoot as well as its demise lies in the effects of the Atlantic slave trade.³

Without the Atlantic slave trade and the possession of world colonies, it seems probable that the “fifth wave” of international migration⁴ would not have comprised such an extensive dispersal of non-Europeans to the U.S. In other words, whether we separated or included other waves of regional migrations into the U.S. during this particular period, those from Africa and Asia would still have marked the

¹This background was explained in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

²See, for example, Black Reconstruction, pp. 3, 15-16, 55-67, 632-4; Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 28-9.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis, p. 24.

most peculiar links toward the forewarned “problem of the color line in the twentieth century.”¹

If, therefore, Professor Weiner is correct in his periodization, it would then mean that the “fifth wave” of international migration represented the most visible intersection of cross-cultural transformation in the “relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”² So, what Winant later views as, “in nascent anticolonialism, pan-Africanism, and diasporic consciousness, lay the problem of the 20th century, the problem of color line,”³ was molded mostly by reactive waves of global migration from non-European regions into the U.S.

We argue at this point that the “fifth Wave” of international labor migration represented the most identifiable contour of “the problem of color line in the twentieth century.” This phenomenon unfolded as a response to the existing global inequalities between the Southern and Northern poles. This revolt by the ex-colonial subjects after decolonization occurred almost as forewarned: “If this situation is not frankly faced and steps toward remedy are not attempted, we shall seek in vain to find peace and security; we shall leave the door wide open for renewed international strive to secure colonies, and eventually and inevitably for colonial revolt.”⁴

The above observation by Du Bois seems to have been like a two edged sword: first, it forewarned of the implicit effects of sustained European exploitation

¹W. E. B. Dubois, The Souls of the Black Folk: Essays and Sketches (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), p. 23.

²Ibid.; also, see Winant, The World is a Ghetto, pp. 81-106, about fifty years later.

³Winant, The World is a Ghetto, p. 82.

⁴Du Bois, Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace, p. 12.

of the colored proletariat under colonialism, especially before and after World War II. Second, it forewarned of an inevitable revolt in a world of unequal distribution of the bounties of the earth resources. Collectively, both the former and latter emphases anticipated the revolt of the ex-colonial subjects against their former colonial masters before and after the post-world war era and decolonization. These emphases had their historic origins in the historical responses by the descendants of slaves in the Americas, in which the U.S. evidence remains the strongest.

Admittedly, within the U.S. this revolt was first embedded in the aspiration of the descendants of slaves against unsolicited labor degradation: the resolution formed the basis of the American Civil War and ultimately of their freedom. Since that time, the inherent dynamic of the descendants of slaves has corresponded with the hierarchic inequalities influencing voluntary exchanges through international labor migration both of the European and non-European peoples into the U.S. as well as other parts of the Americas, especially North America.¹

3. The Nigerian Immigrant Community **Within the African-American Context**

Accordingly, as we hinted earlier, both the above emphases as well as the socio-cultural context of the black experience, suggested a need for caution in explaining post-colonial African immigration to the U.S. This, as also noted earlier, was due mostly to the historical ties that black America had and still has with black Africa, as well as with some of its influences on post-colonial African immigration.² Thus, based on the data examined, the black African immigration to the U.S.,

¹Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, pp. 9-21. See earlier notes on Sowell, Migrations and Cultures; and Winant, The World is a Ghetto.

²See, for example, Chapter 3, especially Tables 10.1 and 10.2, 12, and 13.2 for explanations.

especially during the 1970s and 1980s, marked the first clearly identifiable historic build-up in America. Thus, although the Nigerian variable exemplified the uniqueness of a specific context of post-colonial African immigration, the general trend during a similar period was somewhat like the pattern of Asians (Table 32).

However, a case can be made for the pattern of Nigerian or the black African migration than that of Asian: that is, for the former, their contextual visibility in America was foregrounded between the 1970s and 1980s. For Asians, on the other hand, the small population of labor migrants, which began during the early decades of the 1800s, increased steadily from the mid-1850s to the Second World War, and again to decolonization and thereafter. From decolonization to the 1980s, the flow of Asians to America compared to Africa was much larger (Tables 10.1, 10.2, 12, 13, and 32).

Prior to the 1950s, the black African migrants comprised one of the smallest proportions of both labor and students' sojourners entering America from the major regions of the world. Similarly, prior to the 1960s, on the general plain of international migration, they comprised a very narrow proportion of American migrants.¹

Whether for Nigerian immigration, as a specific country, or the entire black African immigration within a larger context—post-colonial immigration to America, especially during the 1970s—was somewhat concomitant of the gains of black American civil rights struggles of the 1960s.² Again, it is worth noting here that,

¹This background is explained in chapter 3.

²Ueda, *Postwar Immigrant America*, pp. 44-5. Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 88-91, 115-119, 156-164, 260-273.

prior to the 1960s, the black African build-up in America did not have any viable demographic base. Based on our data analyses, even the extent to which the provisions resulting from the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law had benefited African immigration requires cautious evaluation.¹

For example, in the first place, the medium of African immigration to the U.S. after the passage of the 1965 immigration law continued to be constrained. Compared to the population entering from other regions, African immigration had one of the smallest population bases. In the second place, the result of the new law favored the extraction of highly skilled class of African immigrants. This meant that the gains were more likely to be asymmetrical.² Third, and perhaps the most important, the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, which amended the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, ought to be measured against the pre-1960s crisis of black America as well as the general pattern of African immigration to the U.S. Unlike Asians, as we pointed out earlier, Africans were more likely to have constrained demographic slots within the mosaic for exploiting the benefits of the new immigration law.³

Despite the above, however, the changes in American foreign policy toward Africa during the late 1970s, along with the successive amendments of the U.S. immigration law, proved somewhat helpful to the subsequent patterns of African immigration. Therefore, it is quite probable that the real gains of the 1965 U.S. immigration law for Africans were felt around the late 1970s. Neither should the links between the historic appointment of Andrew Young—as the first African-

¹Hawk, "Africans and the 1965 U.S. Immigration Law," pp. 88-91, 115-119, 156-164, 260-273.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

American U.N Ambassador to the U.S. and the visit by President Jimmy Carter to Nigeria—be separated from this new cycle of Nigerian-American exchanges. This, along with new patterns of immigration, marked the beginning of a different cycle of Nigerian/African-U.S. relations since the demise of chattel slavery and colonial rule.¹

The Carter mandate, seeking to establish a more respectable bridge between America and African countries, also corresponded with favorable black African immigration to the U.S.² Further, besides the above and latter emphasis, the Carter mandate toward Africa went beyond that of the Kennedy administration, which was noted mostly through the peace corps program.³

Significantly, during the 1970s, the demographic composition of Nigerian immigrants in the U.S. was dominated by students; they were mostly males, including a few females. Collectively, they formed the nucleus of the Nigerian immigrant community. This community had its strongest visibility in areas with dense population and presence of African-American institutions.⁴

Considered side by side within a specific context,⁵ post-colonial Nigerian immigration to the U.S.—especially the 1970s and the 1980s waves—represented the most distinctive largely voluntary concentration of Nigerian settlers since the demise of slavery and colonialism. Due to the effects of racial slavery and colonial dispossession, which affected the medium of African immigration into the U.S., the

¹Roberts, *Afro-Arab Fraternity: The Roots of Terramedia*, pp. 100-1.

²Udofia, *Trotter Review*, p. 32.

³Oliver and Atmore, *Africa Since 1800*, p. 304.

⁴This is based on analyses of demographic evidences in Chapters 2 and 3.

⁵See Chapters 1 to 3 of this dissertation.

general pattern of the black African immigration during this same period represented the most distinctive waves of world migration.

Correspondingly, therefore, the development of a Nigerian immigrant community might have been slower but for the policies of two American presidencies toward black America and black Africa: Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Their policies were either favorable or unfavorable toward black America and black Africa based on how they impacted on African-Americans and hence African settlers in America. This, to a great extent, depended on the degree to which the Carter and Reagan mandates had sought to influence the internal and international changes within the American nation.¹

Not surprisingly, therefore, from the late 1970s to early 1980s, the Carter policies made it somewhat much easier for Nigerians to converge on the American shores. Some of the changes in the Reagan era, on the other hand, hastened the pace in which they were confronted with crises, resulting in their search for alternate means of contextual adjustment into the American mosaic.²

The Reagan policies which affected black America in turn explained the status of all African immigrants, and formed the core of the systemic unfolding of the communal dynamic of Nigerians as the largest African group.³ The Reagan era, moreover, notorious for weakening the black base and encouraging open bigotry, also released new initiatives among African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants. One of these was evident in the gains made by blacks through active participation in

¹For example, see the explanation of this trend in chapters 4-6.

²Ibid.

³Apraku, *African Émigrés in the United States*, p. 110; and *Trotter Review*, p. 32

voter's registration and grassroots mobilization of varying electorates within the democratic process.¹

For Nigerians, on the other hand, nearly all their strengths and weaknesses were transformed either positively or negatively at the intersection between the entry and departure of President Carter and President Reagan. The experiences of the Reagan era—along with the negative effects of his deregulation policies on the international monetary system—compelled most Nigerians both in America and back in the homeland to begin seeking other means of securing their foothold. Similarly, some of the policies of the Reagan era, along with those of his successor President Bush, which affected the status of black America and black Africa, also corresponded with increases in the number of Nigerians and African-Americans involved in deviant activities.²

Elsewhere, however, as Nigerians adjusted into the American mosaic, they successfully developed the imperatives for collective identification, as evident, for example, by their five leadership models. While all the five leadership models are important, their women-type leadership and representative-professional-type leadership appear at this point to be the strongest in welding the divisive historical set-up of ethnic Nigeria in America and, to a certain extent, back in the homeland.

If, as we pointed out earlier, there is a strong likelihood that the Nigerian women leadership exercised greater influences over the other branches of the

¹Ibid. Also see Janet-Dewart, State of Black America 1990 (National Urban League, 1990), pp. 2-4, 25-52, 159; Rod Bush, ed., The New Black Vote: Politics and Power in Four American Cities (San Francisco Synthesis Publication, 1984), pp. 1-11; Black Power in Chicago: A Documentary Survey of the 1983 Mayoral Democratic Primary, Vol. 1 (Chicago: People's College Press, 1983), pp. 1-6.

²For example, see some of the emphases on the Reagan era in Chapters 4 and 6.

Nigerian immigrant leadership, this is perhaps due in part to its role and some inherent attribute. First, it has a most natural inter-cultural closeness as the mentor to the Nigerian offspring. Second, its inherent feminine attribute has accorded to this branch of Nigerian leadership a distinctiveness that allows for success compared to its male-counterparts.¹ Some of the effectiveness of the Nigerian women leadership is due more to the fact that its functionaries are often gender specific.

Due to the strong racial resilience of American civilization, the Nigerian immigrant communities examined in this study were found to be more effective within the African-American context. Despite some differences in generational and historical cycles, both the crisis of American slavery as well as colonial dispossession corresponded with the differentiated socio-cultural experiences that continue to affect the relations between the two related groups.²

Also, the general distribution of the Nigerian ancestry group populations was found to be strongest in the Southern U.S., and again within the African-American context.³ Yet, in the South or elsewhere in the U.S., Nigerians tended to have a detached pattern of residential/neighborhood bonding with African-Americans. This detached residential/neighborhood pattern of Nigerian immigrants toward African-Americans was found to be influenced by the socio-cultural crisis of the black

¹For example, Author's Invisible Sojourners, pp. 110-124, does not quite accord to the African male immigrants the same degree of extended role accorded their females in the particular development of their American-born offspring. Nonetheless, his general conception of the point referenced here seems good enough for understanding the agency of the African women in the development of their American offspring. My research, however, leans with some skepticism toward some of the conclusions reached by Author.

²This is based on general examination of the related data in this dissertation. See, for instance the major emphases on this issue in Chapters 1-7.

³For example, see notes on Allen and Turner, We The People: An Atlas of America's Ethnic Diversity, especially "Introduction," pp. 143-150.

experience in America.¹ These then are the social effects of American apartheid which alluded to earlier in this dissertation.²

For, arguably, the fact that successful middle-class Nigerians—like African-Americans—often chose to live outside predominantly black neighborhoods might suggest that the general flight from the black neighborhood was rooted in their socio-cultural experience in America. Therefore, situations where Nigerians chose to live in predominantly white neighborhood can be a very misleading basis for claiming that a majority of them had sustained intra-cultural collaboration with mainstream Americans, or with their related agencies. Some aspect of this attitude can be traced to the inherent crisis of individualism in American cultures.³ Nonetheless, in the particular circumstances of Nigerian/Africa immigrants, this development appears to be closely linked to the socio-cultural problem of incorporating African descent indices into American society.⁴

An educated guess can then be made that, in a situation where Nigerian immigrants are among the newest of the newcomers within the mosaic, they not only confront crises that affect their collective unity but also one corresponding with expressed inter-racial distancing from African-Americans.⁵ This again seems to confirm the negative effects of the varying degrees of intra-racial/socio-cultural tensions associated with racism and discrimination in America impinging on African decent people.

¹For example, see our major conclusions in Chapters 4-7 of this dissertation.

²For example, see earlier reference to Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, in Chapter 6.

³See earlier notes in Chapter 4 on Bellah et al. on "Individualism in American Cultures."

⁴This conclusion is supported by findings especially in Chapters 5-6 of this dissertation.

⁵This reference was supported by the general evidence in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Nigerians therefore comprised one of the most inassimilable bases of America's immigrants. Beyond this, furthermore, our analyses revealed that the rigid tenacity of the unfriendly allies, which affected sustained partnerships of Nigerians with African-Americans, also corresponded with their general pattern of contextual instability.¹ Ultimately the preceding trend was found to correspond with why Nigerian immigrants exhibited a selective pattern of neighborhood incorporation in America. Similarly, it explains why most of them considered themselves as "foreigner," and why their high levels of education were mostly geared toward economic survival than necessarily the case with integration or assimilation.²

Unsurprisingly, our data analyses did not find very favorable support for sustained inter-American incorporation of Nigerian or black African indices.³ Even the more established professional classes were often susceptible to deep-seated socio-cultural crisis on the basis of their accent, which further reinforced the racial indifference toward them, as well as set them apart as a group.

So, as found in this study, what constituted Nigerians' visibility within the African-American context was far stronger in such Southern cities as Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston. Within this context, Houston, in Texas, had one of the strongest evidences of a Nigerian immigrant community currently in the diaspora.

¹Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32.

²This is discussed in perhaps greater details in Chapter 6. Also, see Authur, Invisible Sojourners, pp. 3-4.

³Gordon, Nigeria's Diverse Peoples, p. 237.

4. The Black Diaspora of Enslavement and the Nigerian Diaspora of Colonialism in the Crossroads of American Sojourn

What then were the benefits resulting from the forced and voluntary migrations of sub-Saharan Africans to the U.S.? Based on the data examined in this dissertation (Chapters 1 to 7), we approached this issue by looking at both the general and specific contexts of African-Americans and Nigerian immigrants.¹ For example, going by the Nigerian variable, this approach revealed that its comparable edge with African-American from 1960s onward was least likely to support an all round understanding of varying historical eras. With this revelation, it was found that it might be more rewarding to focus more on the Nigerian physicians albeit with some occasional forays into other related sectors of the Nigerian settlers.

If, therefore, some of the benefits derived from the forced and voluntary migrations by African-Americans and Nigerians were taken from the 1960s to 1990s, the conclusion would very likely be that they had not done too badly in their current status of American sojourn. At the same time, however, the Nigerian variable would have called for greater substantiation since the likely gains made in the U.S. were almost simultaneous with the end of foreign rule back in the homeland. This would then have meant that the end of foreign rule in Nigeria had perhaps no positive effects on the internal cohesion of its highly trained and skilled classes of personnel. Hence, given the undeniable crisis of institutional instability after alien rule in Nigeria, along with the corresponding political and economic crisis, the simultaneous emigration of its skilled class to the U.S. could even be seen as having facilitated

¹The underlying assumption of this dissertation was that shared experiences of “racial otherness” would correspond with relationship between the descendants of slaves and voluntary migration from Nigeria in America. For further elaboration, see Chapter 1.

some prospects of human development. That is, as documented in this dissertation, in the case of Nigerian physicians, the alternate result is rather positive.

Also, as shown earlier in the case of black America, despite continuing problems, some tremendous gains have been made since it broke the chains of racial slavery. Indeed, its racial indices are currently being represented in nearly all the crucial features of American world development. This fact is particularly undeniable in considering black features in such areas as popular cultures, academia, corporate American leadership, politics, military leadership, and in the sciences.¹

Like their African-American kin—some sectors of Nigerian settlers in America are beginning to achieve some necessary strengths within the capitalist economy. With their current access to modern technology and ideas of collaborative exchanges as well as philanthropic missions, the future of post-colonial settlers points toward the possibility of sustainable development of their homeland from the American shores.² The ANPA efforts to integrate the Nigerian homeland and the rest of Africa into an industrial age from the diaspora are clearly supportive of some gains.³

Other gains by Nigerians in America are to be seen across the American landscape in their emerging independent entrepreneurships, legal professionals, accountants, sport stars, engineering profession, academia, auto dealerships, computer software, cultural institutions, and healthcare businesses. By all the available criteria, their overall numerical potentialities represent the most

¹Based on the literature review, see chapter 1 of this dissertation.

²Ibid., especially chapter 4, which examines and discusses the role of Nigerian physicians in America.

³For example, see ANPA literature in Chapter 4.

concentrated representation of any sector of the black African diaspora of colonialism. This then is the central fact of the emigration which resulted from the disruptions of post-colonial institutions back in the Nigerian homeland.¹ On the other hand, however, the effects of American slavery and colonialism have continued to threaten the gains made by African-Americans and Nigerian settlers.

First, it is probable that without slavery and its corresponding relationship with colonialism, the context of the socio-cultural crisis that affect black Americans and Nigerians in American society would either have been much different in character or less visible in its structural tenacity. Second, as found in this study, the enduring effect of slavery and colonialism is the most common predictor of socioeconomic and politico-cultural crisis for African-Americans and Nigerians in the U.S. This is the most serious indictment of their American sojourn.² This background, along with the continuing racial indifference, further confirms why, despite some economic gains—African-Americans and Nigerians are the least assimilable enclaves of ethnic America.

The race crisis that confronts African-Americans in their country of birth mirrors how most Nigerians can interact with them and among themselves within the mosaic. It explains as well why Nigerians—like their kin—are increasingly becoming attached to their indigenous institutions for socioeconomic and cultural uplift, and longer-term security. Similarly, it explains why they are likely to employ the egalitarian principles of the republic to advance their interests without necessarily

¹See, for example, chapters 1 and 3.

²Also, see, for example, Chapters 2, 3, 5-7.

compromising their cultural foundations.¹ This feature is not exceptional to the black experience in the U.S.: the struggle of multiculturalism is also an effort to strengthen and retain some cultural identities within existing differences.

For African-Americans and Nigerians, however, the preceding trend appears to be more peculiar. The extent, then, to which the descendants of forced migration and voluntary Nigerian migration benefited from the crossroads of American sojourn, is lopsided. There are still strong evidences of human and institutional crisis in black Africa and black America that are traceable to the negative effects of these two historic migrations. Beyond this, there are still no ways of ascertaining what type of human developments might have taken place in black Africa and black America had not the negative effects of slavery and colonial dispossession been so rigidly sustained after emancipation and end of colonial rule. As found in this study, the effects of slavery and colonialism were closely associated with the sometimes tenuous relationships between African-Americans and Nigerians, all of which corresponded with their current status of lopsided development.²

Thus, there are evidences that the resultant benefits of the two historic migrations of Africans to the U.S. are lacking in terms of relative balance within

¹This conclusion is based on an examination of the demography of forced migrants and voluntary Nigerian migrants in the U.S. We have emphasized aspects of this trend in Chapters 1, 2, and 4-7 of this dissertation.

²Also, for political and institutional retardation of Africa south of the Sahara, see Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, pp. 211-219. For the demographic crisis of European expansion and effects of slavery, see, for example, Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), especially Chapter IV; Manning Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America (Boston: South End Press, 1983), especially the "Introduction;" Inikori, "The Slave trade and the Atlantic economies," pp. 76-80; Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 3-69; Blackburn, The New World Slavery, p. 4.

their human and regional context. This is due largely to the inordinate-subordinate status that the descendants of these two migrations occupy within the crossroads of American sojourn. As suggested by the data analyses, the extent to which capitalism underdeveloped black America is closely linked to the underdevelopment of sub-Saharan Africa as well as to the lopsided development of Nigerians through post-colonial migration.¹ This further confirms the relationship between the attitude of historical eras on the pattern of human development and underdevelopment.

The Nigerian context in America, in particular, can further be explained. Given the current state of poor healthcare services back in the Nigerian homeland, the loss of its skilled class of medical scientists at a time they were needed in the homeland was found to be a serious crisis. These populations were mostly males just as during the forced migration.² Back in Nigeria, solving even the most common medical problem would still have required its best trained physicians currently practicing within or outside the medical fields in the U.S. Despite efforts to use their official status in the diaspora to uplift the poor healthcare system in the homeland, and despite the prospect of continuing future gains in their American expertise, they still represent a missing link in the overall human development of Nigeria/Africa.³

¹Ibid. Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 3-9; and Chapters 1, 3-7.

²This is based on the ANPA profiles from 1994 to 2000. For the record of black Africa's loss of males, see, for example, Segal, The Black Diaspora, pp. 4-5; Inikori, "The slave trade and the Atlantic economies, 1451-1870," pp. 67-80. The same pattern of male loss was characteristic of post-colonial African immigration to the U.S. (Levinson and Ember, American Immigrant Cultures, p. 950).

³Apraku, African Émigrés in the United States, pp. 19, 110. Also, see earlier notes on ANPA missions to Nigeria, Chapter 4; and Apraku, pp. 3-9.

Whatever the side gains of Nigerian physicians in America, one cannot overlook the cost of shouldering their initial medical training by both the federal and state governments, and ultimately of losing them and their services. Their enormous successes in the diaspora are in sharp contrast with the appalling state of healthcare underdevelopment in the homeland. This is made further problematic by the racial indifferences that constrain their incorporation into the American medical establishments. Only about 4,000 Nigerian physicians were certified in practice by ANPA between 1994 and 2006, compared to an estimated 21,000 of them reportedly in the U.S. by around mid-1995. This seems to be a development that can be viewed within the context of cultural constraints.¹

Our earlier emphasis that post-colonial African migration to the U.S. represented the most distinctive phase of world migration (1960s to 1980s) can then be viewed in light of the uneven diffusion of its indices due to racial slavery and colonialism. Unsurprisingly, the general pattern of incorporating the black African migrants into American society reflected almost a similar pattern of north-south thrust of the races of Africa first evident in the shift from the Afro-Asian lanes to the New World particularly between the 1500s and 1800s and thereafter.²

Within the U.S., this trend mirrors a North African to North-East African to South African to West African thrust of incorporating African migrants into society. Thus, black African migrants from Western and Central Africa, where a majority of the New World slaves were taken, are most likely to occupy an unfavorable orbit of inter/intra-American incorporation.

¹Ibid. Also, see Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this dissertation.

²See, for example, particularly Chapters 2 and 3 for some emphases of this trend.

Further examination of the data revealed that patterns of misunderstanding and unfavorable coverage of Nigerians and African-Americans in the media were shaped by differences at their generational and cultural cycles.¹ However, the two groups complemented each other's strengths and weaknesses in terms of cultural exchanges, political rapport, and socioeconomic partnerships—in ways yielding toward greater understanding than misunderstanding, and favorable than unfavorable disposition.²

Additionally, both the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration often differed in their perception of their inherent racial identities. As found in this study, this was mostly at the intersection of the experiential negative effects of slavery and colonialism.

To descendants of slaves, being forced out of the homelands could mean that concise lines of conscious re-entry into the homelands were seriously undermined. The umbilical cord, particularly in the language medium, had either been broken or seriously destroyed.

To the core Nigerians/Africans, both the medium and consciousness of exchanges with the homeland were found to be intact, even if often distorted. But, to their American-born descendants, although the medium is still distorted, it is more flexible and can allow for clearer lines of direct or an indirect re-entry into some of the traditional cultures of the homelands.³ This appears to be one of the most unique

¹For example, this based on the content analyses of Nigerian/African community media. See Chapter 7 for elaboration.

²Ibid.

³This conclusion corresponded with analyses of the direction of the general cross-cultural data of Nigerian immigrants. This was supportive of the evidences in Chapter 5 to 7.

features of the emergent new Afro-Atlantic relations in America. This also corresponds with the birth of a more definitive medium of renewed exchanges between the descendants of American slaves and voluntary African migration.

5. The Birth of a Conciliatory Generation: The American-born Offspring of Nigerian Immigrants¹

Another interesting find in this study was that post-colonial Nigerian migration to the U.S. has provided a more definite nerve of ancestral regeneration between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary migration. This re-confirms the birth of “a conciliatory generation.”² That is, there is now a growing new breed of Nigerians/Africans of American birth, with a more distinctive historical and cultural aptitude to re-link the two core bases of the forced migrants and voluntary migrants from Africa, as well as others. Because they have a far lesser degree of deep-seated consciousness of the negative effects of racial slavery and colonialism compared to their forebears, it was found that the earlier experiences White-Black relations had begun to intersect with an era of more amenable and positive relations between black America and black Africa, as well as Euro-America.

As a result, these Nigerian/African offspring represented the strongest dynamic of post-colonial African migration currently in America. Their populations, similarly, represented the most direct indicators of natural growth of the Nigerian/African ancestry groups in the diaspora. This trend was indeterminate prior

¹See, for example, Udofia, “The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 266-270, where this emphasis was first explored; Udofia, Trotter Review, p. 32; Udofia, Research Report, pp. 40-1.

²Ibid., Trotter Review, pp. 32-3.

to the 1960s.¹ For example, the general population of immigrants from Nigeria in the U.S. rose from 55,350 in 1990 to 134,000 in 2000.² This represented an increase of about 41,950 over the one decade. During this same period, their ancestry group population rose from 91,688 in 1990 to 137,002 in 2000—representing an increase of some 45,314. This meant that, between 1980 and 2000, the general population of Nigerians in America, along with that of their offspring, increased simultaneously.³ This same pattern held for the entire sub-Saharan African ancestry group population, which witnessed the strongest peak from about 260,000 in 1990 to about 1,500,000 in 2000.⁴

As suggested by our data, the American-born offspring of Nigerian immigrants represent a conciliatory generation to black America.⁵ Given the sometimes tenuous relations between black America and black Africa, this development was found to represent a most assuring nerve of sustained future partnerships. The generational and historical plateau of the Nigerian offspring was also found to be markedly dissimilar from that of the core parents. Thus, they are more likely to have faithful relations with the black base as well as with their American origin.

Nigerian offspring have already accessed the American black base as carriers of new hope. Within the black base, they are less likely to be faulted for their complicity in the traumatic dispersal of their brethren in the era of racial slavery and

¹See, for example, Chapters 1 and 3, Tables 2 and 13.1.

²Ibid.; including the U.S. Bureau of the Census Report, 2000.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 266-270; Trotter Review, p. 32.

racial capitalism. A more faithful blending within the Nigerian and African-American bloc forms the backdrop of this conciliatory impulse.¹

These Nigerian offspring are beginning to develop patterns of relationships with both Black America and Euro-America that would be markedly different from those of their forebears. They represent two or more strongly knit cultural amalgams from which they could construct a more viable mechanism of urban survival.² The interactions of the Nigerian/African offspring would most likely stir some positive inter-and-intra Euro-American and African-American and African cultural transformation. For example, in the 1994 Miss America Beauty Pageant, an American-born Nigerian, Miss Ohio, Titilayo Adedokun, 20, of Cincinnati, was a second runner-up.³

Other interactions which involve the collective interest of Nigerians in America are also beginning to take place through the medium of their offspring. Even if these offspring should be forced to return to the homelands of their migrant parents, chances are that they would still represent much-needed talents of cross-cultural and politico-economic linkages to Black America and Black Africa, as well as to Euro-America.

While in the diaspora, their parents insisted on the sound education of their offspring, with an understanding of the advantages of both inter-African as well as American world developments. They adopted culturally effective empowerment

¹Skinner, "The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands," p. 17; Trotter Report, p. 32.

²Ibid.

³The 1994 Miss America Beauty Pageant in Atlantic City, New Jersey, had an American-born Nigerian or related African offspring as a second runner-up. Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," pp. 156-7.

strategies aimed at making their offspring to succeed in the U.S.¹ An educated guess can be made that the Nigerian offspring will most likely provide the basis for a more definitive accords between Nigeria and America in the foreseeable decades of the twenty-first century.

It can be speculated that the emerging bond between the Nigerian offspring and the American black base and Euro-America will most likely be facilitated by some degree of intermarriages. This development may depend, to a certain extent, on the political forces shaping their American agenda. It may also depend on their general status of incorporation within the mosaic.

Where the above development embraces all the American-born offspring of African immigrants, then, it can be surmised that their collective numerical power will very likely become influential in shaping inter-African-American as well as inter-Euro-American policies toward Africa in the twenty-first century.²

Given the strong lag in the pace of Nigerian/African world development, it can be further be speculated that, as the twenty-first century unfolds, the American dynamic of this “conciliatory generation” will very likely embrace the larger concert of American and European-Asiatic collaborations toward Africa. Luckily enough, the Nigerian offspring already possessed an advantage in their natural adaptation to the English language and hence to the cultural skills needed to succeed. As such, they are likely to represent the most effective lanes of exchanges between the homelands and the Western Hemisphere. As the most natural representatives of Nigeria/Africa, they are also likely to navigate the often troubling compulsions of

¹*Ibid.*; Trotter Review, p. 32.

²“The Status of the Relationship with African Americans,” pp. 266-269.

intra-American and European relations for Africa with a more genuine interest of the homelands, the black diaspora of the Western Hemisphere, and their American origin.

Additionally, these new generations of Nigerians/Africans Americans are more likely than their core migrant parents to master the cultural implications of the Euro-American linguistic traditions. A culturally mature propagation of the African voice within the American as well as the larger global context will be pivotal to constructive relationship between Black America and Black Africa as well as Euro-America in much of the twenty-first century.

More than a decade ago, Mazrui and Nicol identified the Anglo-Saxon English language legacy as the medium of universal translation.¹ While their observation is well noted, the view here is that, the anticipated transformation of this development does seem at this point to be more suited within the historical context of the American-born offspring of the African diaspora of colonialism. An elaborate evidence of their dynamic will probably mature by the mid-twenty first century from within the American humanity.²

Conclusively, with the birth of a conciliatory generation, the Nigerian/African-U.S. relations entered into an era of sustainable relations as never before—both within and beyond. This, as noted earlier, marks the beginning of a more definitive medium of intra-American collaboration with Africa, as well as a more rewarding epoch of cultural diffusion. Yet, comparatively, the Nigerian

¹Mazrui, "The World Economy and the African/afro-American Connection," p. 43-45; Davidson Nicole, "Response," in Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection: From Dependency to Self-Reliance, p. 59.

²Udofia, "The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 269.

offspring either within a specific or the general context of the black African offspring are only now beginning to do what others from non-African descent regions had long done as Americans. Again, we see here how the attitudes of historical eras as well as constrained medium of collective exchanges, can affect the character of human development.

6. The Nigerian-African Community Media vs. Nigerian-African Churches

Due consideration then was given in this dissertation to two structures of the Nigerian immigrant community in America: Nigerian church and media. This was because, for Nigerian immigrants, community power was found to gravitate more substantially around their community churches and the media in the diaspora. As the evidences found in the Southern cities showed, there were about five hundred major Nigerian-owned churches: Houston alone owned about one hundred,¹ coupled with its powerful network of the Nigerian community media.

While the role of the Nigerian community media was influential, particularly in the development of Nigerians in Southern cities of the U.S., an overall data analysis confirmed that the Nigerian-owned and pastored churches were the most dynamic instruments in their current transformation. This phenomenon was more operative within the African-American context.² This trend revealed evidences of contextual partnerships between Nigerian-owned churches and African-American

¹This is based on an exploratory survey of the Nigerian data in the South. For example, the population of Nigerian churches in the South would probably be much higher if every mock assemblage of the Judeo-Christian congregation of Nigerians were counted.

²The evidences in this conclusion were in Chapters 3-4 but with stronger elaboration in Chapters 6-7.

churches and some white churches, actively supported by the Nigerian offspring and African-American memberships.¹ Within the African-American context, Nigerian churches were found to be replaying some of the nineteenth century patterns of the Negro Christian missionary crusade to convert so-called heathen Africans to Christianity. This trend was found to be taking place between African and African-American churches across international waters.²

Generally, these churches represented Nigerian territories in a foreign land. Even if they operated on an adversarial premise to the host nation, which was not here even the case, they were the locales where Nigerians acted more in their terms and in accordance with the revealed messages of God.

The Nigerian church adherents were particularly freer and more frank to one another and as a collective cultural unit within their Judeo-Christian tenet. The churches were found to be important economic vehicle in supporting the struggles of the faithful brethren. Active economic support from the brethren's communities often required sustained membership and participation in the necessary activities of the church.³ In other words, adherents must first demonstrate their faith, which, according to our analysis, corresponded with welding and the re-direction of the contextual divergence of ethnic Nigeria in the diaspora.

In another sense, the presumptions of power require not only an acceptable territorial integrity but the potential to convert or will people—related or unrelated—to the contending imperatives.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid. See, for example, excerpt entitled "Dr. Frederick K.C. Price in Nigeria," All Nations for Christ: Redemption Faith Magazine, pp. 9-13.

³Ibid.

⁴"The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," p. 282.

A case study of the Brotherhood Church indicated that its American Bethels exude with a “messianic mission” to convert black Americans back to the motherland. During the 1980s, this church took some black American members on a religious crusade to Nigeria, with some reportedly willing to resettle in Nigeria.¹ Conclusively, the Brotherhood’s message of “universal love” and “human brotherhood,” was found to be in furtherance of the ideals of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the slain civil rights leader.²

7. Direction of Coverage by Nigerians/Africans and African-Americans in Nigerian-African Community Media in Southern U.S. Cities

As hinted above, the Nigerian-owned media, like the Nigerian church, had enormous influences on the direction of the Nigerian immigrant community. Also, as with the church, the influences of the Nigerian media were stronger in Southern cities of the U.S. First, our data revealed that they were the medium through which Nigerian voices converged on shared ideas within the American mosaic. Second, they were crucial in informing their communities about available resources upon which Nigerians identified themselves and their interests as a group in a foreign land. As found in this study, their numerous influences were generally unquestionable.³

Unlike the Nigerian-owned churches, the Nigerian media sometimes lacked unifying themes. Apart from providing essential information on the Nigerian-owned businesses, social events, and other developmental issues, the extent to which they

¹The Herald of the New Kingdom, U.S. Special Edition (May, 1988); see examples excerpts in the Appendix.

²Ibid.

³J. Nkrumah, “African Businesses Target African Customers,” African Business Source Magazine (June/July, 1992), pp. 7, 21.

extent to which they had a unifying theme of an American as well as of the homeland development was often mixed and indeterminate.¹

As found in this study, however, the published views of Nigerians/Africans in their community media on the issue of race were much clearer. This seems to be a similar pattern for the descendants of slaves. For example, the content analyses of the published views of African-Americans and Nigerians confirmed to an existing understanding on racial/socio-cultural matters between the two groups. This was supported by how they employed their racial/cultural experiences to depict their views. Further analyses revealed a trend toward greater understanding between the two groups than misunderstanding as well as favorable than unfavorable predisposition. Nigerians and African-Americans also shared almost a similar degree of socio-cultural crises in America.²

A careful examination of the data on the Nigerian media revealed that existing misunderstanding and unfavorable disposition between African-Americans and Nigerians were often based on errant grasp of their historical context rather than deliberate omission based on personal desire. Nonetheless, the very element of misunderstanding or unfavorable disposition should be reason for concern: such an attitude operated in a socio-cultural setting as yet to develop a united vision of collective Pan-African development.

Variations in the overall media weight levels and frequency of coverage on African-Americans shown in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the content analyses

¹The problem of ethnic splits among Nigerians makes a clear definition of communal theme of human development somewhat difficult through their community media.

²See, for example, Chapters 4-7.

were stronger in areas with dense concentrations of African-American and Nigerians/Africans. These were mostly in the Southern U.S., enclaves with high incidences of racism and discrimination.¹ The Good Hope News, African Business Source (Phase 1, 1990-1992) and The African Herald (Phase 2, 1993-2000) were stationed in Dallas and Houston. Along with the dense concentration of black-owned institutions and populations, the proximity of these two competing sister-cities to each other, also corresponded with the intense social crises affecting Nigerians and African-Americans.²

At this point, however, the Southern enclave of the Nigerian News Digest (Phase 1, 1990-1992) and African News Weekly (Phase 2, 1993-2000), requires some explanation. Asheville, in North Carolina, where the Nigerian News Digest was first stationed before relocating to Charlotte as African News Weekly, had neither as large a size of Nigerians nor of African-Americans as Dallas and Houston; nor, moreover, as extensive a size of black institutions. This variant had a lot to do with the design of its targeted audiences.

Recommendations

Based on the overall data examined in this dissertation, it is the opinion of the author of this dissertation that the following questions are in need of a resolution:

1. As found in this study, post-colonial Nigerian immigration to the U.S. is unique in that the processes of its historical exchanges after slavery and colonialism are markedly dissimilar from those of Europeans and other non-African descent groups. Where Nigeria or black Africa as a

¹See "Methodology," in Chapter 1, and Chapters 2-3, 6-7.

²See especially Chapter 7.

bloc did not have any clearly sustainable control over the medium of socioeconomic and cultural collaboration as well as of the diffusion of its vital interests until the 1960s, would it be determined what the net effects are/were on the later course of its immigration and the related context of American world development, etc.?

2. If, as we have stated here, sustainable interactions and exchanges were collectively linked to the medium of human exchanges as well as to the attitudes of historical eras—since the opening of the Atlantic system of world capitalism—would it be determined which historical era Nigeria or black Africa really began to have an effective interaction with the modern world after slavery and colonialism, and why?
3. The Nigerian offspring found in this study represented a conciliatory generation particularly to Black America and Black Africa, as well as to Euro-America. How can we further explain the likely implications of their generational transformation, which are certain to involve their American and Nigerian-African backgrounds, and even far beyond?
4. As found in this study, one of the underlying implications of the Nigerian-African build-up in America is that there is now a more viable socio-cultural context to gauge the direction of race relations between two historically related and almost similarly affected generations. How then can scholars further explain or re-explain the

similarities and dissimilarities between the two migrations, along with those from Asia, the Americas, and Europe?

Answers to the above questions are certain to take us toward a clearer understanding of the emerging new dynamics in the ancestral relationships between the descendants of forced migration and voluntary African migration to the U.S., along with those of European and non-European regions. Such answers may suggest the general direction of race relations for the two most affected groups, as well as for all others in the twenty-first century. On the other hand, of course, they may lead us toward a greater understanding of the still revolving demographic composition of reactive patterns of global migration into the U.S. This dissertation is one step in that direction.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

ANPA:	Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas
ANW:	African News Weekly
Brain Drain:	The loss of the skilled class of Nigerian/African personnel to the U.S.
CRRP:	Civil Rights/Race Politics
Colonial Dispossession:	The crisis of European colonial enclosure and dispossession in Africa: the alienation of Africans from their lands and cultures, and resources due to colonial exploitation.
Diaspora of Enslavement:	The survivors/descendants of the Middle Passage, who were forced to America against their will.
Diaspora of Colonialism:	Voluntary Nigerian/Black African migrant-settlers in the U.S. largely from the 1960 to 2000 who migrated due to the disruptions of post-colonial institutions, etc.
Editorial:	This refers to an article(s) in a newspaper that expresses the opinion of its editors or publishers.
Feature Stories:	Prominent news stories or articles in a newspaper that may be opinionated.
Frequency:	The average number of times a given position or message is aired or published over a given period of time.
Intra-active Relations	This involves relationships of historical nature among culturally/racially related, or sometimes among similarly differing interest groups, etc.
Intra-active Pan-Africanism:	This involves relationships among African descent groups with racial/cultural, political, and economic affinities, as well as of groups with differing but closely related regional and global interests—who have shared collective vision of achieving a common goal.

Media Weight	A net level of continuous concentration of information on a subject.
Neocolonialism:	Control of Africans by their former colonial masters, especially in the spheres of economics, cultural, and political development after decolonization.
Negative News:	News stories that reflect stereotypical tendencies and biases, misunderstanding, and that lack the criteria of objective journalism.
OFRSP:	Opinion Feature Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism
OAAAB:	Opinion-Attitude About American Blacks.
Positive News:	A news story that is objective and that embraces the essential features of a rounded news/journalism.
Reactive Relations	A corresponding relations to an uncertain or certain event, whose outcomes involves racial/cultural groups with differing and often irreconcilable regional and global interests, mirrored mostly from the perspective of Europeans to non-Europeans.
Reactive Migration:	This involves differing reactions via migration which are often of uncontrollable and unplanned responses/implications to modern human needs, etc: since the opening of the modern era, these kinds of migrations have been driven by the upward and downward pulls of socioeconomic, political, and cultural opportunities—for example, the pull of Europeans through colonization to non-European regions—and the current pull of ex-colonial subjects to the metropolises of the ex-colonial states in Europe and North America, etc.
RRR:	Race Relation and Racism
RSP:	Racial Solidarity and Pan-Africanism
SEBAP:	Special Events-Black American Personages
Straight News:	News stories that have clear objectives and that convey understandable, broadly direct and known information.
SANPA:	Students' Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas
TAH:	The African Herald

APPENDIX B

THE AFRICAN HERALD, 1996-2000

African Americans

News About African Americans: NAAA (2)

Vol 7 No. 10 October. 1996, p. 5 (Congresswoman Johnson Announces NHTSA Grant to Dallas Organization for safe Communities)
Vol 7 No. 10 October. 1996, p. 5 (Sturns named Senior V.P. for Harris Methodist Health)

Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: NRSP (11)

Vol 7 No.7 July 1996, p 3 (African Chamber of Commerce Annual Event held in Dallas)
Vol 7 No. 11 Nov. 1996, p. 5 ("African Adventure Day" in Dallas)
Vol 7 No. 11 Nov. 1996, p. 6 (Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson meets with Nigerian Leaders)
Vol 8 No.1 Jan. 1997, p. 1 (Lawyer questions U.S. Refugee Ceiling on Africa)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 3 (TPA Treasurer passes on)
Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997, p. 3 (Kwanzaa's Last Day held in Style)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 3 (San Antonio: A Place to be)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 5 (Africans and Blacks in the Diaspora Consultation....Tuskegee)
1 Vol 10 No 3 March 1999, p. 1 (Dr. Ali Mazrui Speaks at UTA African Lecture Series)
Vol 11 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p.3 (10 Things Black Folks should do Now)
Vol 11 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 5 (Our Focus is African American Missionaries)

News-Civil Rights Race-Politics: NCRRP (23)

Vol 7 No 5 May 1996, p.1 (Libya suggests CIA May Have Killed Ron Brown)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 1 (Where Do We Go from Here?)
Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 8 (Nyon Carrathers named Director of Outreach & Health Ed....)
Vol 8 No 1, Jan 1 1997, p. 21 (Roster of U.S. White House, Cabinet Appointments)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 7 (Clinton Has New Rules for Minority Business Preferences)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 20 (43 Haitians Wash Ashore in Jamaica)
Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 20 (Haitians Decry Unfair Treatment)
Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 7 (Western Michigan University Names First Black President)

Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1998, p. 3 (Senator Royce West Expresses Concern over States....Report)

Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998, p. 7 (MU Receives \$2.4 million Grant to Train Minority Professors)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999, p. 1 (Dr. King's Day Remembered: His Letter from Birmingham)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999, p. 5 (Mississippi Head Start Program Receives \$2.8 M)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999, p. 6 (Man Becomes State's First Black Sheriff)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan. 1999, p. 6 (Lawmakers Still Grappling with Hopwood)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999, p. 7 (Coroner: Woman Killed by Police shot 12 Times)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 7 (ATOKA County)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 7 (Espy Friends Celebrate Verdict)

Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 1(Dr. King's Letter from Birmingham Jail on April 16, '63)

Vol 10 No 3 Mar. 1999, p. 7 (Clinton Honors Legacy of Thurgood Marshall ...Opening)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. 1(By Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Continues ...Strange Liberators)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. 7 (Missouri Legislation Would Name KKK'S Adopted Highway)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 8 (Montgomery's First Black Presiding Judge Sworn In)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 8 (Panhandle Jury Convicts Councilman in Corruption Case)

News- Black American Business: NBAB (1)

Vol 7 No. 8 Aug. 1996, p. 14 (Black Investment Trust seen by Year-end)

Picture-News Black American Socials: PNBAS (6)

Vol 7 No 7 July 1996, p. 13 (Texas State Technical College Ad)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996, p 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996, p. 7 (Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996, p. 20 (The Power is in Your Hands)

Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 6 (Bullock and Senator Ellis)

Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 20 (Women Changing the face of the Workforce)

Picture-News Black-American Business: PNBAB – 30

1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996, p. 6 (Walter & Maxine Session of Cherokee County...Informer)

Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1996, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)

Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1996, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)

Vol 7 No 8 Aug. 1996, p 13 (Texas State Technical College – Waco Ad)

Vol 7 No. 10 Oct. 1996. p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
 1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 20 (Women in Technology)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson, P.C.)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 32 (HUD Homes Ad- Affordable Home Ownership)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 7 (Immigration Law Office of Ollie Jefferson Ad)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 22 (Texas State Technical College – Waco Ad)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998, p. 28 (The Associates Ad – Lower your Payments)
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 7 (Texas State Technical College – Waco, Marshall)
 Vol 9 No. 7 July 1998, p. 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1998, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1998, p 9 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998, p. 15 (Your Phone Bill by AT&T)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 31 (Internet Access by AT&T Ad)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 3 (Royal Rack Reggae Club Ad)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 9 (Association of Electric Companies of Texas, Inc. Ad)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999, p. 15 (Consumer Choice by AT&T)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar. 1999, p. 31 (Access Charges by AT&T Ad)
 Vol 11 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. 29 (Southwestern Bell Ad)
 Vol 11 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 30 (In the Future, our past will be present by AT&T)
 Vol 11 No. 2 Feb. 2000, p. 31 (Go, World. Go. - TXU Electric & Gas)

Picture-News About Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: PNRSP (6)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov. 1996. p. 6 (Picture of Attorney Charles Maduka & Victor Emuakhagon)
 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996, p. 3 (Picture of Mr. Breedlove, Gloria and Mr. Miller)
 Vol 7 No. 11 Nov. 1996, p. 6 (Picture of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson and others)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997, p. 4 (Picture of Mr. John and Mrs. Robin Yearwood)
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 3 (Picture of Dr. Nwachukwu with Gen. Lloyd Newton)
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998, p. 5 (Picture of Dr. Inyama, Jessam, Dr. Monday and Mrs. Eliz. Offem)

Picture-News About White American Business (PNWAB) (2)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 24 (Lotto Texas)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 26 (Legal Matters by Attorney General Dan Morales)

Editorial: Special Events About Black American Personages: ESEBAP (1)

1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 4 (Brown Built Bridges for Blacks)

Editorial: Racial Solidarity-Pan Africanism: ERSP (3)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996, p 4 (Senator Moseley –Braun’s Visit: Compliments, Please)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb. 2000, p. 4. (Martin Luther King III in Dallas)

Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000, p. 4 (Letters to the Editor by Sheila Cunningham)

Editorial: Civil Rights Race Politics: ECRRP (2)

Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997 p. 4 (Blacks and Clinton’s Cabinet Appointment)

Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997 p. 4 (What Goes Around Comes Around)

Opinion-Feature: (9)/Opinion-Feature Race Relations-Racism: OFRRR (2)

1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996, p. 22 (The Judicial System is unfair towards African-Americans)

1 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p. 25 (Supreme Court Finds Company Guilty of Racial Discrimination)

Opinion-Feature Civil Rights Race Politics: OFCRRP (5)

Vol 7 No. 10 Oct 1996, p. 28 (The Enforcement of Minorities Rights)

Vol 8 No. 1 Jan. 1997, p. 28 (Proposition 209 and Affirmative Action: Whither America?)

Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p 25 (Hall asks Congress to Apologize to Descendants of Slaves)

Vol 8 No 7 July 1997, p 25 (The First Black Trustee Elected to IU Board)

Vol 10 No. 3 March 1999, p. 25 (Lee Named S. Carolina’s First Female Black Circuit Court Judge)

Opinion-Feature Attitude About American Blacks: OFAAAB (2)

1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997, p. 24 (Explorations in the city of Light: African-American Artists)

1 Vol 9 No. 12 Dec 1998 p. 28 (Retention among African American Students in Predominantly White Colleges and Universities in America)

Race Relations-Racism: RRR (18)

Vol 7 No. 8 Aug. 1996 (NIMH Wastes Millions on Psychiatric Racism – creates violence)

Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 7 (NAACP Head Says Racial Problems of 1960s Endure)

1 Vol 7 No 10 Oct. 1996 p 6 (Black Employees Sue Bell Atlantic)

Vol 8 No. 6 June 1997 p 6 (Grocery Chain Settles Discrimination Case for \$4.3M)

Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (Judge Rules Beauty Shop Discrimination Suit Can be Class Action)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (Lone Black Student Graduates From Gonzaga Law)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (Black Businessmen Sue Over Municipal Purchasing & Contracting)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 7 (Alabama Executes Ex-Klansman for Lynching of Black Teenager)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 7 (Egyptian Sues U.S. Government over His Race Classification)
 Vol 8 No. 7 July 1997 p. 8 (Lawsuit: Police using excessive Force against Ethnic Minorities)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 10 (Former Principal Murdered in Nigerian Seminary)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 (Police Chief Suspended, Demoted)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 (Slave's Descendants Feel Vindicated)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 Attorney Accuses Judge of Being Racist)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 31 (Pizza Hut Settles Hate Crime Lawsuit)
 Vol 10 No. 1 Jan 1999 p. 31 (Denver Toughens its Affirmative Action Law)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 7 (UNT Guilty of Bias Against Black Professor)
 Vol 10 No. 3 Mar.1999 p. 4 (A Lesson from Jasper, Texas)

Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: RSP (9)

1 Vol 7 No. 5 May 1996 p 5 (Lawyer sentenced for bank robbery)
 1 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 16 (Michael Jackson Composes Song for Mandela)
 Vol 8 No 6 Jun 1997 p 4 (Apology)
 Vol 8 No 6 Jun 1997 p 5 (The Nation's Largest Black History Museum Opens in Detroit)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 5 (African Community Honors Retiring Human Rights Commissioner)
 Vol 9 No. 12 Dec. 1998 p. 30 (Jackson ends Africa Trip Heaping Praise on Ghana)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Ethiopian Trade Consul Visits Dallas)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (African Americans Monitor Gabon Election)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p6 (Book Review – Book: Here and Now – Author K.L. Roby)

Special Events Black-American Personages: SEBAP (9)

1 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 6 (Alone in a Crowd: Prints by African Artists of the ... open at Dallas)
 1 Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 5 (Dallas Links Inc. Nominate Eddie Bernice Johnson.....)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 21 (Tyson Takes a Mega Bite out of Boxing)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 21 (Attorney Files Class Action Lawsuit Against Tyson for Cable Refund)

Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 5 (Book Review: The Silent Cradle)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 7 (Wolpe Speaks about U.S. Policy Toward Africa)
 1 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 6 (Engler Honors Rosa Parks)
 1 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 3 (Cottrell Honored)
 1 Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000, p 1 (Black Inventors: Something to share during the Black History Month)

Civil Rights Race-Politics: CRRP (21)

1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 5 (California Initiative to bar Racial Preferences Qualifies)
 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 6 (1st African-American Female Deputy Chief of Police Recognized)
 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 7 (Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson reacts to SC Decision...)
 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 8 (Hope High for Mfume Leadership at NAACP)
 1 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997 p 8 (Nyon Carathers Named Director of Outreach & Health Edu.)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 6 (Senator Ellis Praises Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock for Service to Texas)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 6 (Black Administrator at Jail Sues County for Discrimination)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 7 (Bernstine Named as new PSU President; Some Faculty says....)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 8 (Jackson Elects First Black Mayor)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 8 (Bar Disciplines Scheck, Douglas, not Cochran)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Florida's 'Little Haiti' honored for Restoring Houses)
 Vol 9 No. 5 May 1998 p. 7 (Western Michigan University Names First Black President)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 3 (Senator Royce West Expresses Concern over StatesReport)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 7 (MU receives \$2.4 M Grant to train Minority Professors)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 5 (Rep. Thompson to introduce Legislation on Independent Counsels)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Calendar of the Month)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Dallas Urban League and UTD president to salute Youth)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 6 (Texas Publishers Association Holds Seminar in Austin)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 6 (Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk kicks off Re-election Campaign)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 31 (Plans afoot for first N.C. Minority-owned Bank in over 20 years)
 1 Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 7 (Woman Ordered to repay \$534,159 for stolen chips)

Opinion-Attitude About American-Blacks: OAAAB (16)

- 1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 5 (Texas Publishers Association 10th Annual Convention ... in Austin)
- 1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 5 (African-American Leaders head to Austin)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 1 (Nation's 100 Biggest Black-owned Companies)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 6 (Senate Approves Proposal to create Juvenile Crime Center.....)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 21 (Golf's New Math: How many can Tiger Win?)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 28 (State Rep. Coleman helps TSU to remain Independent)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (States with Fastest Growth of Black Buying Power listed)
- Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 31 (Historic Black School appears on Verge of Shutdown)
- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 6 (Students "Reep" the Summer with science and Technology)
- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Haiti seeks Loans for Electric Power, Agriculture)
- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Former Barbadian Cabinet Minister Charged .. Destroying Property)
- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (Immigration Sends Illegal Migrants to Bahamas, Cuba)
- Vol 9 No. 12 Dec. 1998 p. 6 (Moseley-Braun loses tough Re-election Test)
- Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 5 (Southwestern Bell Offers Hope to South Dallas Students)
- Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 5 (The Making of a Legendary Dealmaker)
- Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 30 (North Texas Residents urged to open their Eyes to the risk of Diabetes)

Opinion-Feature Race Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: OFRSP (5)

- 1 Vol 7 No. 8 Aug 1996 p. 26 (Immigration Issue as relates to Anti-terrorism Law)
- 1 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 28 ("African" or "African-American" as a mere tag is not Enough)
- 1 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 25 (Towards Another breed of Black Americans)
- 1 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 28 (Afrocentricity Thrives Despite Vicious Attacks by Detractors)
- 1 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 22 (The Persistence of Economic inequality in age of Globalization)

News About Caribbean Affairs: NACA (6)

- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 20 (St. Vincent man sentenced to death for drug slaying)
- Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 21 (Jamaican Government sells TV, Radio Station)

Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 20 (Jamaica Agrees to let U.S. Narcotics Agents help Police its Waters)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 21 (Trinidad cancels airport construction contract with Florida Firm)
 1 Vol 9 No 12 Dec. 1998 p 20 (South Korea closing its Embassy in Jamaica)
 1 Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 21 (Haitians campaigning against disparity in Immigration Policy)

Select Samples of Content Analyses of Nigerian Immigrants¹

News-Nigerian Immigrant Community Crisis: NNICC (14)

Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 1 (Nigerian near dead due to Dallas Police Brutality)
 Vol 7 No 10 Oct 1996 p 1 (Nigerian allegedly killed wife, dragged her behind van in L.A.)
 Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 7 (The tragic death of a Nigerian)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 1 (Two Nigerian cab drivers killed two weeks apart in U.S.)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 23 (Stress –The Silent killer)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 1 (A tragic death of a Ghanaian student)
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 6 (The tragic death of Charles Oyekwe)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 3 (The tragic death of Tianna Nzeakor)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 3 (The tragic death of Rebecca Abazie)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 5 (Stacy Nzeakor charged on children's death)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 6 (The tragic death of a Nigerian in Atlanta)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 11 (Nigerian woman, daughter granted asylum in U.S.)
 Vol 10 No. 3 Mar 1999 p. 23 (My name is Cornelius Emeka Nnadi – an African living in a Black Community in Gary, Indiana: My Ordeal)
 Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 1 (Nigerian woman, fights her wrongful conviction in Dallas)
 Vol 11 No 2 Feb 2000 p 3 (Dr. Abasika passes on)

Opinion-Feature Nigerian Immigrant National Crisis: OFNINC (17)

Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 28 (Critics of Africa's Crisis Situation need to be Realistic)
 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 22 (Nigeria: A blueprint for Peace and Progress)
 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 24 (Igbo & the future of Nigeria, and a United West African States)
 Vol 7 No 8 Aug 1996 p 28 (Nigeria's True Future Leaders must rid nation of Military's Alien Culture of Madness and Death)
 Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 22 (The Igbos and their Future in Nigeria)

¹The content analyses of Nigerian/African immigrants only included a portion of the data that were relevant to an understanding of the relationships/cultural exchanges with African-Americans. Thus, a greater part of the sample data shown here was not included in the present study.

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 22 (The Road Not Taken)
 Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 22 (Nigerian Federalism)
 Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 22 (The Federal Military Structure)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 25 (Nigeria on the Road for Democracy)
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 23 (What have you done to rid your country of
 Despotism?)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 23 ("It took the US over 200 Years:" A Comment)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 24 (Nigeria: Another Future betrayed!)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 23 (Nigeria's transition program: Promises, doubts,
 and impending perils)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 24 (Beware of February Mine Fields)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 25 (Nigeria and Low Self-consciousness)
 Vol 10 No 2 Feb 1999 p 28 (Nigeria "Southernizing" the Presidency:
 Viability, Desirability and Legality --- 1)

Opinion-Feature Nigerian National Crisis: OFNNC (17)

1 Vol 7 No 5 May 1996 p 22 (Joe Garba's Fractured History: An Extended
 Commentary)
 1 Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 22 (Losing Nigeria)
 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997 p 23 (Govt. Has no business doing business: a Recipe
 for Privatization)
 Vol 8 No 1 Jan 1997 p 23 (The Nigerian Economy – the Way out an open
 letter to Gen. Abacha)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 22 (Vision 2010: Agenda for the Nation)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 23 (Our Resolve will not diminish)
 Vol 8 No 6 June 1997 p 23 (Will General Abacha transfer power to Civilian
 or from Gen. Abacha to Abacha?)
 Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 22 (Vision 2010: Agenda for the Nation, Conclusion)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 22 (No Peace without Reconciliation, No Progress
 without Peace)
 Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 28 (Abacha must stay on as President, Carry out
 Vision 2010")
 Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 22 (No peace without reconciliation, No Progress
 without Peace. III)
 Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 23 (Shun Politics or Quit, Bamaiyi Tells Military)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 23 (Nigeria lacks a Solid Leadership Succession
 Program)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 23 (The Current Transition Program: A Review)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 23 (Nigeria's Current Transition Program: A Roller
 Coaster to Nowhere)
 Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 24 (My wish for Nigeria)
 Vol 10 No 3 Mar 1999 p 25 (Obasanjo, at NACCIMA Forum, suggests
 spiritual rebirth)

Editorial-Nigerian National Crisis: ENNC (11)

Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 4 (Ogoni: Now one of the known names in the World)

Vol 7 No 7 July 1996 p 4 (Does Nigeria Deserve Sanctions Now?)

Vol 7 No 11 Nov 1996 p 4 (A Disturbing Speculation)

Vol 8 No 7 July 1997 p 4 (British Airways vs. Nigeria)

Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 4 (The Coup Plotters verdict in Nigeria)

Vol 9 No 5 May 1998 p 4 (Abacha for President: Whose interest?)

Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 4 (General Abacha's death)

Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 4 (Nigerian at the cross-road: What should be done)

Vol 9 No 7 July 1998 p 4 (Gen. Abubakar: Welcome to the Front Line)

Vol 9 No 12 Dec 1998 p 4 (Obasanjo for President? Habah!!)

Vol 10 No 1 Jan 1999 p 4 (Dr. Alex Ekwueme: Please continue to stand tall)

APPENDIX C

AFRICAN NEWS WEEKLY, 1993-1996

African Americans

News Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: NRSP (4)

- Vol 6 No. 16 May 1995 p. 1 (TransAfrica vs Abacha)
- Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 2 (N'COBRA Award for Abiola)
- Vol 7 No. 17 May 1996 p. 2 (CPA Conference on Liberia Held at Howard University)
- Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p1 (Farrakhan on African Tour)

Picture-News Black American Business: PNBAB (4)

- Vol 4 No. 24 July 16, 1993 p. 19 ("Career Opportunities Available"- Mary Kay)
- Vol 4 No. 26 Aug 1993 p 19 ("Career Opportunities Available" - Mary Kay)
- Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 (Mike's Restaurant Cooks up a Global Flavor with AT&T)
- Vol 7 No. 40 Nov. 1996 (Mike's Restaurant Cooks up a Global Flavor with AT&T)

Picture-News About Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: PNRSP (1)

- Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 21 (Photo News – African American Coalition led by Randall Robinson, staged a rally in front of Nigerian Embassy in Washington D.C.))

Editorial: Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: ERSP (1)

- Vol. 6 No 19 June 1995 p 7 (Know Your Mission, Go Do it!)

Opinion-Feature Race Relations-Racism: OFRRR (1)

- Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 6 (Apartheid: Why it's so hard to forget)

Opinion-Feature Civil rights race politics: OFCRRP (1)

- Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 18 (The Black church: a core Institution in the Black community)

Opinion-Feature Racial Solidarity-Pan Africanism: OFRSP (4)

- Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 17 & 22 (Why Africa Matters: The case for Continued U.S. Assistance to Africa)
- Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 18 (African American Heritage Awards)
- Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 18 (Reflections on a Visit to Ghana)
- Vol 7 No 24 July 1996, p.18 (Center Honors African/African-American Children)

Opinion-Feature Attitude About American Blacks: OFAAAB (1)

1 Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 16 (In Retrospect: Professor John Hope Franklin, What a life!)

Race Relations-Racism: RRR (0)

Racial Solidarity-Pan-Africanism: RSP (9)

1 Vol 4 No 22 July 1993 p 2 (PAMUSA Plans National Conference)
1 Vol 4 No 24 July 16 1993 p 18 (Reconnection with the Motherland)
1 Vol 4 No 24 July 16 1993 p 26 (Jesse Jackson on Weekend Visit)
1 Vol 4 No 26 Aug 6, 1993 p 18 (Jumping the Broom)
1 Vol 4 No 34 Oct 8, 1993 p 3 (Summit Brings Trade Pact, Goodwill)
Vol 6, No. 19 June 2, 1995 p. 6 (A Rich African Cultural Excursion)
Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 7 (Most Nigerians Support Randall Robinson)
1 Vol 7 No 3 Jan-Feb. 1996 p 2 (Symposium on Entrepreneurship in Chicago)
Vol 7, No. 17 May 1996 p. 32 (Tyson needs to stay out of trouble)

Special Events Black American Personages: SEBAP (1)

1 Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 32 (Tyson needs to stay out of trouble)

Civil Rights Race-Politics: CRRP (2)

Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 2 (Lincoln Prez Chair of PACU)
Vol 7 No 3 Jan 29-Feb 4, 1996 p 2 (NAACP to Honor Harvey Gantt)

Editorial: Civil Rights Race Politics: ECRRP (2)

Vol 6 No. 36 Oct 1995 p 1 (O.J. Puts America on Trial)
Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 7 (Immigrants: Handwriting on the Wall)

Opinion-Attitude About –American-Blacks: OAAAB (7)

Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 2 (Fight of the Century: Mandela vs Tyson)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 2 (Who Am I?)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 2 (Serving Two Masters)
Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 18 (Winning in Africa Makes it Special for Miss Universe)
Vol 6 No. 36 October 1995 (Colin Powell: Nigerians are Scammers)
Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 2 (Senator Sees Abacha)
Vol 7 No. 31 Sept 1996 p. 32 (Fredericks challenged by Johnson; Big Purse at Stake)

Picture News Opinion Attitude About American Blacks: PNOAAAB (3)

Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 21 (U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown Delivers opening remarks)
Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 21 (Legendary Entertainer Ray Charles—red carpet treatment)

Vol 7 No 36 Oct 1996 p 21 (U.S. Senate Candidate Harvey Gantt at a campaign appearance)

Select Sample of the Content Analyses of Nigerian Immigrants¹

News-Nigerian Immigrant Community Crisis: NNICC (5)

Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 4 (Community Pulls Together During Tragedy)

Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 4 (Nigerians Shot in Robbery Attempt)

Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 20 (Biafra War Revisited)

Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 3 (Nigerians Abroad Speak Out)

Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 2 (Nigerian Killed in Work Place)

Opinion-Feature Nigerian Immigrant National Crisis: OFNINC (16)

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 6 ("Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death")

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 6 (Now that Babangida Has Left the Scene....)

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 7 ("If the horse is crazy, At Least the Rider is Not")

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 7 (The Nigerian Political Crisis)

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 8 (What is Wrong with the Nigerian Economy... and How to Fix it)

Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 16 (Africa: Whither Nigeria?)

Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 6 (Abiola Should Get out of Politics, Period)

Vol 6 No 19 June 1995 p 9 (When Our turn Comes)

Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 6 (Nigeria: The Consequences of Apathy)

Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 6 (Abacha's Regime Has Lost Credibility)

Vol 7 No 3 Feb. 1996. p. 7 (President Mandela to Rescue Nigeria)

Vol 7 No 24 July 1996 p 6 (Military Kleptocracy: An Obstacle to Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria)

Vol 7 No 24 July 1996 p 9 (Once Upon a Country...)

Vol 7 No 26 July/Aug 1996 p 6 (The Death of Saro-Wiwa: Human Liberty in Nigeria)

Vol 7 No 36 Oct. 1996 p 6 (Celebrating the Nigerian Independence Day?)

Vol 7 No 36 Oct 1996 p 6 (Nigeria: The Real Cause of our Problems)

News Nigerian National Crisis (37) NNNC

Vol 4 No 22 July 2, 1993 p 1 (Election Results Suspended)

Vol 4 No 22 July 2, 1993 p 3 (Ogoni Rights Activist Says Passport Seized)

Vol 4 No 22 July 2, 1993 p 4 (Nigeria's third Attempt at Civilian Rule)

Vol 4 No 24 July 16, 1993 p 1 (Babangida Explains it All)

Vol 4 No 24 July 16, 1993 p 5 (SDP, Others seek Passive Resistance over Poll)

Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 1 (Supreme Court Kills Abiola's Suit)

Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 2 (Chinua Achebe Speaks Out)

Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 6 (Swear in Abiola to Avert Catastrophe)

¹For example, the earlier explanation noted on the Nigerian data also applies to this section.

Vol 4 No 26 Aug 1993 p 8 (Political Crisis Haunts Nigeria's Economy – Shonékan)
 Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 1 (Abiola's Return)
 Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 3 (Diya: Soldiers to Remain in Barracks Forever)
 Vol 4 No 34 Oct 1993 p 9 (Nigeria Records N26 Billion Deficit)
 Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 3 (No Bail yet for Abiola)
 Vol 6 No 16 May 1995 p 3 (Rebels try Nigerians, Guineans)
 Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 1 (Abiola to stay in Jail Indefinitely)
 Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 8 (Petrol Price Issue Resurfaces)
 Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 23 (Nigeria Dips into Food Reserve)
 Vol 6 No 19 June 2, 1995 p 28 (Govt. Aims to halt Foreign Divestment)
 Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 1 (Abacha's Exit: Oct. 1, 1998)
 Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 28 (NALICON Launched in London)
 Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 1 (Terror in Nigeria)
 Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 3 (Nigeria winning Drug War)
 Vol 7 No 3 Jan/Feb 1996 p 4 (Nigeria Tells EU "Let's Talk")
 Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 1 (Ethnic War in Nigeria)
 Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 24 (Farrakhan Calls for Patience with Abacha)
 Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 1 (Abiola's Wife Arrested)
 Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 9 (Nigeria Problem Banks Rescued)
 Vol 7 No 17 May 1996 p 23 (Showdown over Bakassi?)
 Vol 7 No 24 July 15, 1996 p 1 (Abiola Weeps over Kudirat)
 Vol 7 No 24 July 15, 1996 p 29 (Abacha urges Vigilance)
 Vol 7 No 26 July 29, 1996 p 3 (Nigerian Opposition Accused of Murder Plot)
 Vol 7 No 31 Sept 1996 p 1 (Commonwealth Visit Cancelled)
 Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 1 (Saro-Wiwa Rallies Banned)
 Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 3 (No Decision on Abiola Lawyer)
 Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 3 (Abacha Says He'll Quit in '98)
 Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 4 (Nigeria's Vision 2010)
 Vol 7 No 40 Nov 1996 p 4 (Shell to Provide for Ogoni Hospital)

United States Nigerian Relations: USNR (7)

Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 1 (U.S. Expels Nigerian Military Attaché)
 Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 3 (Govt. Accuses U.S., Britain of "Plot" against Nigeria)
 Vol 4 No 24 July 1993 p 4 (Political Chaos Threatens Foreign Image)
 Vol 4 No 26 July 1993 p 2 (Fickle Ruler Wrecking Nigeria)
 Vol 6 No 36 Oct 1995 p 3 (Global Reaction to Abacha's Speech)
 Vol 7 No 26 July 29, 1996 p 3 (U.S. Group Wants Journalists Released)
 Vol 7 No. 36 Oct. 1996 (Govt. Protests Ikimi's Delay at Airport)

Opinion-Feature- United States Nigerian Relations: OFUSNR (1)

Vol 7 No 6 Feb 1996 p 16 (CNN: An Unfair Report on Nigerians)

Editorial United States-African Relations: EUSAR (2)

Vol 7 No 26 July 1996 pp.1 & 7 (NBC Shuts Out African Olympians)
 Vol 7 No. 6 Feb 1996 p 7 (Leave Seychelles Alone, Hypocrites).

APPENDIX D

NIGERIAN-AFRICAN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY RECORDS¹

Selected Samples of Major Portions of the Nigerian Community Media and archives, 1980-2000

1. Photo Copy of Olumba Olumba Obu of the Brotherhood and Star Church
2. Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, Miracle in the Classroom, etc.
3. Brotherhood Church of the Cross and Star: Herald of the New Kingdom. Bishop Ellerbe, 2 others attend Kingfest '8, etc.
4. Brotherhood Cross and Star Holds Anniversary
5. Houston: Akeem Roast and Toast Events and Banquet, etc.
6. Akeem's Day of Glory (Nigerian Community House, Houston)
7. Hakeem Olajuwon: A Nigerian Earns \$4 Million Annual Salary in U.S.
8. African Products Shine at Black Expo, USA (Houston)
9. Titus K. Oniya, Publisher of African Business Magazine at Black Expo, etc.
10. African and Afro-American Extravaganza, etc.
11. Nigerian Democratic Movement. Washington, DC
12. Song by Akwa Ibom Youth Christian and Cultural Group
13. "Heart-to-Heart: A Stranger in the Midst:" Fictional Recreation of True Nigerian-African Romantic Stories/Crises, May 1991).
14. "Heart-to-Heart All in the Name of Love:" Fictional Recreation of True Nigerian-African Romantic Stories/Crises, July 1991).
15. A Peak at African and Afrocentric Fashions.
16. Proclamation of Akwa-Ibom State Day by Mayor Lee Brown of Houston, Texas.
17. 1998 Mbuk Akwa Ibom State: National Transfer of Power from NY to Houston and traditional mask display of "Ekong" masquerade.
18. Miss Akwa-Ibom State National 1997/1998.
19. Dr. Frederick K. G. Price, an African-American Preacher, in Nigeria.
20. African offspring/African-American Judeo-Christian Connection.
21. Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, Inc.
22. ANPA Redemption Mission to Anua General Hospital, Uyo, Nigeria led by Dr. Nsidibe Ikpe.
23. Cultural Photos, etc.

¹This phase comprises mostly evidences of selected samples of the Nigerian community data employed in the content analyses of Nigerian and African-American relationships in the U.S. from 1990 to 1992, and from 1993 to 2000. See Udofia, "Toward an Understanding of Nigerian Immigrants in the United States: The Status of the Relationship with African Americans," as well as the sequences in Appendix D of this dissertation, pp. 673-716.

**Select Samples used in the Content Analyses of
African-Americans by the Nigerian Media**

The Good Hope News: African Perspective, 1990-1992

1. Debby Turner, Miss America, 1990. (Did you know?)
2. The Civil Rights bill and Its Importance
3. African-American: A Journey Through the Niger
4. Mike Tyson and Rape Trial
5. L.A. Shame
6. The Young Black Males in the 1990s
7. Confirm Clarence Thomas
8. History in the Making in the United States

Nigerian News Digest (African Weekly News), 1990-1992

1. Abacha Honored by Collin Powell
2. Clarence Thomas: Mainstream Media-Hype
3. Professor Hill/Judge Thomas: An Epic Saga
4. Race: America's Quagmire
5. Race: America's Quagmire - A Rebuttal
6. Dr. Martin Luther King: His Dream and Legacy He Left Behind
7. The Problems Lies with Teachers. Not Their Underlings
8. Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International Perspective.

African Business Source Magazine, 1990-1992

1. Africans Have High I.Q. Says Houston Attorney
2. Nigerian Businessman Gives \$100,000 to Atlanta Institute
3. The King Verdict
4. Up in Smoke Goes U.S. Credibility Abroad
5. Dork Noble: Casting a Niche

BROTHERHOOD OF THE CROSS AND STAR

LEADERSHIP

BY EXAMPLE:

LEADER OLUMBA OLUMBA OBU

"...AND THE BRIDE SAYS COME..."
REV. 22:17


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HERALD OF THE NEW KINGDOM

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NOV 1988

PRICE TWO DOLLARS

Bishop Ellerbe, 2 others attend Kingfest '88

Bishop James C. Under Ominia Quinlan, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, and Bishop Paul E. S. O'Connell, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, were among those present at the opening of this year's Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

At the opening ceremony, Bishop James C. Under Ominia Quinlan, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, and Bishop Paul E. S. O'Connell, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, were among those present at the opening of this year's Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.



The opening of Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

The Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, James C. Under Ominia Quinlan, was among those present at the opening of this year's Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

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LABOUR BUREAU PLANNING

At the opening ceremony, Bishop James C. Under Ominia Quinlan, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, and Bishop Paul E. S. O'Connell, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, were among those present at the opening of this year's Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.



The opening of Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

Africa Is The Origin of Christianity

At the opening ceremony, Bishop James C. Under Ominia Quinlan, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, and Bishop Paul E. S. O'Connell, Bishop of the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, were among those present at the opening of this year's Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

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Reception For Bishop Ellerbe

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The opening of Kingfest '88, which was held at the Diocese of the Cross and St. Paul, on Sunday May 7.

EVENTS IN PIX

Any 101 Herald of the New Kingdom U.S. Special Edition Page 11



LOCAL NEWS

Brotherhood of the cross and star holds anniversary

By SIR EDDIE C.O. OSUAGWU
Members of the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star from all over North America, including Canada, gathered in Dallas, Texas for a two-day anniversary. The 20th anniversary of Brotherhood in the United States was held on the 28th & 29th of September, 1991.

The Good Hope News was specially invited with a note suggestive of the importance of the occasion. I was assigned to cover the Sunday session of the event.

I approached the Bethel or Church with caution, because many things have been said about the organization and its leader, Olumba Olumba Obu (O.O.O.). At the door of the Bethel, I was asked to remove my shoes. I obeyed and went inside. The whole house was painted white and white lace materials were used to cover the altar part of the wall and windows. Olumba's portrait hung all over the place.

At the altar was the "father's representative" in the U.S., Orlando Obu. He conducted the service. The service was essentially reading some verses of the Bible which they call lessons; they also sang songs which are unmistakably praises and glorification of O.O. Obu. Meanwhile, as people came in, they knocked their heads on the ground three times. The knocking of the head on the ground signifies total submission and adoration to the father, son and holy spirit. It is also a demonstration of how the

angels worship God in Heaven. This information was given to us by Prophet David Jumbo, one of the leaders of the Dallas Bethel.

The theme of Olumba's sermon was that love is the most important virtue. With love, all the world's problems can be solved, he said. He also said that human beings are small, gods connected with the Almighty God. To be connected to God, people have to belong to the Brotherhood which is not a church but a school. A school where the qualities of God is taught, and where humans are shown the right way to eternity.

The second part of the occasion was the ministerial fund raising. Orlando Obu stressed the importance of the fund raising. According to him, God's work must be done whether people like it or not. And it is the responsibility of the Brotherhood to teach the world about God's Kingdom on earth. Hymn books, tracts and other materials were launched.

In another development, I was given a copy of a sermon delivered by O.O. Obu where he revealed the meaning of Brotherhood, Cross and star.

According to O.O. Obu, Brotherhood is founded by God. Brotherhood is God, Christ and the angels. It means everything above and below, including the sun, the wind, the moon, the sun and the stars. It also means oneness. In short, "God and everything created by Him put together are

Brotherhood." Brotherhood is owned and run by God. The Angels are the servants in Brotherhood, white people are workers. Living and non-living things work in Brotherhood, O.O. Obu teaches.

The "Cross means bearing another man's burden without complaining; tolerating all kinds of sinners. To carry the Cross means complete self renunciation to God. And this is accomplishable only if one is loving, humble, patient, forgiving, unassuming and unweary. Jesus Christ was able to carry the Cross of our salvation because He passed these virtues," O.O. Obu says.

On the Star "The Star radiates light. The star is Christ, the glory of God and Christ. The Star indicates the reign and the glory of Christ." The Star means other things such as "the brightness of God, the power of His reign, and peace of the Almighty God."

When O.O. Obu speaks, the father speaks, and that is Jesus Christ - God. What is O.O. Obu's mission on earth? He says that he has come to "lead man, angels and all that God created to honour all sorts of men, fear God and to have for the whole association of brethren..." In a sort of contradiction, O.O. Obu also says that he has "not come as a man, spirit, God, Jesus, Angel, or Prophet, but as a demonstrator of love for the whole association of Brethren (and) as a teacher."

Prophet David Jumbo, one of the



Olumba Olumba Obu

leaders of Dallas Bethel is quick to attest that Olumba Olumba Obu is everything. According to Jumbo, all true believers in O.O. Obu will inherit the everlasting Kingdom. He happily discusses the wonders O.O. Obu had performed, including his ability to bilocate - that is, be in

more than one place at a time. He prophesies and heals all kinds of diseases, Jumbo claims.

As a saying goes, faith in anything is personal. For further questions on the Brotherhood, Cross and Star, call David Jumbo at (214) 363-9710.

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
CELEBRATION

Continued from Page 3

tions in Nigeria are based on nepotism, favoritism and other social and political vices. All these, he emphasized, impede progress because business tycoons who have little or no education, have taken the run of the government. Above all, uncompromising ideologies, tribal conflicts and other social barriers have led to unacceptability of ideas that would help make the country a better place to live.

Prof. Ihonvbere berated the country on its disparity between policy making and (its) implementation. To put Nigeria in the proper position it ought to be in the world, he advised that there must be mental decolonization, political decolonization, and social decolonization, he concluded, amid deafening applause.

This august speech was followed by cultural dances and masquerades presented by the Igbo Community Association of Nigeria, among others. The closing



Masquerades entertain the audience

remarks of the event was done by Richard O. Nwachukwu, the Vice-Chairman of the ONN Care-Taker Committee. The symposium and cultural phase of the celebration came to a close at 4:45 p.m. All night party continued at the Club Serengeti till 4 a.m.

What a celebration, particularly when the organizers started with little or no cash, but ended up with

a surplus that would keep ONN afloat for a while. The credit, Good Hope News learnt, goes to Richard O. Nwachukwu. He, Robert Nwankwo, Robert Elin, Kehinde Ladapo, and others like Oe Sony Urui. The Nigerian independence celebration was the last official act at Club Serengeti before it was sold to non-Africans by the management.

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Nigerian Ceremony & Cultural Contact in Houston

African Business Source Magazine • December 1990 • Page 20

EVENT: AKEEM ROAST AND TOAST



Akeem Ojigweom receiving trophy award from Uto Ukpodua, President of the Nigerian Foundation.



Diplomat J. U. Ibachaba, representative of the Nigerian government at the Banquet.



Dr. and Mrs. Oji receiving award for Selfless Service from Mrs. Ohanaja



Houston Mayor Whitmire being welcomed to the Banquet hall by Ruke Bazunu.



Publisher, Titus Oniya and wife receiving award.



Dr. and Mrs. Fadula also at the Banquet.

Cultural Contacts in Nigerian in Houston, TX

African Business Source Magazine • December 1990 • Page 21

EVENTS AND BANQUET



Sheila Jackson Lee presenting proclamation papers to Akeem.



Chief and Mrs. Collins O'Kie during his chieftaincy outing ceremony held recently in Houston.




Houston Rocket owner, C. Thomas and wife at the "Roast" of Akeem.



Cross section of people at Dr. Collins chieftaincy ceremony.



Akeem receiving another proclamation while Newscaster, Rob Nicholas touches on.



President of "Umo Afo" community, Houston, Emmanuel Okoro



Akeem, the dream, delivering a speech at the Banquet

Akeem: presented with a trophy by Udo Ekpoudia and John Shanu

Akeem's Day Of Glory

By Lal Adedagun

The atmosphere was tense, the air wore a look of overgrown anticipation and the venue was somehow in a festive mood. A drop of pin would have caused a stir and the audience, a few hundred Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike sat with all the attentive air of expectation.

That was the setting at the Ballroom of the Westin Galleria Hotel in Houston, Texas where the basketball superstar, Akeem, the Dream, Olajuwon was roasted and toasted at a dinner organized by the Nigerian Foundation, a Houston based organization, to raise fund for the \$150,000 Nigerian Community House, a cultural centre essential for entertainment, recreation and the promotion of African culture through cultural activities and exhibition.

The night was indeed a grandiose affair that saw an impeccable turnout of the creme-de-la-creme of

the Nigerian Community in Houston.

The dress code was predominantly Black tie on dark suit except for some few Nigerians who donned their native attire.

The whole arena started bubbling at exactly 8:15 p.m. an hour and a quarter behind schedule when Akeem, the dream, arrived in front of the Westin Galleria Hotel and as he trudges towards the ballroom, doorman, belltop and maids at the hotel freeze in recognition of his domineering presence.

The business of the day got on the way when the Mayor of Houston, Honorable Kathryn J. Whitmire got on the rostrum to trumpet the good qualities of Akeem.

She described the basketball superstar as an outstanding role model for young people not only in Houston and the United States but all over the world. She said of Akeem

"The City of Houston commends members of the Nigerian Foundation and Akeem Olajuwon for their contributions to the economic and cultural life of the City of Houston".


The Mayor therefore in recognition of the role Akeem plays both on the basketball court and business declared "Friday, November 30th 1990 as Akeem Olajuwon's day."

A number of other dignitaries which included the owner of Houston Rockets, Mr. Charlie Thomas, Rockets Coach, Don Channy, Jim Folley, Dr. Walter Oji, Dr. Youmey Ogboso, Dr. Ozurumba, Bill Worrel of KLA Radio, all spoke at length about Akeem, his game and relationships with those who know him.

What seems to be the most interesting part of the whole event came when Akeem, the dream, with his 6'10" height and 250 pounds weight stood up to acknowledge all that have been said about him by

Earns Whopping \$4 Million and Extra \$5 Million in Commercials

A Nigerian Earns \$4 Million Annual Salary in U.S.



Super Star Hakeem Olajuwon, receiving proclamation from Houston Mayor, Kathy Whitmire during a dinner organized recently by the Nigerian foundation in Houston

A Nigerian, Hakeem Olajuwon of the Houston Rockets Basketball team has been named one of the highest paid Black athletes in the United States.

Hakeem, who was recently quoted while defending himself against allegation by his employer, Charlie Thomas during a dinner organized by the Nigerian foundation in Houston that "Hakeem keeps asking for a raise" said "I believe in asking for what I deserve" afterall he said, "I am not the highest paid player in the league.

Hakeem trailed fourth in his category with \$4 million annual salary behind New-York Knicks Star, Patrick Ewing, who contractually bags \$4.2 million pay checks annually.

Olajuwon, in an unconfirmed report is also said to be earning an extra \$5 million for his "Apple Tree"

commercials now showing in several television stations across America.


But it is in the boxing category that the richest pay-checks among blacks is recorded.

The top earner in all categories is the current world heavy weight champion, Evander Holyfield, who reigns as the undisputed earnings champ, with a whopping \$25 million so far this year. He pocketed the largesse from just one fight this April 19 battle of the ages against George Foreman.

Two former Champions follow Holyfield in the earnings arena.

Foreman, 42 years old, collected \$12.5 million and some change for his part in the 12 round fight.

Third is Mike Tyson, who went smiling to the bank with \$5 million for his seventh round T.K.O. of Donovan "Razor" Ruddock, on March 19, 1991.



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
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Jerry Roebuck welcoming participants to the Black Expo reception in Houston.



Mr. & Mrs. Annet V. Ayewa, owners of Original African Fashions and Imports at the Black-Expo Reception in Houston.



Model models at the recently held Ola Productions Fashion Fair pose for photographers and their audience applauds their performance in Houston.



Mr. Edward Washington, vice president, sales division, special market of Coca-Cola Enterprises speaking at the reception for Expo participants.



A cross-section of people at the Black-Expo reception held recently at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Houston.



Models at the Ola Production Fashion Fair pose for photographers after an exciting performance.




Jerry Roebuck Chairman and Founder of Black Expo U.S.A.

Africa efforts towards greater recognition in trade and commerce got a boost recently in Houston, Texas at the Black Expo, U.S.A., an event co-sponsored by the Coca-Cola Incorporation and Jerry Productions.

Most of the products displayed by the African participants at the fair were sold out before the curtain was drawn on the two-day extravaganza.

Thousands of visitors who thronged the George R. Brown Convention in Houston venue of the Expo simply found



Kente fabrics on display at the Expo.

African wares at the fair exotic, prominent among such products was the African "Kente" fabric.

Perhaps, the major attribute of the "Kente" was the wide range of use into which the material could be sewn.

African Products Shine At Black Expo U.S.A.

by Lei Adella

It became so paramount at the Expo that everyone had a piece of the fabric either as a full jacket, trouser, pants, shirts, belts, caps, scarves or simply a tie.

ABS spoke to some of the exhibitors and here are some of their views on the Black Expo.

Mr. Mohammed Job whose company, Lionel and/BN Inc., of New York is the largest importer of African fabrics into the U.S. with an assets worth over \$2 million said that there is a growing demand for African fabrics especially in the East Coast of the United States.

He reiterated his company's commitment towards opening up the American market for quality African goods.

"Mr. Job praised the efforts of the African Business Source Magazine for giving the necessary support to African and African-American businesses both at home and abroad.

Spokesman for Brown and Williamson, manufacturer of Cool cigarettes in Houston, Mr. Tim Jacobs said that he

party has evolved a programme where minority businessmen are given opportunities to participate in the development of the company Corporate.

At Booth 502, Mrs. Bobby C. President and owner of the African Finance Art gallery, said to have been the first African woman to receive five more patronage to African and sculptures.

She was of the opinion that even African-American in the US need have at least one African Art work in their home.

Mrs. Clark advocated a change the educational system so that the term that further "enriched" the black youth could be established for a system that educates the black youth towards operating successfully as an entrepreneur in a free economy, so that they could in future be self-sufficient with necessary going into crime.

Also speaking at the Expo was Aliu of the Senegal Arts, a market company based in New York.

Mr. Aliu said that he was there to expand the scope of his business outside the sprawling city of New York.

Mrs. Lamma, President and owner of one of the most successful women apparel company in Houston, The Lamma Fabrics said the Black Expo was an eye opener to the capability the black mind, all over the world.

She advised minority business and women operating within the American system to be a bit cautious in their dealings adding that only hard work and an aggressive marketing strategies could guarantee success.

Yolanda Amire of the Kente Africa and Crafts said she was in Houston to sell her Kente fabric and to be on her feet.

Also, at the same booth was Gloria Bu who manages a bridal consultancy firm in Houston.

Her company engages in planning events like marriages, bridal trainings and conventions.

PHOTO REVIEW BLACK EXPO U.S.A.




Black, Publisher of Houston Black Pages
standing by his booth at the EXPO

Tutu A. Onye, Publisher of ABS Magazine dis-
playing ABS at the EXPO



African of Top Brander and Christine at
BLACK EXPO



African forum said "Africa Experiences in America" was
recently organized by African Community Organization of
Guest Quarters Hotel.
From L to R: President Mr. Mankins Mankins, Mr.
Florence Akale, Councilman Calaway, Mr. Eugene
Honey and Professor M. W. Akale.

African Business Source Magazine - June-July, 1991 Page 11

She said her job includes scaling down wedding cost in accordance with available monetary budget.

Gloria believes there is a growing need among young blacks wishing to get into marriage to know how to spend less on wedding ceremonies while achieving the necessary grace and elegance.

She described the black Expo as a very exciting event adding that the time is now for blacks to learn how to spend their money into the black community in order to become economically free.

Another participant, who wish to remain anonymous said there was a quiet movement afoot to rekindle the spirit and power of the black economic independence, remarking that there were few who worked more diligently towards that end than Jerry Roebuck, President and founder of the Black Expo U.S.A.

Most of the visitors walked with the Expo agreed that the quality of the products displayed at the exposition stood out as the greatest attributes of the modern black man's entrepreneurship.

Earlier on, the mayor of Houston, Kathryn Whitmore declaring the expo officially opened said "the city of Houston has been very aggressive in supporting minority businesses." The exposition also featured musical concerts, seminars and symposiums.



Mr. Tim Jacobs at "cool" cigarette stand at the Expo



Alexander Amos of Kumba flowers standing by her wares at the Expo.



Mrs. Annet Akere of original African Fashion and Cynthia Hill, owner of African Fashion at its Best at Black Expo.

"The Black Community must remain supportive of Black Entrepreneurs and Business Persons if Black Businesses are to compete fully in the National Economy."

- Mickey Leland

The songwriters were a great species mix and their names in evidence on the songs of *M. l.* and its groups in the eyes of Afro-Americans, was in the credit were readily perceptible, such as Edgar Allan Poe, William Shakespeare and Edmund K. Spenser were throughout the song with words written of African origin. One, Eliot, another, other song, but not so much.

[illegible]

In a post

...with some African-American who are doing well. African culture is the strongest. Another African belief...

to him. Brother Abraham Malik, who organ-
ized the Africans in the West, died of the

Call to a leading provider. Address-Archives program is the cultural heritage work

Just too good to waste! Our gorgeous African birds representing Ghana, Nigeria and Ivory Coast are among a few.

[illegible][illegible]

Hispanics became a valuable drug in Africa demonstrated by E. Mangoch.

D. Chaveroth Jr.

Some of the African claims proposed for drug occasion were the high tide of the crowd.

hotters and bops, she crumpled the good words for the sake of our youth who are crying out for the removal of a corrupt leader.

All the people that attended were glad they did. Victor Thompson, a Los Angeles television person, who is the first time I've seen him on paper had said, "I hope she is wrong like an open book. I hope she is a wonder like Alvin Ailey, who will tell us the truth." We on the scene are both so proud and

Always a few lines with the secretary of the club in the office, ready and waiting. This is a club of men, not a women's club.

WEDDING
WITH A T

The scenario was in (U.S. and U.S.). The business plan and Africa-America. The business plan marriage ceremony according to tradition. Conducted by the priest in the African culture their image.

with testimony and the
corrosary attack in 1911
between and August 1911
Wedge Publishing Inc. v
a Zobel for the African
Cont.

Test Monitors, a broad-based research Africa before accounts had "monopoly" (11) we were in a place distributed in the U.S.A., the trials served, the participants, emphasis was to research and emotional impact of it and before all, the survivors "which is Africa."

(The words inside a paragraph—graduate from [CCT], 1963, and [CCT] and [CCT]—are not in the original.)

NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT



3700 Georgia Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20010
Phone (202) 397-7052
Fax (202) 398-3875

August 26, 1993

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

All Nigerians abroad share the pain that most Nigerians at home are undergoing as a result of the political impasse in Nigeria. We commend our brothers and sisters for the patience they have exercised so far especially for their wise conduct since the annulment of the presidential results.

All Nigerians are grieved by the wanton disregard of the peoples' wishes and ceaseless effort to circumvent their June 12, 1993 decision at the polls, by General Babangida and his cronies. We abhor and condemn the brutal killing of hundreds of innocent Nigerians who exercised their right to peaceful assembly in Lagos. We repudiate the actions of the Association for Better Nigeria and all other Nigerians who have collaborated with the regime of General Babangida in their efforts to rape Nigeria. We applaud all Nigerians who successfully ground to a halt all government and business transactions in Lagos and other major cities in Nigeria from August 19 - 21, 1993.

The decision of General Babangida to annul the results of June 12, 1993 and to create an interim government is totally unacceptable. It is a reckless attempt by a military junta to thwart the yearnings of the Nigerian people for Democracy, and impose its will on the Nigerian people who have overwhelming rejected military interference in government.

It is time for a decisive change in governance from an appointed Leadership to an elected Leadership. Nigerians elected a president on June 12, 1993. It is therefore the obligation of all Nigerians and friends of Nigeria, to ensure the execution of the democratic decision of the Nigerian electorate. We therefore urge and recommend the following actions:

- We urge all Nigerians, friends of Nigeria and true believers of democracy to shun the interim government. As far as we are concerned, the interim government is a surrogate of Babangida and as such, an extension of the military dictatorship.*

Committed to a United and Democratic Nigeria

AT THE WHEELER AVE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH, HOUSTON, TEXAS

AKWA IBOM YOUTH CHRISTIAN AND CULTURAL GROUP.
15526b SCHUMANN LANE,
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77083.

1. WE ARE NIGERIANS FROM AKWA IBOM STATE,
WE ARE SO AFRICAN-AMERICANS.

===== CHORUS =====

2. THE BLACK MAN WAS THE FIRST MAN ON EARTH,
THE BLACK MAY LIKELY BE THE FIRST MAN IN HEAVEN.

=====CHORUS =====

3. we ruled the WORLD ,WE HAD KINGDOMS,
WE WILL LIKELY RULE THE WORLD AGAIN,
FOR WE WERE AND STILL ARE A STRONG AND DETERMINED GROUP
OF PEOPLE.

=====CHORUS=====

4. PRINCES AND PRINCESSES SOUGHT KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA,
WE WERE A POWER TO BE RECKONED WITH.

=====CHORUS=====

5. AFRICA HAS A RICH HISTORY,
WE HAVE TO UNCOVER AND WRITE OUR HISTORY.

=====CHORUS=====

6. OUR PEOPLE BECAME CAPTIVES IN A FOREIGN LAND.
THEY WERE TORTURED, BURNED AND KILLED,
BUT THANK GOD FOR HIS LOVE STRENGTH AND FAITH,
WE SURVIVED , BUT WE MUST BE FREE.
OUR FATHERS AND MOTHERS WORKED THE LAND,
THEY SACRIFICED A LOT TO BRING US TO WHERE WE ARE TODAY,
WE THANK THEM FOR THEIR LOVE AND STRENGTH,
WE THANK THEM FOR THEIR SACRIFICES,
WE WILL NEVER, NEVER FORGET THEIR STRUGGLE.

=====CHORUS =====

8. DR. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON,
DR. NKWANE NKURUMA,
DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING,
DR. UOCH UOO-AMA,
MALCOLM-X, HICKEY LELAND,
WE LOVE YOU ALL.

OUR YOUNG PEOPLE MUST NEVER FORGET,
THAT WE HAVE A DUTY:
TO CARRY ON THE STRUGGLE OF OUR FATHERS AND MOTHERS
TO RECOVER OUR DIGNITY AND GLORY

=====CHORUS=====

10. TO BE ABLE TO DO THIS,
WE MUST BE WELL EDUCATED,
WE MUST HAVE SELF CONFIDENCE,
WE MUST LOVE ONE ANOTHER,
MOST OF ALL, WE MUST BE GOD'S CHILDREN.

=====CHORUS=====

11. WE MUST STOP SELLING AND TAKING DRUGS
DRUGS DESTROY THE MIND, THE BRAIN

=====CHORUS=====

12. OUR FUTURE IS IN OUR HANDS,
OUR DESTINY AS A PEOPLE IS OURS TO SHAPE.
GOD HAS SUSTAINED US THROUGH THE DIFFICULT YEARS,
HE MUST HAVE A PURPOSE FOR US ON EARTH.

=====CHORUS=====

A Stranger in the Midst

--Amie Joof

"Kedu," a stranger at the table said, greeting me in her native Nigerian language, Ibo.

"Hi," I responded.

"Oh you're a foreigner!" she said with disappointment.

"No! I'm from Africa," I said.

"That's what I mean, you're not from Nigeria," she said.

"But I'm an African," I insisted.

Turning rudely away from me, she said to her friend, "I told you. Nigerian men would marry 'anything' as long as it's a woman. I can't understand their problem."

The two friends continued their conversation in Ibo, ignoring me totally. Meanwhile, my husband Olu was chatting with some friends at a corner in the party hall.

As I stared into the air, thinking of the appropriate words to say to the women, a gentleman at the next table leaned toward our table and said, "My name is Mba." Addressing the two other women in particular, he continued, "Six years ago, I fell in love with a woman from Cameroon. Yata was the woman of my dreams. She offered all the qualities I wanted. She valued her African traditions, and she supported me at every level of my struggle to survive in America. But my family wouldn't accept her because she wasn't from Nigeria. After years of dealing with my family and friends who always treated her like a stranger in their midst, Yata began to feel like a stranger. At the same time, I couldn't deal with the stress of having a fiancée that wasn't accepted by my family. I eventually left Yata, losing my true love.

Shortly after the breakup, I went home to Nigeria to meet the woman my family had selected for

me. I came back to America after taking care of the necessary traditional arrangements that would lead to our marriage. I paid over \$10,000 in cash and material goods to win her hand in marriage. I drained all my savings to pay for Ify's bridal price and to give her the lavish wedding she wanted. London was her choice for honeymoon. One month in London cost me a lot of money,



Joof

granted we had much fun.

We got back to Nigeria only to be advised by the U.S. Embassy that Ify's application for a visa to the United States had been denied. Upon my return to America, I incurred huge debts in legal fees to get Ify here. Frustrated by Ify's impatience to come to America, I reluctantly gave up my Nigerian citizenship for an American one to speed up the process of bringing Ify here. Within months, she got her visa to the United States.

Shortly after Ify came to this country, problems developed in our marriage. She was very materialistic. She wanted to live up to her fantasies of America -- in her actions, manner of dressing and speech. Our communication suffered. She eventually started having an affair with another man. She told her friends that she

wouldn't file for a divorce because she wanted alimony from me. She accused me of being too possessive and provoked me into granting her a divorce.

My ordeal with Ify turned to be a very costly lesson in my life. In trying to marry a woman from Nigeria, I ignored an important factor in choosing a life-time partner -- getting to know her well. All I knew was that Ify was from Nigeria and was an Ibo.

In retrospect, nothing should have prevented me from marrying Yata. She loved me for who I was, and she cherished her traditional values. She was always content with what we had. She understood more than I did that our aspirations and value systems were more important than our tribal backgrounds."

At this point, Olu returned to the table. Putting his arm around Olu, Mba said, "My brother, I believe you've found a great woman. Don't let any of these narrow-minded people convince you to let her go because she is not from the same tribe or country." Olu accepted the compliment with a smile and said, "When I was marrying her five years ago, I refused to listen to anybody, and I don't intend to do so now." Olu's words were most reassuring to me. Since he and I have known each other, he and his family have never made me feel like a stranger in their midst.

Author's Note: The use of the Ibo tribe in Nigeria was only intended to illustrate the unnecessary limitations Africans impose on their relationships. The characters could have been any other nationals.

Editor's Note: Our staff columnist, Amie Joof, uses fictitious names to capture African relationships. If you have a story to tell send it to the editor, African Newbreed.

— AMIE JOOF

All in the Name of Love

"Baby, we need to plan our future. I can quit medical school and work, or you can be the breadwinner until I finish school," said Musa.

"What about our wedding plans?" asked.

In between kisses, Musa managed to say, "I think the best thing is for us to live together until we can afford the wedding you deserve. When I marry you, I want the whole world to know...."

"I'll quit school myself, and....," I said, swallowing the rest of my words with his mesmerizing kisses.

Not too long after this incident, Musa moved in with me. I quit my own school and took a full-time job to pay the rent and the bills. My job, however, couldn't cover school expenses. Musa tried to hold a part-time job, but found himself on academic probation after his first year. Again, he suggested that we make a decision about the future. I took another full-time job so he could concentrate on school. I also became Musa's housewife without a ring. I did all the cleaning, laundry, cooking and attended to all of Musa's personal demands.

As a medical student, Musa's lifestyle was very demanding. He was in school all day and spent most of the night studying. To better manage his time, we had to schedule every minute of the day. His food had to be ready when he needed it; his clothes were cleaned and ironed when he wanted them. The schedule was hectic, but I didn't mind, for as Musa said, "we need to alter our lifestyles for a better future."

I scheduled my jobs to keep my weekends free. On Saturday mornings, I did errands like banking and

I chose to make the sacrifice because I loved Musa, and as he said, 'we're working for a happy future that was to come after he finished medical school.'

running to the dry cleaners. On Saturday afternoons, I did laundry and cooked a special dinner for the two of us. We would have dinner between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m.; and after dinner we tried to make time for love-making and a nap. Sex was straight to the point and fast, because the clock was ticking. On Sundays, I ironed clothes and cooked five different entrees to last us the whole week. The household chores and Musa's demands turned me into a robot, but I didn't mind. I

chose to make the sacrifice because I loved Musa, and as he said, "we are working for a happy future that was to come after he finished medical school."

Two months after Musa got into his residency program, he bought himself a corvette as a graduation gift from the two of us. I continued working my two jobs so that we could make payments on the car. Right after the corvette was paid for, Musa bought a BMW, which he called the family car.

By the time he finished paying for the BMW, he was sent to Washington, D.C. for a program on cardiology. The night before he returned from the program, I received a "dear John" note from him:

"Dear Ndelia:

Let me begin by inquiring about your health and jobs. I hope everything is well at that end. Things are going well for me. I've passed my course with flying colors, and I've also met somebody who has changed my life forever. Ndelia, I hate to hurt you, but I am now experiencing real love. I've fallen in love with one of the students here. The two of you are alike in so

many ways, yet different in many respects. I cannot explain it, but she's brought a totally different dimension to my life. I'm sorry. For all it means, I will never forget you.

I'll be over tomorrow to pick up my things. Thanks for everything, and good luck.

*Love,
Musa."*

(To be continued...)

A Peek at African and Afrocentric Fashions


African fashions have now made their way into the United States with spunk. Fashion gurus are no longer settling for the simplistic dashikis, agbadas, (traditional gowns) iros and bubas (traditional female attire popular among the Yorubas of Nigeria) that corporate America frowned upon years ago. Present fashions adapt traditional patterns for use in western styles. Kente, batik, aso-oke are now designed in contemporary western styles suitable for offices and after-five formal wear.

The craze for African fashions is nothing new in America. Afrocentricity was quite "IN" in the early 60's and thereafter. However, pride in Africa then had rebellion at

its coat-tail. Today's trend, however, has appreciation for the intricate designs by brilliant craftsmen and women in Africa. It gives a touch of African culture without being overwhelming.


Whatever happened to African fashions in the true sense of the word? Are the styles that were considered "unhip" in corporate America

out of our closets and boutiques for good? No. These same styles are now making their ways into high-fashion runaways with a dab of western sophistication. It is obvious that the breeze of pride in Africa is blowing again in the African-American community. This time however, the fashions are here to stay. African fashion business is booming in Chicago. Boutiques readily display authentic fashions that are fit to flaunt. Check them out!



--Funmi Apantaku
Fashion Editor





Akwa Ibom State

Houston is a city of rich cultural diversity, and the many ethnic groups that share their heritage with Houstonians enhance the quality of our lives. Houston has been enriched by the presence and contributions of its residents of Nigerian ancestry, and is proud to be the recipient of their many significant contributions to the cultural, civic, economic, and spiritual life of our city.

As a non-profit organization, the purpose of the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., is to unite Akwa Ibom families and citizens together throughout the United States and in Nigeria; to promote the political, economic, educational and social needs of Akwa Ibom families and citizens; to preserve the cultural identity and heritage of the people of the Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria; to act as a liaison between governments, Nigerian and American, and to support American charitable organizations.

On Saturday, August, 5, 2000, the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., will host its 13th Annual National Convention in Houston, Texas.

The City of Houston is pleased to congratulate and commend the Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Inc., on this auspicious occasion, and extends best wishes to all for a successful and rewarding event.


Therefore, I, Lee P. Browo, Mayor of the City of Houston, hereby proclaim Saturday, August 5, 2000, as

Akwa Ibom State Day

in Houston, Texas.



In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and have caused the Official Seal of the City of Houston to be affixed this 27th day of July, 2000, A.D.


Lee P. Brown
Mayor of the City of Houston



**"Ekong" masquerade
by New Yorkers**



The National Power Transfer From New York to Houston (August 8, 1998)

INTRODUCING MISS AKWA IBOM-NATIONAL- 1997/98

Miss Emem S. Udo

On August 9, 1997, Atlanta Chapter produced another Queen for Akwa Ibom State Association, USA, Inc., National. She is Miss Emem Udo. On this day, at the National Convention held at Atlanta, Georgia and hosted by the Atlanta Chapter, was the crowning of the most beautiful girl in Akwa Ibom community here in the Americas, Miss Emem Udo, 16, of Atlanta Chapter. Emem has become the fifth *Miss Akwa Ibom - National*. She is the third winner of this Noble Title from Atlanta Chapter in the past three years. Miss Udo is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Udo of Atlanta Chapter. "It's a great honor to wear the crown as Miss Akwa Ibom-National", says Miss Udo. Emem is also the Secretary to the Akwa Ibom Youth Association, an affiliate of Akwa Ibom State Association of Nigeria, USA, Incorporation (AKISANUS). It would be a mistake not to mention to the public that Emem was determined to be the next Queen that day. Apparently she had determined that, no ill shall stand in her way as long as she participated in the contest. No wonder Emem performed of head on the floor when her musical tape failed to play for her. Emem danced without it and still came out a winner. As much as some people tried to insinuate that Emem was being sabotaged, the Queen to be continued to do what she determined to do, try and win the crown!! And she did very brilliantly. So when she sent words of advice to the youths, she did so because she knows how to overcome the life's obstacles when you least expect them. So youths, learn from our Queen. When Mbuk Akwa Ibom asked her for some advice to the youths, the Queen replied without any hesitation, "...stay in school and learn all you can for your bright future!", she added. She also has some words for the adults, "Educate us please!" Commenting on the decision to eliminate the Swimsuit from the annual Beauty Pageant competition, Emem quickly added, "...Brains NOT skinny body!"

Since becoming the current reigning Queen, Emem has attended the 1st National Council and Board of Directors Meeting in New York on November 1, 1997. In Atlanta where she lives with her parents, she has joined the Food Drives campaigns organized by the Atlanta Chapter of AKISANUS to feed the hungry. To do what she loves best- Talk! She has visited schools in Atlanta and proudly educate fellow students on Nigeria and Africa.

On inquiring about whether she finds the title meaningful and worthy of all the efforts she put into it, she replied that it was very worthwhile! Balancing Title with school work enhances her leadership skills. "We need leaders and encourage others to do same and learn. she plans to visit some Chapters including Dallas, to encourage the youths.

When asked about her relationship with the past Queens of Akwa Ibom - National, Emem stated that the past



On inquiring about whether she finds the title meaningful Misses Akwa Ibom are "my rich resources and they are always there for my moral support. Sometimes with their crowns when we visit."

Emem was asked about her plans after her time is up as the National queen in August 1998. The answer was very simple. She will continue to speak about Nigeria, was her answer. "Title never ends just because you give up the crown," added the Queen politely with great admiration.

The other past Akwa Ibom - National Queens from Atlanta Chapter were, Miss Ofonmbuk Uyo, (1995/96), and Miss Nelly Otu, (1996/97), who crowned the new 1997/98 Miss Akwa Ibom-National. There were seven beautiful contestants at the Beauty Pageant which was staged on Saturday evening before the whole convention. The First Runner-up was Miss Ubong Akpan, of Washington DC Chapter.

Emem is a student at the Tri-City High School In Atlanta. She hopes to become a Pediatrician someday.

Emem is the fifth reigning Queen of AKISANUS. Contestants always come from different Chapters of AKISANUS throughout the United States. However, to qualify, they must meet certain requirements including their chapters meeting all their financial obligations to the National body.

Emem is a recipient of the Barkley Forum Scholarship for Excellence in Debate. Congratulations, Emem!!

Dr. Frederick K. C. Price in Nigeria.

Born-Again Christians Are Supposed To Be Perfect

Dr. FREDERICK K. C. PRICE, a

Benson Idahosa

The maxim that Dios of similar plumbe flock together was again brought to the fore when Dr. Fred Price declared what Archbishop Idris had constantly affirmed, namely, that it is the unmitigated right of the Christian to become rich. This declaration is clearly spelt out in the words of God, the Bible.

Dr. Price's evangelistic tour took him to Lagos and Port-Harcourt, after his ministrations in Benin City. He has since returned to the United

part all the time, then you go to church on Sunday? You pastor all the time. You work for your church every time. So does your church pay you a salary? or do you make money by flying airplanes? No, they pay you from the

Suppose I ask you to come to America with me and work for me without a salary or any form of reward or remuneration, no food, nothing for your family, nothing for your children, yet I want you to leave your job that pays you well and go to work for me as a slave, to do as I please and to give up everything and to love me. How do you think Jesus could have tricked those men into following Him, and they were fishermen, not loving Him, and they were fishermen, not they did drop everything and followed Him.

“And when he had gone a little farther, I saw him going to show you how He did it: HE MADE THEM AN OFFER WHICH THEY COULD NOT REFUSE!

Now let me show you again, that Jesus was wealthy. Turn to John's Gospel

25

"Very, very," I say now. "That's one of you! That's why then the disciples looked on as another, doubting on whom He spoke." Now there was learning at Jesus' bosom some one of His disciples whom Jesus loved—Simon Peter, thereafter bedecked on film; James the son of Alphaeus, who Jesus loved; John the apostle who, it is, or was, thought to be the beloved disciple; and Thomas, the twin, who Jesus loved. He should like what it is, or why, it should be about His spoke. He came living on Jesus' bosom speaking to him, "Lord who is he?" If other words with is going to betray you, v. 28, "Jesus answered, He is, iowmhen tsahaiyeh uha a soq, when I have died it, And when he had dropped the sop, he gave to Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon. And after he so shared entered into him. Then said Jesus unto him, Follow me, and thou shalt be made perfect. That he doest do quickly," John 13:26-27.

In other words what we learn from this going to do, do it quickly, Aye! Yes! Yes! Now follow this very important, v. 28.

Now what does that mean, it's saying they didn't know why He said what He said? I mean, they didn't know, now watch, 429. Okay if them though, because Jesus said the bag. The word bag, the word that we would have in English language, the highest word that wilderness, and interpreted the word bag, would be treasury. And all that was the treasurer. Now can any one tell me this put does it have to keep money or put money in the bank, it's to keep money or how many of you think it's to keep money? I ask to me, that's not why you have a treasury. I ask to me, why would you have a treasury? What is a treasury for? A treasury is a place where you put what you haven't yet spent. Now I ask you didn't have anything, why would He need a treasury, and sure enough,

Continued on page 15

Continued on page 15

The Foolishness Of Poverty In The Church

By Dr. Frederick K.C. Price


OUR source is not in the world order, for God is our source and He is never out of business. And so Christians need to know and understand that God wants us to prosper. If anybody on this planet is to prosper, we there

After 14 days, Robinson (right) and Big Top Gyrodeppa outcumes Dr. Price to the Ninth Century.

people of God should prosper. There is plenty of wealth in this world. In America alone, there are over one million millionaires. So there is no shortage of wealth, but the wealthy needs to be in the hands of the people of God for the proclamation of the gospel to the ends of the world. Because after all, all the currencies of the world are based on gold stand,

the sky. So the money is here, that's my point. The wealth is here to finance the gospel around the world in order for us to do so, we first have to learn to think about Jesus and His love to learn to think about people as disciples correctly, because if you don't, you will never be able to truly prosper. You may think about prosperity, you may talk about it but you

m21 c *



They lead him into the Facility's

Centre auditorium

[illegible]

will never be able to be truly prosperous because deep down inside you there will always be a sense of guilt. How could I ever have more than my Master had? How can I ever achieve more economically, financially, materially, than my Master? He was poor, He didn't have anything. This is the Euro-centric expression of Jesus that we've heard all our lives.

African Offspring/African-Americans Mostly of American-Born

• VOL 01

• VOL 01 # 03 NOVEMBER 25 - DECEMBER 15, 2005 • Email: tcmirrornews@yahoo.com 713-668-6400 •

TCM: Celebration

RCCG Restoration - Youth Week Celebration




RCCG Restoration youth power dancers




Cross section of youths at last Sundays celebration




RCCG Restoration youth drama team




RCCG Restoration youth drama team




RCCG Restoration youth power dancers




Cross section of parishioners at Sundays celebration



Pastor Agas




Miss Alexis- Youth Week Coordinator



Cross section of youths at last Sundays celebration




RCCG Restoration youths Singing Praises



RCCG Restoration youth drama team



RCCG Restoration youth drama team



RCCG Restoration youths Singing Praises



RCCG Restoration youth drama team



RCCG Restoration youth during the Celebration

ANPA Office



Association of Nigerian Physicians in the Americas, Inc.

Incorporated in 1995 as a non-profit Charity
(a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code)

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234-1-775-3049

OUR VISION:

A Healthier Nigeria in a Healthier World

MISSION STATEMENT


To foster personal and professional growth of its members through camaraderie and unselfish exchange of ideas.

To promote altruism, professionalism and scholarship among its members.

To identify and stimulate interest in all matters affecting the health of Nigerians and provide the forum for debating evolving health issues.

To encourage the development of practical solutions to Nigerian health care problems through strategic initiatives and field activities inside Nigeria.


To seek collaborative research opportunities in the international medical community and contribute to improved health care in the Americas and world-wide.



THE FREE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY

TOP: Dr. Nsidibe Ikpe, owner of *The Majesty Hospital*, who led a team of Medical Practicioners to Nigeria, listened to the accounts of a patient for medical at Anua General Hospital.

BELOW: Dr. Ikpe's Associate fits a pair of eye glasses on a patient at Anua General Hospital.



PAGE 4 GOOD HOPE NEWS

Cultural Photos *Oghu Festival*



WORLD NEWS (Continued)

EUROPEAN

Continued From Page 10

Eastern European nations that adopt democracy and start moving toward market economies.

But those decisions were overshadowed by the agreement on political union, a remarkable step even in a year in which historic developments in Europe have come at dizzying speed.

The proposal was put forward April 19 by French President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Nine days later, the 12 leaders bought it.

The concept and the speed were a victory for Mr. Mitterrand and Mr. Kohl and a defeat for Mrs. Thatcher. She spent the day insisting on what political union must not be.

"There's far too much rhetoric and far too little nitty-gritty," Mrs. Thatcher said. She insisted that any political union not undermine the

"God did do better on His second thoughts when He created Eve."

British monarchy, Parliament, national legal systems or other rights of governments.

"If God had tried to define what a man isn't, I don't think Adam ever would have been created," quipped Community President Jacques Delors.

Mrs. Thatcher retorted: "God did do better on his second thoughts when he created Eve."

Mr. Mitterrand, asked about Mrs. Thatcher's objections, said: "If I had to summarize what she said, it was, 'I don't know what you're talking about.' I said, 'We'll see about that in two months.'"

"They don't know what they mean," Mrs. Thatcher complained. "It astounds me."

In their April 19 statement, Mr. Kohl and Mr. Mitterrand said political union must include not only a stronger European Parliament and more powers for the Commission, the Community's Belgium-based bureaucracy, but "a common foreign and security policy."

The West German and French leaders seemed to have no idea what they meant by this. They didn't clear the proposal first with their own foreign ministers, and their aides in

Dublin said the details — which would seem to affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. position in Europe — were vague.

Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey, the summit's host, said the Community wants "NATO to continue in being for the purposes for which it was created." But he added European security is evolving from its Western European base into an all-European security system.

To a great degree, the debate reflected the age-old cultural differences between France, with its love of grand designs, Germany, with its romanticism, and Britain, with its traditional suspicion of continental visions. Mrs. Thatcher at various times has called ideas for greater European union "escapism" and "sun-fair."

The congress that will make political union possible will start at the same time as one on economic and monetary union.

Asked if all this wasn't biting off more than the Community can chew, Mr. Haughey said: "Fortune favors the brave."

Contributed by RTN News Wire

QUOTED OF THIS EDITION

"Each nation is strong because of its talents and best minds. And any nation persists if such talents do not have an opportunity to flourish."

President Mikhail Gorbachev, in a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy in the U.S.A. He unveiled extraordinary collection of talents: actors, artists, writers, and academics.

"The time comes in the life of any nation, when there remains only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom."

Nelson Mandela, Quoting part of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the Military arm of the ANC manifesto.

"The lesson of the abortive coup (in Nigeria) is that the greatest security of any government, military or civilian, is not arms and ammunition, but the affection, support and confidence of the people it governs."

Part of Editorial of the Lagos based Daily News on April 14, 1990 published by John West

Publications which was banned by the government for the national.

"Don't just complain about a situation; do something about it (in a positive way). Things don't just happen; people make it happen."

Richard O. Newsham, an author.

"Individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be equally advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be covered by methods which conflict with the constitution: a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means."

The US Supreme Court on the case of Meyer Vs State of Nebraska (1923), in the review of a controversial statute forbidding any teacher to "teach any subject to any person in any language other than the English language."

Did You Know?

Do you know that the beauty crowns of Miss America and Miss USA are worn by African-Americans for the first time ever. Miss Debbie Turner is Miss America 1990, while Miss Carole Gist is Miss USA 1990. What a way to say that America has come a long way and that Black is really beautiful.



Debbie Turner, Miss America 1990. She is an African-American and proud of it.

LOUIS

Continued From Page 11

them a teacher." He told his audience that "The time is setting for white supremacy and eurocentric thought."

Minister Louis Farrakhan is a very controversial figure. Born on May 11, 1933, he was raised in Boston Massachusetts. At the age of 11, while visiting his relatives, he was shown a picture of the Honorable Marcus Garvey. He was told what this man meant to the Black people. The idea to serve his people grew and intensified in him.

In February 1965, a friend invited Farrakhan to the Nation of Islam's annual Savior's Day Convention in Chicago, Illinois. This was the first time he had the opportunity to hear the Honorable Elijah Muhammad. From this encounter, a relationship developed between Farrakhan and the Honorable Elijah Muhammad that would last forever.

However, in 1975, Elijah Muhammad departed which caused the Nation of Islam to fall. In 1977, Minister Louis Farrakhan began to rebuild the institution through the teachings of his idol Muhammad. Their Mosque and Muhammad University of

Islam on Stony Island in Chicago were repurchased. Thus, the Nation of Islam, according to the followers, is on the move again.

Carrying a Koran on the right hand and Bible on the left hand, Minister Farrakhan quoted the definition of "These" from both holy books. (Chapter 103 of Koran and Ecclesiastes in the Bible.) Just like the Bible, Farrakhan defined God as the One "Whom all things began and

to whom all things will eventually return."

As controversial as Minister Farrakhan was, he drew an unprecedented crowd as if it was Michael Jackson's concert. He acknowledged this when he said, "Dallas, you are making history tonight. I don't think there has ever been a Black leader to come to this city and draw this many people."

"What does this show the world?" he asked. In an answer to his own

question, he said, "It shows there is a hunger and thirst in the Black Community for the truth that will set us free."

Later in his "lecture," he told his audience, "Don't accuse me of being a racist. That is not what I am about... I don't feel comfortable saying all that I say, but the truth must be told. I am not a racist, bigot, or anti-semitic. I am your brother. Well, he may be right, but you are the one to judge."



Louis Farrakhan says "Dallas, you are making history tonight."

EDITORIALS

The civil rights bill and its importance



RICHARD O. NWACHUKWU

The U.S. Congress this August, will approve or may have approved a civil rights act of 1990. As we go to the press, the rewording of the bill was still being negotiated between the bill's authors and the White House to avoid a presidential veto. Any veto will be very unpopular.

President Bush wants to sign it, but he claims that he would not sign any civil rights bill that has "quota" in it. One thing is clear: This civil rights bill before the U.S. Congress does not have a quota in it. Those opposed to civil rights laws are the ones using the word on it. The bill is for equal opportunity for all.

The importance of a civil rights bill, especially this one authored by Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass and Rep. Augustus Hawkins, D-Calif., cannot be over-emphasized. It is even more significant that a person of Sen. Kennedy's calibre would sponsor such a relief to the minority groups.

Over the past two years, the U.S. Supreme Court, majority of which is made up of President Reagan's appointees, has rolled back the hands of the clock of judicial protection in the U.S. The court has made it virtually impossible to prove on the job discrimination. In our opinion, it is an exhibition of sheer ignorance, a mere idiosyncrasy, or a play of stupidity for any one to think that discrimination does not exist in America, especially at the corporate America and its establishment.

As the NAACP rightly pointed out to July, the two recent supreme Court decisions - *Wards Cove Packaging Co. Vs. Atonio and Patterson Vs. LeLeau Credit Union* - prompted dismissals of over 200 race discrimination suits nationally. The *Wards Cove* decision made it more difficult to use statistics to prove discrimination. The *Patterson* decision carried a civil war era bias statute from being applied in cases other than biased hiring practices.

Just last June, 1989, the Supreme Court let stand the dismissal of a Texas case because African-American workers at Port Arthur Refinery could not approve their

employer's contention that a biased job classification system was an efficient method of holding down workers training costs.

The Kennedy-Hawkins bill seeks to overturn these Supreme Court's decisions, as well as expand legal protections for women, racial and religious minorities and victims of intentional discrimination. Said Sen. Kennedy during the senate debate in July: "We have seen the damage caused by these Supreme Court decisions, and we must repair it. We cannot leave millions of workers vulnerable to discrimination."

This bill which should become law would make it easier for workers to prove discrimination in a wide range

of job-related activities. For the first time, the law would allow juries to award monetary damages to ethnic and religious minorities, as well as women who are victims of purposeful or intentional discrimination. No wonder the big corporations, well known for their disdain and intentional torture of their minority employees, are lobbying hard against this much needed law.

It is only minorities, especially people of African descent, that can train and/or help hire a person or persons who would in turn become their boss or bosses in no distant time. It is when it comes to the minorities that education which they

have, is no longer important (or having or promoting). They become "un-qualified" when they do not have education, and "over-qualified" to many cases when they have it. In fact, they have to prove themselves in some positions before they get the title and the commensurate pay, instead of vice versa.

As President Bush said to the businessmen to May: "We seek civil rights legislation that is more effective, not less. The focus of employers in this country must be on providing equal opportunity for all workers, not on developing strategies to avoid litigation."

It is very important that President

Bush signs the bill, not only that he enjoys a high rating among African-Americans now, but for the fact that the law is necessary. There is no excuse to dilute the bill. Above all, the bill does not advocate quota; rather it advocates equal opportunity for everyone.

As Houston, Texas Congressman Craig Washington said, failure to approve this bill would send a message to employers that discrimination on the job is tolerable in an already raging tide of racial intolerance in America. As the Democratic Congressman stated, and we strongly agree, "That is not the road to a kinder, gentler nation."

The formation of ONN is long overdue

Nigerians in Dallas, on July 7, 1990, formed a unified organization that embraces social, economic, political and cultural characteristics that bear their African heritage. The name of the association is Organization of Nigerian Nationals (ONN). Such an organization is long overdue in Dallas/Fort Worth metropolis.

The success of such move was not without some actors. Richard O. Nwachukwu must be congratulated for his foresightedness in initiating such a meeting that brought the unification of the existing organizations, as well as Jerry Ugokwe, the president of the defunct New Nigerian Forum who saw the need for a unification. Tony Nwanne, the president of the defunct Nigerian Peoples Union, Herbert Nwankwo who provided a list of names in which one was chosen from, Freddy Ngwu, Amin Nzeakor, Attorney Obinna Duru who not only provided a space for the meeting, but moderated it as well, and a host of others who helped make every effort successful.

Now that a viable organization is

in place through a democratic and legal process, it is now up to the care-taker executives to prove themselves. Luckily, Jerry Ugokwe who was the president of one of the defunct organizations is the president of the newly formed one. His ability for the job cannot be contested. We hope he will not let Nigerians in Dallas down.

There is no time to waste in moving on. Nigerians in Dallas should celebrate October 1, independence day for the first time this year. That is why the executives must move fast to consolidate their programs, including a call for general meeting of "all" Nigerians in Dallas. There is no excuse for procrastination. Ghanaians in Dallas will celebrate the first anniversary of their association - Ghana Leadership Society - on September 1. That should be an encouragement to Nigerians in Dallas.

We encourage a move towards unity among Africans. Unity, as it is said, is strength. And Africans anywhere need all the strengths they can get. With the present political

near future come together to form an organization or association

geared toward that end, it could be in form of African Chamber of Commerce. With Nigerians now on board, we believe that won't be long.

CORRECTIONS

There were a few typos we did not catch in our July 1990 edition. Prominent among them were Azum which was typed as Amure on where Kenneth Onyima is from, and \$23 billion as \$25 million on Dr. Obinna Duru's write-up on "The IMF and African Underdevelopment." Duru meant to write "...The IMF is the

key stone of a total system. Its power is made possible not only by the enormous resources which it controls (over \$23 billion) in national money in the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), but more significantly as a result of its function as an international credit agency..."

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A betrayal by Senas John Ukpanah

A high level Nigerian Trade Delegation was supposed to be in Dallas on July 27, 1990, but the visit was officially canceled by Mr. C.O. Ubo, the commercial Consul at the Nigerian Consulate office in New York. It was not only a blow; it was an insult and a betrayal, not only to the City of Dallas, but to Nigeria as a nation.

The word had gone out that there was a trade delegation visiting Dallas. A lot of money and man-hours were invested. Most of the time lost cannot be quantified in

dollars like that of Herbert Nwankwo and Jerry Ugokwe.

Mr. Ubo himself who cancelled the visit after it was certain that their visit to Houston was a failure visited Dallas several times to cement the plans. In fact, he went to Austin too to make an arrangement for Senas John Ukpanah's audience with the governor of Texas Bill Clemente. Who knows if he ever called the Governor's office to cancel the scheduled visit.

The most disturbing though, was

See BETRAYAL Page 14

OPINION CORNER

Opinions expressed on these pages do not necessarily reflect the position of the Good Hope News.



Ifeanyi Obiagbo

Living in Fantasia

By IFEANYI OBIAGBO

For whatever reasons we come over to the U.S., mostly to add to what we already know, the coming usually turns to be a fantasy. No matter the shape of our departures from our countries in terms of the preparedness, there is always excitement, curiosity and most importantly, enthusiasm. Wherever we interpret our spoken and our unspoken intentions, goals and our aspirations, there is also that uncertainty. When our ships sail and anchor, or our planes take off and land, we are greeted with that mystery of the Fantasy Island.

I remember very vividly my first experience in America when I naively arrived at Chicago O'Hare Airport in 1981. I wanted to call the foreign students advisor of the University of Wisconsin to be informed of my next steps on how to get to Wisconsin. I was left with the only option in doing that with a public telephone. To be honest with you, I could not differentiate between quarters, dimes, and even nickels. I did not know what computer recorded voice messages were. When I had tried several times without any measure of success, I became frustrated and I did a lot of funny things with my coins that when I look back at them now, I laugh at myself. I laugh because prior to my arrival to the U.S. I did not think in a Fantasy Island such as America, that I would be faced with any type of problems like using a public telephone. I tell you that from that point on I realized that even in America, with all the efforts to enhance effective communications, one could still be stuck. There have been stories of similar circumstances which others have narrated to me which sometimes portray our unpreparedness for the shocks emanating from chance of environment and systems.

See FANTASY Page 12

"African-American": A journey through the Niger River

By HERBERT NWANKWO

In recent years, particularly within the past five or so years, the Americans with claims of African heritage are reviving a sense lost over years. They have come a long way, but apparently, have traveled the long course with continued search for a more befitting identity. Until recently, the term "blacks" has reigned with certain grip on the minds of many — for some mysterious reason. I have all along fallen into the same track as most of you there, until my daughter protested. She holds it religiously that it is insulting to call people "blacks". First, it isn't a fancy color, like pink or red or yellow. Secondly, it takes a colorblind person to think people are black. If color of skin is the main measure, then the world must be stupid if they think somebody like Gen. Powell (she saw him on TV), the U.S. strongman, is black. She laughs harder at the point that the color is his (Powell's) race.

It may never make sense to her. She knows what she is, a Nigerian-American, not a black. Her advice for Gen. Powell? Find out what country your parents come from, that's your heritage.

There is more to this childish talk than can be seen immediately. What I intend to do here today is run you



Herbert E. Nwankwo

through my mind's version of the African-American "history". My hypothesis is that too many of them may have originated from Nigeria, especially in the area with 200 miles or less radius of the entire stream of the River Niger, which strides Nigeria.

You must understand that this is a history month, and some reflections would not do us much harm.

How hard we work as people can fairly be seen by retracing a path of where we have been, what items we dropped along the way — even the foods we eat have a history in them. Blackeye pea is a popular food in southern Nigeria and history credits its origin here to blacks. History is not just political history. Often times that's what we see being celebrated

here. There is more to where we have been than just the politics of it.

Meanwhile, let us take a look at the history of names from Negro to African-American. The name "Negro", undoubtedly, may have been imposed by the white master, following minute nuances that gave us Nigeria and Niger as names of two neighboring West African countries. The coincidence in combination of letters cannot be accidental. Lending weight to this claim is the fact that the white slave masters and their descendants pronounced "Negro" as "Nigra". Given how well names from Africa are pronounced here, one may logically claim that the River Niger may have something to do with this name.

The Niger River was used extensively for slave trades from the boundary towns in the east, west and north of it. The Onitsha areas have been cited as one of the principal markets and gathering centers for dealers and middlemen enroute to places as far as Opobo and Degema. Onitsha is located by the Niger River and has remained a key market center for local traders today.

Niger pronounced "Nijel" is the country located north of Nigeria today. That the two have names tied to the river is also not a coincidence.

Somebody somehow may have labeled a group of slaves as the "Nijers" as a show of their port of origin. This probably caught up and became what most slaves were called then. Slave trading took a much larger proportion in the eastern part of Nigeria, and remained in various forms through several decades after it was abolished in Europe and the Americas.

Personal knowledge as a kid and up until the late sixties around that slavery was still going on them. There were then owners of some mystery kidnappers called "Ndalo madu", meaning those who kidnapped people. Parents used this as a scare trick to send kids running to their rooms at night.

Even though "illegal" shipment to America stopped probably around the first quarter of the 1960s, there remained local dealers far into the 60s. Like today's "open adoption" market, during this final period, it changed from closed secretive to an open trade with parental, and sometimes personal consent of the person traded. Poor families traded their children for money, the money was never returned (as was the case of Jaja of Opobo, who later succeeded his master as king of the area because he was able to cum-

See AMERICAN Page 11

Unbelief is dangerous

By REV. N. S. OKEREKE

A man was traveling on his motorcycle on a far journey; he saw a train approaching opposite his direction. The train driver blew his horn for the motorcyclist to clear from the road. Adamantly he did not move for the train. He did not either see the train or could not hear the horn, then the train crushed him, he died.

Humanly we can lay the blame on the motorcyclist or the train, or the driver. The motorcyclist has to carry the blame because he refused to clear for the train. Most of us are like the motorcyclist. Traveling is a part of life. We travel around the world but refuse to listen or cannot hear the horn. We refuse to see, acknowledge, and believe in God.

God revealed Himself through general revelation. You know as I know that unbelief is dangerous. The early prophets were a horn for us, we heard them, but did not believe. God revealed Himself to us through His Son Jesus who is a horn for us.



Rev. N.S. Okereke

Preachers are the modern horn we have today. Bible is a horn that is used to instruct us. If we cannot hear these horns, we will be crushed. Jesus says: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him" — John 3:36.

Do we have eye to see and ear to hear? The horns are blowing in everywhere, but one major factor is are we ready to listen? Is the horn blowing strongly into our ears? Or are we approaching the wrath of

See UNBELIEF Page 11



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EDITORIALS

S. African referendum

President Frederick de Klerk of South Africa, in reaction to his party's substantial loss in a mid-term election to a conservative party, announced on Wednesday, February 19, 1992, that his negotiation with the Black majority on the new constitution that will guarantee the sharing of powers with the disfranchised Blacks, would be sent to whites (only) referendum. As expected, the ANC condemned it.

Upon reflection, we think that de Klerk, the most pragmatic and far minded president the apartheid South Africa has ever had, made a good move. He was elected by whites in the first place. No matter how illegal the whites-only vote for a national president is, it is immaterial at this juncture. As such, the whites are his constituency first. He is using the powers entrusted in him to make South Africa a better place for all. He has threatened to resign if the referendum fails, thus putting South

Africa in an uncertain future. He has started a campaign in favor of the referendum. We hope that the white South Africans would not be stupid again to vote against his constitutional negotiation. Their first stupidity and unfortunate one was initiating apartheid in the first place.

This shows that apartheid is still alive in the minds of many whites in South Africa. As such, the international community should not relax and think that everything is okay in that sub-region. Spike Lee, the African American movie director, confirmed after visiting South Africa in January that apartheid is still alive and well.

We support de Klerk's move, but we don't support abandoning the negotiations midway. If the referendum is approved, as we think it should, de Klerk would get stronger mandate for this important future of South Africa. He has acknowledged that failure of the



RICHARD O. NWACHUKWU

referendum would bring "disaster."

To the ANC, they should be strong and ready for any eventuality. We remain hopeful that apartheid whites should choose the right path to their nation's future — peace and freedom. The consequences of otherwise may be better imagined than described.

QUOTES OF THE EDITION

"I have to know that those who gave me a mandate in the first place are still with me and are supporting me when I go ahead. I should accept your verdict..." — a national President Frederick W. de Klerk, in announcing March 17, 1992 as the whites-only referendum date on whether he would continue the constitution talks that would grant Blacks political equality.

"Our children cannot go to the school of their choice because of racism, discrimination or what you know of as apartheid... I think that it's very important for our children to be educated — to get the opportunity that you have." — Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthe, during his visit to Dallas on Monday, February 10, 1992.

"Most decent people, if they do something indecent, have the decency to keep the indecency to themselves." — Mike Royko, on Mrs. Plovers' alleged sex affairs with Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton.

"David Stockman, 45, now general partner to the Blackstone Group, an investment banking firm, has to share responsibility for America's ledger of 'no-no's' — a national debt currently at \$3 trillion. Stockman himself admitted as much early in the Reagan administration, when he said he harbored secret doubts about his own budget calculations and the effectiveness of the president's economic program." — Parade Magazine of February 23, 1992, on "How History Will View the Contribution of David Stockman." Stockman is the supply-side economist who presided as President Reagan's first director of the Office of Management and Budget.

"My country did not send the 7,000 miles to start the (Olympic) race. They sent the 7,000 miles to finish it." — Johnson Stephen Akwari of Tanzania, on his last finish in Marathon in Mexico City in 1988. He was one hour behind the winner.

"There will be only a single nuclear button, and other presidents will not possess it... Of course, we think this button must never be used." — Boris Yeltsin, Russian President, after President Gorbachev passed nuclear code to him.

Mike Tyson and rape trial

The rape trial that led to Mike Tyson's conviction on February 10, 1992 was very unfortunate. And we hope that the conviction be overturned at the higher court.

Under normal circumstances, a conviction should be beyond any reasonable and/or shadow of doubt. On Mike Tyson's case, it left more questions than answers. Even as Miss Desiree Washington, 19, the so-called rape victim, appeared on ABC's 20/20 with Barbara Walters on Friday, February 21, 1992, the situation became cloudier.

She claimed that Mike Tyson was sick and should be sentenced to prison "for as long as it takes for him to be rehabilitated." Asked what she would say if she could talk with Mr. Tyson, she said: "I would tell him, 'You need help, you know — I didn't do this to hurt you. I didn't do this to take your career away. I did it because you need help...' Well, who knows when Desiree Washington became a psychiatrist.

It must be recalled that it was this young lady, a Black American Beauty Pageant contestant in July 1991 that looked for Mr. Tyson at about 3 o'clock in the morning at Mike Tyson's hotel room. Unlike Mr. Kennedy Smith's case, Mr. Tyson did not convince and/or take her from a club. She apparently did not go to his room by any influence of drug or alcohol. As she admitted, she went there willingly and knowingly. She probably did not get what she bargained for, although she was happy to have

gone out on a date earlier with a celebrity her parents would be proud of.

In Mr. Kennedy Smith's rape trial, he was acquitted. On the one that looked much less like rape, Mike Tyson was convicted. Perhaps, the fact that Mr. Smith was a medical doctor from a celebrity family and, of course, a white, helped exonerate him. Mike Tyson, although a world boxing champion, has a terrible background. He probably was prejudged and convicted before the case even came up for trial.

It must be recalled that Miss Desiree Washington participated fully in the pageant contest a few

hours after the alleged rape. If she was raped as claimed, why didn't she report to the police sooner. Her excuse for continuing the pageant was that she was not a "quitter". What a good excuse to someone who must have lost a personal pride through this "felonious act."

This argument should not be misconstrued that we do not sympathize with rape victims. To the contrary, we certainly do. The only problem we have with this is that a lot of doubts still cloud it.

Miss Washington sounded very intelligent at the ABC's 20/20 interview, her lawyer's presence notwithstanding. Her intelligence came out clearly when she said

that she planned to study law and perhaps go into politics. Well, this exposure may have given her a future political weapon. And who knows, she may be called to act in a movie portraying a rape victim. We wish her well. But to Mike Tyson, it is about time he learns

that to whom more is given, more is expected, especially as his boxing career is not managed anymore by the establishment. At 25, he should settle down and be more careful. Perhaps, this is his greatest lesson yet.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear editor:

The article and interview that you conducted with Dallas County Commissioner John Wiley Price was even handed and objective. You presented a side of Commissioner Price that the other print media never do: John Wiley Price, the person — not just the protestor.

When people get an opportunity to read about John Wiley Price, the person, they will then understand why he protests.

The article was paramount! The foremost piece of journalism I've ever read about Commissioner Price.

Your idea to make the interview a question and answer one was also a good idea. That way one doesn't

have to worry about being misquoted or having their words misconstrued.

Thank you for printing that story. The two pieces on Mrs. Winnie Mandela were also very enlightening and educational. I had never known that up until two years ago, the executive members of the African National Congress were not allowed to visit the United States, as the ANC was perceived to be a "terrorist" organization. But we have to remember this is the same United States that was responsible for the incarceration of Nelson Mandela in the first place!

Respectfully yours,
Dannay L. Suggers

GOOD HOPE NEWS

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EDITORIALS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The unforeseen consequences of war

The Gulf war has come and gone. The victor and the vanquished are no more a secret. But what is next? It is our opinion that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq miscalculated on the United States' reactions to his invasion of Kuwait. He also miscalculated on how the war should be fought, and its eventual outcome.

The Soviet Union miscalculated too. The authorities there did not realize that a defeat of Iraqi army would be a defeat of the Soviet weaponry, and that the U.S. would seek a permanent base in the Gulf. According to the statement credited to the American Commander of Operation Desert Storm Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf on Sunday, March 24, the U.S. is closer than ever to establishing a permanent military headquarters on Arab soil, a goal Arab governments have blocked for many years. Well, as we said in our earlier editorial, the Arabs would never be the same again after the war.

To the U.S. government, there were some miscalculations too. The United States, we assume, did not want to destroy Iraq to the extent that it would become a prey to its neighbors like Iran. But it ended up doing so. According to the United Nations report released recently, Iraq has been set back to the pre-industrial development era. On top of that, the war has not stopped in Iraq; the country is still having internal strife, and Iran is said to be sponsoring it. The United States, again, did not want to conquer Saddam Hussein so that an extremist Shiite Moslem would take over the country. But with the conditions the United States is setting for the yet-to-be-signed permanent cease-fire, that might happen.

Overall, what has Saddam Hussein gained from the war other than drawing attention to the Palestine question? He could have done that by pulling out on the January 15 deadline. What did he gain from the Iraq-Iran war? Nothing! All the land Iraq gained was given back to Iran when he invaded Kuwait. Now Iran has most of the Iraqi warplanes that were sent there during the Gulf war to avoid the U.S. bombers' destruction. Now we are hearing that Iran intends to keep these warplanes.

Kuwait did not gain either. Almost all its oilfields are on fire, and they may take about two years to be extinguished. As we write this, the country has no power supply, no good drinking water, no good breathing air, and it is littered with war debris. In other words, the country has gone back to the primitive stage until things are rebuilt again. And stability is not assured there either. Remember, there used to be a snafu of Iran; that no more exists.

There might be power nukes there in the long run. The citizens' eyes are more open now than ever. But only time will tell on that one.

In late 1970s or early 1980s, Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma (rtd.) of Nigeria, advised that country's leaders to avoid anything that would drag them into another civil war. Gen. Danjuma who was one of the architects of the counter-coup that resulted in the assassination of Gen. Thomas U. Aguiyi Irons (an Ibo) on July 29, 1966, and subsequently into a 30-month civil war, told the leaders that no nation in history had survived

two (civil) wars within 10 years.

Perhaps someone courageous enough within the Iraqi cabinet or party should have advised Saddam Hussein that before he defied the United Nations deadline. And as things stand now, with the country "decimated", people divided according to religious and ethnic lines, and Iran standing to prey on her, in retaliation of the past acts. Theophilus Danjuma may have been proven right with the Iraqi miscalculation. As such, nations should from now on, learn from others' past mistakes.



RICHARD O. NWACHUKWU

Dear Editor:

I am always embused to read the "Personality Of This Edition," one of the best informative and educational columns in your newspaper. It is very commendable of you to bring into the limelight such persons that are really primus inter pares to our conditions. Africa.

To those persons who have been or will be recognized in this column, I tender my congratulations for excelling in their various capacities. They are the good hopes and inspirations to their country's men and women.

We are proud of the Good Hope News and the chosen personalities of each edition of the newspaper. Your jobs are worthy of emulation. Please keep up your good works!

Eric Umeh

The L.A. Shame

What happened in Los Angeles, California on Sunday, March 3, 1991 between police officers and a motorist, Rodney Glen King, was a shame, not only to the L.A. Police Department and its Chief Daryl Gates, but to law enforcement agencies across the United States and/or the world. In fact, the incident looked more like what had been going on in the apartheid South Africa, or what had happened in the U.S. in the 1930s and early 1960s, especially in the deep South.

On that date, Police Sergeant Stacey Koon, 40, and officers Lawrence Powell, 23, Timothy Wind, 30, and Theodore Briseno, 38, (all whites), stopped Mr. Rodney King (an African American) who was allegedly speeding. As soon as Mr. King stepped out of his car, Sgt. Stacey Koon fired a 50,000-volt Taser stun gun on him, while the other three officers look turns to beat, club, and kick him as the sergeant and other eleven officers looked on. Luckily for Mr. King, an amateur video shooter, Mr. George Holliday, was trying his newly bought home video camera when the incident occurred. He shot the footage of the incident from his home. The actions of those police officers were, and still are, gruesome. By the time the officers finished having "good time" on Mr. King, he had suffered eleven fractures in his head, a broken leg, a crushed cheekbone, a broken ankle, injuries to both knees, internal injuries, a burn on his chest, a concussion, nerve damage, a shattered eye socket, and possible brain damage. On top of that, they tried to charge him for resisting arrest. The Los Angeles District Attorney's office, understandably declined to file the charges. Rather, those officers were charged.

What a shame in the United States! What apparent racism and prejudice: it was written all over their conversation and communica-

tions to the police headquarters. And yet, an African American, Tom Bradley, is the city's mayor.

The police chief of the city is not helping the situation either. On Monday, March 18, 1991, he said, "We regret what took place. I hope the (victim) gets his life straightened out. Perhaps this will be the vehicle to move him down the road to a good life instead of the life he's been involved in for such a long time." Well, what was how regretful the chief was.

Now, the FBI and the Justice Department are looking into all police complaints nationwide that have not passed the statute of limitation. Meanwhile, Sgt. Koon, Officers Powell, Wind and Briseno have been indicted on felony charges of assault and assault under the color of authority.

The incident in Los Angeles, a city relatively more modern and progressive than many cities in the South, is not unique. Such incidents are regularly reported in Miami, New York, Dallas, Houston, and various other big cities. What is unique though, is that it was caught by a video camera — thanks to Mr. George Holliday, who deserves an award.

Here in Dallas, African Americans, particularly African immigrants, report flagrant abuse of authority by police. We have gotten many reports of police assaults, racial slurs, unlawful search and seizure and issuance of unwarranted tickets. We have heard that when a car accident occurs between Africans and Caucasians, the police officers that arrive at the scene, particularly white officers, ask only their fellow whites to tell how the incident happened, and then write their report solely on such one-sided accounts. One attorney told the Good Hope News that when his client, who was involved in a car accident, was rushed to the hospital unconscious,

the police who arrived at the scene just wrote a one-sided report without hearing from the victim.

While we do not diminish the inherent danger the police officers face each day on their duties, it is very necessary that they treat people like human beings. It is only through that process that they will get the respect they truly deserve. Simply put, you don't enforce law by breaking the law, and we are glad that the new Dallas police chief, William Rathburn, incidentally from the Los Angeles Police Department, has put it in writing to his police officers and he said that he will lead by example.

Dear Mr. Nwachukwu:

Your book makes a compelling reading. It is a very lucid intelligence to bear on a demystifying creativity and you've managed to be highly informative without obscuring the great darkness of your subject.

It is indeed an informative book that captures in human terms the difficult transitional period as our country embarks itself, yet again, on a democratic model.

Apparently, you are committed to thoughtfully analyzing thought, and you are, quite frankly, one of Nigeria's best commentators on these matters. You insured me. Please do not let up.

Sincerely,
Ikenna Anokwuts, Jr.

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OPINION CORNER

The young black males in the 1990's

By JOSIAH OPATA

In the book of Hebrews, Chapter 12 verses 7-9, we read, "If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as sons; for what son is he whom the father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons."

Furthermore we have had fathers of our flesh which corrupted us, and we gave them reverence: Shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the father of spirits, and live?"

To be able to deal fairly with our theme, the young males in the 1990's, we would need to recapture the past of the male, especially the African American male; diagnose the work of our parents and put them on the back if we feel that they have done a good job. On the other hand, if we find any pathology or defect in our children, soul then we would need to prescribe a cure or a panacea or a remedy.

First of all, my personal observation of the black men from the mid 70's to the nineties, is that we live in a very fractured or divided society. With the coming of Ronnie Reagan into power in the 1980's, the African American family failed through governmental policies and agendas. For example, the average under-employed family who took welfare or food stamps, was not served, unless the father was evicted from the home. At the same time, the



Rev. Josiah Opata

fathers were denied meaningful jobs in Texas, Mexico, Arizona and other immigrants replaced African American men who worked manual or less skilled jobs. The men who went to college and benefited from government quotas to obtain jobs in the private sector, were also denied jobs as the government opposed quotas. Thus the only employment avenue left for black males was in the military, sales commission jobs, teaching and preaching, or service type jobs. So we have a whole lot of preachers who were called by circumstances beyond

their control, who were called by man and not by God. Their pockets and their stomachs, which were empty, drove them to ministry. So even in the ministry, they have no compassion, no mercy, no love and no Holy Ghost. If we fail to write down what we are saying today, there will be no history or future generations. Those who went into

the military, were driven to genocide, either killed, or frustrated after they were discharged from the service, by being denied meaningful jobs. So often they turned to drugs, because their wives became material minded, that their sole aim of marrying the GI's was not based on love, but to steal their military benefits.

Those who turned to drugs became

criminals, went to jail and became public enemies instead of public defenders. Their counterparts who served in the military, were able to use their G.I. Bill to go to college and were absorbed into private and public industry, where they are in middle management or other leadership roles.

So in their sonnets, they write: See YOUNG, Page 15

Dictators still dominate Africa

By IKENNA ANOKWUTE

The triumphant visit of African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela to the United States last summer raised an interesting but largely overlooked paradox about African politics as a whole. Mandela, representing an oppressed black majority speaking out against their white minority, enjoys massive world-wide support. Yet beyond the borders of South Africa, the tyranny inflicted by black rulers on their black subjects is on a par with that of Pretoria's despised apartheid regime.

And with the cold war winding down, the world has turned its back on black Africa because there seems to be no compelling political or economic reasons to pay attention. Most of the traditional hard-headed commercial and military reasons

for pouring money into Africa's poor countries — keeping communism out of the third world, making poor countries safe for economic penetration and exploitation of their resources — have begun to sound old fashioned or beside the point. The Soviets are busy at home. Resources turn out to be well-distributed around the globe, and, increasingly, syndicates can be suborned. Cheap labor is available almost everywhere. Poor people do not make good customers, and not very many of them get rich.

Much western aid to Africa has come through the World Bank, which funds huge development projects with the dubious idea that the benefits will "trickle down" to the poor. World Bank policies contribute to Africa's misery by forcing African leaders to make "structural

adjustments", devaluation of currency, reduction of government payrolls, etc., that harm the poor. The World Bank has fallen into a co-dependent relationship with countries whose officials regularly rake 10 to 15 percent off on big projects. Furthermore, the World Bank charter is "above politics" — dutifully servicing any government that meets its conditions however repressive, however corrupt, that government may be.

African governmental leaders tend to take care of themselves and their friends. They either ignore or are unable to provide medical and educational services (just to name a few) for their citizens. The answer, I suggest, is increased awareness of the world economy. Africa adrift from the rest of the world's

See DICTATORS, Page 11

Failures: Stepping stones to success

By JOE WALKER

The notion that success has a thousand fathers and failure is an orphan is a vital part of human development and adjustment. That's probably why troubles and challenges have a way of showing up on a more routine basis than happiness and the good life.

But look at the brighter side. Failures are the stepping stones to success. It's so simple it's complex. Think about it. Show me an individual that has never made a mistake and I'll bet my last penny that it will either be a brand new baby or someone that never quite mastered the technique of breathing.

Most people walk the narrow back roads of life by trying to avoid failure at all cost. That's like going without air for about two weeks. The reality is failure is the one reading which allows genuine self-reflection with a quest for understanding. It begs the question, "where did I go wrong?" Additionally, failure allows a cleansing of the soul in that most of the bottled up frustrations find easy

ventilation channels once the idea is accepted.

Failure is also therapeutic. It slows the burn rate, reduces momentum and superimposes an involuntary regrouping process which is regulated by an inner-clock synchronized to the "real beat" as opposed to the heartbeat. That's why most people do a lot of soul searching after experiencing defeat. It hurts, but more importantly, it heals and prepares you for a greater challenge and a better day ahead. The hidden key to enjoying the benefits of failure is to make quota on mistakes and then take advantage of the extended recuperation plan.

Failure also promotes honesty. When people have nothing to lose that's when the truth generally comes out. Countless public figures have gotten their houses back in order after stepping forward and acknowledging their failures as a prelude to picking up the pieces again. One of the most glaring examples is the success of Alcoholic Anonymous, a model, snowcase program built upon the principle that the truth will set you free once you acknowledge your shortcomings and accept your failures as challenging stepping stones.



Joe Walker

Failure is the equalizer that realigns egos while keeping humility alive. People brag and boast when things are going good. Once they slip and fall they have a tendency to be kinda quiet about it. Not only does failure cut egos down to size but it also adjusts the most view mirror. See FAILURES, Page 14



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EDITORIALS

It is Africa's turn at the UN

The post of Secretary-General of the United Nations will be vacant some time this year. Africa believes it is her turn to fill the post since she is the only continent that has not produced one. This reasoning is appropriate for several reasons.

Africa produced Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania when the position was vacant in 1982, but Salim was refused the job because of the United States veto. African continent does not have a permanent member at the United Nations Security Council, nor does it have a veto power. Due to what happened in 1982, Africa decided to produce four candidates for the post this time around. We hope that one of them will get it.

The diplomats Africa produced for this position this year are people of high calibre and substance.

For example, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo was a former Nigerian head of state; Bernard Cudjere is Zimbabwe's Finance Minister; James Jonah of Sierra Leone is currently the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Kenneth Oadzie of Ghana is the head of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Each of the African countries involved in this diplomatic jangle is independently pursuing the interest of its name, reputation and power. Our hope is to see an African elevated to that executive position at the United Nations. Africa can no longer be marginalized in the world affairs. It has been for too long. Whether a Zimbabwean or Nigerian or Ghanaian or Sierra Leonean, what we care about is for an African to



RICHARD O. NWACHUKWU

take the spot light. Luckily, each of them is uniquely qualified to lead the world body. This might not solve Africa's economic and political problems, but it sure would position Africa to be heard.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Editor:

First, let me thank you for your prompt response to my request in forwarding to me the most recent copy of the Good Hope News. Please find enclosed a cheque in the amount of \$16 (U.S.) covering an entire one year's subscription for me.

Second, on reading through some of the articles and news items in the Good Hope News I noticed that there are several references to the Igbo people with the derogatory term "Ibo". Please let me stress that the term "Ibo" has been an anglicized reference for Igbo, apparently by the British and other non-Igbo elements who refuse to employ the proper term Igbo. The reference "Ibo" is resented by many well-meaning

Igbo, and I believe that it is only proper that you may pay attention to this and use the proper and correct term of identification for the Igbo people.

I do not object to your publishing this letter in the next edition of the Good Hope News. Keep on the good work, as your efforts in familiarizing us in far away North America with events in our dear home land is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,
Dr. Fidelis H. Ezazi
St. John, New Brunswick
Canada

Editor's Note: Thanks Dr. Ezazi for your observation. We will take note.

Confirm Clarence Thomas

Judge Clarence Thomas, the second African American ever to be appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court — the highest court of the land — is a conservative. To most African Americans, it is unbecoming of anybody from Judge Thomas' background to be so unconcerned with minority plight in this country. He exhibited a nonchalant attitude to the minorities problems when he was the chief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. At such, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) strongly opposed him then. So it is no surprise that the association opposed him again as he is appointed to the Supreme Court. NAACP's position was made public on Wednesday, July 31.

After reviewing Judge Thomas' background very carefully, we feel that he should be confirmed to the highest court. It is well established in politics that the devil you know is better than the one you don't know.

Judge Thomas was born black and poor. According to the Time Magazine, "Thomas was born with the help of a midwife in 1948 in segregated enclave without paved streets or sewers. His mother Leola Williams, only 18 when he was born, already had an infant daughter. When Thomas was two, his father walked out on the family, heading to Philadelphia in search of a better life. Pregnant with a third child, Thomas' mother lived in dirt floor one-room shack that belonged to an aunt and went to work at the factory next door,

picking crabmeat for 5 cents per lb." Continued the Time, "The children wore hand-me-down clothes from the Sweet Fields of Eden Baptist Church and often without shoes..."

That is not all. Judge Thomas attended rigorous Catholic schools, including St. John Vianney Minor Seminary in Savannah. He was the only black in the 1967 graduating class. He also attended Immaculate Conception Seminary for one year in Concepcion, Missouri. It was reported that he could not stand the unfair racial snub his white colleagues were giving him. The nuns that taught him in the Catholic schools reportedly were called "nigger nuns." Even when Rev. (Dr.) Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968, he reportedly heard a fellow student say something like "It's about time you got the s.o.b." At another occasion, one student yelled at him when light went out, "Smile, Clarence, so we can see you," reported the Time. And the list of his racial encounters continued.

Judge Thomas once married a fellow African American. That marriage ended in divorce. He is now married to a white lady. He was once a Catholic; he is now an Episcopalian. He was admitted into Yale Law School under affirmative action plan. And after he graduated from law school, he was not able to get a job in the white law firms in Georgia. All these show that Judge Thomas, if, has seen discrimination, segregation, hardship, and a host of other sufferings of blacks in America. Hav-

ing suffered all these, it would be a hypocrisy for him to say or believe that it is easy for black people in America.

It is true that he is a conservative. He advocates self-help among African Americans. He was in July 1983 quoted in the Washington Post as saying "I'll put the bottom line on you: I don't think we (African Americans) caused our problem, but we're damn sure going to have to solve it." In February 1987, Atlantic magazine quoted him as saying: "I don't see how the civil rights people today can claim Malcolm X as one of their own. Where does he say black people should go begging the Labor Department for jobs. He was hell on integrationists. Where does he say you should sacrifice your institutions to be next to white people." Turning to white racism he said, "There is nothing you can do to get past black skin. I don't care how educated you are, how good you are at what you do, if you are a black, you'll never be seen as equal to whites."

It is our hope that Judge Thomas be confirmed. But if not him, another African American. We share the concerns of those who oppose his nomination. His past utterances were starkly contrary to the legacy left behind by Justice Thurgood Marshall. But we have to hear what his mother said recently. Said her: "Black people, they don't have to think alike, they don't have to talk alike. And that Clarence, he always did have a mind of his

own." President Bush needs to be praised for, at least finding an African American who meets his predetermined test. He could have chosen a Hispanic like Judge Garcia, or a white. In our opinion, no matter how conservative Judge Thomas is, he would surely be bet-

ter than another conservative who has not been a black. As such, we want him confirmed, unless it is certain that another qualified African American would be nominated. This may be very unlikely, having watched President Bush in the past.

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History in the Making In The United States

Some color barriers were knocked down in the United States of America during the recent November 7, 1989 elections. L. Douglas Wilder, an African-American, a lawyer, and the Lt. Governor of the former confederacy Virginia, was elected Governor of that state. And David Dinkins, also an African-American, a lawyer, and the Manhattan Borough President, was elected the first black mayor of New York City. What a victory for African-Americans.

America is changing. The Rev. Jesse Jackson called it "the maturing of white America." The Martin Luther King, Jr.'s dream is fast materializing. Blacks are increasingly being judged by the content of their character rather than by the pigmentation of their skin.

Although Mr. Wilder was the first African-American ever elected as a governor in the

United States history, he was not the first black governor. In 1870 Pinckney B.S. Pinchback was appointed the Louisiana acting governor after the incumbent was impeached.

Other African-Americans elected mayors for the first time were Norman Rice in Seattle, Washington State, John Daniels in New Haven, Connecticut, Michael White in Cleveland, Ohio, and Chester Jenkins in Durham, North Carolina.

When these newly elected mayors take their respective offices, there will be at least 314 African-American mayors in the United States, according to the National Conference of Black Mayors.

Four of the nation's six largest cities will have black mayors. They are New York which is the largest city, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Detroit. This is a new America.

Nigerian Made Cars Displayed

The first batch of 100 cars manufactured in Nigeria were displayed towards the end of September 1989, in Abuja, the future Nigerian capital.

One type of the cars was the prototype of a three-wheel car capable of accommodating three passengers. This type was developed by the Kwara State Polytechnic.

The other type was a four-wheel vehicle with room for five people. Designed by a Lagos-based engi-

neering firm, the car has four forward gears and one reverse. It has a rear-wheel independent suspension, a payload of 500 kilograms and an unladen weight of 400 kilograms.

Meanwhile, the ministry of industry has evolved new guidelines for the automobile sector, with the aim of emphasizing the production of a Nigerian automobile that is cheap but suitable for general use.

One of the Oghu Festival masquerades dances to the satisfaction of the audience.

Racial Slur Backfires In Houston

The eight-term Houston city councilman's racial slur on blacks, backfired on the November 7, 1989 elections. Black voters had the last laugh.

The ex-large councilmember Jim Westmoreland had suggested renaming Houston's intercontinental airport "Nigger International," as a "joke". what he called an off-the-record conversation during the council debate on how to best honor the late U.S. Rep. Mickey Leland, who died in a plane crash in July 7, 1989 in Ethiopia. Mickey Leland was the chairman of the House Sub Committee on Hunger and Nutrition. The famine in Ethiopia was the result of the

Westmoreland later claimed was "Negro International," made national headlines.

On November 7, 1989, the Houstonians who heard such overt and insensitive racial remarks by a man of Westmoreland's stature, gave him a political death sentence. They, in effect, elected a black woman, Beverly Clark 34, who was virtually unknown.

During the Sunday Morning News radio talk show on November 9, Westmoreland said that he was "sorry" for his "joke". He said he was "sorry" for his "joke". He said he was "sorry" for his "joke".

mark to be unacceptable. His defeat also sent a clear message that no one with such views will be allowed to speak for the city.

The editorial further stated that "Mr. Westmoreland's reelection bid notwithstanding, his remarks could not have come at a worse time. It was made when Houston was beginning to heal from the tragic loss of a popular congressman. The overt bigotry of the councilman's comment was insensitive, not only to the memory of the late representative but also to the community's shared sense of loss."

Now, had it not been for Westmoreland's racist remarks, Houston does not know who would have been elected.

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Ethiopian President Flees



President Mengistu

With rebels chasing him, Ethiopia's Marxist President, Mengistu Haile Mariam, resigned and fled into exile on May 21 ending an iron-fisted 14-year rule over one of Africa's poorest countries.

The State radio announced that a former defense minister, Lt. General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, had taken over as acting president of the country. The government said it would try

to arrange a cease-fire with the rebels, who had long sought Mengistu's ouster and an end to human rights abuses.

The rebels, who control the northern third of Ethiopia, expressed skepticism about the government's readiness to change and commit to continue fighting. However, they have agreed to attend a US-sponsored peace conference which was scheduled to start in London on May 20. The rebels have expressed the desire to negotiate a broad-based transitional government that would hold elections.

Diplomatic sources said Mengistu was likely to have gone to Zimbabwe where he is said to own a villa and to have kept his family the last six months. Other sources said he flew to Nairobi, Kenya.

Continued on page 18

ABACHA HONORED BY COLLIN POWELL

by Azubuike
Ukachuwa-Nwoko, Jr. and
Isaiah E. Nwankwo

Nigeria's Defense Minister and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Sani Abacha paid an official visit to the United States from May 8 to May 17 at the invitation of General Collin Powell, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States.

General Abacha was greeted upon arrival at Andrews' Air Force base by C. Jerome Jones, Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy. His next stop was at Las Vegas, Nevada where he inspected military installations. He was received in Nevada by Major General Billy G. McCoy, the Commander of US Airforce



General Collin Powell Greets General Sani Abacha at the Pentagon.

General Abacha received commendation from the United States for his service.

Yes African

Continued on page 18

Armed Robbery: Kids Stolen With Car

Unbelievably true! On May 2, around 7:30 a.m., Bisola Savage and Tomi Makinde, both 6-year olds were abducted by armed robbers while being chauffeured to their school, Navy Town Primary School, Qm Town in a Toyota Land Cruiser belonging to UNICEF.

The chauffeur, Mr. Sagbo, had stopped at Volkswagen bus stop along Badagry Ex-



Bisola Savage



Tomi Makinde

pressway, Lagos to let off one of his riders, one Ronke Daskwe. Before the driver could pull away, gun-toting hoodlums shot their way out of the crowd and emptied their bullets into the driver and a soldier who had come to his rescue.

The bandits, thereafter, escaped through Iba Road in the Land Cruiser with regis-

Continued on page 18

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Clarence Thomas: Mainstream Media-Hype

PART ONE

by Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr.

While ours, as a newspaper, has been to mainly troubleshoot, debate and attempt a multi-angular resolution of continental African problems, the intrinsic relevance of African-Americans to the composite African cultural and racial dilemma, vis-a-vis global human relations, cannot be controverted. It is for this reason, coupled with and consonant to his above interest in American affairs, that this writer spotlights the discussion of the African personality at this juncture on the recent nomination of appellate court judge Clarence Thomas. If the man's surname (or last name) could be said, facetiously, to be controvertible, this aspect would be tackled in the follow-up part to this discourse. But, perhaps, the rather unfathomable molding impact of Anglo-American media in the definition, choice and character of African-American political potentials (if there is anything really as such) is the greatest hurdle in the endless track towards racial self-liberation and destiny. Traditionally, the mainstream has always arrogated itself the right to validate or annul the substance of those who will pretend to articulate the collective ideology and drive of African-Americans; which brings us to the recent editorial in *The New York Times*, entitled "A Justice Until 2030" (July 2, 1991).

The above-mentioned editorial smacks of sheer racism, to adumbrate the least. In asking that the U.S. Senate accord Thomas its toughest scrutiny ever, the editorial purveys a dual moral standard — not surprisingly — in view of the fact that the *Times* did not demand a similar high-handedness when bonafide white conservative justice David Souter was nominated to the same United States Supreme Court by President George Bush. To this effect, the *Times*' editors write: "Presidents are entitled in a presumption in favor of their nominees for transitory appointments to the executive branch positions. But there can be no such presumption for lifetime appointments to the coordinate judicial branch. Fair and thorough hearings are not a presumption but a constitutional responsibility" (This writer's emphasis).

Whatever "constitutional responsibility" these editors are talking about, their singular message cannot easily be mistaken: as long as the majority of appointees to the executive branch of government is white, the legislature should maintain a laxity in confirmation scrutiny but, perhaps, what is even more disturbing is the hypocritical attitude taken by the *Times*' editors in emphatically demanding "extra scrutiny" of Judge Clarence Thomas on the dubious grounds of the nominee's African-American racial identity. While lauding the voluntarily truncated tenure of Justice Thurgood Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court, the *Times* forks

its tongue by pretending to belong to the much touted liberal camp of the venerable red-robed black judicial pioneer, nothing could be farther from the truth. Whenever *The New York Times* has supported civil rights measures, it has almost always been with the supposed special interests of its "non-parallelled" long suffering ethnic constituency in the back of its composite mind. Indeed, a glaring case in point is the *Times*' rather condescending attitude towards African-Americans encapsulated by that paper's snuckering front-page report less than twenty-four hours after Justice Marshall's resignation, attributing the indisputably aging adjudicator's voluntary abdication to sheer anger and frustration generated by the court's conservative majority. Needless to recall, in a rather apt reposit, Marshall called the *Times* upon a "double-barreled lie." This is the very newspaper which while assiduously championing the cause of other non-black, supposedly oppressed groups, has almost consistently denounced relief programs oriented towards the infrastructural rehabilitation of historically stymied African-Americans.

The foregoing assertion can be borne out by *The New York Times*' systematic and "loyal", if not blind, support for recent arbitrary and rampant tuition hikes imposed on the increasingly heavily minority-enrolled city and state universities of New York, as well as other public institutions that lean considerably towards the sound education of the poor and racially marginalized at reasonable expenditures. The *Times*, it is interesting to note, has yet to launch a similar campaign against the clearly over-inflated salaries — between \$60,000 to \$100,000 — of the faculty of these universities, and the latter's consequent insensitivity to the grim grips of these rambunctious hikes imposed on its students.

Thus, when *The New York Times* calls for the extra-scrutiny of Judge Clarence Thomas — and it is important to note that this writer is not in any way a staunch supporter of the Supreme Court nominee — it is simply engaging only one of its myriad traditional anti-African gimmicks. Consequently, when the *Times*' editors state that: "If Thomas is confirmed, and remains on the Court until the same age as Justice Marshall, this (i.e., Marshall's) seat won't be filled again until the year 2030," they are only crassly questioning the propriety of elccong an African-American to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States for such a promisingly protracted tenure, assuming this stereotypical paralleling of Marshall and

Continued on the following page

COMMENTARY

D I G E S T

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Professor Hill/Judge Thomas

An Epic Saga

by Angeberth Ugochukwu Ezeogu

Professor of Law, Anita Faye Hill - young, single, a good student while at Yale Law School, intelligent, ambitious and laden with advice - flies from little Norman, Oklahoma to Washington, D.C. She flies in to testify of her alleged sexual harassment by her former boss, Judge Clarence Thomas. She sits before more than 100 lawmakers of the greatest country on earth. They are clad in dark business suits. Their eyes are aglare. Mercilessly. Inquisitively. For a moment I think I see the professor shudder. I think I see a glimmer of perspiration on her intelligent forehead. She is meticulously clad, color and all. The screen lends the impression of a robin-egg's blue. A red or black outfit would have taken from her credibility. She is laden with advice.



Anita Hill

The professor suppresses the little glint of timidity. She thrusts her lower jaw forward and commences her testimonial. During the hearing/interrogation she reminds us that this is not a legal suit. Rather, she is doing her country a service by stepping forward to testify when called upon. She is here to testify to the bad character of the Judge at large. That's what she states before millions of viewers and listeners. Professor Hill is also very much aware that the defendant's opposition is on her side. Heavyweights like Joseph Biden, Lloyd Bentsen, Alan Cranston, Dodd and why not, Ted Kennedy, are on her side. For a moment Professor Hill is oblivious of the ferocity of the defendant's support. Little does she know that the defendant's supporters could do damage in what will metamorphosize into a bipartisan riot. There is suborn Orrin Hatch. There is Robert Dole, John Danforth, D'Amato, Arlene Specter, et al. They are glaring at her. Poor Professor Hill finds herself in the middle of a bipartisan brass-knuckle brawl. She is in the very center of the Punisian war. She is surrounded by the Cartheginians and Spartans alike under the spectatorship of the whole world. Only this war is bloodless. The battlefield is within the hallowed walls of the Senate Caucus Room. The thick carpeting is blood-red. The tablecloths are a sobering green. The audience is motionless. Nobody leaves. Nobody enters.

Somebody insinuates that Professor Hill's testimonial is a brain child of her fantasy. Another wickedly brandishes a copy of the Exorcist and propounds that she is possessed by

Comes the time for he who has not sinned to cost the first stone. Senator Kennedy is careful not to be the one. The Republicans have ammunition too, you see. Ferocious Orrin Hatch, gentleman from Utah, offers to sell us a bridge in Massachusetts. It is Arlen Specter who offers to sell us the Kennedy estate in Palm Beach, Florida?

a demon. The hearing takes on a trial canopy. Chairman Biden had earlier emphasized the incredibility of the professor's credibility.

But Professor Hill knows Judge Thomas very closely. Are you kidding me? They worked together in very close proximity. She was single and young and had a Yale law degree. She was not bad looking at all. She was an intelligent, career oriented young woman. Judge Thomas was divorced at the time. He wielded power and influence. Somewhere along the line, Professor Hill probably nurtured fantasies of getting hitched with the Judge. Despite her alleged sexual harassment, she follows him from the Department of Education to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She states that it was because her position at Education was not guaranteed. She did not bother to find out, though. She is intelligent and ambitious.

The dream of getting hitched blurs when the Judge decides to get hitched to another woman of a different race. Professor Hill's telephone messages stop. Her pride is



Clarence Thomas

wounded. Retaliation lurks.

A decade later, a grand opportunity knocks. Vindication has to rear its head. It is the eve of the Judge's confirmation as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States of America which is a classy, honorable, life-long echelon. The professor steps forward. Wouldn't you? She scares the lights out of Judge Thomas and places his career, integrity, reputation and perhaps, family life on a hot wire. Or so it seems. I am so glad that Judge Thomas stood real tall. I am glad I did not catch him whimper. He shot right back chastening the hearing a high-tech lynching of the uppity black.

Comes the time for he who has not sinned to cast the first stone. Senator Kennedy is careful not to be the one. The Republicans have ammunition too, you see. Ferocious Orrin Hatch, gentleman from Utah, offers to sell us a bridge in Massachusetts. It is Arlen Specter who offers to sell us the Kennedy estate in Palm Beach, Florida?

We the bystanders are led to believe that Judge Thomas is highly qualified for this new position. He is only a vicum of the process. He, like Professor Hill, is in the middle of this fist fight. His opposition has been unable to dig up more grotesque skeletons from his long past. Rather they bring public hairs, breasts, penises and long dong silvers into the celebrated Senate Caucus Room and the homes of millions of American men, women, teenagers and snout-nosed children.

"Hey mom, what's Long Dong Silver?" Since nothing anyone says has mattered hitherto, may everyone for ever zip their lips.

Congratulations to Justice Thomas and a pat on the shoulder for Professor Hill. I admire her courage. The Senate will never be the same again.

Angeberth Ugochukwu Ezeogu, a contributor to the Nigerian News Digest is based in East Orange, New Jersey.

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COMMENTARY

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Race: America's Quagmire

by Ikenna E. Anokwule

A generation ago, America convulsed its society and changed its laws to free Black America from discrimination. Legally and socially, no country on earth tries so hard to be free of racism, yet no nation is so obsessed with race. It infests almost every debate.

George Bush makes a campaign television commercial about crime, but it features a Black criminal, so he is called racist. The FBI prosecutes a cocaine-using mayor and is accused of racism because he is Black. The army that fought in the Gulf was disproportionately Black, so there were cries that Blacks would die for a white quarrel. Car dealers are found to offer better deals to White people than Black. AIDS kills more Blacks than Whites. The high blood pressure of Black men was blamed by a medical report on discrimination. Race is still America's top domestic issue.



Despite all its efforts, America still has its racism. In January a national poll found that most Whites think Blacks are lazy, less intelligent and less patriotic than Whites. David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard, won almost two-thirds of the white vote in the Louisiana Senate race last year, and 55% of the White vote in the governorship runoff election last month. And in one poll 29% of

Blacks were willing to countenance the idea that AIDS was created by Whites to eradicate Blacks.

But is racism the cause of Black peoples deprivation? Historically, yes. Blacks would have been better off now if, after being shipped to America in chains, they had been allowed the same freedom to prosper as willing immigrants here. But what about today? The progress America has made in dismantling discrimination is extraordinary. A generation ago in the South, Blacks could not even go to the White restaurants or be buried in White cemeteries. Let alone compete for good jobs or live in White neighborhoods. Since then Blacks have not caught up at all, in fact, in recent years they have fallen back. Is that because discrimination lingers on? Many Black civil rights group claim that Black deprivation is the result of continuing racism, and that reversing discrimination will rescue Blacks from poverty. A growing number of Black intellectuals, and White politicians, disagree. Ending what remains of racism is eminently desirable, they say, but it will do little to improve the lot of the poorest Blacks.

The irony of Black power is that just as Whites once used skin color as a source of privilege, so Blacks now use it as a source of entitlement. At one college, professors have demanded higher pay for Black professors because they are Black. At another, Black students (but only Blacks) are paid for improving their grades, a Pavlovian training in the mentality of entitlement and a perpetuation of the idea of Blacks as victims. Are we?

In recent years, policy has increasingly turned to "affirmative action" (American word for positive discrimination) in hope that better Black role models will emerge. But affirmative action is a two-edged sword. It suggests to the Black who gets the job, and the White colleague he meets that he did not get there on merit, but because of the color of his skin. Racial resentment follows. In 1990, Jesse Helms defeated a Black opponent, Harvey Gantt, in a senate race in North Carolina after running television commercials showing imaginary Whites being rejected for jobs because

affirmative action had given those jobs to Blacks. Job placement stigmatizes those who do not need help, starts a "backlash" from Whites and reinforces the myth of racial inferiority, the most pernicious effect of which is that Blacks have believed it as much as whites. Above all, affirmative action assuages white guilt.

For some individuals, affirmative action may still do more good than harm. But the real problem is that it reaches mainly those who need it least. The chief beneficiaries of affirmative action are university students and Black businessmen, who are the Blacks most likely to succeed anyway. It does not touch the lives of most poor Blacks, and yet, it dominates the debate. Blacks need to realize that affirmative action cannot solve their most serious problems. Whites need to remember that affirmative action does not make it an advantage to be born Black.

Two bad ideas clutter the debate. The first is Black separatism, in vogue in universities led by extreme Black activists. Racially separated degree ceremonies and fraternities are popular with the people most angry at apartheid. But who can doubt that, if the two races were to "separate", the Blacks would be the poor? Integration is the best hope for both. Black separatism is like the free East Germans choosing to rebuild the Berlin Wall.

The second bad idea is reparations. A few years ago Japanese-Americans were compensated for being interned during the second world war, and some (mostly White) people have begun to point out that Blacks have yet to be compensated for centuries of slavery. In other words, for a steep sum of money, whites could buy their right to forget their guilt. In reality that would only increase White racism and try to solve with money a problem that cannot be bribed away.

A better idea is to forget such racially minded solutions altogether. If America were to attack the reasons for the underclass's existence, the beneficiaries would be disproportionately Black. Whites need to recognize that Blacks cannot hope to prosper in any numbers while they are confined to ghettos, and housing projects riddled with crime, poverty and lousy schools, and that it is society's duty to do something about it.

That means the same law enforcement in inner cities that the rest of the country expects and receives. Firmness on crime is what most inner city Blacks cry out for. Their lives are made miserable by muggers, pimps and drug dealers. (Four Los Angeles policemen beating a Black man 56 times after stopping him for speeding does not count as good law enforcement. It means gun control, which urban Blacks want, but many Whites illogically hate. It means treatment not just punishment for drug users. It means expensive

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COMMENTARY

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Race: America's Quagmire - A Rebuttal

by Benner Akpa

Mr. Ikenna Anokwu's article titled "Race: America's Quagmire" (Nigerian News Digest, December 27) was indeed very interesting. Apart from rehearsing some of the hackneyed stereotypes and speaking in broad generalizations about Black people, he failed to come up with any concrete solutions to the problems facing Blacks in America.

Mr. Anokwu is undoubtedly aware that there are many Nigerians in this country who, despite having two or three degrees, drive cabs or work at menial tasks. How does he explain that? He also must be aware of African countries that, despite decades and in some cases centuries of self-government, have made very little progress. In fact many of those countries were better off under colonialism. How does he account for that?

I don't know that any of us from Africa has the moral high ground to pontificate about the probable solutions to the problems facing African-Americans. Remember that it was

our ancestors who sold them into slavery in exchange for such simple things as a bottle of gin or shiny pieces of jewelry. Besides, we have a whole continent riddled with problems and many of us have not the vaguest idea how to solve them.

Before we talk about African-American problems, let's make an attempt to understand the people. Let's join some of their associations and sit around the table with them and allow them to open up to us. If we do, we would be surprised to find out that the majority of Black people work every day, are not on welfare, do not push drugs, have close families, have good things to say about Africans (despite what we did to them), and contribute positively to the American economy.

We might also learn that although they came to this country as slaves, African-Americans as a group are wealthier and have a higher literacy rate than any single Black country in the world. Compare their progress to that of Blacks on the African continent who have never been enslaved and you will see the greatest comeback ever attempted by any people in history.

I don't know that any of us from Africa has the moral high ground to pontificate about the probable solutions to the problems facing African-Americans. Remember that it was our ancestors who sold them into slavery in exchange for such simple things as a bottle of gin or shiny pieces of jewelry.

Although African-Americans have good reasons to feel resentful toward Africans, their organizations (remember TransAfrica?), churches and colleges have made huge contributions toward the advancement of Black people worldwide.

Of course it is possible that one's perception of Black people depends on the level of Black society that such a person has access to. Many of us are in positions where we either do not meet Black people, or have very little contact with successful Blacks. I remember taking a fellow Nigerian on an ad-hoc drive to Baltimore (Maryland) metro. Upon entering Howard County, he remarked that he did not think any Black lived there, whereupon I took him on tour of Columbia and Ellicott City. There, in Black neighborhoods where homes sell in excess of \$250,000, you will find Black Americans, Haitians, and yes, Nigerians, living the American dream.

can dream.

If I may venture to comment on the problems of Black people, I dare say that being born, and growing up Black in America, is not something any of us Africans could ever understand. When we came here, we were already fortified with high self-esteem and driven by ambition and the determination to return to Africa richer than when we left. But consider being born Black in this country. From the very first day, you are presumed to be incapable of accomplishing anything. You hear such nonsense at home (from some relatives who themselves are victims of the big lie), you hear it at school, read it in newspapers, listen to it on radio and see it on television.

You learn to live with the fact that whenever such clichés as welfare, inner city, ghetto, murder, AIDS, credit card fraud, hunger and starvation are uttered on TV, the accompanying photograph is more likely than not to be that of a Black person. He or she could be from the United States, Haiti, Ethiopia or Nigeria, but the person would most certainly be Black.

When news announcers talk about high blood pressure and sickle cell anemia, it is almost always followed by the disclaimer that it is a Black disease. However, when the same announcers talk about multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer's disease and cancer, they fail to remind us that it strikes mostly White people. When they talk about welfare and poverty, they fail to mention that there are more poor Whites on welfare than Blacks (which is one of the reasons they will never abolish welfare).

In the English language, Black is too often associated with something evil and diabolical. Thus White people have black days, tell black lies, are afraid of their dark sides, fear the black cat, and engage in blackmail. Many of us even use and accept these words. The problem is that most White people, especially those in positions to hire and fire, or who in some other way influence your chances of success, cannot differentiate between a black cat and a Black person. The only way that you stand a chance is to peddle your skills for less money than a White of equal or inferior expertise. Without affirmative action, a Black Ph.D. could earn less than a White high school graduate.

The defamation of Blacks as a people, because of problems attributable to a few, has the same negative effects on employers and school administrators that the defamation of Nigerians has on potential employers and business associates. Thus when a Black person walks into a room, he or she is assumed to be this or that, without any benefit of a doubt whatsoever.

I imagine these kinds of experiences being the only thing you've ever known. Imagine being used as a perpetual scapegoat for all of America's ills. As a Nigerian, any time I am tired of the harassment and suspicion, I can pack my

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ee Nigerian Airports

the localizer for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) are expected to arrive in early January.

The arrival of the equipment is expected to coincide with the prevalence of the hurricane which is hampering visibility in the nation's airspace. The prevalence of poor visibility led to a series of flight delays, diversions, and outright cancellations by many airlines in the last weeks of December.

The move is part of efforts by the FCAA to standardize navigational aids at all the nation's airports by June ending.

Race: America's Quagmire - A Rebuttal

continued from page 4

bags and leave, and there will be a place for me to go. But as a Black American, such an option is limited or nonexistent.

If all laws mandating the employment of Blacks were repealed, the number of Black working people will decline. President Bush sometime ago talked about raising immigration rules to encourage East Europeans to immigrate to the United States. There is 21 percent unemployment among Black youth, but he would rather import Europeans to work in America. That is exactly the type of mind-set that makes affirmative action a necessity. (Note that he is not trying to import Africans or Asians, who are hard-working, by the way. Does he know something that Mr. Anokwu does not?) Affirmative action does not make the hiring of unqualified people. It is the responsibility of the employer to choose the most qualified Blacks - and there are indeed qualified Blacks, believe it or not.

As for the demand for reparations, I believe it is a valid one (with the exception of a relatively small number of Blacks who arrived in this part of the world before and after Columbus, the overwhelming majority of Black people did not volunteer to come here. They were forcibly uprooted from familiar surroundings and brought to a strange country, where they endured centuries of dehumanizing conditions sanctioned by law. As far as I am concerned, they have a legitimate right to demand that those who brought them here take care of them for the rest of their lives. And it is not only against the United States that they have a claim. They must demand reparation from Africa and I believe that they are entitled to the land and resources of that continent.

Although Mr. Anokwu does not think so, those who teach about Egypt are attempting to present a version of history that was conveniently left out by European writers. If Socrates studied in Egypt, isn't it reasonable to assume that he learned something?

I do agree, though, that to succeed in this country one needs to prepare oneself unconditionally and learn to be thrifty. For us Africans there is an additional requirement: we must learn to count African-Americans as our allies not enemies. Who knows what the outcome would have been if Black grassroots organizations had mobilized to support those Nigerians who were fighting discrimination in Dallas, Texas.

Benner Akpa is a publisher based in Wicliw, Maryland.

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LEISURE

D I G E S T

Okocha Talks Tough

- Withdraw troops from Liberia; Restructure the Embassy, etc.

by Eyobong Ila

Emma Okocha, Publisher of USA Africa magazine and a new senatorial aspirant is calling for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Liberia to save the economy of the nation. "The civilian regime cannot afford to keep our troops outside the country. We cannot play the sort of power politics the United States is playing because we don't have the means."

"We must resolve it through the OAU or determine it by war. We should have allowed them to fight and end it since they didn't want peaceful solution, just like it happened in Angola, Chad and Zimbabwe. As it is now we haven't achieved anything in Liberia. There's no war and there's no peace."

The publisher-turned-politician is also calling for the restructuring of the Nigerian Embassy in Washington, D.C.



Emma Okocha, Publisher-Turned-Politician

He recommends the replacement of civil servants by trade experts and other experts who would understand Nigeria's foreign policies better.

"We cannot move into the 21st century without link with the world economic power and we can't attract enough economic market because of poor personnel in Washington. Some departments at the Embassy should be closed down. The most effective department there is the Visa department. The Press Attache should be recalled, he doesn't know what he's doing. We have to reconstruct Nigeria's

image abroad."

On the domestic front, Okocha's first solution to the mismanagement of public funds is to ban public officers from getting involved in contract deals. "Public officers should no longer be involved in contract deals because our economy suffers that way. Public officers normally spend a fortune to win elections only to pursue contracts and wreck the economy."

"Contracts in the Third Republic should be handled by a Tenders Board which should comprise of retired teachers, judges, clergymen and community leaders of integrity."

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Dr. Martin Luther King

His Dream and The Legacy He Left Behind

Almost a quarter of a century after an infamous assassin's bullet snuffed the life out of him, the voice of this black charismatic leader and champion of the human rights movement still echoes throughout America and around the world probing the conscience of man and calling for social justice, equality for all, and the rights of a man to be judged not by his color but by the contents of his character. A dream that is still far from realization judging by the surreal and poignant acts of violence that sweep through urban centers every day to the disillusionment of civil rights leaders and activists.

"It seems to me that hate is becoming kind of a fashion," the frustrated inaynr Dinkins of New York City, said at a church service in commemoration of Dr. Martin Luther King's birthday. Hate, this ugly appellation is sucking out its head in many souls and we must be combatant in its eradication from our society and most especially from the youths who today are willing to paint one's face with intent to dehumanize.

Dr. Martin Luther King's teachings of non-violence had a profound influence across all color boundaries. His wis-



dom and vision exemplify him as an icon of freedom and justice for millions of people all over the world. His struggles in the United States led to the introduction of the civil rights bill, which till this day benefits millions of immigrants from impoverished countries, who, classified as minorities are exposed to several kinds of government assistance.

Dr. Martin Luther King may be gone but his dream still lives on and we must keep the faith and hope alive.

"I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a 'thing-oriented' society to a 'person-oriented' society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered."

DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
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(Excerpta from his famous "I Have A Dream" speech.)

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Fire Talk

The Problem Lies With Teachers, Not Their Underlings

by Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr.

In a rather amusing recent article on this country's educational crisis titled "Solving Our Education (sic) Crisis," American Federation of Teachers president Albert Shanker attributes the generally declining state of student performance to what the writer terms, or rather implies, as the inordinate proliferation of universities and colleges in the United States. This state of affairs, Shanker thinks, does not motivate students to study hard, since regardless of whether they perform poorly or not students will always get a college to attend and graduate with a degree.

Ideally, more colleges should mean enhanced standard of living for the general population. This is attested by the fact that living standards in America are significantly higher than those of most countries where such healthy facilities are lacking in abundance. Those of us coming from Africa and the so-called Third World do not need to visit any of the local libraries here to verify this fact. Most of us have lived it.

The proliferation of colleges in the United States, while it may have a flipside with regard to the general level of academic standards and performances, does not in reality account for the low level of the average American student's knowledge; neither does Shanker's implied blame on lax admission requirements account for this country's declining educational standards. Indeed, there are records of hundreds of thousands of students who had maintained a lackluster precollege performance levels (mainly in the high school), but who had gone on to rank among the best and finest America has ever had in academia.

The problem, in at least my limited imagination, lies with the competence of the educational personnel: the system hires, and the nature of the curriculum, and also how far and firm teachers are with grading systems and other requirements. Albert Shanker's statement that "The fact that students in other industrialized countries know more than our kids means they work more" may be quite true. But what is even more significantly true is that students in most of these countries are not cursed with the sort of narrow-minded and ethnocentric teachers and policy formulators that we have in this country. The squeamishness of Shanker himself towards a multi-cultural educational orientation is a case in point.

However, Shanker also hits on the right point for debate when he states inter alia (regarding the educationally insensitive U.S. job market) that: "... (by) going to work from high school, all students know that employers don't ask to see high school transcripts and don't even offer decent jobs to high school graduates until they are twenty-four or so, if then, adding up to "So a student who has worked hard at rigorous courses will be competing for the same low pay as a student who has filled his schedule with soft courses that he barely passed. These bad lessons are being learned by students in public and private schools alike" (see The New York Times, Sept. 15, 1991).

What Shanker by virtue, or the vice, of his race naturally does not add is that most employers are more concerned about the color or physical characteristics of those whom they choose to employ rather than sheer competence. Thus when employers even choose to ignore academic or intellectual competence, the rule still almost exclusively favors white people. The few "affirmative action" beneficiaries who gain access almost invariably tend to be far better

academically than the bulk of their European-American professional colleagues. Also the fact that, as Albert Shanker states: "I've (that is Shanker) presented evidence from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) math exams and elsewhere indicating that private schools do not out-perform public schools" (idem.), in itself debunks, albeit unintentionally, City College of New York's Neo-Nazi Professor Michael Levin's assertion that the declining standards in the quality of American education is due to the integration of African-Americans, as well as other racial minorities, into the system.

In an article published in the Australian journal "Quadrant" in February 1988 titled, "The Trouble with American: And not only American," Levin stated, among other things that: "Since 1954 staggering energies have been expended to bring American Negroes (sic) into the educational mainstream. Yet," adds Levin, "they continue to exhibit disproportionately high rates of illiteracy, dropping out, absence from the more prestigious disciplines and other forms of academic failure." The fascist Jewish philosophy professor in the foregoing does not give the cause of black exclusion from the so-called U.S. educational mainstream until 1954. Needless to say, African-Americans have been present since the founding of colonial America, long before the ancestors of most contemporary American Jews. But one thing is indisputably certain, African-Americans were not excluded from the "mainstream" educational system because of any proven intellectual cretinism, but rather sheer appearance, my own kindly way of charging racism. Thus Levin is grossly wrong in stating that since 1954 "adjustments have been made to eliminate any measure on which blacks underperform, it always being assumed that blacks on average are as intelligent as whites and as capable of passing any fair test in proportionate numbers. But (that) there is now quite solid evidence that this assumption is not correct; (and that) the average black is significantly less intelligent than the average white. Therefore (condemns this neo-Nazi), the only adjustments in educational measures that will allow blacks their due number of successes amount to making course-work and tests easier and easier" (idem.).

In brief, Levin does not provide a single iota of evidence to prove his case. No adjustments whatsoever have accompanied the "physical" inclusion of the African-American in this country's curriculum. The fact that this country does not seem to be poised for curriculum revision — or the currently topical Multi-Cultural Curriculum Revision belies Levin's assertions. As an educator, Levin also demonstrates his acute incompetence by basing his sense of academic success on the so-called "standardized" tests.

For his part, as a solution for the decadent and ramshacked educational system, Shanker writes as follows: "The only way to do that is to design incentives that would reward the entire staff of a school for success in consistently improving student achievement and single out or even punish the staff of a school where students consistently failed to improve" (Times, Sept. 15, 1991).

If Albert Shanker seems to reason almost exactly like New York City College's Michael Levin, Shanker also

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COMMENTARY

Opinions expressed in this column do not necessarily represent the views of the Nigerian News Digest.
This page is for our readers to express their opinions on any issue.

Election Year Politics: Black Power in an International Perspective

by Emma S. Eluk, Ph.D.

Most likely, experts in the field of "current history" will remember 1992 as the year of two presidential elections on both sides of the Atlantic. Almost coincidentally, African-Americans, with a population of 29,986,060 (according to the 1990 census) and Nigerians, with a population of 88,254,501 (according to the 1991 census) will go to the polls this fall. The Americans will elect a new president on November 3, and the Nigerians, hopefully, on December 5.

African-Americans constitute a minority, about 12.5% of the population of the United States. Nigerians, on the other hand, constitute about 25% of all people living on the African continent. African-Americans and Nigerians combined constitute the ninth largest population group in the world, coming after China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Japan and Pakistan. This combination produces a figure of 118,500,561. This is the group which will elect two important presidents this fall, one white and American, the other black and a Nigerian, an African.

It is said that, at times, there can be power in sheer numbers. The combined numbers of African-Americans and Nigerians can produce some political strength if they are united in mission and action. This combined action can signal a significant change of direction in world affairs.

Barely thirty-two years ago, most Nigerians were strapped in the chains of colonialism and foreign domination. They could not vote for their sons and daughters to represent them in world affairs. And 127 years ago, many African-Americans were still in slavery, helpless, and unable to vote. Until after the civil war, no African-American was selected as an American diplomat to a foreign country.

The participation of a large segment of peoples of African descent in the election of their people to represent them, either on the continent or in the so-called New World, should fill every one of them with pride and hope that the issues which affect them will not always be brushed aside by non-Africans. They would no longer be treated merely as objects and observers of the international scene. This is one reason why every eligible African-American and Nigerian should vote this fall.

The persons who struggled for the franchise, whether in Nigeria or in the United States, did so out of a deep faith and belief in the power of the vote to make a difference, nationally and internationally. Viewed from the tangent of sheer numbers, a united people can bring about important socioeconomic and political changes.

There is no doubt, in my mind, that the 118.5 million figure of combined African-Americans and Nigerians, united by some mutual interests, can bring about a significant impact upon our world, for the benefit of the black race as a whole. After all, we are bound also by some historical and cultural ties that go deeper than geopolitical differences. Consider the following:

1. What would have happened if African-American leaders of thought and Nigerians worked faithfully together in lobbying the United States Congress and the Senate, the mega-companies, and the military industrial complexes to pay closer attention to their sheer numbers as a market, consumers, and as an important demographic group of the black race?

2. What could have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians provided a united voice to the United Nations on some matters related to their interests, such as war, pollution, health, immigration, resource exploitation, racism, trade, and world prices of commodities? Here I include massive public demonstrations on some matters of mutual concern.

3. What would have happened if African-Americans and Nigerians collaborated and cooperated in the areas of oil exploration, space technology, space engineering, automobile manufacturing, university personnel transfers or exchanges, and in agro-economics?

But alas, alas, it is not so done. And why not? Because among many African-Americans and Nigerians the age-old stereotypes, fears, suspicions and misapprehensions still

... thirty-two years ago, Nigerians were strapped in the chains of colonialism.

And 127 years ago, many African-Americans were still in slavery and unable to vote. Until after the civil war, no African-American was selected as an American diplomat to a foreign country.

exist. These are at the root of our powerlessness. As long as these misapprehensions exist, we shall never be able to get united and wield the kind of political power that we should.

There is still an oral code of conspiracy of distrust among us. This is often expressed in different forms. For example, "you sold our forefathers" is often a charge which many Nigerians have been confronted with in the United States. Some Nigerians also have been alleged to possess certain degrees of arrogance and airs of superiority. No one seems to honestly and frankly deal with these matters of distrust. There is a lot of hypocrisy and pretense while we claim that we are "brothers" and "sisters." There seems to be more talk than action.

In this election year, African-Americans and Nigerians should think seriously about the historic turn of events in which 118.5 million of them will provide two presidential candidates, an event that will impact upon their destinies for good or evil. Given the strength of their numbers, and the areas of their mutual interests, I suggest that a national congress of Nigerian and African-American leaders of thought be convened as soon as possible for a declaration of purpose and action. This congress can also issue a manifesto which would highlight future areas for action.

There are thousands of well-educated Nigerian professionals in the United States with resources that can be tapped in order to lay the foundation for this kind of congress. There are also many Nigerian organizations to be harnessed for this purpose. All that is needed now is a commitment and dedication to work together.

It is my contention that unless the Nigerians and African-Americans get their houses in order they shall continue to remain powerless, complain, and blame the whites for all their vicissitudes. They tend to forget that the North Koreans, who are not as many as 118.5 million, have begun to change their destiny in today's world.

I hope that African-Americans and Nigerians will remember that their destinies are in their own hands. Now is the time to begin to prepare for the twenty-first century. The time to begin to work together is not tomorrow but NOW.

Dr. Eluk is a regular contributor who teaches World History at Dillard University in New Orleans, Louisiana.

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Africans Have High I.Q. Says Houston Attorney



ATTORNEY T. P. JAKABOSKI

A white Houston immigration Attorney, Theodore P. Jakaboski has said that Africans are equal to if not superior to an average Americans when it comes to the question of testing I.Q.

Africans he said also possess exceptional abilities in interpersonal sensitivities, spontaneity, communication skills, arts and music.

Mr. Jakaboski was reacting to a conventional thinking of some scientists who postulated that African-Americans lag about 15 points below whites on standard I.Q. test, a situation they claimed was due to their heredity. This hypothesis was contained in a new book written by Charles Murray.

The Houston Attorney was of the opinion that for Mr. Murray to have made such an outrageous assertion, he must have been overly influenced by his negative experiences while serving in the Peace Corps in Thailand where he was an "outdoor toilet expert."

He mentioned further that Mr. Murray book lacks firm grasp of relevant terms, inaccurate, incorrect and bedecked with preconceived ideas when talking of the concept of "I.Q.", "Success" as it affects African-Americans.

Attorney Jakaboski who claimed to have researched into the subject matter affirmed that he had found Africans with whom he came into contact to be persons of out-

standing intelligence with exceptional gifts in the right hemisphere areas such as perception, human relationships and creativity.

The Houston lawyer continued "Murray's definition of I.Q. is flawed because it does not consider these factors—probably because of the ingrained lock step nature of Murray's Harvard-acquired philosophy. He contends that conventional "Western" philosophy has gone off the right track ever since Descartes turned the previously group centered thought into egocentric tracks. This, combined with the rigid notions of irrevocable forms, along with an automatic pairing of all ideas into opposites, carried Western thought away from its roots in Middle Eastern philosophy, which he held more fluid views".

Jakaboski also argued with Murray's analysis of "American Blacks." How he said, is it that I see every day scores of Africans from Africa who do not fit Murray's stereotypes of Blacks? "The answer," confided Jakaboski is that the Blacks who came to America 300 years ago did not remain pure and that Africans may be better off seeking to maintain racial purity?" What Mr. Jakaboski is saying in effect was that

"Mr. Murray's reference to America Blacks is not correctly applicable to real Africans, to people who have not been diluted through intermarriage, and who have not shown any dip in their collective I.Q."

The Houston Attorney picked holes in Murray's ideas of "success" saying that it was culturally biased, incorporating completely the worst in Anglo-Saxon and Judeo-Christian thinking, too materialistic, and rejecting the idealistic parts of white traditions.

"Surely, we affirmed success should be measured in ways other than counting ones material assets and those trappings of 'success' that Murray peddles."

"In many cultures, including traditional African, said the Houstonian, success includes a strong moral and spiritual element, whereas he went on Murray makes the conventional mistake of accepting material and dollars as the sole criteria. One of the curses of our civilization he stressed was the unscrupulous grasping of money by businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians, regardless of the means.

Jakaboski noted with dissatisfaction that the November 30th New York Times reported Murray teaming up with Professor Richard Herrnstein, a Harvard psychologist famous for his connection I.Q. with race were ungenerous and flawed to begin with, parochial, lacking a broad international vision or experience, and narrowly political in the sense of seeking to justify conservative Republican social policy.

In closing, Jakaboski remarked that "the time has come to disregard Murray's kind of ideological garbage the same way Communism has been rejected:" what is needed, he went on, "is a single view of all mankind without the division dualisms and selfcenteredness of much of 19th Century European philosophy."

Americans, he said needs to revitalize its basic philosophy, to incorporate new ideas from all cultures and religions that can contribute to a flowering of our nation, and "I expect the African contribution to be a large one," concluded Jakaboski.

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Mrs. Coretta Scott-King graciously receives the noteworthy gift

Nigerian Businessman Gives \$100,000 to Atlanta Institute



Photo by Jet Magazine

One of the untrumpeted stories of the African society has been its history of generosity and kindness especially to visitors and strangers irrespective of his or her status.

Hence, it was a big source of emotional pride to all Africans and African-Americans alike recently in Atlanta, when a Nigerian prominent businessman and philanthropist, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Abiola gave out a whopping sum of \$ 100,000 to Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Non-violent Social Change.

Receiving the check on behalf of the Center, its founding president and chief-

executive, Mrs. Coretta Scott-King, said, "Chief Abiola's support will help the King Center to carry forward Martin Luther King's unfinished work of non-violent change. It would help us to educate and train people from African, America and other nations in non-violent strategies in the years ahead," she said.

She praised Chief Abiola's "commitment to developing leadership training programs in non-violent conflict-resolution and social changes in Africa."

Chief Abiola is the founder and chairman of the Concord Group of Newspapers and Magazine and also president of many multi-million dollar organiza-

L-R--Martin Luther King III, Chief Abiola, Coretta Scott-King, Andrew Young and Dr. Young during the check presentation at Atlanta.

tions which include among others, Rad Communication, ITT (Nig) Ltd., Wonder Bakery, Abiola Book Shops and one of the biggest mechanized agricultural projects in Africa, Abiola Farm Ltd.

Chief Abiola is also in the fore-front of many charitable organizations in Africa, Asia and Europe.

"Live a life of self-less service to mankind"

THE KING VERDICT

If an Oscar award is presented in the category of the "Most sensational verdict of the Year," the Rodney King verdict dwarfs competitors like the Kennedy and Tyson verdicts. Neither will the Clarence Thomas' confirmation saga put up a strong showing in this imaginary category.

In retrospect, I still have very good recollection of the very moment that a friend told me that the verdict had just been announced and that most major and local media have confirmed the verdict. For several days whenever my mind wandered to the verdict, I sort of pinched myself to see whether or not I was dreaming. When I regained my composure I started wondering, and I am still wondering, how such a verdict could have been rendered by "impartial jurors," as required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

My biggest impairment in understanding the verdict is that, like most people, I was overwhelmed by the brutal scenes in the video tape that was recurrently televised after the beating incidence. I concluded that what I saw constitutes excessive force given the fact that Mr. King was on the floor and repeated baton blows were being delivered to his body by an officer while others stood and watched. Quite frankly, I expected the trial process to entail a mere formality in compliance with due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Unlike the televised Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing, few people saw the trial of the four Los Angeles officers. The latter trial places the highest burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) on the prosecutor (a government attorney whose duty is to bring justice upon those who have committed crimes, which are deemed acts against the State and its people). Meanwhile, the judicial system presumes all indicted persons innocent until proven guilty. A criminal defense attorney does not have a burden to prove the innocence of a defendant. This is probably one of the reasons that the defense attorneys in the Rodney King case repeatedly replayed the videotape in slow-motion, frame-by-frame to attack the prosecutors' key evidence in an effort to create reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. Such creativity or manipulation must

have influenced the jurors to some extent. The lead prosecutor even conceded during a post-verdict interview that he did not agree with this rendition of what happened, but could not do much about it since it is the same video tape that he had introduced into evidence and had played it to the jury.

Ideally, Jurors are supposed to be impartial, but realistically, attorneys have a duty to zealously represent their clients and will generally pick jurors that they think will be sympathetic with their client's cause. Several books have been written on how to pick a winning jury. Some people have even gone as far as calling themselves experts in this field. This practice may have influenced the defense attorneys' choice to remove the trial of the four officers to an area with sparse minority population. The presiding Judge is presently considering areas with different demographics in the retrial of one of the officers on a count in which the jurors could not reach a verdict.

After the verdict, several outraged persons interviewed on television and on radio indicated that the verdict was unacceptable and that it should be thrown out or appealed. Such statements manifest an insufficient understanding of the American jurisprudence. Generally, in criminal cases, a judge can rule that a defendant is not guilty even when a jury has returned a

guilty verdict; meanwhile, a judge cannot rule

that a defendant is guilty after a jury had returned a "not guilty" verdict. While discussing the King verdict, an attorney friend of mine practicing in the area of medical malpractice indicated that the prosecuting attorney should appeal the verdict. I had to remind her that it is the defeated criminal defendant, not the defeated state prosecutor, that has the right of appeal in criminal cases under the American Jurisprudence.

Some people disappointed about the verdict have suggested that the four officers be retried in an urban area with more diverse demography. The constitutional problem raised by this view is that the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be subject to "double jeopardy" for the same offense. Therefore, the four officers cannot be retried for the same state offenses for which the jurors returned a "not guilty" verdict.

In few politically charged cases, an exception had been made to the double jeopardy rule to allow the Federal Prosecu-

Continues on page 39



By Patrick Chukelu

UP IN SMOKE GOES U.S. CREDIBILITY ABROAD

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So you are a prosecutor who puts people in jail for beating up their wives and children? Meanwhile at night, in the privacy of your home, you tie-up your wife and children and beat them up because they are powerless against you. Unfortunately for you, a stranger is testing his new Sony camcorder; he accidentally picks your hideous acts up. When the issue comes to court, you and your friends get

together and bungles up the case, resulting in your NOT GUILTY VERDICT. Sounds familiar? Welcome

to the real United States of America.

Whatever credibility that took centuries and countless number of top secret operations, special agents, foreign policies and public relations manoeuvres to build by the United States government start to go up in smoke thanks to George Holiday's Sony camcorder. This case would have died a quiet death like several others about which we usually tend to second-guess the possibilities; "maybe they didn't really beat him up like he claimed because the evidence in court proves otherwise." This time, it was there for everyone with eyes to see. Yet ten neutral jurors had the nerve to tell the whole world that except for them, everybody else is blind; what we saw didn't actually happen. "Rodney King was in control of the situation." Despite all those baton blows, he could have laid there calmly and endured the pain like the 260 pounder he is. Despite all the taxpayers money spent on training police officers, ten of them averaging 200 pounds each, cannot arrest one 260-pound-man unless they beat his energy out of him.

Yes, you're right; Rodney King was in control, and so were the Chinese protesters who were beaten up and killed by their government's forces, and whom the United States government supported. You could say that was a peaceful demon-

Whatever credibility that took centuries and countless number of top secret operations, special agents, foreign policies and public relations manoeuvres to build by the United States government start to go up in smoke thanks to George Holiday's Sony camcorder.

stration against the Chinese government, but then according to the laws of China, that was civil disobedience. You could say that was by government forces whereas this was by police force, but that difference could be drawn only if you naively believe the U.S. government is not aware of police brutality towards minorities in cities across this land.

Now everybody has seen what happened here in America. There is no second-guessing this one. The reaction from the international community is right on the money. Says a Japanese journalist: "United States of America is supposed to be the number one democracy in the world, and this happened in the United States." France President, Francois Mitterand, the nonsense, I-kiss-no-one's-butt NATO pal, indicated that what happened in Los Angeles is the result of social problems that the Reagan and Bush administrations refused to deal with. For once Libya's muamma Gadaffi has a point; he says it's obvious he cannot trust the justice system in America to try the two men accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103. To crown it all, Saddam Hussien has called on the United Nations Security Council to condemn the human rights violations by the U.S., something the latter would have undoubtedly done if it had happened in someone else's backyard.

The repercussions of this chain of incidents are going to be enormous. Even though the U.S. stood up for human rights abuses everywhere except when it concerned people of color, the effort is still applaudable. Dictators always look over their shoulders to see if the world's police was coming. Hence, they thought twice before they abused people's human rights. Now that this has happened, who do they have to worry about? The world has seen America's closet, and it didn't look good. You think the same credibility with which America went around the world preaching the need to respect human rights still exist? Unfortunately, not any more.

It is tempting to draw the difference between L.A. police and the U.S. government. However, federal government officials had two good hours to comment on the verdict. They didn't. After the riots, it got their attention. Even then, Vice President Dan Quayle is still the highest ranking government official to come out against the verdict, which is unanimously thought to be a rape of the justice system.

It is hoped that governments all over the globe do not take advantage of this human rights violations and continue or increase theirs. That will clearly suggest the fact that everybody follows in America's steps, a notion no government wants to be associated with.

DORIK NOBLE:— CASTING A NICHE

To most people in the United States, it is almost unheard of to find a black man as C.E.O of a large construction company talkless of an indigenous African man, whose lots are regarded as uninitiated in the highly competitive American construction industry.

Dorik Noble Construction and Drafting Company founded by Mr. Noble M. Uchendu, remains the farthest point Africans in America have gone in the struggle to integrate and have a fair share from the economy proportionate to their inputs.

Barely eight years after setting foot on U.S. soil, Dorik Uchendu achieved one of his life-long ambition—having a viable construction outfit—thereby casting a niche for himself within the African-American community.

Born thirty-eight years ago at Nnewi, Headquarters of Nnewi Local Government area of Anambra State in Nigeria. He is the second of seven children by Late Chief Issac N. Uchendu and Agnes Uchendu.

Young Noble started his education at Government Primary School, Port Harcourt and later had his secondary education at Christ the Kings College in Onitsha. It was in the middle of his Secondary education that the Nigerian Civil War broke out during which he was drafted into the Biafran Army. He later came out of the army as the only surviving male child among three in his family. His immediate senior and junior brothers died in action.

Immediately after the civil war, young Noble went back to his former college, C.K.C. to complete his Secondary education. He finished in flying colors.

When Noble came to the United States, he was not totally new to construction. In fact his romance with the construction industry began nineteen years ago when he was hired by VINCENTI ENGINEERING, a reputable construction firm in Nigeria where he was directly in charge of plants and machinery during the construction of terminals of the Mualala Mohammed International Airport in Lagos, the Calabar International Airport, Calabar, and the Port Harcourt International Airport in Port Harcourt, Rivers State.

Smart Noble knew that education was the fastest mono-rail towards his desired goal hence he pursued it with a tenacity of purpose. First he worked diligently and bagged two Associate degrees, one in Architectural design and the other in Architectural technology from the Miami Community College.

His pursuit did not stop there. He proceeded to Florida International University where he again bagged his B.S.C degree with a major in Architectural Technology and Minor in Construction Management.



NOBLE M. UCHENDU

President/CEO Dorik Noble Construction and Drafting Company, Houston

Today Dorik Noble Construction and Drafting Company has blossomed from its initial \$5,000 capital outlay into a six figure annual turn-over outfit.


This year alone, the company has landed contracts worth over \$250,000, these include among others the \$75,000 just completed Ceko Building in Houston.

Among its many clientele are the Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Harris County Housing Authority, the City of Houston and the Houston Independent School District (HISD).

In addition to his construction firm, Dorik Noble has other subsidiaries, these include, the Dorik Import and Export and the Dorik Ink currently doing business with the Nigerian Police and other manufacturing company in Nigeria and Uganda.

Elegant Uchendu is a teetotaler, highly regarded within his social circle. He holds the treasurership of two reputable social organizations in Houston which include the African Chamber of Commerce and the Nnewi Union.

Noble Uchendu is married to pretty Nkasi, a beautician with four kids.



Ceko Buildings, Houston

In 1985, the same year he floated his construction firm, Uchendu bagged his Masters in Architecture from the University of Houston, Texas.

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